1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 TONIA SARTIN, No. 2:23-cv-00658-DCJ-DB 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER
14 HUMPHREYS UNIVERSITY and BEACON ORAL SPECIALISTS 15 MANAGEMENT LLC, 16 Defendants. 17 18 Before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claim under the Americans 19 with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) on the basis that Plaintiff has failed to establish standing 20 for injunctive relief. Because the Court agrees that Plaintiff has not alleged a plausible 21 and sincere intent to return to Defendant Beacon Oral Specialists Management LLC’s 22 oral surgery center, Plaintiff does not have an “actual and imminent” injury required 23 for Article III standing. Accordingly, the Court will submit the matter without oral 24 argument pursuant to Local Rule 230(g), and GRANT Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss 25 with leave to amend. 26 I. Background 27 Plaintiff Tonia Sartin, a disabled individual and wheelchair user, brings the 28 present suit alleging that she faced barriers to accessing the California Oral Surgery 1 Center (the “Center”), owned and operated by Defendants, and was told that the 2 Center would not be able to accommodate her disability when providing treatment. 3 ( FAC (ECF No. 13) at 3–6.) 4 Taking the allegations in the complaint as true, on January 25, 2023 Plaintiff 5 arrived at the Center via a disability van provided by the San Joaquin Regional Transit 6 District. ( ¶¶ 21, 23.) The Center has both an east and west entrance. ( ¶ 24.) 7 Plaintiff arrived at the west entrance which had a slope too steep for Plaintiff to 8 maneuver independently. ( ¶¶ 29–36.) She did not encounter any signage alerting 9 her to the existence of the east entrance, and instead received assistance from the 10 disability driver to access the Center through the west entrance. ( ¶¶ 30, 36.) 11 Once inside the Center, Plaintiff was told that she did not have an appointment 12 scheduled, despite Plaintiff having made an appointment. ( ¶ 40.) She was further 13 told that, regardless, the Center would be unable to accommodate her disability 14 because she would be required to stand without aid to receive x-rays. ( ) Plaintiff 15 later consulted with and received treatment from a different oral surgeon who was 16 able to accommodate her wheelchair. ( ¶¶ 41–42.) Despite having received 17 treatment, Plaintiff alleges that she “intends to return to the business in the future. . . .” 18 ( ¶ 62.) 19 During the investigation of Plaintiff’s claims, her counsel discovered numerous 20 other barriers relevant to Plaintiff’s ability to access the Center, though Plaintiff did not 21 encounter these barriers on her own visit. ( at 2, ¶ 45.) These barriers include 22 deficiencies in the markings of wheelchair accessible parking spaces, the access aisle 23 and ramp adjacent to these parking spaces, and a lack signage for a van-accessible 24 parking space, among other barriers. ( ¶¶ 46–57.) 25 Plaintiff brings a claim alleging violations of the ADA and seeking to remove the 26 barriers to access. ( ¶¶ 64–78, 84–87.) She also brings a claim alleging 27 discrimination on the basis of her disability under the California Unruh Civil Rights Act 28 seeking damages. ( ¶¶ 79–83.) 1 Defendant Beacon Oral Specialists Management LLC brought the present 2 Motion to Dismiss asserting that Plaintiff does not have standing to bring a claim 3 under the ADA, and that the Court must therefore also dismiss Plaintiff’s state law 4 claim for lack of supplemental jurisdiction. (Mot. (ECF No. 19) at 4–6.)1 The Court 5 takes this matter under submission without oral argument. 6 II. Legal Standard for Motion to Dismiss 7 A party may move to dismiss a complaint for “lack of subject matter jurisdiction” 8 under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). Challenges to a plaintiff’s Article III 9 standing are properly raised under a 12(b)(1) motion as standing is required for a 10 federal court to exercise jurisdiction. , 598 11 F.3d 1115, 1122 (9th Cir. 2010); , 12 103 F. Supp. 3d 1073, 1078 (N.D. Cal. 2015). Taking the allegations in the complaint 13 as true, “the court must determine whether a lack of federal jurisdiction appears from 14 the face of the complaint itself.” , 103 F. Supp. 3d at 1078. 15 “[The] party invoking the federal court's jurisdiction has the burden of proving the 16 actual existence of subject matter jurisdiction.” , 99 F.3d 352, 17 353 (9th Cir.1996); , 598 F.3d at 1122. 18 Standing under Article III of the Constitution has three basic elements: the 19 Plaintiff must have suffered (1) an “injury in fact;” (2) which is fairly traceable to or 20 caused by the defendant’s offensive conduct; and (3) which is likely to be redressed 21 by a favorable decision. , 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). 