Sauntio Carter v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: July 8, 2016
• Docket: 49A02-1511-CR-1822
• Status: Published

Opinion

FILED Jul 08 2016, 8:37 am MEMORANDUM DECISION CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this and Tax Court Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Barbara J. Simmons Gregory F. Zoeller Oldenburg, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana Lyubov Gore Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Sauntio Carter, July 8, 2016

Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 49A02-1511-CR-1822 v. Appeal from the Marion Superior Court. The Honorable Christina R. State of Indiana, Klineman, Judge. Appellee-Plaintiff. Cause No. 49G17-1507-F6-26649

Barteau, Senior Judge

Statement of the Case [1] Sauntio Carter appeals his conviction of battery resulting in bodily injury, a

Class A misdemeanor. Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1 (2014). We affirm.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1511-CR-1822 | July 8, 2016 Page 1 of 5 Issue [2] Carter raises one issue, which we restate as: whether the State of Indiana

presented sufficient evidence to rebut Carter’s claim of self-defense.

Facts and Procedural History [3] Kiana Moore and Carter were in a romantic relationship from April 2015 until

July 2015. On June 27, 2015, she went to Carter’s house after they argued on

the phone. They continued to argue outside the house, and Moore went inside

to get her laundry. She picked up her laundry basket and prepared to leave, but

Carter continued to argue with her. Next, Carter knocked the basket out of

Moore’s hands and struck her in the face. Carter’s punch “busted [her] lip,”

causing bleeding. Tr. p. 10. Moore defended herself, attempting to prevent

Carter from hitting her. After she broke away from Carter, she left the house

and contacted the police.

[4] The State charged Carter with strangulation, a Level 6 felony, and battery

resulting in bodily injury, a Class A misdemeanor. Carter waived his right to a

jury trial. At the bench trial, Moore testified as set forth above. Carter

presented a claim of self-defense, claiming Moore attacked him first. After the

presentation of evidence, the court concluded: “I don’t doubt there was a lot of

screaming and yelling but I believe her story.” Id. at 27. The court determined

Carter was not guilty of strangulation but was guilty of battery and sentenced

him accordingly. This appeal followed.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1511-CR-1822 | July 8, 2016 Page 2 of 5 Discussion and Decision [5] Carter asserts the State failed to present sufficient evidence to disprove his claim

of self-defense. When a claim of self-defense is raised and finds support in the

evidence, the State has the burden of negating at least one of the necessary

elements. Wilson v. State, 770 N.E.2d 799, 800 (Ind. 2002). The State may

meet this burden by rebutting the defense directly, by affirmatively showing the

defendant did not act in self-defense, or by simply relying upon the sufficiency

of its evidence in chief. Cole v. State, 28 N.E.3d 1126, 1137 (Ind. Ct. App.

2015).

[6] The standard of review for a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence to rebut a

claim of self-defense is the same as the standard for any sufficiency of the

evidence claim. Bryant v. State, 984 N.E.2d 240, 250 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans.

denied. We do not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the

witnesses. Id. We consider only the probative evidence and reasonable

inferences drawn from the evidence that support the verdict. Id. If the

defendant is convicted despite a claim of self-defense, this Court will reverse

only if no reasonable person could say that self-defense was negated by the

State beyond a reasonable doubt. Wilson, 770 N.E.2d at 800-01.

[7] “A person is justified in using reasonable force against any other person to

protect the person or a third person from what the person reasonably believes to

be the imminent use of unlawful force.” Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2(c) (2013). “No

person in this state shall be placed in legal jeopardy of any kind whatsoever for

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1511-CR-1822 | July 8, 2016 Page 3 of 5 protecting the person or a third person by reasonable means necessary.” Id. A

person is not justified in using force if “the person has entered into combat with

another person or is the initial aggressor unless the person withdraws from the

encounter and communicates to the other person the intent to do so and the

other person nevertheless continues or threatens to continue unlawful action.”

Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2(g).

[8] To prevail on a claim of self-defense under Indiana Code section 35-41-3-2, a

defendant must have: (1) acted without fault; (2) been in a place where he or

she had a right to be; and (3) been in reasonable fear or apprehension of bodily

harm. Weedman v. State, 21 N.E.3d 873, 891-92 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans.

denied.

[9] Based on our review of the transcript, the State submitted sufficient evidence to

rebut Carter’s claim of self-defense. Viewing the facts in the light most

favorable to the judgment, Carter attacked Moore first, and she merely blocked

his punches. Furthermore, he did not withdraw from the confrontation. To the

contrary, he continued to attack Moore until she was able to break away from

him and flee. Under these circumstances, Carter was not entitled to use force.

See Cole, 28 N.E.3d at 1137 (evidence showed defendant was the aggressor and

thus was not entitled to use force). Carter’s challenge to the sufficiency of the

evidence fails.

Conclusion

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1511-CR-1822 | July 8, 2016 Page 4 of 5 [10] For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

[11] Affirmed.

Mathias, J., and Barnes, J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1511-CR-1822 | July 8, 2016 Page 5 of 5