Savannah Moton v. Amer Sports Winter & Outdoor Co.

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
• Decided: May 29, 2026
• Docket: 25-3844
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 26a0248n.06

Case No. 25-3844

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED May 29, 2026 ) KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk SAVANNAH MOTON, ) Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED v. ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR ) THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF AMER SPORTS WINTER & OUTDOOR ) OHIO COMPANY, ) Defendant-Appellee. ) OPINION )

Before: WHITE, THAPAR, and MATHIS, Circuit Judges.

THAPAR, Circuit Judge. Savannah Moton sued her former employer, alleging she was

fired because of her race and in retaliation for an internal complaint she filed. But she didn’t

provide sufficient evidence that her race or the complaint motivated her firing. So the district court

granted summary judgment to her former employer. We affirm.

I.

In October 2021, Amer Sports (Amer) hired Savannah Moton as a recruiter for one of its

subsidiary companies, Arc’teryx, which sells outdoor gear. As a recruiter, Moton found potential

job candidates, guided them through interviews, and worked with hiring managers to help Amer

reach a final decision on each applicant. In Moton’s words, starting this new job was “challenging”

and “stressful.” R. 10-1, Pg. ID 88. She had a lot to learn because she hadn’t worked in the

industry before. But despite these challenges, Moton thought she was performing well. No. 25-3844, Moton v. Amer Sports Winter & Outdoor Co.

Unfortunately, others at Amer didn’t agree. In late February 2022, after she had spent a

few months at the company, Moton’s manager, Joel Brideau, informed her that hiring managers in

the brand-marketing team had some complaints about her work. They thought she was taking too

long to find candidates for some roles, and they weren’t sure that the candidates she did identify

were good fits for roles at Amer. They also didn’t think Moton was communicating clearly with

them. So Brideau eventually reassigned Moton to work with other teams.

On May 9, 2022, Brideau sent an email documenting Moton’s struggles to Mariah

Marshall, a member of Amer’s human-resources team. He described several communication

issues in detail, including Moton’s defensiveness, failure to stay in touch with candidates, and

inability to provide clear answers to hiring managers. As Marshall put it, these “gaps in

performance” meant that Moton’s job was “at risk.” R. 11-1, Pg. ID 284. In fact, the problems

were so serious that Marshall thought they could lead to termination.

Later that same day, Moton reached out to Marshall and indicated that she wanted to file a

report about Brideau. And two days later, she alleged that Brideau had discriminated against her

because she is black. Specifically, Moton claimed that Brideau had treated her differently from

other recruiters and told her during one meeting that she “needed coaching on her soft skills.”

R. 10-1, Pg. ID 234. She also mentioned a prior conversation in which Brideau had said he didn’t

“really agree” with diversity initiatives in hiring. Id. at 101. According to Moton, Brideau added

that Amer’s hiring should generally reflect the population of Vancouver (the location of its office),

which was “mostly white[,] so that’s probably what the applicants are going to be.” Id.

Marshall investigated Moton’s claims, but she didn’t find evidence of discrimination or

harassment. Instead, her findings confirmed what Brideau had already told her: Moton’s

performance “was not meeting expectations.” Id. at 236–38. For example, Marshall noted that

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Moton had sent an offer to a candidate without any agreement on the salary. And multiple other

employees had complained about Moton’s communication abilities with both candidates and her

coworkers. So Marshall recommended a meeting between herself, Moton, and Brideau to discuss

those performance issues. Moton expressed her disagreement with the finding of no

discrimination, but she agreed to return to work after being on leave during the investigation.

When she returned, Moton began reporting to a different manager instead of Brideau. But

that new arrangement didn’t fix things. So Marshall again reviewed feedback from hiring

managers and observations from others at Amer regarding Moton. That feedback revealed the

same issues as before: Moton didn’t communicate well, didn’t follow company procedures, and

didn’t recruit adequate candidates. And although she didn’t remember specifics, Marshall later

testified that she likely spoke with Moton’s new manager and eventually recommended Moton’s

termination. Amer fired Moton in June 2022.

