1 2 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 5 SAN JOSE DIVISION 6 7 DACOREY SATTERWHITE, Case No. 20-cv-02116-BLF
8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 9 v. DISMISS WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND 10 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, [Re: ECF 3] 11 Defendant.
12 13 Plaintiff, DaCorey Satterwhite (“Satterwhite”), proceeding pro se, filed a complaint for 14 “professional negligence” in the Santa Clara Superior Court against the United States Postal Service 15 (“USPS”), a federal agency of the United States. Defendant timely removed the case to this Court. 16 Upon removal, the United States was automatically substituted as the party defendant pursuant to 17 28 U.S.C § 2679(d)(2). Before the Court is a motion to dismiss by the United States. ECF 3. The 18 time for Satterwhite to respond to the United States’ motion has passed without any response from 19 Satterwhite. Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7–1(b), the motion is suitable for disposition without oral 20 argument, and the hearing set for July 2, 2020 is vacated. For the reasons stated herein, the Court 21 GRANTS the motion to dismiss WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. 22 I. BACKGROUND 23 Satterwhite alleges that on January 14, 2020, he was approved for a credit card processing 24 machine from Leaders of Merchants. Compl. at 1, ECF 1-1. Satterwhite received USPS tracking 25 information that his package had arrived at the post office on January 18, 2020 at 1:19 a.m. Compl. 26 at 2, ECF 1-1. Satterwhite went to the post office at 105 N. 1st Street in Downtown San Jose on the 27 same day and was told that “[his] item was not there.” Id. at 2. In addition, Satterwhite alleges that 1 Satterwhite left without the package. Id. When Satterwhite called Leaders of Merchants, he was 2 told that the package had been sent. Id. Based on the foregoing, Satterwhite alleges that “someone 3 inside the post office is lying!” Id. It is not clear from the Complaint whether Satterwhite ultimately 4 received the package. See generally, Compl. 5 On February 24, 2020, Satterwhite filed a Complaint for “professional negligence” in the 6 Santa Clara Superior Court against the USPS, seeking monetary damages in excess of $25,000.00, 7 non-monetary relief, and punitive damages. See Civil Cover Sheet, ECF 1-1. The United States 8 timely removed the case to this Court. See Not. of Removal, ECF 1. The United States moves to 9 dismiss the case on two grounds: (1) lack of subject matter jurisdiction because Plaintiff failed to 10 exhaust his administrative remedies and (2) Plaintiff cannot state a claim because the United States 11 is immune from tort claims based on mishandled mail. Mot. to Dismiss, ECF 3. 12 II. LEGAL STANDARD 13 A. Rule 12(b)(1) 14 A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) challenges whether a court has subject matter 15 jurisdiction to hear a case. Federal courts have limited jurisdiction and are “presumed to lack subject 16 matter jurisdiction until the contrary affirmatively appears.” Dragovich v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 17 764 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1184 (N.D. Cal. 2011). It is the plaintiff’s burden to prove jurisdiction at 18 time the action is commenced. United States ex rel. Mateski v. Raytheon Co., 816 F.3d 565, 569 19 (9th Cir. 2016). A court considering a 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss is not limited to the pleadings, 20 “but may review any evidence, such as affidavits and testimony, to resolve factual disputes 21 concerning the existence of jurisdiction.” McCarthy v. United States, 850 F.2d 558, 560 (9th Cir. 22 1988). Once subject matter jurisdiction is challenged, the party opposing the motion bears the 23 burden of establishing jurisdiction. Chandler v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 598 F.2d 1115, 1122 24 (9th Cir. 2010). 25 B. Rule 12(b)(6) 26 A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) concerns what facts a plaintiff must plead on the 27 face of his claim. Under Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, a complaint must include 1 must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. 2 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007), and the factual contents in the complaint must allow the court 3 to “draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft 4 v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). However, the Court need not “accept as true allegations that 5 contradict matters properly subject to judicial notice” or “allegations that are merely conclusory, 6 unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 7 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In ruling on a motion 8 to dismiss, factual allegations are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the 9 nonmoving party. Cousins v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2009). 10 C. Leave to Amend 11 A court granting a motion to dismiss a complaint must decide whether to grant a leave to 12 amend. Leave to amend should be “freely given” when there is no “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory 13 motive on the part of the movant, … undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance 14 of the amendment, …[or] futility of amendment.” Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 15 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003). Dismissal without leave to amend is proper only if it is clear that “the 16 complaint could not be saved by any amendment.” Intri-Plex Techs., Inc. v. Crest Group, Inc., 499 17 F.3d 1048, 1056 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 18 III. DISCUSSION 19 First, the United States argues that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because 20 Satterwhite failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before filing this suit. Motion at 3. The 21 Court agrees. The Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) is the exclusive remedy for torts against a 22 federal agency. 28 U.S.C. § 2679; Kennedy v. U.S. Postal Serv., 145 F.3d 1077, 1078 (9th Cir. 23 1998). For tort actions within the purview of 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), the FTCA allows tort claimants 24 to sue the United States only after they have exhausted their administrative remedies with the federal 25 agency that is purportedly responsible for the injury. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). The FTCA’s exhaustion 26 requirement is jurisdictional. Vacek v. U.S. Postal Serv., 447 F.3d 1248, 1250 (9th Cir. 2006). An 27 action filed prematurely, before the claimant has exhausted his or her administrative remedies, must 1 According to the United States, Satterwhite has not presented a claim to the Postal Service 2 before filing this action. See Beatty Decl.
