Sardon v. Jennings

Opinion

NOTICE 2026 IL App (5th) 250367-U NOTICE Decision filed 08/04/26. The This order was filed under text of this decision may be NO. 5-25-0367 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is changed or corrected prior to the filing of a Petition for not precedent except in the

Rehearing or the disposition of IN THE limited circumstances allowed the same. under Rule 23(e)(1). APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIFTH DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

EDDIE SARDON, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Crawford County. ) v. ) No. 24-MR-13 ) CHAD JENNINGS, ) Honorable ) Matthew J. Hartrich, Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge, presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE CLARKE delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Boie and Vaughan concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The circuit court did not err in granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s mandamus petition, where the plaintiff failed to exhaust all administrative remedies before initiating the mandamus action.

¶2 The plaintiff, Eddie Sardon, was an inmate in the Illinois Department of Corrections

(IDOC) and was incarcerated at the Robinson Correctional Center (Robinson), where he was

serving sentences for his convictions in Bureau County. The plaintiff filed a pro se petition for a

writ of mandamus against the defendant, Chad Jennings, who was the warden at Robinson. In that

petition, the plaintiff sought an order compelling the defendant to award him 180 days of credit

against his prison sentence. The defendant moved to dismiss the mandamus petition, on grounds

that included the plaintiff’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The circuit court granted

the motion to dismiss. The plaintiff appealed. This court affirms the judgment. 1 ¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 A. Plaintiff’s Petition for Mandamus Relief

¶5 On June 28, 2024, the plaintiff filed, in the circuit court of Crawford County, a pro se

petition for mandamus relief against the defendant, pursuant to section 14-101 of the Code of Civil

Procedure (Procedure Code) (735 ILCS 5/14-101 (West 2022)). According to the plaintiff, on

January 2, 2024, he completed the criminal law course offered through the advanced paralegal

program at Blackstone Career Institute (Blackstone). The plaintiff further alleged that this course

was an approved educational program at IDOC, and his completion of the course entitled him to

180 days of credit against his prison sentence. The plaintiff then asserted: “As of the date of this

filing, the records office supervisor, under the direction of the warden, has refused to credit the

amount of sentence credit that I am owed.” As a remedy, the plaintiff sought the issuance of a

mandamus order compelling the defendant to award him 180 days of sentence credit.

¶6 The mandamus petition was not accompanied by any document purporting to verify any of

the allegations contained in the petition. For example, there was no document relating to the

records office supervisor’s alleged refusal to grant programming credit against the plaintiff’s

sentence.

¶7 On July 19, 2024, the plaintiff filed a pro se amended petition for mandamus relief. The

plaintiff claimed that, in addition to the 180 days of sentence credit for his completion of a criminal

law course, he also was entitled to 10 days of sentence credit for his completion of an anger-

management program. Like the initial mandamus petition, the amended petition was

unaccompanied by any document purporting to verify any of its allegations. In the instant appeal,

the plaintiff does not pursue this claim about 10 days of credit for completion of an anger-

2 management program, and therefore, he has forfeited any argument related to that claim. See Ill.

S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020).

¶8 B. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss

¶9 On August 1, 2024, the defendant filed, under section 2-619.1 of the Procedure Code (735

ILCS 5/2-619.1 (West 2022)), a motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s mandamus petition. In the first

part of the motion, the defendant stated that the mandamus petition should be dismissed under

section 2-615 of the Procedure Code (id. § 2-615) because the plaintiff (1) failed to attach to the

petition the necessary documents showing that he had completed the Blackstone course or that the

course was eligible for sentence credit, (2) failed to include in his petition any indication that he

had notified Robinson officials of his not receiving sentence credit, and (3) failed to include in his

petition any indication that he had exhausted the available IDOC administrative remedies before

initiating his mandamus action. In the second part of the motion, the defendant stated that the

mandamus petition should be dismissed under section 2-619 of the Procedure Code (id. § 2-619)

because the plaintiff was not actually entitled to the sentence credit he sought because he failed to

submit documentation showing completion of a course that had been approved for sentence credit.

¶ 10 The defendant’s section 2-619.1 motion to dismiss was accompanied by an affidavit from

Jeff Patchett, signed on August 1, 2024. In the affidavit, Patchett averred that he was an IDOC

employee who served as the “Education Facility Administrator” at Robinson. One part of

Patchett’s job was to “administer sentence credit for successful completion of certain approved

educational programs through the creation and distribution of award memos.” According to

Patchett, “[c]ertain courses” provided by Blackstone were “approved and eligible for sentence

credit,” although “not all” of Blackstone’s courses were eligible. Patchett further averred: “I

explain to all individuals regarding Blackstone that I need three documents to create an award

3 memo: (1) the certificate of completion for the legal assistant/paralegal program, (2) the award

letter, and (3) the transcript.” According to Patchett, the plaintiff “did not submit the required

documentation for an approved Blackstone course.”

