Savage El v. Missouri

556 F. Supp. 599, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19523
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Missouri
DecidedFebruary 3, 1983
DocketNo. 82-0864-CV-W-1
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 556 F. Supp. 599 (Savage El v. Missouri) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Missouri primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Savage El v. Missouri, 556 F. Supp. 599, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19523 (W.D. Mo. 1983).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDERS DIRECTING FURTHER PROCEEDINGS

JOHN W. OLIVER, Senior District Judge.

I.

Petitioner is currently in federal custody serving a 15 year regular adult federal sentence for robbery with assault, imposed September 23, 1971, and a consecutive federal life sentence for first degree murder, imposed January 13, 1977. Petitioner has filed a pro se petition for habeas corpus in which he attempts to attack two 20 year consecutive sentences imposed June 20,1973 after trial in the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri for robbery in the first degree and for assault with intent to kill, with malice. Petitioner’s State convictions resulted from a trial conducted in the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri pursuant to petitioner’s invocation of the Uniform Agreement on Detainers after petitioner was committed to federal custody pursuant to his first federal conviction. Petitioner’s State court convictions were affirmed by the Missouri Court of Appeals, Kansas City District, on direct appeal in State v. Savage, 522 S.W.2d 144 (Mo.App. 1975).

We have carefully considered the exhibits attached to the petition for habeas corpus, those attached to the response to the order to show cause filed by the Attorney General’s office, and those attached to petitioner’s traverse filed January 25, 1983. We find and conclude that the Missouri Court of Appeals properly determined that the Uniform Agreement on Detainers had not been violated and that petitioner’s claims to the contrary are without merit.

We further find and conclude that petitioner’s claim that the State of Missouri has somehow waived its right to the execution of petitioner’s State sentences is without merit for the reasons stated in Brown v. State, 452 S.W.2d 176 (Mo.Sup.Ct.1970), and [601]*601the cases cited therein, and in the cases cited by Judge Daugherty in Gregory v. Page, 289 F.Supp. 316 (E.D.Okl.1968). See also and compare the rationale stated in Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254, 42 S.Ct. 309, 66 L.Ed. 607 (1922).1

The fact that petitioner’s claim for federal habeas corpus relief is without merit, however, does not end the matter. Section 2243 of Title 28 U.S.C. imposes the duty upon a district court to dispose of an application for writ of habeas corpus “as law and justice require.” Various of the exhibits attached to the pleadings filed in this case establish that justice requires that an order be entered directing further proceedings before the pending application for habeas corpus is dismissed.

We discuss those exhibits in the next part of this memorandum opinion.

II.

Petitioner’s amended supplemental petition for writ of mandamus filed in the Supreme Court of Missouri alleged in paragraph 13 on page 2 that the federal Prison authorities offered to parole petitioner to Missouri custody to commence service of his Missouri state sentences but that “the State of Missouri ultimately refused petitioner’s custody.”

The files and records reflect that sometime prior to February 10, 1980 the Warden at Terre Haute Penitentiary made inquiry of the Sheriff of Jackson County, Missouri as to whether the State of Missouri would accept custody of the petitioner and another inmate of that federal penitentiary. The Warden was obviously familiar with the fact that under the law of most states and certainly under the law of Missouri, a State court can not order a State sentence to be served concurrently with a federal sentence during the time the defendant is in federal custody.

On the other hand, the Attorney General of the United States, acting through appropriate designated officials of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, can designate a State correctional institution as the institution in which a federal sentence is to be served. The law is also clear that if the State penal authorities agree to accept a transfer of custody, time served by the defendant after he is received in State custody is credited against both his State and his federal sentence. The factual circumstances set forth in Brown v. State, supra, at 179 reflect the routine manner in which federal penal authorities respond to a State’s request that a defendant be transferred to State custody in order to permit concurrent service of a federal and a State sentence.

While the February, 1980 request of the Warden of the United States Penitentiary at Terre Haute is not in the file, the response of the Chief of Detectives attached to the Sheriff’s office of Jackson County, Missouri reflects that an Assistant Prosecuting Attorney of Jackson County, Missouri gave the Chief of Detectives inaccurate information which the latter stated in á letter he wrote to the Warden on February [602]*60210, 1980. The Captain of Detectives advised the Warden that he had had the Assistant Prosecuting Attorney review the petitioner’s file and that he had ascertained that the petitioner had been convicted rath-, er than merely charged. The Captain of Detectives therefore relayed the advice given him by the Assistant Prosecuting Attorney and stated to the Warden that “we have absolutely no legal authority to retain these individuals.”

On November 20,1980 the Warden at the Terre Haute Penitentiary wrote the Director of the Missouri Division of Corrections in regard to the petitioner. That letter, copy of which is attached to this memorandum opinion, requested that the State of Missouri review and give consideration to the transfer of petitioner’s custody to State custody so that petitioner could begin service of his State sentences.

The Warden’s letter was referred to a case worker “assigned to Interstate Compact” who also inaccurately advised the federal Warden in a letter dated December 31, 1980 that:

Be advised that the Missouri Division of Corrections has no jurisdiction in this matter at this time. We must refer you to the Jackson County, Missouri authorities who can take custody of these inmates under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers.2

. On January 12, 1981 the Warden, in accordance with the suggestion of the case worker, wrote the Sheriff of Jackson County, Missouri a letter which made the same request earlier made to the Director of the Missouri Division of Corrections. The January 12, 1981 letter, however, added that:

A previous request was submitted to Mr. Jenkins, the Director for the Missouri Division of Corrections, on November 20, 1980. On December 31, 1980 a response concerning this request was received which indicated that this matter should be referred to Jackson County Authorities. We were informed that it is the responsibility of Jackson County Authorities to take custody of inmates under the Inter-State Agreement on Detainers. Enclosed please find a copy of this response for your review.

It is apparent that neither the Jackson County Sheriff nor any other Jackson County authority responded to the Warden’s January 12, 1981 letter. For it is clear that the petitioner, on March 20, 1981, wrote the Attorney General of Missouri a pro se

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Bluebook (online)
556 F. Supp. 599, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19523, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/savage-el-v-missouri-mowd-1983.