NEELY, Justice.
The question we decide in this case is whether the trial court erred in not award[614]*614ing plaintiffs their attorney’s fees and costs under W.Va.Code, 22A-3-25(f) [1985] 1, which provides that a court may award attorneys’ fees in civil suits concerning surface mining operations.2
On 18 September 1987, appellee, Land Use Corporation, acting through appellee, Maplewood Mining Company, a contract miner, set off a blast at its surface mine in the vicinity of the appellants’ homes located on the Tioga Road near Craigsville, in Nicholas County.3 Around the same time, the four families experienced a drastic reduction in their well water, so that the houses lost clean running water.
The four families experienced considerable inconvenience due to the loss of their well water, and sought to have Land Use connect them to the local public water system. In December of 1987, one of the appellants, Ms. Donna Schartiger, contacted Michael Farber, Esquire, and on 11 February 1988, the Schartigers and the other families (hereinafter “the Schartigers”) filed suit against Land Use. On 17 June 1988, Land Use contacted Mr. Farber in an effort to settle the case.4 On 12 July 1988, Mr. Farber offered to settle the case for either $77,187.50 or for $63,459.50 plus the connection of the appellants to the public water supply at Land Use’s expense. The next day, Land Use responded with an offer of $20,496.00. Appellants rejected this offer because it did not compensate them for the hardship of going without adequate well water for a number of months, and would not pay their attorney’s fees and costs.
In early October of 1988, Land Use offered $23,000 to settle the claim. Appellants refused the offer. Then, on 12 October 1988, Land Use raised its offer to $30,-000. Appellants’ counsel, in his supplemental brief in rebuttal, admitted that this offer, “would, in effect, pay for the estimated costs and attorney fees, etc., but would provide no compensatory damages for appellants who had then subsisted without water for nearly 400 days as of that date.”
The case went to trial on 1 February 1989. On 8 February 1989, the jury deliberated and returned a verdict for the appellants, requiring Land Use to replace the appellants’ water supplies. However, on the separate question of compensatory damages, the jury awarded no damages. On 10 March 1989, the judge entered an order incorporating the jury’s verdict.
Appellants moved for an award of attorney’s fees, and on 6 June 1989, after giving the parties an opportunity to brief the court on the appropriateness of awarding appellants’ attorney’s fees and costs in the amount of $27,715, the court decided not to award attorney’s fees because the court found that the appellees’ defense was made in good faith and was not vexatious, wanton or oppressive.
I.
The trial court’s observation that Land Use did not act in bad faith or in a [615]*615wanton or oppressive manner in defending its case indicates that he applied the wrong standard in determining whether to award attorneys’ fees under W.Va.Code, 22A-3-25(f) [1985]. We said in Syllabus Point 2 of Sally-Mike Properties v. Yokum, 179 W.Va. 48, 365 S.E.2d 246 (1986):
As a general rule each litigant bears his or her own attorney’s fees absent a contrary rule of court or express statutory or contractual authority for reimbursement.
However, there is a common law exception to this general rule, which we applied in a case involving West Virginia’s Freedom of Information Act, which contains no express provision for attorneys’ fees. Syllabus Point 6 of Daily Gazette v. Withrow, 177 W.Va. 110, 350 S.E.2d 738 (1986) states:
For a person prevailing in an action under the State’s Freedom of Information Act to recover reasonable attorney’s fees, the evidence before the trial court must show bad faith, vexatious, wanton or oppressive conduct on the part of the custodian of the public record(s).
It appears that the trial court applied the Daily Gazette standard in the case before us.
The Daily Gazette standard is not applicable here, because W.Va.Code, 22A-3-25(f) [1985] specifically provides that a court may award attorneys’ fees in a civil suit concerning a surface mining operation.
We reverse the trial court’s decision on attorneys’ fees, not because the court abused his discretion, but because he applied the wrong standard, and may have believed that attorneys’ fees could not have been awarded in the absence of bad faith or vexatious or wanton conduct by a party.