¶ 11 C. Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss

¶ 12 On August 22, 2024, the plaintiff filed a pro se response to the defendant’s section 2-619.1

motion to dismiss. In his response, the plaintiff addressed, for the first time, the exhaustion of

administrative remedies.

¶ 13 The plaintiff stated that in January 2024, he “completed an approved course of study

through Blackstone” and submitted “the required documents” to Patchett, who informed the

plaintiff that “he would send ‘an award memo’ ” to the assistant warden. Patchett made clear to

the plaintiff that it was the assistant warden, and not he, who was responsible for awarding sentence

credit. “[T]wo months” after submitting the required documents to Patchett, the plaintiff had not

heard anything about the sentence credit he was owed for the criminal law course. Therefore, on

March 18, 2024, the plaintiff filed an IDOC grievance, seeking sentence credit for the Blackstone

course. His institutional counselor, A. Correll, responded in writing to the plaintiff’s grievance,

stating that the records office supervisor, K. Redman, had said that the sentence-credit issue “will

be processed as time allows.” The plaintiff then “forwarded his grievance to the grievance officer

on April 23, 2024,” but the grievance officer “did not respond to [the plaintiff’s] grievance within

the 60-day time requirement.” According to the plaintiff, the grievance officer’s failure to respond

within 60 days “made the remedy unavailable.” Once the 60 days had passed, the plaintiff filed his

mandamus petition on June 28, 2024. The defendant was served with a summons in the mandamus

action. On July 15, 2024, the grievance officer “issued a moot response to [the plainitff’s]

grievance. The response is moot because the 60-day time requirement had passed.” The plaintiff

4 closed his response to the dismissal motion by stating that he had a clear right to the mandamus

relief requested because (1) he “has provided documentation showing his completion of an IDOC

approved course,” and (2) he has shown that he exhausted his administrative remedies before filing

his mandamus petition.

¶ 14 Accompanying the plaintiff’s response to the dismissal motion were:

(1) A certificate from Blackstone dated January 2, 2024, indicating that the plaintiff

had fulfilled all the requirements for the criminal law course.

(2) A two-page “grade report” from Blackstone, which showed the plaintiff’s

results on the six exams in criminal law.

(3) A one-page IDOC grievance form, completed by the plaintiff on March 18,

2024. In that grievance form, the plaintiff complained that he had not received sentence

credit for (1) his completion of “two (2) separate work assignments” and (2) his completion

of “an Advanced Paralegal Course in Criminal Law.” As relief, he requested that IDOC

award him earned credit against his sentence. At the bottom of the grievance form was a

section for a “Counselor’s Response” to the grievance. In this section, the plaintiff’s

institutional counselor indicated that she had received the grievance form on March 30,

2024, and that the counselor’s response to the grievance was made on April 2, 2024.

Counselor A. Correll wrote the following response: “Per R/O Supervisor K. Redman,

‘Records has 4 calendars to award. These will be processed as time allows.’ ”

(4) A one-page handwritten note dated April 18, 2024, from the plaintiff to the

grievance officer. In the note, the plaintiff complained about the counselor’s response to

his grievance form of March 18, 2024. He appeared to think that K. Redman had been

5 brusque and dismissive toward him when she said that she would process his sentence

credit as time allowed.

(5) A one-page “grievance officer’s report,” responding to the plaintiff’s grievance.

The report indicated that the grievance officer received the plaintiff’s grievance on April

23, 2024, and that he reviewed the grievance and the counselor response on July 15, 2024.

In the “nature of the grievance” section of the report, the grievance officer wrote that the

plaintiff complained of completing “multiple work assignments and programs” but not

receiving sentence credit for them. In the “facts reviewed” section of the report, the

grievance officer noted that the plaintiff had been awarded sentence credits for three

separate work assignments. However, the grievance officer did not write anything about

the plaintiff’s completion of the criminal law course, or about earned program sentence

credit for the course’s completion. The grievance officer’s “recommendation” was as

follows: “Based upon review of all available information, this grievance officer

recommends that the following grievance be affirmed. Grievant had been awarded pending

[Earned Program Sentence Credit] for completed work contracts.” Again, there was no

mention of credit for completion of the criminal law course. Directly below the grievance

officer’s recommendation was a place for the chief administrative officer to indicate

whether he concurred or did not concur in the grievance officer’s recommendation. On July

