MORGAN, Justice (on rehearing).
This case, before us on rehearing, is an appeal from the decision of the trial court (habeas court) denying habeas corpus relief to Steven Satter (Satter) from two convictions of murder. We reverse and remand.
The habeas court determined that Satter voluntarily and knowingly made certain admissions to Codington County Sheriff Berg (sheriff), notwithstanding the fact that he had not been given Miranda warnings, and that such inquiry was investigatory rather than accusatory. The original opinion, reversing the habeas court, was filed April 20, 1988, and is found at 422 N.W.2d 425 (S.D.1988) (Satter I). In that decision, two Justices voted to reverse the habeas court on the grounds that Satter’s statements to the sheriff at the April 2, 1973, interrogation should not have been admitted in evidence because they were involuntary. Two Justices (hereinafter referred to as the dissent) held to the contrary and voted to affirm. One Justice joined in the reversal on the grounds that Satter had received ineffective assistance of counsel.
State’s petition for rehearing was granted but limited to two issues, namely:
(1) Whether [Satter’s] statements to Sheriff Berg were voluntary and admissible; and
(2) Whether [Satter] was denied effective assistance of counsel due to his trial counsel’s failure to object to the admission into evidence of two exhibits.
[726]*726After additional briefing and oral arguments, we determine that the first issue is dispositive and that Satter’s statements to the sheriff were not voluntary and are therefore inadmissible. Presumably, the conduct of counsel complained of in the second issue will be avoided upon retrial.
We summarize the factual background as it relates only to the first issue. At all times pertinent, Satter was in custody in the Codington County Jail on burglary charges. He was questioned by law enforcement officers on several occasions regarding those burglaries and on each of those occasions Satter was fully advised of his Miranda rights in advance of questioning.
In the meantime, the sheriffs office was also investigating the disappearance of two local men. Late in the evening on April 1, 1973, the sheriff received an anonymous telephone tip on the location of the bodies of the missing men and the suggestion that Satter was connected. The next day, after an unsuccessful attempt at locating the bodies per the telephone information, the sheriff visited Satter in the jail. Without any attempt to mirandize Satter, the sheriff first interrogated him about some burglaries in the area. He then changed the line of interrogation by asking Satter if he knew anything about two bodies supposedly buried in the Watertown vicinity.
The sheriff testified at trial that when first asked about the bodies, Satter posed a hypothetical question to the effect: If he had been paid to go out and destroy two bodies that are buried, what could he be charged with? The sheriff responded that he could possibly be charged with being an accessory. After some further conversation, Satter gave the sheriff detailed directions to find the location of the bodies. Next, Satter told the Sheriff that some third person from Minneapolis named Delu-ci, who had apparently killed the two men, offered him money to burn the bodies. Satter stated that he had not done so because of the smell of the bodies. The sheriff followed Satter’s directions and recovered the bodies. The Division of Criminal Investigation was called in to assist in the investigation and Satter was properly advised of his Miranda rights before any further interrogation.
State has admitted at all stages of the appeal that the sheriff failed to give Satter any Miranda warning immediately prior to the commencement of interrogation on the date in question. State urges, however, that such a warning was unnecessary in this case. This position is based on four major premises. First, the sheriffs inquiry, at that point, was merely investigatory, not accusatorial, because he had no known crime and Satter was not a suspect. Secondly, Satter, who was not a stranger to the criminal justice system, knew, understood and waived his Miranda rights, thus the failure to give him the warning was merely a technical omission. Thirdly, Sat-ter’s story about Deluci was a fabrication and there was nothing said incriminating Satter with the offense of murder. Lastly, there were no deliberately coercive or improper tactics used to warrant a presumption of compulsion.
With respect to the first premise, we pointed out in Satter I that the question was not whether the inquiry was investigatory or accusatory, but whether the interview was custodial. The record discloses that the interview in question was held in an office at the Watertown Police Department while Satter was in custody.
The Miranda Court stated:
The principles announced today deal with the protection which must be given to the privilege against self-incrimination when the individual is first subjected to police interrogation while in custody at the station or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. (Emphasis added.)
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1629, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 725 (1966).
Custodial interrogation was again the background for the United States Supreme [727]*727Court’s decision in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 481-82, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1883, 68 L.Ed.2d 378, 384 (1981), wherein the Court reaffirmed the language in Miranda which required that “custodial interrogation be preceded by advice to the putative defendant that he has the right to remain silent and also the right to the presence of an attorney.” This was reiterated in Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. -, -, 108 S.Ct. 2093, 2097, 100 L.Ed.2d 704, 712 (1988), wherein the court stated that a major purpose of Miranda “was ‘to give concrete constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow.’ ‘As we have stressed on numerous occasions, “[o]ne of the principal advantages” of Miranda is the ease and clarity of its application_’” (Citations omitted.)
