Filed 3/6/24 Sarah B. v. Evans CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
SARAH B.,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E079447
v. (Super.Ct.No. CVPS2202003)
STEVEN EVANS, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Ronald L. Johnson,
Judge. Reversed with directions.
Daniel J. Tripathi for Defendant and Appellant.
Sarah B., in pro. per, and for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1 Steven Evans appeals from the trial court’s order granting a three-year civil
harassment restraining order against him. (Code Civ. Proc., § 527.6; unlabeled statutory
references are to this code.) We conclude that the trial court prejudicially erred by not
allowing Evans to introduce certain evidence. We accordingly reverse the order and
remand with directions.
BACKGROUND
On May 25, 2022, Sarah B. applied for a civil harassment restraining order against
Evans. In support of the application, Sarah attested to being harassed by Evans in various
ways over the preceding two years, including that he had twice “attempt[ed] arson,”
threatened her and her husband, and harassed her in public. She also stated that Evans
“recently came at me as I was leaving my home[.] [C]aught me by surprise—Assaulted
my truck tried to enter my vehicle tried to stop me, . . . .”
The court issued a temporary restraining order and scheduled a hearing on the
application in June 2022. Five days before the hearing, Evans filed a motion to deem
Sarah a vexatious litigant. Evans argued that Sarah qualified as a vexatious litigant
because she allegedly had unsuccessfully prosecuted seven cases in the preceding seven
years as a self-represented litigant. The motion was not accompanied by a declaration or
any exhibits, and it was not verified.
Both Sarah and Evans testified at the hearing. At the beginning of the hearing,
Sarah stated: “You’re probably aware that I’m not a vexatious litigant. I did not get
served that paper.” The court stated that it was not entertaining the vexatious litigant
2 motion, explaining that it had “no jurisdiction for that.” The clerk then stated that the
motion was on the calendar for that day, but the judge responded, “It’s denied,” adding,
“It can’t be heard here.” Evans did not object.
The court questioned both parties. Evans testified that he had been on Sarah’s
property only in order to effectuate service of legal documents, most recently in May
2022. Evans explained that Sarah’s house is gated and walled, so he believed that he
could contact her only by approaching her when she was backing out of the driveway or
was already on the street. Sarah denied that Evans had been on her property only to
effectuate service.
Asked what conduct by Evans she wanted restrained, Sarah testified that Evans
had “harassed [her], threatened to beat [her] up, attempted to burn [her] house down . . .
[¶] . . . threatened to kill [her] husband,” “chased me down with his truck,” and “killed
[her] dear dog.” The incident concerning the truck happened on May 25, 2022, or “after
that.” She said that she and Evans had some sort of physical confrontation in June 2022
when Evans trespassed onto her property to personally serve her with legal documents.
Sarah also described an incident that occurred at a courthouse in which a security guard
had to ask Evans to leave and escorted Sarah out of the courthouse because Evans was
screaming and yelling at her.
Sarah told the court: “I want him to stop coming at my truck, yanking at the door
like he’s trying to get in, which I have pictures of.” Sarah said that Evans had hit her
windshield with his hand and grabbed at her truck door, trying to get inside of the truck.
3 Evans admitted that his “hand did hit her windshield when she was trying to run me
down.” He explained, “That was when I was serving them. I have the direct incident on
my phone on video, if you want to take a look at it. I can show you exactly what
happened. She was backing out of her driveway. I entered the street. Okay. As she was
finishing backing up, she knew that I was in the road, and she chose to use her vehicle as
a weapon to avoid, almost—almost ran me down.” The court did not respond to Evans’s
offer to show the video. Sarah agreed that Evans had been attempting to serve her with
“just civil stuff,” and she stated: “He comes and hits the truck with his hand, and he
grabs, I have pictures. He’s grabbing my door trying to get into my truck.” Sarah also
said that she had witnesses whom she could present, but the court did not respond to
those statements either.
After hearing from both parties, the court granted a three-year restraining order
against Evans. Evans objected, stating that he had just “served her small claims
paperwork, maybe not in the right way, but it was the only way that I knew of to be able
to serve her.” The court responded: “Well, no, sir, that’s not correct. It [led] to a
conflict that shouldn’t have been there. It became aggressive. The Court is not going to
allow it to occur any more.” The court ordered Evans to stay at least 10 yards from Sarah
and her residence, vehicle, and workplace for three years, until June 15, 2025.
4 DISCUSSION
Evans argues that the trial court prejudicially erred by not allowing him to
introduce the video recording of the incident involving the truck. We agree.
Section 527.6 provides that a trial court must issue a restraining order if the court
finds by clear and convincing evidence that the requesting party has suffered harassment
as defined by the statute. (Id., subds. (a), (i).) “‘Harassment’” is defined as (1) “unlawful
violence,” (2) “a credible threat of violence,” or (3) “a knowing and willful course of
conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person,
and that serves no legitimate purpose.” (Id., subd. (b)(3).) We review for substantial
evidence the trial court’s express and implied factual findings in granting a civil
harassment restraining order. (R.D. v. P.M. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 181, 188.)