17, 2024, the chief administrative officer—i.e., the prison warden and the defendant here,

Chad Jennings—indicated that he concurred in the grievance officer’s recommendation

and signed his name. At the very bottom of the grievance officer’s one-page response was

a place for the plaintiff to indicate a desire to appeal the chief administrative officer’s

decision to the IDOC director. The instructions for this section read as follows:

6 “I am appealing the Chief Administrative Officer’s decision to the [IDOC]

Director. I understand this appeal must, within 30 days after the date of the Chief

Administrative Officer’s decision, be received by the Administrative Review

Board, P.O. Box 19277, Springfield, IL 62794-9277. (Attach a complete copy of

the original grievance, including the counselor’s response if applicable, and any

pertinent documents.)”

Directly underneath this paragraph, there were lines for an inmate-grievant to sign his name, to

write his inmate identification number, and to write the date of his signing, if the inmate-grievant

wished to appeal. However, this portion of the IDOC grievance officer’s “response” was left blank.

The plaintiff did not sign his name, etc., to indicate that he wished to appeal to the IDOC director.

¶ 15 D. Defendant’s Reply in Support of His Motion to Dismiss

¶ 16 On September 4, 2024, the defendant filed a reply in support of his motion to dismiss. The

defendant stated that the plaintiff’s response had introduced “a number of new facts” in an attempt

to combat the arguments presented in the defendant’s motion to dismiss. However, according to

the defendant, the plaintiff “cannot rely on facts that are not apparent from the face of his petition

in responding to a Section 2-615 motion.” The defendant asserted: “Within the four corners of the

[p]etition, it is not clear that [the plaintiff] is entitled to sentence credit. [The plaintiff] did not

include any documentation showing that he completed a Blackstone course, or that said course

was eligible for sentence credit.” In addition, “[a]dministrative remedies were available to [the

plaintiff], he simply failed to wait for the process to play out.”

¶ 17 On October 10, 2024, the plaintiff filed a “summary judgment or leave to file a second

amended petition.” The plaintiff argued that in his response to the defendant’s motion to dismiss,

he had not offered any new evidence that was outside the four corners of his petition. He stated

7 that in his response, he presented to the court “the same documents” that he had submitted to

Patchett, the education facility administrator at Robinson, in January 2024. The plaintiff also

insisted that he had, in fact, exhausted his administrative remedies before filing his mandamus

petition with the circuit court. He stated that he “waited a full three months” between the time he

submitted the required documents to Patchett and the time he filed a grievance in April 2024. He

noted that the grievance officer did not answer his specific grievance about the criminal law course.

The plaintiff stated that the defendant “has not offered any evidence” to show that he “is not

entitled” to the mandamus relief he sought.

¶ 18 E. Circuit Court’s Decision on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss

¶ 19 On November 12, 2024, the circuit court held a hearing on the defendant’s section 2-619.1

motion to dismiss. The record on appeal does not include a transcript of this hearing. The defendant

and the plaintiff pro se appeared via telephone and presented their arguments, pro and contra, on

the motion. The court took the matter under advisement.

¶ 20 On January 17, 2025, the circuit court entered a docket-entry order that granted the

defendant’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s mandamus petition. The court stated that the plaintiff

had failed to demonstrate (1) that he had a clear, affirmative right to mandamus relief; (2) that the

defendant had a clear duty to act; and (3) that the defendant had clear authority to comply with the

mandamus order that the plaintiff sought. The mandamus petition was dismissed.

¶ 21 On February 13, 2025, the plaintiff filed a pro se motion to reconsider the dismissal. On

April 14, 2025, the circuit court denied the plaintiff’s motion to reconsider. On April 30, 2025, the

plaintiff filed a pro se notice of appeal from the order granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss,

thus perfecting the instant appeal.

8 ¶ 22 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 23 This appeal is from the circuit court’s order that granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss

the plaintiff’s petition for mandamus relief. For the reasons that follow, this court affirms the

dismissal order on the grounds that the plaintiff did not exhaust the IDOC’s administrative

remedies before initiating the mandamus action.

¶ 24 This court begins with a preliminary matter. Subsequent to the plaintiff’s filing his notice

of appeal in this case, and specifically on June 23, 2025, the plaintiff was released from prison and

began his term of mandatory supervised release (MSR), which he is scheduled to finish on June

23, 2029. This information was obtained from the “inmate search” section of the IDOC’s website

(https://www2. illinois.gov/idoc/Offender/ Pages/InmateSearch.aspx (last visited July 28, 2026)),

of which this court may take judicial notice under the “public records” exception to the hearsay

rule. Cordrey v. Prisoner Review Board, 2014 IL 117155, ¶ 12. Despite the fact that the plaintiff’s

ultimate goal is 180 days of credit against his prison sentence and the plaintiff has now completed

his prison sentence, this case is not moot. “A case becomes moot where the occurrence of events

since filing of the appeal makes it impossible for the reviewing court to render effectual relief.”

