1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 SARAH BRUNO REYES, Case No.: 25-CV-2959 JLS (JLB)
12 Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING IN PART 13 v. WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
14 CHRISTOPHER LAROSE, Senior (ECF No. 1) Warden, Otay Mesa Detention Center, et 15 al., 16 Respondents. 17 18 Presently before the Court is Petitioner Sarah Bruno Reyes’s Petition for Writ of 19 Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Pet.,” ECF No. 1). Also before the Court 20 is Respondents Christopher LaRose’s (Senior Warden of Otay Mesa Detention Center), 21 Gregory Archambeault (San Diego Field Office Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs 22 Enforcement), Todd Lyons’s (Acting Director of Immigration Customs Enforcement), 23 Kristi Noem’s (Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security), and Pamela 24 Bondi’s (Attorney General of the United States) (collectively, “Respondents”) Return to 25 the Habeas Petition (“Ret.,” ECF No. 4), and Petitioner’s Traverse (“Traverse,” ECF No. 26 6). See generally Docket. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS in part 27 Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1). 28 / / / 1 BACKGROUND 2 Petitioner, a Mexican national, has been detained by the United States Department 3 of Homeland Security’s Immigration and Customs Enforcement division at the Otay Mesa 4 Detention Facility, since March 11, 2025. Pet. ¶¶ 10, 26. Petitioner, a transgender woman, 5 suffered persecution in Mexico on account of her transgender identity and, thus, entered 6 the United States multiple times without inspection in the early 2000s. Id. ¶ 17. Petitioner 7 has lived continuously in the United States since 2007. Id. On February 22, 2012, and 8 other unspecified times, Petitioner was arrested and convicted of “multiple low-level, non- 9 violent offenses.” Id. ¶ 18. After a series of immigration judge decisions and appeals, 10 Petitioner’s application for protection from removal under 8 U.S.C. §1231(b)(3) was 11 granted; the immigration judge recognizing that “she faced persecution in Mexico on 12 account of her membership in a particular social group—transgender women.” Id. ¶ 21. 13 On February 20, 2013, Petitioner was released from immigration custody under an Order 14 of Supervision (“OSUP”), and for more than twelve years, has complied with all 15 supervisory conditions. Id. ¶¶ 22–23. Petitioner married her U.S. citizen spouse in 2020, 16 lawfully changed her name and gender marker, and is actively working towards an 17 immigrant visa. Id. ¶¶ 24–25. 18 On March 11, 2025, while attending her routine annual Immigration and Customs 19 Enforcement (“ICE”) check-in, Petitioner “was unexpectedly arrested and detained by ICE 20 officers,” being informed only that “the laws have changed and that she would be taken 21 into custody notwithstanding her grant of protection from removal to Mexico.” Id. ¶ 26. 22 Since Petitioner’s detention, according to Respondents, “ICE has been seeking to identify 23 a third country where Petitioner may be removed.” Ret. at 2. On March 14, 2025, “ICE 24 submitted a Form I-214, Request for Acceptance of Alien, to Guatemala, El Salvador, and 25 Ecuador.” Id. at 4. All these countries have since denied ICE’s requests. Id. 26 LEGAL STANDARD 27 A federal prisoner challenging the execution of his or her sentence, rather than the 28 legality of the sentence itself, may file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the district of 1 his confinement pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The sole judicial 2 body able to review challenges to final orders of deportation, exclusion, or removal is the 3 court of appeals. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1252; see also Alvarez–Barajas v. Gonzales, 4 418 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing REAL ID Act, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 5 231, § 106(a)). However, for claims challenging ancillary or collateral issues arising 6 independently from the removal process—for example, a claim of indefinite detention— 7 federal habeas corpus jurisdiction remains in the district court. Nadarajah v. Gonzales, 8 443 F.3d 1069, 1076 (9th Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by Jennings v. Rodriguez, 9 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018); Alvarez v. Sessions, 338 F. Supp. 3d 1042, 1048–49 (N.D. Cal. 10 2018) (citations omitted). 11 DISCUSSION 12 When an alien is denied asylum, granted withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 13 1231(b)(3), and ordered removed, they must be detained for ninety days (90) pending the 14 government’s efforts to secure their removal to a third country. See 28 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2). 15 This ninety-day period is referred to as the “removal period.” § 1231(a)(1)(A). After the 16 removal period, this statute “limits an alien’s post-removal-period detention to a period 17 reasonably necessary to bring about that alien’s removal from the United States” and “does 18 not permit indefinite detention.