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1 2 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 5 SAN JOSE DIVISION 6 7 DACOREY SATTERWHITE, Case No. 20-cv-02116-BLF
8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 9 v. DISMISS WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND 10 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, [Re: ECF 3] 11 Defendant.
12 13 Plaintiff, DaCorey Satterwhite (“Satterwhite”), proceeding pro se, filed a complaint for 14 “professional negligence” in the Santa Clara Superior Court against the United States Postal Service 15 (“USPS”), a federal agency of the United States. Defendant timely removed the case to this Court. 16 Upon removal, the United States was automatically substituted as the party defendant pursuant to 17 28 U.S.C § 2679(d)(2). Before the Court is a motion to dismiss by the United States. ECF 3. The 18 time for Satterwhite to respond to the United States’ motion has passed without any response from 19 Satterwhite. Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7–1(b), the motion is suitable for disposition without oral 20 argument, and the hearing set for July 2, 2020 is vacated. For the reasons stated herein, the Court 21 GRANTS the motion to dismiss WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. 22 I. BACKGROUND 23 Satterwhite alleges that on January 14, 2020, he was approved for a credit card processing 24 machine from Leaders of Merchants. Compl. at 1, ECF 1-1. Satterwhite received USPS tracking 25 information that his package had arrived at the post office on January 18, 2020 at 1:19 a.m. Compl. 26 at 2, ECF 1-1. Satterwhite went to the post office at 105 N. 1st Street in Downtown San Jose on the 27 same day and was told that “[his] item was not there.” Id. at 2. In addition, Satterwhite alleges that 1 Satterwhite left without the package. Id. When Satterwhite called Leaders of Merchants, he was 2 told that the package had been sent. Id. Based on the foregoing, Satterwhite alleges that “someone 3 inside the post office is lying!” Id. It is not clear from the Complaint whether Satterwhite ultimately 4 received the package. See generally, Compl. 5 On February 24, 2020, Satterwhite filed a Complaint for “professional negligence” in the 6 Santa Clara Superior Court against the USPS, seeking monetary damages in excess of $25,000.00, 7 non-monetary relief, and punitive damages. See Civil Cover Sheet, ECF 1-1. The United States 8 timely removed the case to this Court. See Not. of Removal, ECF 1. The United States moves to 9 dismiss the case on two grounds: (1) lack of subject matter jurisdiction because Plaintiff failed to 10 exhaust his administrative remedies and (2) Plaintiff cannot state a claim because the United States 11 is immune from tort claims based on mishandled mail. Mot. to Dismiss, ECF 3. 12 II. LEGAL STANDARD 13 A. Rule 12(b)(1) 14 A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) challenges whether a court has subject matter 15 jurisdiction to hear a case. Federal courts have limited jurisdiction and are “presumed to lack subject 16 matter jurisdiction until the contrary affirmatively appears.” Dragovich v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 17 764 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1184 (N.D. Cal. 2011). It is the plaintiff’s burden to prove jurisdiction at 18 time the action is commenced. United States ex rel. Mateski v. Raytheon Co., 816 F.3d 565, 569 19 (9th Cir. 2016). A court considering a 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss is not limited to the pleadings, 20 “but may review any evidence, such as affidavits and testimony, to resolve factual disputes 21 concerning the existence of jurisdiction.” McCarthy v. United States, 850 F.2d 558, 560 (9th Cir. 22 1988). Once subject matter jurisdiction is challenged, the party opposing the motion bears the 23 burden of establishing jurisdiction. Chandler v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 598 F.2d 1115, 1122 24 (9th Cir. 2010). 25 B. Rule 12(b)(6) 26 A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) concerns what facts a plaintiff must plead on the 27 face of his claim. Under Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, a complaint must include 1 must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. 2 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007), and the factual contents in the complaint must allow the court 3 to “draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft 4 v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). However, the Court need not “accept as true allegations that 5 contradict matters properly subject to judicial notice” or “allegations that are merely conclusory, 6 unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 7 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In ruling on a motion 8 to dismiss, factual allegations are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the 9 nonmoving party. Cousins v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2009). 