II.
The question before us of what standard to apply in awarding attorneys’ fees under W.Va.Code, 22A-3-25(f) [1985] is one of first impression. In deciding this question it is helpful to examine the federal courts’ approach when Congress has departed from the common law rule. The federal courts have adopted different standards for different statutes.5
In Save Our Cumberland Mountains, Inc. v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1516 (D.C.Cir.1988), the court considered an award of attorneys’ fees under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1270(d) (1982 and Supp.1986).6 The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act is the federal version of W.Va.Code, 22A-3-1 [1985], et seq. In Hodel, the court interpreted the attorneys’ fees provision of SMCRA in accordance with the U.S. Supreme Court’s previous awards of civil rights attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982), noting that the Supreme Court had done the same thing for the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d) (1982). Hodel, supra at 1519.
Under the Civil Rights Attorneys’ Fees Awards Act, 42 U.S.C. 1988 (1982), the Supreme Court has adopted the prevailing party standard.7 See Texas State Teachers v. Garland Indep. School D., 489 U.S. 782, 109 S.Ct. 1486, 103 L.Ed.2d 866 (1989); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983).
[A plaintiff may be considered a prevailing party] for attorney’s fees pur[616]*616poses if [he succeeds] on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit [he] sought in bringing the suit.
Hensley, supra at 433, 103 S.Ct. at 1939 (quoting Nadeau v. Helgemoe,
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NEELY, Justice.
The question we decide in this case is whether the trial court erred in not award[614]*614ing plaintiffs their attorney’s fees and costs under W.Va.Code, 22A-3-25(f) [1985] 1, which provides that a court may award attorneys’ fees in civil suits concerning surface mining operations.2
On 18 September 1987, appellee, Land Use Corporation, acting through appellee, Maplewood Mining Company, a contract miner, set off a blast at its surface mine in the vicinity of the appellants’ homes located on the Tioga Road near Craigsville, in Nicholas County.3 Around the same time, the four families experienced a drastic reduction in their well water, so that the houses lost clean running water.
The four families experienced considerable inconvenience due to the loss of their well water, and sought to have Land Use connect them to the local public water system. In December of 1987, one of the appellants, Ms. Donna Schartiger, contacted Michael Farber, Esquire, and on 11 February 1988, the Schartigers and the other families (hereinafter “the Schartigers”) filed suit against Land Use. On 17 June 1988, Land Use contacted Mr. Farber in an effort to settle the case.4 On 12 July 1988, Mr. Farber offered to settle the case for either $77,187.50 or for $63,459.50 plus the connection of the appellants to the public water supply at Land Use’s expense. The next day, Land Use responded with an offer of $20,496.00. Appellants rejected this offer because it did not compensate them for the hardship of going without adequate well water for a number of months, and would not pay their attorney’s fees and costs.
In early October of 1988, Land Use offered $23,000 to settle the claim. Appellants refused the offer. Then, on 12 October 1988, Land Use raised its offer to $30,-000. Appellants’ counsel, in his supplemental brief in rebuttal, admitted that this offer, “would, in effect, pay for the estimated costs and attorney fees, etc., but would provide no compensatory damages for appellants who had then subsisted without water for nearly 400 days as of that date.”
The case went to trial on 1 February 1989. On 8 February 1989, the jury deliberated and returned a verdict for the appellants, requiring Land Use to replace the appellants’ water supplies. However, on the separate question of compensatory damages, the jury awarded no damages. On 10 March 1989, the judge entered an order incorporating the jury’s verdict.
Appellants moved for an award of attorney’s fees, and on 6 June 1989, after giving the parties an opportunity to brief the court on the appropriateness of awarding appellants’ attorney’s fees and costs in the amount of $27,715, the court decided not to award attorney’s fees because the court found that the appellees’ defense was made in good faith and was not vexatious, wanton or oppressive.
I.
