CHASANOW, Judge.
On June 7, 1989, Baltimore City Police Officer Stanley Nolan was making a purchase at a 7-11 store in Anne Arundel County. As Nolan returned to his truck, he saw a man, who was later identified as George E. Satterfield, Jr., getting into the front passenger seat of a car parked next to his truck. Nolan, an experienced narcotics officer, noticed “a very strong odor of PCP” when the car door was opened.
Immediately after the car left the 7-11 parking lot heading north on Point Pleasant Road, an Anne Arundel County police cruiser driven by Officer James Teare pulled into the lot. Nolan told Teare that a tan Monte Carlo, occupied by three white males, had just left the parking lot. Nolan further told Teare that, based upon the strong smell of PCP [150]*150coming from the car, he believed that a sizeable quantity of freshly shaken or applied liquid PCP could be found in the Monte Carlo.
Officer Teare testified that he knew Officer Nolan and was aware of his expertise in the field of narcotics. Officer Teare, accompanied by Officer Nolan, drove one mile north on Point Pleasant Road before spotting the Monte Carlo parked outside the Double Eagle Saloon. The two officers arrived just as Satterfield and the two other men were walking to the door of the bar. Officer Nolan confirmed that both the car and the individuals were those that he had seen in the 7-11 parking lot. In response to Teare’s call for back-up, Anne Arundel County Police Officers Athena Blake and Max Weinstein joined the surveillance effort at the Double Eagle Saloon.
After roughly half an hour, the same three white males emerged from the Double Eagle Saloon and headed toward the tan Monte Carlo. Satterfield went to the trunk of the car, removed a white plastic bag, and then got into the front passenger seat of the car. A man later identified as Russell Michael got into the driver’s seat, and a man named Ronald Aiken got into the back seat. The car then left the parking lot and proceeded less than half a mile before Officer Blake, in a marked car, stopped the Monte Carlo for driving on the wrong side of the road. Officers Teare and Blake each testified that, as they approached the car, they smelled the strong odor of PCP coming from it.
Behind the driver’s seat of the Monte Carlo, Officer Blake found a white plastic bag containing a glass jar, a bag of green vegetable material, sandwich baggies, a hypodermic syringe, and a 35mm film canister. The green vegetable material was determined by a police chemist to be 32.43 grams of parsley flakes laced with PCP. From Satterfield’s pockets, Officer Weinstein recovered a list of names and monetary amounts, E-Z Wider rolling papers, and “bunched” paper currency amounting to $145.
[151]*151Satterfield was convicted in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County of possession with intent to distribute phencyclidine (PCP) and of two counts of possession of paraphernalia. On April 7, 1990, he was sentenced to seven years imprisonment for possession with intent to distribute PCP, a consecutive two-year term for possession of a hypodermic syringe, and another consecutive two-year term for possession of plastic baggies. The Court of Special Appeals, in an unreported opinion, affirmed Satterfield’s convictions and sentences. We granted Satterfield’s petition for certiorari to determine whether Satterfield could be convicted of and sentenced on two separate counts of possession of paraphernalia. For the reasons set forth below, we believe Satterfield may be properly convicted of only a single count of possession of paraphernalia.
Satterfield was charged with and convicted of possessing the hypodermic syringe and the plastic baggies, each in violation of Maryland Code (1957, 1987 Repl.Vol.), Article 27, § 287(d).1 Defense counsel explained at oral argument [152]*152that the hypodermic syringe, which was found in the plastic bag among the other items, was used to “spray” the parsley with liquid PCP. Defense counsel referred to this Court’s explanation in State v. Owens, 320 Md. 682, 687, 579 A.2d 766, 768 (1990), that a substance which is “laced” with PCP is usually “dipped into, or sprayed with, PCP.” The Assistant Attorney General representing the State seemed to agree:
THE COURT: You are satisfied that the hypodermic was used in conjunction with mixing the PCP with parsley?