22 The injury in fact element is satisfied by showing that the injury is both (a) concrete 23 and particularized and (b) actual or — where a Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief — 24 imminent. , 504 U.S. at 564; , 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983). 25 1 Defendant alternatively argues that that Plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim should be dismissed under the 26 standard laid out in , 19 F.4th 1202 (9th Cir. 2022), which counsels courts to dismiss Unruh claims when the special California filing requirements for high-frequency litigants under 27 California Civil Procedure Code section 425.50 would apply. ( at 6–8.) Because the Court finds that Plaintiff does not have standing for the ADA claim and will dismiss the Unruh Act claim for lack of 28 supplemental jurisdiction, there is no need for the Court to address this argument at this time. 1 III. Discussion 2 A. Standing for Plaintiff’s ADA Claims 3 As the ADA provides for only injunctive relief, it is not enough for Plaintiff to 4 allege that she has been harmed in the past; she must demonstrate that she is 5 continuing to be harmed or that she will be harmed in the future in order to establish 6 an actual or imminent injury. , 631 F.3d 939, 946 7 (9th Cir. 2011); , 504 U.S. at 564 (“Past exposure to illegal conduct does 8 not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief.” (quoting 9 , 461 U.S. at 102)). Where a plaintiff “is currently deterred from visiting [an] 10 accommodation by accessibility barriers” the plaintiff has established that their injury 11 “is actual or imminent.” , 57 F.4th 1085, 1094 (9th Cir. 2023); 12 , 524 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2008). 13 Deterrence, however, is only an actual or imminent injury where the plaintiff has 14 demonstrated a “sincere and plausible” intent to return if and when the barrier is 15 removed. , 57 F.4th at 1098. For instance, in the plaintiff had standing to 16 sue a 7-Eleven that was located 500 miles from his home on the basis that “the store is 17 conveniently located near his favorite fast food restaurant in Anaheim, and that he 18 plans to visit Anaheim at least once a year on his annual trips to Disneyland,” 19 confirming in his deposition that he intended to return there once the disability 20 barriers were removed. 524 F.3d at 1040.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 TONIA SARTIN, No. 2:23-cv-00658-DCJ-DB 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER
14 HUMPHREYS UNIVERSITY and BEACON ORAL SPECIALISTS 15 MANAGEMENT LLC, 16 Defendants. 17 18 Before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claim under the Americans 19 with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) on the basis that Plaintiff has failed to establish standing 20 for injunctive relief. Because the Court agrees that Plaintiff has not alleged a plausible 21 and sincere intent to return to Defendant Beacon Oral Specialists Management LLC’s 22 oral surgery center, Plaintiff does not have an “actual and imminent” injury required 23 for Article III standing. Accordingly, the Court will submit the matter without oral 24 argument pursuant to Local Rule 230(g), and GRANT Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss 25 with leave to amend. 26 I. Background 27 Plaintiff Tonia Sartin, a disabled individual and wheelchair user, brings the 28 present suit alleging that she faced barriers to accessing the California Oral Surgery 1 Center (the “Center”), owned and operated by Defendants, and was told that the 2 Center would not be able to accommodate her disability when providing treatment. 3 ( FAC (ECF No. 13) at 3–6.) 4 Taking the allegations in the complaint as true, on January 25, 2023 Plaintiff 5 arrived at the Center via a disability van provided by the San Joaquin Regional Transit 6 District. ( ¶¶ 21, 23.) The Center has both an east and west entrance. ( ¶ 24.) 7 Plaintiff arrived at the west entrance which had a slope too steep for Plaintiff to 8 maneuver independently. ( ¶¶ 29–36.) She did not encounter any signage alerting 9 her to the existence of the east entrance, and instead received assistance from the 10 disability driver to access the Center through the west entrance. ( ¶¶ 30, 36.) 11 Once inside the Center, Plaintiff was told that she did not have an appointment 12 scheduled, despite Plaintiff having made an appointment. ( ¶ 40.) She was further 13 told that, regardless, the Center would be unable to accommodate her disability 14 because she would be required to stand without aid to receive x-rays. ( ) Plaintiff 15 later consulted with and received treatment from a different oral surgeon who was 16 able to accommodate her wheelchair. ( ¶¶ 41–42.) Despite having received 17 treatment, Plaintiff alleges that she “intends to return to the business in the future. . . .” 18 ( ¶ 62.) 