The trial court’s observation that Land Use did not act in bad faith or in a [615]*615wanton or oppressive manner in defending its case indicates that he applied the wrong standard in determining whether to award attorneys’ fees under W.Va.Code, 22A-3-25(f) [1985]. We said in Syllabus Point 2 of Sally-Mike Properties v. Yokum, 179 W.Va. 48, 365 S.E.2d 246 (1986):
As a general rule each litigant bears his or her own attorney’s fees absent a contrary rule of court or express statutory or contractual authority for reimbursement.
However, there is a common law exception to this general rule, which we applied in a case involving West Virginia’s Freedom of Information Act, which contains no express provision for attorneys’ fees. Syllabus Point 6 of Daily Gazette v. Withrow, 177 W.Va. 110, 350 S.E.2d 738 (1986) states:
For a person prevailing in an action under the State’s Freedom of Information Act to recover reasonable attorney’s fees, the evidence before the trial court must show bad faith, vexatious, wanton or oppressive conduct on the part of the custodian of the public record(s).
It appears that the trial court applied the Daily Gazette standard in the case before us.
The Daily Gazette standard is not applicable here, because W.Va.Code, 22A-3-25(f) [1985] specifically provides that a court may award attorneys’ fees in a civil suit concerning a surface mining operation.
We reverse the trial court’s decision on attorneys’ fees, not because the court abused his discretion, but because he applied the wrong standard, and may have believed that attorneys’ fees could not have been awarded in the absence of bad faith or vexatious or wanton conduct by a party.
II.
The question before us of what standard to apply in awarding attorneys’ fees under W.Va.Code, 22A-3-25(f) [1985] is one of first impression. In deciding this question it is helpful to examine the federal courts’ approach when Congress has departed from the common law rule. The federal courts have adopted different standards for different statutes.5
In Save Our Cumberland Mountains, Inc. v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1516 (D.C.Cir.1988), the court considered an award of attorneys’ fees under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1270(d) (1982 and Supp.1986).6 The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act is the federal version of W.Va.Code, 22A-3-1 [1985], et seq. In Hodel, the court interpreted the attorneys’ fees provision of SMCRA in accordance with the U.S. Supreme Court’s previous awards of civil rights attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982), noting that the Supreme Court had done the same thing for the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d) (1982). Hodel, supra at 1519.
Under the Civil Rights Attorneys’ Fees Awards Act, 42 U.S.C. 1988 (1982), the Supreme Court has adopted the prevailing party standard.7 See Texas State Teachers v. Garland Indep. School D., 489 U.S. 782, 109 S.Ct. 1486, 103 L.Ed.2d 866 (1989); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983).
[A plaintiff may be considered a prevailing party] for attorney’s fees pur[616]*616poses if [he succeeds] on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit [he] sought in bringing the suit.
Hensley, supra at 433, 103 S.Ct. at 1939 (quoting Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278-279 (1st Cir.1978)) (brackets supplied by this court).
A prevailing party must be one who has succeeded on any significant claim affording it some of the relief sought, either pendente lite or at the conclusion of the litigation ... [T]he touchstone of the prevailing party inquiry must be the material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties in a manner which Congress sought to promote in the fee statute.
Texas State, supra 489 U.S. at 783-84, 109 S.Ct. at 1488-89.
Although the efforts of the federal courts offer us some guidance, the language of W.Va.Code, 22A-3-25(f) [1985] is not identical to any of these statutes. Moreover, in the federal cases cited, the standards applied are not distinct, but overlap with one another. For attorneys’ fees applications brought under W.Va.Code, 22A-3-25(f) [1985], we adopt the rule that the trial court should award attorneys’ fees if the applicant was the prevailing party at trial, and for a party to “prevail” at trial, he need not show success on every claim brought but he must demonstrate significant success on a significant claim. In other words, he must have succeeded in effecting a “material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties in a manner which [the Legislature] sought to promote in the fee statute.” Texas State, supra at 783, 109 S.Ct. at 1488.