People v. Jackson, 199 Ill. 2d 286, 294 (2002). Where an offender has been released from prison

but remains on MSR, a reduction in his prison sentence would affect how long he could be

reincarcerated for a violation of his MSR. Id. Here, the plaintiff has been released from prison, but

he remains on MSR. For that reason, this appeal is not moot. This court now turns to the merits of

the appeal.

¶ 25 “Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy used to compel a public officer to perform

nondiscretionary official duties.” People ex rel. Senko v. Meersman, 2012 IL 114163, ¶ 9. The writ

of mandamus provides affirmative, rather than prohibitory, relief. Chicago Bar Ass’n v. Illinois

9 State Board of Elections, 161 Ill. 2d 502, 507 (1994). To obtain a writ of mandamus, “the plaintiff

must establish a clear right to the requested relief, a clear duty of the public officer to act, and clear

authority of the public officer to comply with the order.” McFatridge v. Madigan, 2013 IL 113676,

¶ 17. The plaintiff must “set forth every material fact needed to demonstrate” these three elements.

(Emphasis in original.) Rodriguez v. Illinois Prisoner Review Board, 376 Ill. App. 3d 429, 433-34

(2007).

¶ 26 For mandamus relief to be appropriate, there must be no other fully adequate remedy

available to the plaintiff. Cordrey, 2014 IL 117155, ¶ 18. Consistent with this dictate is the doctrine

that mandamus relief will not issue unless the plaintiff has exhausted all the administrative

remedies available to him. “The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies holds that a

party aggrieved by an administrative decision cannot seek judicial review without first pursuing

all available administrative remedies.” Canel v. Topinka, 212 Ill. 2d 311, 320 (2004). “The reasons

for the exhaustion requirement are to allow the administrative agency to fully develop and consider

the facts of the case before it, to allow the agency to utilize its expertise, and to allow the aggrieved

party to obtain relief from the agency, thus making judicial review unnecessary.” Id. at 320-21.

An IDOC inmate, for example, must exhaust the IDOC’s administrative procedures—pursuing

any and all administrative remedies available for grievances—before he initiates a mandamus

action. Johnson v. Department of Corrections, 368 Ill. App. 3d 147, 150 (2006) (where the plaintiff

failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before filing a mandamus petition, he “failed to state

a clear right to relief,” thus defeating his claim).

¶ 27 Here, the defendant’s motion to dismiss the mandamus petition included a section 2-615

motion to dismiss based upon the pleadings. 735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2022). The defendant

10 pointed out that the plaintiff, inter alia, failed to include in his petition any indication that he had

exhausted his administrative remedies before initiating his mandamus action.

¶ 28 A section 2-615(a) motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint based on

defects apparent on its face. Reynolds v. Jimmy John’s Enterprises, LLC, 2013 IL App (4th)

120139, ¶ 25. While a plaintiff is not required to prove his case at the pleading stage, he must

allege sufficient facts to state all the elements which are necessary to sustain his cause of action.

Visvardis v. Eric P. Ferleger, P.C., 375 Ill. App. 3d 719, 724 (2007). A section 2-615(a) motion

to dismiss presents the question of whether the facts alleged in the complaint—viewed in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff (i.e., the nonmoving party), and taking as true all well-pleaded facts

and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from those facts—are sufficient to state a cause

of action upon which relief may be granted. Jane Doe-3 v. McLean County Unit District No. 5

Board of Directors, 2012 IL 112479, ¶ 16. The court should disregard factual conclusions that are

unsupported by specific factual allegations and unreasonable inferences. Patrick Engineering, Inc.

v. City of Naperville, 2012 IL 113148, ¶ 31.

¶ 29 To survive a section 2-615 motion to dismiss, a plaintiff “must allege facts sufficient to

bring a claim within a legally recognized cause of action.” Tedrick v. Community Resource Center,

Inc., 235 Ill. 2d 155, 161 (2009). “[A] cause of action should not be dismissed pursuant to section

2-615 unless it is clearly apparent that no set of facts can be proved that would entitle the plaintiff

to recovery.” Marshall v. Burger King Corp., 222 Ill. 2d 422, 429 (2006). In ruling on a section 2-

615 motion, the court only considers (1) those facts apparent from the face of the pleadings,

(2) matters subject to judicial notice, and (3) judicial admissions in the record. Gillen v. State Farm

Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 215 Ill. 2d 381, 385 (2005). Because a section 2-615 motion

11 raises issues of law, this court reviews orders granting section 2-615 dismissals de novo. Heastie

v. Roberts, 226 Ill. 2d 515, 530-31 (2007).