“Except as otherwise provided by statute, all relevant evidence is admissible.”
(Evid. Code, § 351.) “‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence, including evidence relevant
to the credibility of a witness or hearsay declarant, having any tendency in reason to
prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action.” (Evid. Code, § 210.) “The test of relevance is whether the evidence tends
‘logically, naturally, and by reasonable inference’ to establish material facts . . . .”
(People v. Garceau (1993) 6 Cal.4th 140, 177, overruled on another ground by People v.
Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 117-118.) We review for abuse of discretion “any ruling
by a trial court on the admissibility of evidence.” (People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th
690, 717.)
5 The erroneous exclusion of evidence warrants reversal only if the effect of “the
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Filed 3/6/24 Sarah B. v. Evans CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
SARAH B.,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E079447
v. (Super.Ct.No. CVPS2202003)
STEVEN EVANS, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Ronald L. Johnson,
Judge. Reversed with directions.
Daniel J. Tripathi for Defendant and Appellant.
Sarah B., in pro. per, and for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1 Steven Evans appeals from the trial court’s order granting a three-year civil
harassment restraining order against him. (Code Civ. Proc., § 527.6; unlabeled statutory
references are to this code.) We conclude that the trial court prejudicially erred by not
allowing Evans to introduce certain evidence. We accordingly reverse the order and
remand with directions.
BACKGROUND
On May 25, 2022, Sarah B. applied for a civil harassment restraining order against
Evans. In support of the application, Sarah attested to being harassed by Evans in various
ways over the preceding two years, including that he had twice “attempt[ed] arson,”
threatened her and her husband, and harassed her in public. She also stated that Evans
“recently came at me as I was leaving my home[.] [C]aught me by surprise—Assaulted
my truck tried to enter my vehicle tried to stop me, . . . .”
The court issued a temporary restraining order and scheduled a hearing on the
application in June 2022. Five days before the hearing, Evans filed a motion to deem
Sarah a vexatious litigant. Evans argued that Sarah qualified as a vexatious litigant
because she allegedly had unsuccessfully prosecuted seven cases in the preceding seven
years as a self-represented litigant. The motion was not accompanied by a declaration or
any exhibits, and it was not verified.
Both Sarah and Evans testified at the hearing. At the beginning of the hearing,
Sarah stated: “You’re probably aware that I’m not a vexatious litigant. I did not get
served that paper.” The court stated that it was not entertaining the vexatious litigant
2 motion, explaining that it had “no jurisdiction for that.” The clerk then stated that the
motion was on the calendar for that day, but the judge responded, “It’s denied,” adding,
“It can’t be heard here.” Evans did not object.
The court questioned both parties. Evans testified that he had been on Sarah’s
property only in order to effectuate service of legal documents, most recently in May
2022. Evans explained that Sarah’s house is gated and walled, so he believed that he
could contact her only by approaching her when she was backing out of the driveway or
was already on the street. Sarah denied that Evans had been on her property only to
effectuate service.
Asked what conduct by Evans she wanted restrained, Sarah testified that Evans
had “harassed [her], threatened to beat [her] up, attempted to burn [her] house down . . .
[¶] . . . threatened to kill [her] husband,” “chased me down with his truck,” and “killed
[her] dear dog.” The incident concerning the truck happened on May 25, 2022, or “after
that.” She said that she and Evans had some sort of physical confrontation in June 2022
when Evans trespassed onto her property to personally serve her with legal documents.
Sarah also described an incident that occurred at a courthouse in which a security guard
had to ask Evans to leave and escorted Sarah out of the courthouse because Evans was
screaming and yelling at her.
Sarah told the court: “I want him to stop coming at my truck, yanking at the door
like he’s trying to get in, which I have pictures of.” Sarah said that Evans had hit her
windshield with his hand and grabbed at her truck door, trying to get inside of the truck.
3 Evans admitted that his “hand did hit her windshield when she was trying to run me
down.” He explained, “That was when I was serving them. I have the direct incident on
my phone on video, if you want to take a look at it. I can show you exactly what
happened. She was backing out of her driveway. I entered the street. Okay. As she was
finishing backing up, she knew that I was in the road, and she chose to use her vehicle as
a weapon to avoid, almost—almost ran me down.” The court did not respond to Evans’s
offer to show the video. Sarah agreed that Evans had been attempting to serve her with
“just civil stuff,” and she stated: “He comes and hits the truck with his hand, and he
grabs, I have pictures. He’s grabbing my door trying to get into my truck.” Sarah also
said that she had witnesses whom she could present, but the court did not respond to
those statements either.
After hearing from both parties, the court granted a three-year restraining order
against Evans. Evans objected, stating that he had just “served her small claims
paperwork, maybe not in the right way, but it was the only way that I knew of to be able
to serve her.” The court responded: “Well, no, sir, that’s not correct. It [led] to a
conflict that shouldn’t have been there. It became aggressive. The Court is not going to
allow it to occur any more.” The court ordered Evans to stay at least 10 yards from Sarah
and her residence, vehicle, and workplace for three years, until June 15, 2025.