In applying this standard, trial courts should consider good faith efforts by either party to settle the case without unnecessary litigation. Our Legislature encourages the bringing of certain types of suits by enacting fee-shifting statutes, but a party who receives less from the jury than he was offered by his opponent has not necessarily “materially altered” their relationship. A party who needlessly pursues litigation after he has been offered a settlement that exceeds what the jury finally awards by an amount sufficient to have compensated the plaintiff for all his attorneys’ fees and expenses at the time the offer was made is not entitled to any attorneys’ fees that accrued after the offer was made.
In deciding the case before us, the trial court is to examine all of the facts as they relate to the “prevailing” party standard. The most pertinent of these facts are those relating to settlement offers by Land Use. The question of fact to be resolved by the trial court on remand is at what point did Land Use first make a reasonable offer to the Schartigers. If that date is 12 October 1988, then Land Use should pay reasonable attorneys’ fees accrued before that date. However, if such an offer was made in the fall of 1987, before the Schartigers retained Mr. Farber, then Land Use is not responsible for any of plaintiffs’ attorney’s fees expended in the pursuit of this litigation except for the cost of a consultation on the advisability of accepting the offer.8
On 12 October 1988, Land Use offered the plaintiffs $30,000 to settle the case. As appellant’s counsel admitted in his supplemental brief in rebuttal, “[this] would, in effect, pay for the estimated costs and attorney’s fees, etc., but would provide no compensatory damages for appellants who had then subsisted without water for nearly 400 days as of that date.” The jury awarded no compensatory damages but only the costs of connecting the plaintiffs to the local public water system.
It appears from a State Department of Energy investigation report dated 22 [617]*617December 1987, that the mining company offered to restore the appellants’ water in the Fall of 1987.9 The offer probably occurred before the appellants engaged Mr. Farber, and it certainly occurred, if at all, before they filed suit against Land Use. The report contained the following notation:
Company conducted a complete geologic study of the area and has agreed to extend a public water line to five residents in this area who have experienced water problems.
We cannot know for sure whether the company had actually offered to restore the appellants’ water back in 1987, but the appellants’ lawyer, Mr. Farber, attempted to introduce this evidence of the company’s offer to restore the appellants’ water because he thought the jury would take the offer of settlement as an admission of Land Use’s liability. The trial court properly excluded the evidence of an offer of settlement under Rule 408, W. Va.R. Evidence. 10
The fee-shifting rules adopted by the legislature in the statute under consideration and enforced by this court are meant to cover two extreme cases as well as all of the cases in between. If a tortfeasor approaches his victim immediately after the tort and makes a reasonable offer that includes reasonable attorneys’ fees up to the time of the offer, only to be rebuffed by a greedy victim or victim’s lawyer, and the jury awards less than the tort-feasor originally offered for damages alone, then it would be an abuse of discretion for the trial court to award attorneys’ fees to the plaintiff.
On the other hand, if the tort-feasor chases down the plaintiff on the courthouse steps minutes before trial only to make an offer that might minimally cover the plaintiff’s damages, but that would not cover plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees expended to that point, and the jury awards damages roughly equivalent to the tortfeasor’s offer, then it would be an abuse of discretion for the trial court not to award attorneys’ fees to the plaintiff.
Most cases do not fit either of these extremes but fall somewhere in between. In those cases, the trial judge reasonably applying the “prevailing party” standard should arrive at an equitable decision. Although it appears fairly clear from the briefs and exhibits that some offers of settlement were made, the exact amount, their firmness, and their timing cannot be ascertained with precision from the material before us. Furthermore, although we think we know about the $30,000 offer discussed above, we do not have a record before us constructed to permit the informed application of the standards set out in this opinion.
For the reasons given above, the decision of the Circuit Court of Nicholas County on the award of attorneys’ fees is reversed, and the case is remanded for the circuit court to conduct a hearing and apply the criteria set forth in this opinion.
Reversed and remanded with directions.
MILLER, C.J. and McHUGH, J., dissent and reserve the right to file dissenting opinions.