Sarra Harbaoui Cardoso v. Hat World et al

• Court: District Court, D. Nevada
• Decided: February 11, 2026
• Docket: 2:24-cv-02164
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

3 SARRA HARBAOUI CARDOSO, 4 Plaintiff, Case No.: 2:24-cv-02164-GMN-DJA 5 vs. ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 6 HAT WORLD et al, DENYING IN PART MOTION TO 7 DISMISS Defendants. 8

9 10 Pending before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss, (ECF No. 15), filed by Defendants 11 Hat World and Paul Aguirre. Plaintiff Sarra Harbaoui Cardoso filed a Response, (EFC No 22). 12 Defendants did not file a Reply, and the time to do so has now passed. 13 For the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN 14 PART Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. 15 I. BACKGROUND 16 This case arises out of the alleged discrimination and retaliation Plaintiff experienced 17 while employed by Hat World. (See, generally First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), EFC No. 2- 18 1). Plaintiff alleges that her co-worker, Daniel Gutierrez, discriminated against her by mocking 19 her race and national origin. (FAC 3:13–20). Plaintiff reported the harassment to her manager, 20 Defendant Paul Aguirre, who she alleges repeated the discriminatory jokes. (Id. at 3:23–24; 21 4:1–2). She also alleges that Aguirre retaliated against her by restricting her access password to 22 the store’s computer system and taking her sales. (Id. at 4:3–8). 23 Plaintiff then reported the harassment to the District Manager, Defendant Fernando 24 Hernandez. (Id. at 4:15–18). He allegedly told her that he would open an investigation 25 regarding the reported harassment. (Id.). Though Hernandez talked to her about the report a 1 couple weeks later, Plaintiff claims she never received any communication from Human 2 Resources regarding her report. (Id. at 4:20–24). She then contends that Hernandez retaliated 3 against her by filing two corrective actions on the same day she reported the harassment to him. 4 (Id. at 4:24–27). Finally, she alleges that she was forced to quit her job because of the 5 discrimination and retaliation. (Id. at 6:4–8). 6 Plaintiff filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 7 (“EEOC”) on March 7, 2024. (Plaintiff’s Charge of Discrimination, Ex. A to Mot. Dismiss, 8 EFC No. 15-2). On August 30, 2024, the EEOC issued a Determination and Notice of Rights. 9 (Determination and Notice of Rights, Ex. B to Mot. Dismiss, EFC No. 15-3). The Notice 10 advised Plaintiff of her right to sue and admonished her that a lawsuit must be filed within 90 11 days of receipt of the notice. (Id.). 12 On November 20, 2024, Plaintiff filed pro se an Application for Leave to Proceed in 13 forma pauperis (“IFP”). (EFC No. 2.). Attached to the application was the initial Complaint 14 (EFC No. 2-1). The Complaint was not signed by Plaintiff. (Compl. 7:22–23). On January 8, 15 2025, Magistrate Judge Albregts denied Plaintiff’s application to proceed IFP without prejudice 16 and with leave to amend. (Order 1:15-18, EFC No. 6). He gave Plaintiff until February 7, 17 2025, to either file a renewed application or to pay the filing fee. (Id. at 1:19–20).