Moton then filed a discrimination complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission. She alleged that Amer had discriminated against her based on her race and retaliated

against her for complaining about that discrimination. The Commission later closed its

investigation without making any determination on the merits of Moton’s complaint. At that point,

it notified Moton that she could sue Amer.

And that’s exactly what Moton did. She claimed that Amer’s alleged discrimination and

retaliation had violated federal and state civil-rights laws. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 2000e; Ohio

Rev. Code Ann. § 4112.02(A), (I). After completion of discovery, she moved for summary

judgment on the retaliation claim, and Amer moved for summary judgment on all claims. The

district court denied Moton’s motion and granted summary judgment to Amer. It reasoned that

Moton hadn’t made a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation because she didn’t provide

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sufficient evidence of discrimination based on more favorable treatment of a comparable employee

or that retaliation had caused her termination. Moton timely appealed.

II.

We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Home Depot, Inc. v.

Steadfast Ins. Co., 125 F.4th 769, 774 (6th Cir. 2025). On a motion for summary judgment, we

review the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See id. Summary

judgment is warranted only if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Because Moton can’t establish

a prima facie case for either discrimination or retaliation, the district court correctly granted

summary judgment to Amer.

A.

Start with Moton’s race-discrimination claim. Both federal and Ohio law bar employers

from firing an employee because of her race. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 2000e-2(a)(1); Ohio Rev. Code

Ann. § 4112.02(A).1 Moton doesn’t present any direct evidence that Amer fired her because she

is black, so she must establish a prima facie case of race discrimination by showing that (1) she is

a member of a protected group; (2) Amer subjected her to an adverse employment decision; (3)

she was qualified for her position; and (4) Amer treated a similarly situated non-protected

employee more favorably. Smith v. City of Toledo, 13 F.4th 508, 514–15 (6th Cir. 2021) (citing

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–05 (1973)). Moton fails at the fourth

hurdle. Even if the first three prongs were met, she doesn’t point to any comparable employee

1 Discrimination claims under Ohio law use the same framework as Title VII claims. Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 582 (6th Cir. 1992).

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whom Amer treated more favorably than her. See Loyd v. Saint Joseph Mercy Oakland, 766 F.3d

580, 589 (6th Cir. 2014). That means she can’t establish a prima facie case.

Moton admits that she doesn’t have evidence of a comparator that Amer treated more

favorably than her. But she says that’s Amer’s fault. A comparator employee must do the same

job and be “subject to evaluation by the same decisionmakers” as the plaintiff. Rachells v.

Cingular Wireless Emp. Servs., LLC, 732 F.3d 652, 662 (6th Cir. 2013). Here, Moton argues Amer

didn’t disclose who made the decision to terminate her, so it wasn’t possible to provide a

comparator.

Yet Moton had ample opportunities to identify a comparator during discovery, and she

failed to do so. For starters, she could have asked Brideau and Marshall whether Amer treated

other recruiters differently or replaced her with an employee of a different race. See Blount v.

Stanley Eng’g Fastening, 55 F.4th 504, 510 (6th Cir. 2022). Likewise, she could have deposed

other relevant employees, like Amer’s “chief people officer,” who made the

“ultimate[] . . . decision[s]” on firing. R. 11-1, Pg. ID 303. Or, after identifying “evasive or

incomplete” disclosures from Amer, she could have moved to compel Amer to disclose the final

decisionmaker. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(3)–(4). And after discovery, she could have moved to

sanction Amer for swearing to responses that she now considers “false.” Appellant’s Br. at 23–

24. But she didn’t take any of those steps. So Moton can’t shift the blame to Amer for her failure

to identify a comparable employee.

In the alternative, Moton argues that she doesn’t need to provide a comparator at all. She

points out that to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, she must show that Amer took

actions from which one can infer that it’s probable Amer fired her because of her race. Young v.

