SATTERWHITE v. NAUGLE

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Indiana
DecidedJuly 20, 2022
Docket4:22-cv-00085
StatusUnknown

This text of SATTERWHITE v. NAUGLE (SATTERWHITE v. NAUGLE) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Indiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
SATTERWHITE v. NAUGLE, (S.D. Ind. 2022).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA NEW ALBANY DIVISION

CHRIS EDWARD SATTERWHITE, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) No. 4:22-cv-00085-TWP-DML ) BRAD NAUGLE, ) LARRY MEDLOCK, ) AMY NEWLAN, and ) WASHINGTON CO. CIRCUIT COURT, ) ) Defendants. )

ENTRY GRANTING MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS, SCREENING AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

This matter is before the Court on pro se Plaintiff Chris Edward Satterwhite's ("Satterwhite") Request to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying the Full Filing Fee (Filing No. 2). Because he is allowed to proceed in forma pauperis, this action is also subject to screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). I. DISCUSSION A. Filing Fee Satterwhite's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis without prepaying fees or costs (Filing No. 2) is granted. While in forma pauperis status allows a plaintiff to proceed without pre- payment of the filing fee, the plaintiff remains liable for the full fees. See Robbins v. Switzer, 104 F.3d 895, 898 (7th Cir. 1997) (in forma pauperis litigants remain liable for the filing fee; "all [28 U.S.C.] § 1915(a) does for any litigant is excuse the pre-payment of fees"). The Court does not have the authority to waive the filing fee, and it remains due despite Satterwhite's in forma pauperis status. Fiorito v. Samuels, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84869, at *5 (C.D. Ill. June 30, 2016) ("[c]ourt does not have the authority to waive a filing fee"); McDaniel v. Meisner, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106067, at *12 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 12, 2015) (same). The filing fee for in forma pauperis litigants is $350.00. No payment is due currently; however, the $350.00 balance remains owing. B. Screening

District courts have an obligation under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) to screen complaints before service on the defendant and must dismiss the complaint if it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. Dismissal under the in forma pauperis statute is an exercise of the court's discretion. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 34 (1992). In determining whether the complaint states a claim, the court applies the same standard as when addressing a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Lagerstrom v. Kingston, 463 F.3d 621, 624 (7th Cir. 2006). To survive dismissal under federal pleading standards, [the] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Thus, a "plaintiff must do better than putting a few words on paper that, in the hands of an imaginative reader, might suggest that something has happened to her that might be redressed by the law." Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 403 (7th Cir. 2010) (emphasis in original). C. The Complaint Pro se plaintiff Chris Edward Satterwhite's Complaint names Brad Naugle of the Washington County Sheriff's Department, Judge Larry Medlock, Amy Newlan of the Washington County Public Defender's Office, and Washington County Circuit Court as Defendants in this civil action (Filing No. 1 at 1). Satterwhite notes that he is a citizen of Indiana and is currently incarcerated at the Washington County Jail. Id. Satterwhite alleges that he was charged with felony escape, and he was appointed a public defender, Amy Newlan, who refused to address a false police report and who also "messed up" a plea agreement on his behalf. Satterwhite alleges that the wrong plea agreement was utilized, and he was never "finally sentenced." Satterwhite further

alleges that he requested different counsel, but the court refused his request. Id. at 2–3. Satterwhite additionally alleges that Brad Naugle arrested him on false charges. Id. at 4. Satterwhite requests that "the Guilty Finding and Punishment [be] overturned and taken off my Record and Damages for time spent incarrserated [sic]." Id. D. Dismissal of Complaint Based on the Complaint as currently alleged, this Court does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the claims brought by Satterwhite. "Courts . . . have an independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a challenge from any party." Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006). A court "must raise the issue sua sponte when it appears that subject matter jurisdiction is lacking." Buethe v. Britt Airlines, 749 F.2d 1235,

1238 (7th Cir. 1984); see also Evergreen Square of Cudahy v. Wis. Hous. & Econ. Dev. Auth., 776 F.3d 463, 465 (7th Cir. 2015) ("federal courts are obligated to inquire into the existence of jurisdiction sua sponte"). "When a federal court concludes that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the complaint in its entirety." Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 514, quoted in Miller v. Herman, 600 F.3d 726, 730 (7th Cir. 2010); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) ("If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action."). To the extent Satterwhite seeks relief from his conviction, a judicial rule referred to as the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal district courts from reviewing or overturning a state court's decisions such as Satterwhite's conviction. Scully v. Goldenson, 751 Fed. Appx. 905, 908 (7th Cir. 2018); Remer v. Burlington Area Sch. Dist., 205 F.3d 990, 996 (7th Cir. 2000) ("the Rooker- Feldman doctrine bars federal jurisdiction when the federal plaintiff alleges that her injury was caused by a state court judgment . . . no matter how erroneous or unconstitutional the state court judgment may be"). As to his conviction, Satterwhite must pursue that claim by filing an appeal in

the state court. The Court also notes that "when a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus." Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973). If Satterwhite wishes to challenge his physical confinement resulting from his conviction and sentence, he must do so through a petition for a writ of habeas corpus—not by initiating this civil action.

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Related

Miller v. Herman
600 F.3d 726 (Seventh Circuit, 2010)
Preiser v. Rodriguez
411 U.S. 475 (Supreme Court, 1973)
Denton v. Hernandez
504 U.S. 25 (Supreme Court, 1992)
Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp.
546 U.S. 500 (Supreme Court, 2006)
Erickson v. Pardus
551 U.S. 89 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Swanson v. Citibank, N.A.
614 F.3d 400 (Seventh Circuit, 2010)
Scott Buethe v. Britt Airlines, Inc.
749 F.2d 1235 (Seventh Circuit, 1984)
Todd A. Lagerstrom v. Phil Kingston
463 F.3d 621 (Seventh Circuit, 2006)
Tara Luevano v. Walmart Stores, Incorporated
722 F.3d 1014 (Seventh Circuit, 2013)
Robbins v. Switzer
104 F.3d 895 (Seventh Circuit, 1997)

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Bluebook (online)
SATTERWHITE v. NAUGLE, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/satterwhite-v-naugle-insd-2022.