For the sake of argument, if we were to agree that the sheriff’s initial inquiry was somehow protected from Miranda, we firmly believe that at the point where Satter proposed his hypothetical question the sheriff was on notice that Satter was or could be involved in some criminal activity. At that point, he should have immediately given Satter the requisite warning. The procedure is so simple that there is no excuse for not following it. We prefer to adhere to the bright line rule, rather than start carving exceptions.
The second premise is equally unimpressive. That premise is that Satter knew, understood and waived his Miranda rights; that he was not a stranger to the criminal justice system and had been previously warned on some burglary interrogations. Therefore, it is argued, the failure to give the warning was only a technical omission.
In Miranda,
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MORGAN, Justice (on rehearing).
This case, before us on rehearing, is an appeal from the decision of the trial court (habeas court) denying habeas corpus relief to Steven Satter (Satter) from two convictions of murder. We reverse and remand.
The habeas court determined that Satter voluntarily and knowingly made certain admissions to Codington County Sheriff Berg (sheriff), notwithstanding the fact that he had not been given Miranda warnings, and that such inquiry was investigatory rather than accusatory. The original opinion, reversing the habeas court, was filed April 20, 1988, and is found at 422 N.W.2d 425 (S.D.1988) (Satter I). In that decision, two Justices voted to reverse the habeas court on the grounds that Satter’s statements to the sheriff at the April 2, 1973, interrogation should not have been admitted in evidence because they were involuntary. Two Justices (hereinafter referred to as the dissent) held to the contrary and voted to affirm. One Justice joined in the reversal on the grounds that Satter had received ineffective assistance of counsel.
State’s petition for rehearing was granted but limited to two issues, namely:
(1) Whether [Satter’s] statements to Sheriff Berg were voluntary and admissible; and
(2) Whether [Satter] was denied effective assistance of counsel due to his trial counsel’s failure to object to the admission into evidence of two exhibits.
[726]*726After additional briefing and oral arguments, we determine that the first issue is dispositive and that Satter’s statements to the sheriff were not voluntary and are therefore inadmissible. Presumably, the conduct of counsel complained of in the second issue will be avoided upon retrial.
We summarize the factual background as it relates only to the first issue. At all times pertinent, Satter was in custody in the Codington County Jail on burglary charges. He was questioned by law enforcement officers on several occasions regarding those burglaries and on each of those occasions Satter was fully advised of his Miranda rights in advance of questioning.
In the meantime, the sheriffs office was also investigating the disappearance of two local men. Late in the evening on April 1, 1973, the sheriff received an anonymous telephone tip on the location of the bodies of the missing men and the suggestion that Satter was connected. The next day, after an unsuccessful attempt at locating the bodies per the telephone information, the sheriff visited Satter in the jail. Without any attempt to mirandize Satter, the sheriff first interrogated him about some burglaries in the area. He then changed the line of interrogation by asking Satter if he knew anything about two bodies supposedly buried in the Watertown vicinity.
The sheriff testified at trial that when first asked about the bodies, Satter posed a hypothetical question to the effect: If he had been paid to go out and destroy two bodies that are buried, what could he be charged with? The sheriff responded that he could possibly be charged with being an accessory. After some further conversation, Satter gave the sheriff detailed directions to find the location of the bodies. Next, Satter told the Sheriff that some third person from Minneapolis named Delu-ci, who had apparently killed the two men, offered him money to burn the bodies. Satter stated that he had not done so because of the smell of the bodies. The sheriff followed Satter’s directions and recovered the bodies. The Division of Criminal Investigation was called in to assist in the investigation and Satter was properly advised of his Miranda rights before any further interrogation.
State has admitted at all stages of the appeal that the sheriff failed to give Satter any Miranda warning immediately prior to the commencement of interrogation on the date in question. State urges, however, that such a warning was unnecessary in this case. This position is based on four major premises. First, the sheriffs inquiry, at that point, was merely investigatory, not accusatorial, because he had no known crime and Satter was not a suspect. Secondly, Satter, who was not a stranger to the criminal justice system, knew, understood and waived his Miranda rights, thus the failure to give him the warning was merely a technical omission. Thirdly, Sat-ter’s story about Deluci was a fabrication and there was nothing said incriminating Satter with the offense of murder. Lastly, there were no deliberately coercive or improper tactics used to warrant a presumption of compulsion.
With respect to the first premise, we pointed out in Satter I that the question was not whether the inquiry was investigatory or accusatory, but whether the interview was custodial. The record discloses that the interview in question was held in an office at the Watertown Police Department while Satter was in custody.
The Miranda Court stated:
The principles announced today deal with the protection which must be given to the privilege against self-incrimination when the individual is first subjected to police interrogation while in custody at the station or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. (Emphasis added.)
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1629, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 725 (1966).