United Parcel Serv., Inc., 575 U.S. 206, 228 (2015). Moton contends that we can draw that

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inference here, even without a comparator, because Amer lied about who decided to fire her. In

discovery, Moton asked Amer to “identify each person who played any role in the decision to

terminate” her. R. 12-1, Pg. ID 597. Amer identified only Brideau. But in his deposition, Brideau

said he didn’t participate in the decision to fire Moton. And at Marshall’s deposition, she admitted

that she played a role in Moton’s firing, probably by recommending her termination. Yet she

didn’t remember actually making that recommendation. Based on these inconsistencies, Moton

asks us to “infer” that Amer is “attempting to conceal evidence of guilt” and find that she has

established a prima facie case of discrimination. Appellant’s Br. at 22–23 (citing Philbrick v.

Holder, 583 F. App’x 478, 490 (6th Cir. 2014)). But that simply doesn’t suffice to survive

summary judgment.

For starters, Amer’s inconsistent responses don’t imply that Moton was fired because of

her race. True, if an employer lies about the reason it fired someone, that lie could indicate the

employer’s reason is just pretext for discrimination. See Coburn v. Rockwell Automation, Inc.,

238 F. App’x 112, 122 (6th Cir. 2007); Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133,

147 (2000). But a court only reaches the issue of pretext if the plaintiff has already made a prima

facie case of discrimination. See Smith, 13 F.4th at 515. The cases Moton cites on appeal

exemplify this rule. In each case, the plaintiff made a prima facie case of discrimination separate

from any falsehood on the employer’s part. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142 (showing replacement by

employees not in the protected class); Coburn, 238 F. App’x at 119 (showing direct evidence of

discrimination). Here, Moton hasn’t made that case, either through direct or comparator evidence.

So even if confusion about who fired her showed pretext, she could only rely on that pretext if she

had already made out a prima facie case of race discrimination. Since she hasn’t done so, pretext

is irrelevant.

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Moton responds that evidence of pretext may “buttress” her prima facie case. Appellant’s

Br. at 23 (quoting Philbrick, 583 F. App’x at 490). But that’s true only if such evidence helps

prove that she was treated differently from or replaced by similarly situated employees who

weren’t black. See Philbrick, 583 F. App’x at 490; Blount, 55 F.4th at 510. Moton’s evidence of

alleged pretext doesn’t help prove differential treatment. That’s because Amer’s unclear

explanation of who decided to fire Moton doesn’t tell us anything about how Amer treated

employees of different races. So Amer’s inconsistencies can’t help show that racial discrimination

caused Moton’s termination.

Moton then argues that, as a “general principle of evidence law,” a factfinder can consider

a material dishonesty as evidence of guilt. Appellant’s Br. at 23 (quoting Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147).

But that principle doesn’t help Moton either. In Reeves, the Supreme Court found that the

combination of a plaintiff’s prima facie case and sufficient evidence that the employer was lying

about its alleged justification could allow a factfinder to find discrimination. 530 U.S. at 148. But

here, Moton has neither a prima facie case based on comparator evidence nor evidence that Amer

is lying about the reason for her termination. In fact, Amer has consistently explained why Moton

was fired: her poor performance as a recruiter. And the record backs up those explanations.

Amer’s evidence shows that Moton had issues communicating with hiring managers, following

proper procedures, and finding suitable candidates—major aspects of her job. Those problems put

her position in jeopardy, so Amer later terminated her.

At bottom, Moton needed to show evidence of Amer treating a similarly situated employee

or new hire more favorably to establish a prima facie case of race discrimination. If “unexplained,”

that comparator evidence could make it “more likely than not” that the employer’s actions were

discriminatory. Young, 575 U.S. at 228 (quotation omitted). But confusion about who made the

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ultimate decision to fire Moton doesn’t make discrimination more likely than not. And that’s

especially true because undisputed record evidence suggests issues with Moton’s performance

caused her termination. A reasonable factfinder couldn’t find that Amer discriminated against

Moton because of her race, so her discrimination claim fails.

B.