THE STATE: I would think so. There was, as the Court has eluded, very little evidence provided during trial as to the exact use in this particular instance, but given the context in which it was found—
THE COURT: But given the context? How in the world do you use a hypodermic syringe in this process?
THE STATE: Well I think it was discussed earlier; the idea of using the hypodermic syringe for the PCP to spray it on the parsley leaves____
After the parsley was sprayed, the baggies would then be used to package the PCP-laced parsley for sale. Thus, the parties agreed that it was a reasonable inference from the evidence that both items of paraphernalia were used in conjunction with the preparation and sale of the PCP-laced parsley. As there was no evidence to indicate that the hypodermic syringe was used for purposes of injection, the count charging possession of the syringe does not fall within § 287(d)(1). Rather, the syringe here was used to [153]*153contain and spray the liquid PCP; therefore, it more appropriately falls within the proscription of § 287(d)(2). The baggies clearly fall within that same section’s interdiction.
Because both counts were charged under a single statute, the task before the Court is to determine what the legislature intended to be the appropriate unit of prosecution. Owens, 320 Md. at 686, 579 A.2d at 767. Divining the intent of the legislature is not always a simple task. “As helpful as the various rules of statutory construction may be in determining legislative intent, perhaps the soundest guidance comes from the Supreme Court’s admonition that we give the language of a statute a ‘commonsensica! meaning.’ ” Randall Book Corp. v. State, 316 Md. 315, 324, 558 A.2d 715, 720 (1989) (quoting United States v. Universal Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 221, 73 S.Ct. 227, 229, 97 L.Ed. 260, 264 (1952)).
The State argues that the legislature, in an attempt to “turn the screw of the criminal machinery — detection, prosecution and punishment — tighter and tighter,” 2 intended that each different item of paraphernalia be punished separately. The State cites Cunningham v. State, 318 Md. 182, 567 A.2d 126 (1989) to support its contention. In Cunningham, this Court allowed separate punishment for convictions of one count of possessing cocaine and one count of possessing heroin where the defendant simultaneously possessed separate quantities of each drug in the same bag. In permitting punishment for each of the two convictions, we held that “the legislature intended to make each controlled dangerous substance an allowable unit of prosecution____” Id. at 192-94, 567 A.2d at 131.
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CHASANOW, Judge.
On June 7, 1989, Baltimore City Police Officer Stanley Nolan was making a purchase at a 7-11 store in Anne Arundel County. As Nolan returned to his truck, he saw a man, who was later identified as George E. Satterfield, Jr., getting into the front passenger seat of a car parked next to his truck. Nolan, an experienced narcotics officer, noticed “a very strong odor of PCP” when the car door was opened.
Immediately after the car left the 7-11 parking lot heading north on Point Pleasant Road, an Anne Arundel County police cruiser driven by Officer James Teare pulled into the lot. Nolan told Teare that a tan Monte Carlo, occupied by three white males, had just left the parking lot. Nolan further told Teare that, based upon the strong smell of PCP [150]*150coming from the car, he believed that a sizeable quantity of freshly shaken or applied liquid PCP could be found in the Monte Carlo.
Officer Teare testified that he knew Officer Nolan and was aware of his expertise in the field of narcotics. Officer Teare, accompanied by Officer Nolan, drove one mile north on Point Pleasant Road before spotting the Monte Carlo parked outside the Double Eagle Saloon. The two officers arrived just as Satterfield and the two other men were walking to the door of the bar. Officer Nolan confirmed that both the car and the individuals were those that he had seen in the 7-11 parking lot. In response to Teare’s call for back-up, Anne Arundel County Police Officers Athena Blake and Max Weinstein joined the surveillance effort at the Double Eagle Saloon.
After roughly half an hour, the same three white males emerged from the Double Eagle Saloon and headed toward the tan Monte Carlo. Satterfield went to the trunk of the car, removed a white plastic bag, and then got into the front passenger seat of the car. A man later identified as Russell Michael got into the driver’s seat, and a man named Ronald Aiken got into the back seat. The car then left the parking lot and proceeded less than half a mile before Officer Blake, in a marked car, stopped the Monte Carlo for driving on the wrong side of the road. Officers Teare and Blake each testified that, as they approached the car, they smelled the strong odor of PCP coming from it.