19 During the investigation of Plaintiff’s claims, her counsel discovered numerous 20 other barriers relevant to Plaintiff’s ability to access the Center, though Plaintiff did not 21 encounter these barriers on her own visit. ( at 2, ¶ 45.) These barriers include 22 deficiencies in the markings of wheelchair accessible parking spaces, the access aisle 23 and ramp adjacent to these parking spaces, and a lack signage for a van-accessible 24 parking space, among other barriers. ( ¶¶ 46–57.) 25 Plaintiff brings a claim alleging violations of the ADA and seeking to remove the 26 barriers to access. ( ¶¶ 64–78, 84–87.) She also brings a claim alleging 27 discrimination on the basis of her disability under the California Unruh Civil Rights Act 28 seeking damages. ( ¶¶ 79–83.) 1 Defendant Beacon Oral Specialists Management LLC brought the present 2 Motion to Dismiss asserting that Plaintiff does not have standing to bring a claim 3 under the ADA, and that the Court must therefore also dismiss Plaintiff’s state law 4 claim for lack of supplemental jurisdiction. (Mot. (ECF No. 19) at 4–6.)1 The Court 5 takes this matter under submission without oral argument. 6 II. Legal Standard for Motion to Dismiss 7 A party may move to dismiss a complaint for “lack of subject matter jurisdiction” 8 under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). Challenges to a plaintiff’s Article III 9 standing are properly raised under a 12(b)(1) motion as standing is required for a 10 federal court to exercise jurisdiction. , 598 11 F.3d 1115, 1122 (9th Cir. 2010); , 12 103 F. Supp. 3d 1073, 1078 (N.D. Cal. 2015). Taking the allegations in the complaint 13 as true, “the court must determine whether a lack of federal jurisdiction appears from 14 the face of the complaint itself.” , 103 F. Supp. 3d at 1078. 15 “[The] party invoking the federal court's jurisdiction has the burden of proving the 16 actual existence of subject matter jurisdiction.” , 99 F.3d 352, 17 353 (9th Cir.1996); , 598 F.3d at 1122. 18 Standing under Article III of the Constitution has three basic elements: the 19 Plaintiff must have suffered (1) an “injury in fact;” (2) which is fairly traceable to or 20 caused by the defendant’s offensive conduct; and (3) which is likely to be redressed 21 by a favorable decision. , 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). 22 The injury in fact element is satisfied by showing that the injury is both (a) concrete 23 and particularized and (b) actual or — where a Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief — 24 imminent. , 504 U.S. at 564; , 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983). 25 1 Defendant alternatively argues that that Plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim should be dismissed under the 26 standard laid out in , 19 F.4th 1202 (9th Cir. 2022), which counsels courts to dismiss Unruh claims when the special California filing requirements for high-frequency litigants under 27 California Civil Procedure Code section 425.50 would apply. ( at 6–8.) Because the Court finds that Plaintiff does not have standing for the ADA claim and will dismiss the Unruh Act claim for lack of 28 supplemental jurisdiction, there is no need for the Court to address this argument at this time. 1 III. Discussion 2 A. Standing for Plaintiff’s ADA Claims 3 As the ADA provides for only injunctive relief, it is not enough for Plaintiff to 4 allege that she has been harmed in the past; she must demonstrate that she is 5 continuing to be harmed or that she will be harmed in the future in order to establish 6 an actual or imminent injury. , 631 F.3d 939, 946 7 (9th Cir. 2011); , 504 U.S. at 564 (“Past exposure to illegal conduct does 8 not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief.” (quoting 9 , 461 U.S. at 102)). Where a plaintiff “is currently deterred from visiting [an] 10 accommodation by accessibility barriers” the plaintiff has established that their injury 11 “is actual or imminent.” , 57 F.4th 1085, 1094 (9th Cir. 2023); 12 , 524 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2008). 13 Deterrence, however, is only an actual or imminent injury where the plaintiff has 14 demonstrated a “sincere and plausible” intent to return if and when the barrier is 15 removed. , 57 F.4th at 1098. For instance, in the plaintiff had standing to 16 sue a 7-Eleven that was located 500 miles from his home on the basis that “the store is 17 conveniently located near his favorite fast food restaurant in Anaheim, and that he 18 plans to visit Anaheim at least once a year on his annual trips to Disneyland,” 19 confirming in his deposition that he intended to return there once the disability 20 barriers were removed. 524 F.3d at 1040. Similarly, in 21 , 293 F.3d 1133, 1135–36, 1137–38 (9th Cir. 2002), the plaintiff had standing 22 based on statements in a declaration that the Holiday Foods grocery stores were his 23 favorite chain, and that the specific store at issue was near his grandmother, who he 24 visited every Sunday. , 96 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1079 25 (D. Haw. 2000) (allegations that the restaurant was reasonably close to plaintiff and 26 that plaintiff liked the food served was sufficient to show imminent harm because 27 “[v]isiting a fast food restaurant, as opposed to a hotel or professional office, is not the 28 sort of event that requires advance planning or the need for a reservation”). 