Moton also alleges that Amer fired her in retaliation for her internal complaint of race

discrimination. Because she doesn’t provide any direct evidence, Moton must establish a prima

facie case that Amer retaliated against her. Kenney v. Aspen Techs., Inc., 965 F.3d 443, 448 (6th

Cir. 2020); see also Moody v. Ohio Dep’t of Mental Health & Addiction Servs., 183 N.E.3d 21, 36

(Ohio Ct. App. 2021) (applying the same test to Ohio state-law retaliation claims). That means

she must show that (1) she engaged in protected activity; (2) Amer knew she had done so; (3)

Amer took adverse employment action against her; and (4) her protected activity was the but-for

cause of Amer’s adverse action. Kenney, 965 F.3d at 448. Amer doesn’t dispute that Moton has

established the first three elements. But Moton hasn’t shown that her complaint was the but-for

cause of her firing, so the district court correctly rejected her retaliation claim.

Moton argues that the temporal proximity between her complaint and her firing establishes

causation. Because she was fired five weeks after her discrimination complaint, she argues that

we can infer the complaint caused her firing. But temporal proximity alone can’t establish

causation when an employer has “previously contemplated, though not yet definitively

determined,” the adverse action at issue and is simply “proceeding along [the same] lines.” Clark

Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 272 (2001) (per curiam). Here, Amer had previously

contemplated terminating Moton. Brideau had informed Moton of several issues with her

performance in February, several months before she made her complaint. And as Marshall

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indicated, Moton’s job was at risk because she wasn’t meeting expectations. In fact, Brideau sent

Marshall an outline summarizing Moton’s performance problems before Moton made her

complaint. Marshall testified that she wouldn’t move directly to termination based on that email,

but she would have considered moving “straight to a termination” after speaking with Moton’s

manager. R. 11-1, Pg. ID 285. So before Moton complained about potential discrimination, Amer

had “previously contemplated” firing her. Breeden, 532 U.S. at 272. And its ultimate decision to

fire her proceeded along the same lines—her performance issues. That means Moton can’t show

her complaint caused her firing.

Moton provides two responses, but neither succeeds. First, she argues that the record

doesn’t show that Amer actually contemplated terminating her before the complaint. She’s right

that Brideau hoped to work through her performance problems and that Amer didn’t fire her

immediately after hearing about those problems. But she’s wrong in claiming that there’s “no

record evidence” that Amer contemplated termination. Appellant’s Br. at 31. After Marshall

received a list of issues with Moton’s performance—and before her discrimination complaint—

Moton’s job was “in jeopardy.” R. 11-1, Pg. ID 284. Marshall said that those issues, plus a

discussion with Moton’s manager, could lead “straight to a termination.” Id. at 285. So even

though Amer hadn’t “definitively determined” that it would fire her, it certainly “contemplated”

doing so before her complaint. Breeden, 532 U.S. at 272. That defeats her argument for causation

based on temporal proximity.

Second, Moton contends that Amer didn’t fire her because of her performance, since it

provided “no justification” for terminating her. Appellant’s Br. at 33. But that’s incorrect. The

record is full of one consistent justification. Marshall testified that, while she didn’t remember

making the recommendation in this case, she likely relied on the gaps in Moton’s performance to

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decide whether to recommend her termination. And the record shows that several other employees

at Amer had problems with Moton’s performance. In other words, Amer’s eventual adverse action

“squares with the action previously contemplated”: potential termination due to performance

problems. Montell v. Diversified Clinical Servs., Inc., 757 F.3d 497, 507 (6th Cir. 2014). Because

Amer previously contemplated Moton’s firing, and because the performance issues persisted after

her complaint, the temporal proximity between her complaint and termination isn’t evidence of

causation.

Moton argues our decision in Montell undermines this conclusion, but that case differs

significantly from hers. In Montell, the company kept a written record of the employee’s poor

performance, just like Amer did. Id. But the employer in Montell also told the plaintiff that she

had until a certain day “to improve or else face termination.” Id. at 508. It then deviated from that

plan by firing the plaintiff just a day after she complained about sexual harassment and before the

date by which she needed to show improvement. Id. That’s not what happened here. Rather, after

Moton complained about potential racial discrimination, Amer completed a full investigation. And

it eventually let her go based on performance issues that were documented both before and after

she filed her complaint, without deviating from any established plan. Thus, Moton can’t show that

her complaint caused her firing based on temporal proximity alone. In turn, she can’t make a

prima facie case for retaliation, so her claim fails.

* * *

We affirm.

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