Behind the driver’s seat of the Monte Carlo, Officer Blake found a white plastic bag containing a glass jar, a bag of green vegetable material, sandwich baggies, a hypodermic syringe, and a 35mm film canister. The green vegetable material was determined by a police chemist to be 32.43 grams of parsley flakes laced with PCP. From Satterfield’s pockets, Officer Weinstein recovered a list of names and monetary amounts, E-Z Wider rolling papers, and “bunched” paper currency amounting to $145.
[151]*151Satterfield was convicted in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County of possession with intent to distribute phencyclidine (PCP) and of two counts of possession of paraphernalia. On April 7, 1990, he was sentenced to seven years imprisonment for possession with intent to distribute PCP, a consecutive two-year term for possession of a hypodermic syringe, and another consecutive two-year term for possession of plastic baggies. The Court of Special Appeals, in an unreported opinion, affirmed Satterfield’s convictions and sentences. We granted Satterfield’s petition for certiorari to determine whether Satterfield could be convicted of and sentenced on two separate counts of possession of paraphernalia. For the reasons set forth below, we believe Satterfield may be properly convicted of only a single count of possession of paraphernalia.
Satterfield was charged with and convicted of possessing the hypodermic syringe and the plastic baggies, each in violation of Maryland Code (1957, 1987 Repl.Vol.), Article 27, § 287(d).1 Defense counsel explained at oral argument [152]*152that the hypodermic syringe, which was found in the plastic bag among the other items, was used to “spray” the parsley with liquid PCP. Defense counsel referred to this Court’s explanation in State v. Owens, 320 Md. 682, 687, 579 A.2d 766, 768 (1990), that a substance which is “laced” with PCP is usually “dipped into, or sprayed with, PCP.” The Assistant Attorney General representing the State seemed to agree:
THE COURT: You are satisfied that the hypodermic was used in conjunction with mixing the PCP with parsley?
THE STATE: I would think so. There was, as the Court has eluded, very little evidence provided during trial as to the exact use in this particular instance, but given the context in which it was found—
THE COURT: But given the context? How in the world do you use a hypodermic syringe in this process?
THE STATE: Well I think it was discussed earlier; the idea of using the hypodermic syringe for the PCP to spray it on the parsley leaves____
After the parsley was sprayed, the baggies would then be used to package the PCP-laced parsley for sale. Thus, the parties agreed that it was a reasonable inference from the evidence that both items of paraphernalia were used in conjunction with the preparation and sale of the PCP-laced parsley. As there was no evidence to indicate that the hypodermic syringe was used for purposes of injection, the count charging possession of the syringe does not fall within § 287(d)(1). Rather, the syringe here was used to [153]*153contain and spray the liquid PCP; therefore, it more appropriately falls within the proscription of § 287(d)(2). The baggies clearly fall within that same section’s interdiction.
Because both counts were charged under a single statute, the task before the Court is to determine what the legislature intended to be the appropriate unit of prosecution. Owens, 320 Md. at 686, 579 A.2d at 767. Divining the intent of the legislature is not always a simple task. “As helpful as the various rules of statutory construction may be in determining legislative intent, perhaps the soundest guidance comes from the Supreme Court’s admonition that we give the language of a statute a ‘commonsensica! meaning.’ ” Randall Book Corp. v. State, 316 Md. 315, 324, 558 A.2d 715, 720 (1989) (quoting United States v. Universal Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 221, 73 S.Ct. 227, 229, 97 L.Ed. 260, 264 (1952)).