¶ 30 Here, the plaintiff, in his mandamus petition filed on June 28, 2024, failed to allege facts

sufficient to show that he had exhausted his IDOC administrative remedies before he filed his

petition in the circuit court. He thereby failed to state a clear right to relief, which defeated his

mandamus claim. Johnson, 368 Ill. App. 3d at 150. The plaintiff was precluded from mandamus

relief because he failed to allege the exhaustion of prison administrative remedies.

¶ 31 In the plaintiff’s response to the defendant’s motion to dismiss his mandamus petition,

which the plaintiff filed on August 22, 2024, the plaintiff stated that he “forwarded his grievance

to the grievance officer on April 23, 2024,” but the grievance officer “did not respond to [the

plaintiff’s] grievance within the 60 day time requirement,” and this failure to respond within 60

days “made the remedy unavailable,” leading the plaintiff to file his mandamus petition with the

circuit court on June 28, 2024. However, even if the plaintiff had included this information in his

mandamus petition, it would not have been sufficient to satisfy the exhaustion-of-remedies

doctrine. The plaintiff should have allowed the grievance officer more than 60 days to respond to

his grievance, and he should not have been so quick to file a mandamus petition with the circuit

court.

¶ 32 Under the Illinois Administrative Code, an offender imprisoned in IDOC “may file a

written grievance on a grievance form that shall be made available in all living units.” 20 Ill. Adm.

Code 504.810(a) (eff. Apr. 1, 2017). “Grievances shall be addressed to [the offender’s]

institutional counselor; however, complaints concerning discipline or sexual abuse shall be sent

by the offender directly to the Grievance Officer.” Id. “Grievances shall be reviewed and a written

response provided to the offender.” 20 Ill. Adm. Code 504.830(a) (eff. Apr. 1, 2017). “The

12 Grievance Officer shall consider the grievance and report his or her findings and recommendations

in writing to the Chief Administrative Officer [i.e., the warden] within two months after receipt of

the written grievance, when reasonably feasible under the circumstances.” 20 Ill. Adm. Code

504.830(e) (eff. Apr. 1, 2017). “The Chief Administrative Officer shall review the findings and

recommendation and advise the offender of his or her decision in writing.” Id.

¶ 33 If an inmate receives the response from the chief administrative officer, and the complaint

still has not been resolved to the inmate’s satisfaction, the inmate “may appeal in writing to the

[IDOC] Director.” 20 Ill. Adm. Code 504.850(a) (eff. Apr. 1, 2017). The inmate must attach to the

appeal copies of the grievance officer’s report and the chief administrative officer’s decision. Id.

“The appeal must be received by the Administrative Review Board within 30 days after the date

of the [chief administrative officer’s] decision.” Id.

¶ 34 IDOC regulations “were designed to provide guidance to prison officials in the

administration of prisons.” Ashley v. Snyder, 316 Ill. App. 3d 1252, 1258 (2000). They “were never

intended to confer rights on inmates.” (Emphasis in original.) Id.

¶ 35 The IDOC regulations did not confer upon the plaintiff a right to receive a response from

the grievance officer within 60 days, or two months, after submitting his grievance. The regulations

were not intended to confer such a right upon him. The regulations do not fix a deadline for the

grievance officer’s reply to a grievant. The most that they do is to set a two-month deadline for the

grievance officer to report his findings and recommendations to the warden, “when reasonably

feasible under the circumstances.” 20 Ill. Adm. Code 504.830(e) (eff. Apr. 1, 2017). The rule is

more aspirational than legally binding. The plaintiff should have given the grievance officer more

time to respond, instead of rushing his mandamus petition to the Crawford County circuit court.

In addition, the plaintiff chose not to appeal the decision of the chief administrative officer to the

13 IDOC’s director. The plaintiff’s failure to appeal to the director represents another failure by the

plaintiff to avail himself of an IDOC administrative remedy.

¶ 36 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 37 The plaintiff claimed to be entitled to credit against his prison sentence, but in pursuit of

that credit, he failed to exhaust the IDOC’s administrative remedies. Due to that failure, the

plaintiff could not establish a clear right to a court order compelling an award of the credit, and his

mandamus claim was thus defeated. The circuit court did not err in granting the defendant’s motion

to dismiss. The judgment is affirmed.

¶ 38 Affirmed.