4 DISCUSSION
Evans argues that the trial court prejudicially erred by not allowing him to
introduce the video recording of the incident involving the truck. We agree.
Section 527.6 provides that a trial court must issue a restraining order if the court
finds by clear and convincing evidence that the requesting party has suffered harassment
as defined by the statute. (Id., subds. (a), (i).) “‘Harassment’” is defined as (1) “unlawful
violence,” (2) “a credible threat of violence,” or (3) “a knowing and willful course of
conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person,
and that serves no legitimate purpose.” (Id., subd. (b)(3).) We review for substantial
evidence the trial court’s express and implied factual findings in granting a civil
harassment restraining order. (R.D. v. P.M. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 181, 188.)
“Except as otherwise provided by statute, all relevant evidence is admissible.”
(Evid. Code, § 351.) “‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence, including evidence relevant
to the credibility of a witness or hearsay declarant, having any tendency in reason to
prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action.” (Evid. Code, § 210.) “The test of relevance is whether the evidence tends
‘logically, naturally, and by reasonable inference’ to establish material facts . . . .”
(People v. Garceau (1993) 6 Cal.4th 140, 177, overruled on another ground by People v.
Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 117-118.) We review for abuse of discretion “any ruling
by a trial court on the admissibility of evidence.” (People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th
690, 717.)
5 The erroneous exclusion of evidence warrants reversal only if the effect of “the
error or errors complained of resulted in a miscarriage of justice.” (Evid. Code, § 354.)
“A miscarriage of justice should be declared only when the reviewing court is convinced
after an examination of the entire case, including the evidence, that it is reasonably
probable a result more favorable to the appellant would have been reached absent the
error.” (Brokopp v. Ford Motor Co. (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 841, 853 (Brokopp).)
Sarah repeatedly attested that she was concerned about the recent incident in
which Evans approached her truck, attempted to open her door, and hit her windshield.
The incident accordingly was of central relevance to the court’s determination of whether
Evans unlawfully harassed Sarah. Evans and Sarah agreed about certain aspects of the
incident, such as that it occurred because Evans was attempting to effect personal service
on Sarah and that Evans’s hand made contact with Sarah’s windshield during the
incident. But they otherwise disputed what happened, and they provided conflicting
versions of the incident. Evans claimed that Sarah had attempted to run him over, while
Sarah said that Evans approached the truck and attempted to “yank[]” open the door. A
video recording of the incident likely would shed light on what actually happened.
Moreover, the recording was additionally relevant to assessing the credibility of both
parties. (Evid. Code, § 210.) The parties’ credibility was particularly important given
that the bulk of the evidence in the case was their testimony. In light of the importance of
what transpired during the truck incident to the court’s determination of the ultimate
6 issue, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding the video
recording of that incident.
We also conclude that the erroneous exclusion of that evidence was prejudicial. It
is reasonably probable that the recording portrayed the incident favorably to Evans, given
that he offered to introduce it. It therefore is also reasonably probable that the recording
would have impacted the trial court’s perception of Sarah’s overall credibility and thus
could have undermined Sarah’s entire case.1 We accordingly conclude that absent the
erroneous exclusion of the video recording, it is reasonably probable that the trial court
would have reached a result more favorable to Evans. (Evid. Code, § 354; Brokopp,
supra, 71 Cal.App.3d at p. 853.) Because we conclude that the evidentiary error was
prejudicial, we need not and do not address Evans’s remaining arguments.2
1 Evans also argues that the trial court prejudicially erred by not allowing him to admit evidence supporting the motion to deem Sarah a vexatious litigant, which he claims was “integral” to his opposition to Sarah’s “civil harassment claim.” Evans did not attempt to introduce such evidence at the restraining order hearing, so the trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to admit evidence that no party sought to introduce. (People v. Espinoza (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1287, 1304; see also Evid. Code, § 354, subd. (a).) We nevertheless note that evidence showing that Sarah has engaged in conduct that would justify deeming her a vexatious litigant (§ 391, subd. (b)) could be relevant to evaluating Sarah’s credibility.
2 We also deny the parties’ various requests that we augment the record, receive additional evidence, and take judicial notice of various documents on appeal—mainly records from other court proceedings that were not introduced in this proceeding— because the documents are not relevant to our analysis of the issues in this appeal. (People ex rel. Lockyer v. Shamrock Foods Co. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 415, 422, fn. 2 [“any matter to be judicially noticed must be relevant to a material issue”].)
7 DISPOSITION
We reverse the June 15, 2022, order granting the civil harassment restraining order
against Evans. We remand the matter to the trial court to hold a new evidentiary hearing
on Sarah’s May 25, 2022, application for a civil harassment restraining order. Evans
shall recover his costs of appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1).)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
MENETREZ J.
We concur:
McKINSTER Acting P. J.
CODRINGTON J.