18 Plaintiff filed an amended IFP on February 5, 2025. (EFC No. 7). Attached to the IFP 19 was the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), signed by Plaintiff. (EFC No. 7-1). The FAC 20 identified the Defendants as Hat World Paris Saint Germain, Paul Aguirre, and Fernando 21 Hernandez. (Id.). On March 21, 2025, Judge Albregts denied Plaintiff’s IFP application 22 without prejudice and gave her leave to file an amended application until April 21, 2025. 23 (Order 3:1–6, EFC No. 8). On April 4, 2025, Plaintiff filed a second amended IFP. (EFC No. 24 9). Judge Albregts granted her application on June 11, 2025. (Order, EFC No.10). Per the 25 Order, the FAC was filed on June 12, 2025. (EFC. No. 12). Defendants Hat World and Aguirre 1 then filed the instant Motion to Dismiss seeking dismissal of this case due to Plaintiff’s failure 2 to file a signed complaint by the deadline. 3 II. LEGAL STANDARD 4 Dismissal is appropriate under Rule 12(b)(6) where a pleader fails to state a claim upon 5 which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 6 555 (2007). A pleading must give fair notice of a legally cognizable claim and the grounds on 7 which it rests, and although a court must take all factual allegations as true, legal conclusions 8 couched as factual allegations are insufficient. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Accordingly, Rule 9 12(b)(6) requires “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements 10 of a cause of action will not do.” Id. “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain 11 sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 12 face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A 13 claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to 14 draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. This 15 standard “asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. 16 If the court grants a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, leave to amend should 17 be granted unless it is clear that the deficiencies of the complaint cannot be cured by

18 amendment. DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992). Pursuant 19 to Rule 15(a), the court should “freely” give leave to amend “when justice so requires,” and in 20 the absence of a reason such as “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the 21 movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue 22 23 24 25 1 prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of 2 amendment, etc.” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). 3 III. DISCUSSION 4 Defendants move to dismiss all of Plaintiff’s claims, arguing that they are barred by the 5 statute of limitations. (See generally Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 15). Additionally, Defendants 6 move to dismiss the claims against individual Defendants Aguirre and Hernandez because such 7 claims are not permissible under Title VII. (Id.). Though Plaintiff filed a Response, she did not 8 address the issues raised in the Motion to Dismiss but rather restated her claims of harassment 9 and retaliation. (See generally Resp., ECF No. 22). The Court considers each of Defendants’ 10 arguments in turn. 11 A. Statute of Limitations 12 Defendants claim that Plaintiff’s claims are time barred because she failed to submit a 13 signed complaint within the 90-day deadline. (See generally Mot. Dismiss). Before a claimant 14 can file a Title VII civil action, she must first file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. 15 Nelmida v Shelly Eurocars, Inc., 112 F.3d 380, 383 (9th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). If the 16 EEOC dismisses the charge, a claimant has 90 days to file a civil action. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e- 17 5(f)(1). This 90-day period is a statute of limitations. Nelmida, 112 F.3d at 383. If the claimant

18 fails to file within the 90-day period, the action is time-barred. Id. 19 Under Rule 11(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[e]very pleading, written 20 motion, and other paper must be signed . . . by a party personally if the party is unrepresented.” 21 A court must reject an unsigned pleading, unless it advises the party of the defect, and the party 22 promptly corrects the error. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(a). 23 Here, Plaintiff’s right-to-sue letter was issued on August 30, 2024. She filed her first 24 IFP and the unsigned Complaint on November 20, 2024, 82 days after the right-to sue letter 25 was issued and within the statutory period. The signed FAC, however, was filed on February 5, 1 2025, well outside 90-day statute of limitations. (FAC). Defendants argue that because the 2 initial, timely Complaint was unsigned, the Court should dismiss her claim. (Mot. Dismiss 5:2– 3 16). Judge Albregts did not advise Plaintiff of the defective Complaint in his Order denying 4 her first IFP application, but she nevertheless corrected the error within the time limit given in 5 that Order. 6 In Escobedo v. Applebees, the Ninth Circuit considered a similar question regarding 7 whether the filing of a rejected IFP commences a claim within the statutory time period. 787 8 F.3d 1226 (9th Cir. 2015). There, the plaintiff filed an IFP and complaint within the statutory 9 time limit, but the IFP was rejected by the court. Id. at 1229–30. She later refiled with the 10 filing fee after the statute of limitations had run, but within 30-day time period imposed by the 11 court. Id. at 1230. The district court dismissed her case as time barred. Id. On appeal, the panel 12 held that the filing date “will be the date on which the complaint was originally delivered to the 13 clerk’s office along with the IFP application.” Id. at 1228. Defendants argue that this case is 14 distinguished from Escobedo because the initial complaint in that case was signed. (Mot. 15 Dismiss 5:17–21). However, the fact that the initial complaint was unsigned is not dispositive. 16 Because Plaintiff corrected the error promptly, “the filing date of the corrected complaint 17 relates back to the date of the initial complaint.” Holmes v. Clark County, No. 2:23-cv-1988-