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 689 (2001). A six- 19 month period of post-removal detention constitutes a “presumptively reasonable period of 20 detention.” Id. at 701. After this six-month period passes, the petitioner has the burden to 21 “provide[] good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the 22 reasonably foreseeable future.” Id. If petitioner satisfies their initial burden, it then shifts 23 to the Government to rebut that showing. Id. “[F]or detention to remain reasonable, as the 24 period of prior post-removal confinement grows, what counts as the ‘reasonably 25 foreseeable future’ conversely would have to shrink.” Id. “[O]nce removal is no longer 26 reasonably foreseeable, continued detention is no longer authorized by statute.” Id. at 699. 27 In that case, the alien’s release may be conditioned on any of the various forms of 28 conditioned release, including an OSUP. Id. at 700. 1 Once ICE releases a non-citizen on OSUP, “ICE’s ability to re-detain that noncitizen 2 is constrained by its own regulations.” Nouri v. Herrera, SA CV 25-1905-JFW(DBT), 3 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171809, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2025) (internal citation omitted). 4 ICE may re-detain a non-citizen released on an OSUP “if, on account of changed 5 circumstances, [ICE] determines that there is a significant likelihood that the alien may be 6 removed in the reasonably foreseeable future.” 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2). ICE may also re- 7 detain if the non-citizen “violates any of the conditions of release.” § 241.13(i)(1). If ICE 8 chooses to re-detain, the non-citizen must “be notified of the reasons for revocation” and 9 be afforded “an initial informal interview promptly after [her] return to . . . custody to 10 afford the alien an opportunity to respond to the reasons for revocation stated in the 11 notification.” § 241.13(i)(3). The non-citizen may “submit any evidence or information 12 that [she] believes shows there is no significant likelihood [she may] be removed in the 13 reasonably foreseeable future, or that [she] has not violated the order of supervision.” Id.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 SARAH BRUNO REYES, Case No.: 25-CV-2959 JLS (JLB)
12 Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING IN PART 13 v. WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
14 CHRISTOPHER LAROSE, Senior (ECF No. 1) Warden, Otay Mesa Detention Center, et 15 al., 16 Respondents. 17 18 Presently before the Court is Petitioner Sarah Bruno Reyes’s Petition for Writ of 19 Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Pet.,” ECF No. 1). Also before the Court 20 is Respondents Christopher LaRose’s (Senior Warden of Otay Mesa Detention Center), 21 Gregory Archambeault (San Diego Field Office Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs 22 Enforcement), Todd Lyons’s (Acting Director of Immigration Customs Enforcement), 23 Kristi Noem’s (Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security), and Pamela 24 Bondi’s (Attorney General of the United States) (collectively, “Respondents”) Return to 25 the Habeas Petition (“Ret.,” ECF No. 4), and Petitioner’s Traverse (“Traverse,” ECF No. 26 6). See generally Docket. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS in part 27 Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1). 28 / / / 1 BACKGROUND 2 Petitioner, a Mexican national, has been detained by the United States Department 3 of Homeland Security’s Immigration and Customs Enforcement division at the Otay Mesa 4 Detention Facility, since March 11, 2025. Pet. ¶¶ 10, 26. Petitioner, a transgender woman, 5 suffered persecution in Mexico on account of her transgender identity and, thus, entered 6 the United States multiple times without inspection in the early 2000s. Id. ¶ 17. Petitioner 7 has lived continuously in the United States since 2007. Id. On February 22, 2012, and 8 other unspecified times, Petitioner was arrested and convicted of “multiple low-level, non- 9 violent offenses.” Id. ¶ 18. After a series of immigration judge decisions and appeals, 10 Petitioner’s application for protection from removal under 8 U.S.C. §1231(b)(3) was 11 granted; the immigration judge recognizing that “she faced persecution in Mexico on 12 account of her membership in a particular social group—transgender women.” Id. ¶ 21. 13 On February 20, 2013, Petitioner was released from immigration custody under an Order 14 of Supervision (“OSUP”), and for more than twelve years, has complied with all 15 supervisory conditions. Id. ¶¶ 22–23. Petitioner married her U.S. citizen spouse in 2020, 16 lawfully changed her name and gender marker, and is actively working towards an 17 immigrant visa. Id. ¶¶ 24–25. 18 On March 11, 2025, while attending her routine annual Immigration and Customs 19 Enforcement (“ICE”) check-in, Petitioner “was unexpectedly arrested and detained by ICE 20 officers,” being informed only that “the laws have changed and that she would be taken 21 into custody notwithstanding her grant of protection from removal to Mexico.” Id. ¶ 26. 22 Since Petitioner’s detention, according to Respondents, “ICE has been seeking to identify 23 a third country where Petitioner may be removed.” Ret. at 2. On March 14, 2025, “ICE 24 submitted a Form I-214, Request for Acceptance of Alien, to Guatemala, El Salvador, and 25 Ecuador.” Id. at 4. All these countries have since denied ICE’s requests. Id. 26 LEGAL STANDARD 27 A federal prisoner challenging the execution of his or her sentence, rather than the 28 legality of the sentence itself, may file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the district of 1 his confinement pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The sole judicial 2 body able to review challenges to final orders of deportation, exclusion, or removal is the 3 court of appeals. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1252; see also Alvarez–Barajas v. Gonzales, 4 418 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing REAL ID Act, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 5 231, § 106(a)). However, for claims challenging ancillary or collateral issues arising 6 independently from the removal process—for example, a claim of indefinite detention— 7 federal habeas corpus jurisdiction remains in the district court. Nadarajah v. Gonzales, 8 443 F.3d 1069, 1076 (9th Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by Jennings v. Rodriguez, 9 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018); Alvarez v. Sessions, 338 F. Supp. 3d 1042, 1048–49 (N.D. Cal. 10 2018) (citations omitted). 11 DISCUSSION 12 When an alien is denied asylum, granted withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 13 1231(b)(3), and ordered removed, they must be detained for ninety days (90) pending the 14 government’s efforts to secure their removal to a third country. See 28 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2). 15 This ninety-day period is referred to as the “removal period.” § 1231(a)(1)(A). After the 16 removal period, this statute “limits an alien’s post-removal-period detention to a period 17 reasonably necessary to bring about that alien’s removal from the United States” and “does 18 not permit indefinite detention.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 689 (2001). A six- 19 month period of post-removal detention constitutes a “presumptively reasonable period of 20 detention.” Id. at 701. After this six-month period passes, the petitioner has the burden to 21 “provide[] good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the 22 reasonably foreseeable future.” Id. If petitioner satisfies their initial burden, it then shifts 23 to the Government to rebut that showing. Id. “[F]or detention to remain reasonable, as the 24 period of prior post-removal confinement grows, what counts as the ‘reasonably 25 foreseeable future’ conversely would have to shrink.” Id. “[O]nce removal is no longer 26 reasonably foreseeable, continued detention is no longer authorized by statute.” Id. at 699. 27 In that case, the alien’s release may be conditioned on any of the various forms of 28 conditioned release, including an OSUP. Id. at 700. 1 Once ICE releases a non-citizen on OSUP, “ICE’s ability to re-detain that noncitizen 2 is constrained by its own regulations.” Nouri v. Herrera, SA CV 25-1905-JFW(DBT), 3 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171809, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2025) (internal citation omitted). 4 ICE may re-detain a non-citizen released on an OSUP “if, on account of changed 5 circumstances, [ICE] determines that there is a significant likelihood that the alien may be 6 removed in the reasonably foreseeable future.” 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2). ICE may also re- 7 detain if the non-citizen “violates any of the conditions of release.” § 241.13(i)(1). If ICE 8 chooses to re-detain, the non-citizen must “be notified of the reasons for revocation” and 9 be afforded “an initial informal interview promptly after [her] return to . . . custody to 10 afford the alien an opportunity to respond to the reasons for revocation stated in the 11 notification.” § 241.13(i)(3). The non-citizen may “submit any evidence or information 12 that [she] believes shows there is no significant likelihood [she may] be removed in the 13 reasonably foreseeable future, or that [she] has not violated the order of supervision.” Id. 14 Here, Petitioner was granted protection from removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3), 15 meaning Petitioner cannot be removed to her home country of Mexico. Pet. ¶ 21. 16 Petitioner was released on OSUP in 2013, presumably, because her removal was not 17 foreseeable at that time. Pet ¶ 73; see Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699–700 (“[I]f removal is not 18 reasonably foreseeable, the court should hold continued detention unreasonable and no 19 longer authorized by statute.”). Petitioner was re-detained by ICE agents at her annual ICE 20 check-in. Pet. ¶ 26. Petitioner was not provided any notice of the reasons for her revocation 21 beyond the agent stating, “the laws have changed.” Id.; Tran v. Noem, No. 25-cv-2391 22 BTM (BLM), 2025 WL 3005347, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2025) (holding that this “notice 23 must be in writing and contain all the reasons for the revocation of the alien’s release”). 24 Respondents do not argue that Petitioner was provided with notice; instead, they simply 25 state that, “ICE re-detained Petitioner for purposes of executing her removal to a third 26 country.” Ret. at 2. Further, while ICE agents did conduct an interview immediately after 27 detaining Petitioner, this interview could not have provided Petitioner with “an opportunity 28 to respond to the reasons of revocation stated in the notification,” 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(3), 1 because there was no notification. Pet. Ex. 9.; Nouri, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171809, at 2 *11 (“Petitioner cannot be expected to ‘respond to the reasons for revocation stated in the 3 notification’ when the [n]otice does not actually state any reasons for revocation.”). 