1 On the other hand, “ADA plaintiffs who seek prospective injunctive relief when 2 they allege only past discrimination that is ed have been denied 3 constitutional standing.” , 96 F. Supp. 2d at 1079 (emphasis added). Thus, in 4 , 906 F. Supp. 317, 322 (E.D. Va. 1995) a plaintiff who sought to have 5 her breast implants removed and subsequently obtained the surgery elsewhere did 6 not have standing to sue the doctor who initially refused to perform the surgery due to 7 the plaintiff’s HIV status. Similarly, the court in , 843 F. Supp. 8 1329, 1334 (N.D. Cal. 1994) concluded that a plaintiff who was deaf lacked standing 9 to sue a hospital that was unable to effectively communicate with her when she had 10 visited the hospital after her husband suffered a heart attack. The mere fact that she 11 owned a mobile home 7 miles away from the hospital was insufficient to establish that 12 she was likely to use the hospital in the future. . 13 In the instant case, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not alleged a plausible and 14 sincere intent to return to the Center that would give rise to standing. This case is 15 more like and in that Plaintiff had a specific situational need for which 16 she visited the Defendant’s office, and that need has since been resolved. Plaintiff 17 visited the Center for the purpose of having an oral procedure done, but after being 18 denied a consultation, she sought and received treatment elsewhere. Although 19 Plaintiff alleges that she “intends to return,” this statement, without more, rings hollow. 20 , 504 U.S. at 564 (“Such ‘some day’ intentions — without any description of 21 concrete plans, or indeed even any specification of when the some day will be — do 22 not support a finding of the ‘actual or imminent’ injury that our cases require.”) 23 Unlike , , , and , cited above, where the plaintiffs’ 24 unspecified intent to buy groceries at a store or eat at a restaurant were sufficient 25 because of the nature of those activities, , 96 F. Supp. 2d at 1079 (“[v]isiting a 26 fast food restaurant . . . is not the sort of event that requires advance planning.”), 27 patronizing an oral surgeon is not something one does on a whim. Plaintiff does not 28 allege that she is still in need of treatment or that she will need additional treatment in 1 the near future. In her opposition, Plaintiff asserts that she “continues to have teeth 2 and has a vested interest in ensuring nearby access to dental healthcare,” (Opp’n. 3 (ECF No. 20) at 7), but routine dental healthcare is quite unlike the specialized oral 4 surgery that Defendant offers. And even if oral surgery were as commonplace as 5 stopping at the grocery store, the plaintiffs in , , , and 6 articulated more than a simple statement that they intended to return by furnishing 7 additional facts to support the intent, which Plaintiff has not done here. , , 8 96 F. Supp. 2d at 1079 (plaintiff had “developed a taste for L & L's food and has visited 9 various L & L restaurants across the island of Oahu”); , 57 F.4th at 1098 (plaintiff 10 liked lobster and bought it all the time). Plaintiff has therefore not alleged an actual or 11 imminent injury for standing purposes. 12 Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED as to the First Cause of Action. 13 However, as Plaintiff may be able to allege further specific facts that show why it is 14 likely that she will utilize Defendant’s services in the future such that an injury is actual 15 or imminent, Plaintiff will be granted leave to amend this claim. 16 B. State Law Claims 17 Plaintiffs’ second claim is under state law. The Court declines to exercise 18 supplemental jurisdiction over this claim, and accordingly GRANTS Defendant’s 19 Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Cause of Action as well. 20 , 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1996) (“[I]f the federal claims are dismissed before 21 trial, . . . the state claims should be dismissed as well.”); 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). 22 This dismissal is without prejudice should Plaintiff file an amended complaint that 23 includes a cognizable claim under the ADA. 24 //// 25 //// 26 //// 27 //// 28 //// 1 IV. Conclusion 2 For the above reasons, IT |S HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss 3 | (ECF No. 19) is GRANTED with leave to amend. Plaintiff must file any amended 4 | complaint within thirty days of the entry of this order. 5 The hearing on this motion scheduled for August 17, 2023 is VACATED. 6 4 IT |S SO ORDERED. 3 | Dated: _ August 8, 2023 Bek | Cbabeatin.. Hon. Daniel labretta 9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28