18 JCM-DJA, 2024 WL 4603700 at *2 (D. Nev. Oct. 29, 2024) (finding prompt correction of an 19 unsigned pro se complaint related back to the original complaint), vacated on other grounds on 20 reconsideration, No. 2:23-cv-1988-JCM-DJA, 2025 WL 2421250 (D. Nev. Aug. 21, 2025). 21 Moreover, Plaintiff was not advised of the need to sign any filings until January 8, 2025, when 22 Judge Albregts issued his order. (Order, EFC No. 6). Plaintiff’s claim should not be barred 23 because Judge Albregts failed to notify her of the defects within the 90-day time period. 24 Additionally, Plaintiff has subsequently diligently pursued her claim, complying with deadlines 25 1 set by Judge Albregts. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s FAC is not time- 2 barred and does not dismiss it on those grounds. 3 The Court’s decision today conforms to previous decisions regarding pro se litigants 4 bringing claims under Title VII. See, e.g. Greenlaw v Garrett, 59 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 1995); 5 Rodgers v. American Airlines, Inc., 26 Fed. Appx. 671 (9th Cir. 2001). “The Equal 6 Employment Opportunity Act is a remedial statute to be liberally construed in favor of the 7 victims of discrimination.” Mahroom v. Hook, 563 F.2d 1369, 1375 (9th Cir. 1977). Congress 8 did not intend for laymen to understand each procedural step they must take in order to perfect 9 their claims. Id. The Court’s outcome on this issue is further supported by the Ninth Circuit’s 10 preference for cases to be decided on the merits, see Schwab v. Bullock’s Inc., 508 F.2d 353, 11 355 (9th Cir. 1972), and the fact that “pro se litigants do not lose their right to a hearing on the 12 merits of their claim due to ignorance of a technical procedural requirement.” Balistreri v. 13 Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990); see also Ko v. Mut. Pharm. Co. Inc., 14 2013 WL 3338596, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 1, 2013) (indicating courts ordinarily grant pro se 15 litigants an opportunity to correct deficient signatures). In denying Defendant’s Motion to 16 Dismiss, the Court follows other courts in affording a pro se plaintiff the benefit of the doubt. 17 See, e.g., Rice v. Hamilton Air Force Base Commissary, 720 F.2d. 1082, 1084 (9th Cir. 1983);

18 Rodgers, 26 Fed. Appx at 672. 19 For the above reasons, the Court denies Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s 20 Complaint as barred by the statute of limitations. 21 B. Dismissal of Individual Defendants 22 Plaintiff brings claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against Aguirre and 23 Hernandez as individual employees of Hat World. (FAC 2:25–3:1). Defendants argue that the 24 claims against the individual Defendants must be dismissed because liability under Title VII is 25 limited to the employer. (Mot. Dismiss at 5:24–6:2). The Court agrees. 1 Courts have uniformly found that individual employees may not be held liable under 2 || Title VU. See, e.g. Miller v. Maxwell’s Int’l. Inc., 991 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1993); Ortez v. 3 || Washington Cnty., State of Or., 88 F.3d 804, 808 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[E]mployees cannot be held 4 || liable in their individual capacities under Title VII.”). Because the law is unambiguous on this 5 |{issue, the Court grants Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the claims against Defendants Aguirre 6 Hernandez with prejudice. 7 || V. CONCLUSION 8 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, (ECF No. 15), is 9 || GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The claims against Defendant Hat World, Inc. are 10 || not dismissed as time barred. The claims against individual Defendants Paul Aguirre and 11 || Fernando Hernandez are hereby DISMISSED with prejudice. 12 DATED this 11 day of February, 2026. 14 ff 1S 6 Gloria M. Navarro, District Judge UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

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