4 “Government agencies are required to follow their own regulations.” Hoac v. 5 Becerra, No. 25-cv-1740-DC-JDP, 2025 WL 1993771, at *4 (E.D. Cal. July 16, 2025) 6 (citing United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 US. 260, 268 (1954)) (finding a 7 likelihood of success where petitioner was not provided an informal interview). “[W]hen 8 ICE fails to follow its own regulations in revoking release, the detention is unlawful, and 9 the petitioner’s release must be ordered.” Truong v. Noem, No. 25-cv-2597-JES-MMP, 10 2025 WL 2988357, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2025) (collecting cases). The Court finds that, 11 in violation of ICE’s regulations, the revocation of her OSUP without notice or an informed 12 interview justifies GRANTING the Petition. See, e.g., Hoac, 2025 WL 1993771, at *4 13 (granting a TRO where ICE failed to follow § 241.13(i)(3) procedures); Phakeokoth v. 14 Noem, No. 25-cv-2817 RBM (SBC), 2025 WL 3124341, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2025) 15 (same); Nouri, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171809, at *11 (same); Tran, 2025 WL 3005347, at 16 *4 (granting a habeas petition on the same grounds); Truong, 2025 WL 2988357, at *6 17 (same); Nguyen v. Noem, No. 25-cv-2792 LL (VET), 2025 WL 3101979, at *3 (S.D. Cal. 18 Nov. 6, 2025) (same). 19 Additionally, even if the procedural requirements were met, the Court is not 20 persuaded that Respondents have showed a change in circumstances such that there is now 21 a significant likelihood that Petitioner will be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future. 22 First, Petitioner cannot be removed to Mexico. Pet. ¶ 74. Second, Respondents have failed 23 to secure travel documents for Petitioner. The first time Petitioner was detained, she was 24 released because her removal was not reasonably foreseeable, id. ¶ 73, and Respondents 25 present no evidence that this has changed. Not only did Respondents re-detain Petitioner 26 without any travel documents, or alleged potential for travel documents, but Respondents’ 27 requests for a Form I-214 removal to Guatemala, El Salvador, and Ecuador were all denied. 28 Ret. at 4. Third, in the last eight months since Petitioner has been in custody, Respondents 1 have not provided evidence of any outstanding requests to other countries or developments 2 in Petitioner’s case besides the empty statement by the declaring officer that “there is a 3 significant likelihood of removal to a third country.” Id. at 2; Hoac, 2025 WL 1993771, at 4 *4 (rejecting the government’s argument that ICE’s intent to apply for travel documents 5 constituted changed circumstances because they failed to provide “any details about why 6 a travel document could not be obtained in the past, nor have they attempted to show why 7 obtaining a travel document is more likely this time around”). 8 Therefore, because Respondents have failed to follow their own regulations in re- 9 detaining Petitioner and have failed to demonstrate that her removal is reasonably 10 foreseeable, the Court GRANTS the Petition. 11 A. Attorney’s Fees 12 Petitioner has requested costs and attorney’s fees in this action pursuant to the Equal 13 Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. Pet. at 35. The EAJA provides in part: 14 A party seeking an award of fees and other expenses shall, within thirty days of final judgment in the action, submit to the court an 15 application for fees and other expenses which shows that the 16 party is a prevailing party and is eligible to receive an award under this subsection, and the amount sought, including an 17 itemized statement from any attorney . . . representing or 18 appearing in behalf of the party stating the actual time expended and the rate at which fees and other expenses were 19 computed. The party shall also allege that the position of the 20 United States was not substantially justified. Whether or not the position of the United States was substantially justified shall be 21 determined on the basis of the record . . . which is made in the 22 civil action for which fees and other expenses are sought. 23 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). 24 The Court will consider an application requesting reasonable fees and costs under 25 the EAJA that is filed within thirty days of the judgment. 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / l CONCLUSION 2 Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS in part Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of 3 || Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1), and ORDERS Respondents to immediately release Petitioner 4 || from custody subject to the conditions of her preexisting OSUP. The Court ORDERS that 5 ||Respondents cannot re-detain Petitioner without following the procedures set out in 8 6 || C.F.R. § 241.13() and other implementing regulations. The Parties are ORDERED to file 7 Joint Status Report by November 20, 2025, confirming that Petitioner has been released. 8 Lastly, Petitioner’s attorney is directed to submit an attorney fee application and 9 || corresponding billing records within thirty (30) days of this Order, and Respondents are 10 |/instructed to file any opposition within fourteen (14) days of Petitioner’s attorney fee 11 || application. 12 IT IS SO ORDERED. 13 Dated: November 17, 2025 . L .
15 United States District Judge 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28