10 C. Leave to Amend 11 A court granting a motion to dismiss a complaint must decide whether to grant a leave to 12 amend. Leave to amend should be “freely given” when there is no “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory 13 motive on the part of the movant, … undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance 14 of the amendment, …[or] futility of amendment.” Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 15 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003). Dismissal without leave to amend is proper only if it is clear that “the 16 complaint could not be saved by any amendment.” Intri-Plex Techs., Inc. v. Crest Group, Inc., 499 17 F.3d 1048, 1056 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 18 III. DISCUSSION 19 First, the United States argues that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because 20 Satterwhite failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before filing this suit. Motion at 3. The 21 Court agrees. The Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) is the exclusive remedy for torts against a 22 federal agency. 28 U.S.C. § 2679; Kennedy v. U.S. Postal Serv., 145 F.3d 1077, 1078 (9th Cir. 23 1998). For tort actions within the purview of 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), the FTCA allows tort claimants 24 to sue the United States only after they have exhausted their administrative remedies with the federal 25 agency that is purportedly responsible for the injury. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). The FTCA’s exhaustion 26 requirement is jurisdictional. Vacek v. U.S. Postal Serv., 447 F.3d 1248, 1250 (9th Cir. 2006). An 27 action filed prematurely, before the claimant has exhausted his or her administrative remedies, must 1 According to the United States, Satterwhite has not presented a claim to the Postal Service 2 before filing this action. See Beatty Decl. ¶¶ 2-3, ECF 3-1. Satterwhite has not presented any 3 evidence to the contrary or responded to the United States’ motion to dismiss. Thus, the Court must 4 dismiss this action because Satterwhite fails to carry his burden to establish subject-matter 5 jurisdiction by demonstrating that he complied with the scheme for administrative relief set forth in 6 the FTCA before filing suit against the USPS. See McNeil, 508 U.S. at 113. 7 Second, the United States seeks dismissal because Satterwhite cannot state a claim against 8 the USPS for delayed mail because the United States has not waived its sovereign immunity for 9 claims arising out of the transmission of mail. See Motion at 4. Again, the Court agrees. The FTCA 10 grants a waiver of sovereign immunity in certain cases. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). But the United States 11 retains sovereign immunity for tort claims against it for “loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission 12 of letters or postal matter.” 28 U.S.C. § 2680(b). 13 Satterwhite claims that “Kenia Garcia” in the post office told him that the package had the 14 wrong zip code and was not at the post office when the USPS tracking information indicated 15 otherwise. See Compl. at 2. Viewing all allegations in the light most favorable to Satterwhite, the 16 alleged negligence falls within the definition of “loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission of 17 letters or postal matter.” See Anderson v. U.S. Postal Serv., 761 F.2d 527, 528 (9th Cir. 1985) 18 (affirming dismissal of claims against the USPS for loss of package); Jaguar Assocs. Grp. v. U.S. 19 Postal Serv., No. C07-5022 PVT, 2008 WL 686820, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2008) (“The postal 20 exception is broadly stated and encompasses ‘any claim’ arising out of the delivery of mail.”). The 21 Court cannot make any reasonable inference that the United States is liable based on the 22 Satterwhite’s factual allegations. Therefore, dismissal is warranted. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 23 Based on the above analysis, an amendment would be futile because the United States is 24 exempt from tort liability under 28 U.S.C. § 2680(b). It is clear that Satterwhite cannot cure the 25 defect on legally meritorious grounds. 26 IV. ORDER 27 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the United States’ motion to dismiss at ECF 1 2 IT IS SO ORDERED. 3 4 || Dated: June 5, 2020 kom hh ham én) 5 Fe BETH LABSON FREEMAN 6 United States District Judge 7 8 9 10 11 a 12
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