The State argues that the legislature, in an attempt to “turn the screw of the criminal machinery — detection, prosecution and punishment — tighter and tighter,” 2 intended that each different item of paraphernalia be punished separately. The State cites Cunningham v. State, 318 Md. 182, 567 A.2d 126 (1989) to support its contention. In Cunningham, this Court allowed separate punishment for convictions of one count of possessing cocaine and one count of possessing heroin where the defendant simultaneously possessed separate quantities of each drug in the same bag. In permitting punishment for each of the two convictions, we held that “the legislature intended to make each controlled dangerous substance an allowable unit of prosecution____” Id. at 192-94, 567 A.2d at 131. The State argues that this same analysis applies with equal force in the instant case: “Satterfield was found in simultaneous pos[154]*154session of a syringe and glassine baggies contained separately within a large bag. It follows rationally that if § 287. authorizes separate convictions and punishments for each substance covered by the statute, it must also permit separate convictions and punishments for each item of paraphernalia possessed.”
While this is one possible manner to apply the intent of the legislature as identified in Cunningham, we believe that another, perhaps more “commonsensical,” application exists. The Court in Cunningham clearly identified that a unit of prosecution is permitted for each controlled dangerous substance. This principle explains the contrast between the holdings of Cunningham and Owens. In Cunningham this Court upheld two convictions for the simultaneous possession of cocaine and heroin. Whereas in Owens we held:
“Taking a common sense view of the matter, we are simply not persuaded that the legislature intended separate prosecutions and punishments for possession of PCP and possession of marihuana where the two substances have been, for all practical purposes, irrevocably joined as one.”
Id. at 688, 579 A.2d at 768. Because the PCP-laced marihuana in Owens was determined to be a single controlled dangerous substance, the Court held that only one conviction for its distribution could stand. In each of these cases, the legislature’s intention to allow a unit of prosecution per controlled dangerous substance impelled the result.
Further, we believe it clear that the legislature did not seek to proscribe the use of items identified as paraphernalia (such as sandwich baggies) in and of themselves. Rather these items, which may have common innocent uses, are punishable only under circumstances indicating an intent to use them in conjunction with a controlled dangerous substance. This requisite connection is evidenced by the language of § 287(d)(2), which makes it unlawful to possess [155]*155the enumerated items of paraphernalia3 “under circumstances which reasonably indicate an intention to use any such item for the illegal manufacture, distribution, or dispensing of any controlled dangerous substance.” Consequently, we believe that it is at least equally plausible that the legislature intended for the controlled dangerous substance to dictate the unit of prosecution in charges for paraphernalia as well. Since both the State and defense counsel agree that the syringe and the plastic baggies were used to prepare the PCP-Iaced parsley for sale, there is no dispute that both items of paraphernalia were used in conjunction with a single controlled dangerous substance. Under this analysis, it would seem that the legislature intended but one unit of prosecution.
We cannot say with certainty what the legislature intended. As we have held before:
“When the legislative intent can be gathered from the various sources to which we have referred, that intent will be enforced, and the concept of lenity does not become an operable factor. If, however, the legislative intent cannot be determined, and the indicia point with equal force in opposite directions, the rule of lenity dictates that the matter be resolved in favor of the accused and against the possibility of multiple punishments.”
Cunningham, 318 Md. at 185-86, 567 A.2d at 127-28 (quoting Randall Book, 316 Md. at 327, 558 A.2d at 721). We recognize the rule of lenity as a rule of statutory construction and believe that in this case it tips the balance in favor of the accused. Consequently, we find that Satterfield’s separate convictions for two items of paraphernalia, each used in conjunction with the same controlled dangerous substance, cannot stand. We believe that the items of [156]*156paraphernalia in this case were capable of supporting only one count of possession of paraphernalia under § 287(d).
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART; CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO AFFIRM THE CONVICTION FOR POSSESSION WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE PCP AND ONE CONVICTION FOR POSSESSION OF PARAPHERNALIA, AND TO VACATE ONE CONVICTION FOR POSSESSION OF PARAPHERNALIA; COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY.
Dissenting opinion by McAULIFFE, J., in which RODOWSKY and KARWACKI, JJ., join.