Custodial interrogation was again the background for the United States Supreme [727]*727Court’s decision in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 481-82, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1883, 68 L.Ed.2d 378, 384 (1981), wherein the Court reaffirmed the language in Miranda which required that “custodial interrogation be preceded by advice to the putative defendant that he has the right to remain silent and also the right to the presence of an attorney.” This was reiterated in Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. -, -, 108 S.Ct. 2093, 2097, 100 L.Ed.2d 704, 712 (1988), wherein the court stated that a major purpose of Miranda “was ‘to give concrete constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow.’ ‘As we have stressed on numerous occasions, “[o]ne of the principal advantages” of Miranda is the ease and clarity of its application_’” (Citations omitted.)
For the sake of argument, if we were to agree that the sheriff’s initial inquiry was somehow protected from Miranda, we firmly believe that at the point where Satter proposed his hypothetical question the sheriff was on notice that Satter was or could be involved in some criminal activity. At that point, he should have immediately given Satter the requisite warning. The procedure is so simple that there is no excuse for not following it. We prefer to adhere to the bright line rule, rather than start carving exceptions.
The second premise is equally unimpressive. That premise is that Satter knew, understood and waived his Miranda rights; that he was not a stranger to the criminal justice system and had been previously warned on some burglary interrogations. Therefore, it is argued, the failure to give the warning was only a technical omission.
In Miranda, we find the Court’s reasoning that since it has always set high standards of proof for the waiver of constitutional rights and since the State establishes the circumstances under which the interrogation takes place, the heavy burden to demonstrate a waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination rightfully rests on the shoulders of the State. 384 U.S. at 475, 86 S.Ct. at 1628, 16 L.Ed.2d at 724. Neither the State nor the dissent in Satter I have cited any cases wherein the United States Supreme Court has upheld admission of any statements taken at custodial interrogation where such interrogation was not commenced by the giving of the Miranda warning.
The suggestion that Satter’s previous experience with the criminal justice system excuses' the giving of any warning is rather unique. The State, and the dissent in Sat-ter I, seem to suggest that there should be some sort of intelligence test. If the suspect has four previous convictions, he is sufficiently knowledgeable of his Miranda rights. But what if there are three convictions, two, or only one? Where do we draw the line? More importantly, where do the law enforcement authorities draw the line? They are the ones in the field. The creation of exceptions really does them no favor. Far better to adhere to the bright line rule. After all, it requires no great effort to take out the Miranda card, read the subject his rights, and ask the simple questions: Do you understand your rights and do you waive them?
The third premise is to the effect that since Satter’s response was a fabrication, he did not incriminate himself. If all that Satter had done was to tell the story about Deluci from Minneapolis, we would tend to agree. At least we would not find it sufficiently prejudicial to require reversal of the convictions. What is conveniently overlooked by the State and the dissent in this argument, is that the statements detailed the location of the bodies. To suggest that that information was not incriminating ignores reality. Satter’s knowledge of the exact location of those bodies was the first direct evidence that linked him with the murders. Nothing else was done until after the bodies were recovered. No further interrogations were had, no attempt at lie detector tests was made, no confession was made until after that information was acted upon. Absent those directions, the bodies might still be moldering in their grave under the rock pile. However, we need not speculate on that. In fact, Satter gave the sheriff the di[728]*728rections and implicated himself in the crime.
The final premise that we deal with is that there were no deliberately coercive or improper tactics used to warrant a presumption of compulsion. In other words, absent the use of the rubber hose, icy showers or marathon interrogations under bright lights, we should not presume that Satter’s statements were involuntary.
In Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 307, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 1292, 84 L.Ed.2d 222, 231 (1985), we find the following language:
Failure to administer Miranda warnings creates a presumption of compulsion. Consequently, unwarned statements that are otherwise voluntary within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment must nevertheless be excluded from evidence under Miranda. Thus, in the individual case, Miranda’s preventive medicine provides a remedy even to the defendant who has suffered no identifiable constitutional harm, (citations omitted).
But the Miranda presumption, though irrebuttable for purposes of the prosecution’s case in chief, does not require that the statements and their fruits be discarded as inherently tainted. Despite the fact that patently voluntary statements taken in violation of Miranda must be excluded from the prosecution’s case, the presumption of coercion does not bar their use for impeachment purposes on cross-examination. (Cites omitted.) (Emphasis added.)
This passage completely negates the premise as applied in this case.
What then is the effect of these involuntary admissions on Satter’s convictions in light of the “fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine” announced in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963)? Since the habeas court’s ruling that the statements were voluntary did not require it to consider the implications of involuntariness and the Wong Sun doctrine, we do not consider it appropriate for us to pass on this question. Rather, it is more appropriate that the ha-beas court consider this issue on remand.
WE REVERSE AND REMAND.
HENDERSON and SABERS, JJ,, concur.
WUEST, C.J., and MILLER, J., dissent.
Satter contends that the sheriff also told him that anything that Satter said would be confidential. When questioned at trial, the sheriff testified that he did not remember making such a promise.