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4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 7 SARAH and REGINA ALONSO, CASE NO. 3:25-cv-05594-JHC 8 Plaintiffs, ORDER 9 v. 10 JAMES JACKSON, also known online as 11 “ONISION,” LUCAS JACKSON, formerly known online as “LAINEYBOT,” “LAINEY” 12 and “KAI,” and NESIAMOTU, Inc., 13 Defendants. 14 15 I 16 INTRODUCTION 17 This matter comes before the Court on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and Motion for 18 Severance of Claims (Dkt. # 224), and Motion for Sanctions (Dkt. # 237). The Court has 19 considered the materials filed in support of and in opposition to the motions, the record, and the 20 applicable law. Being fully advised, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part 21 Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and DENIES Defendants’ motion to sever claims. And the 22 Court DENIES Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions. 23 24 1 II BACKGROUND 2 A. Factual Background 3 The following is alleged in Plaintiffs’ operative Consolidated Third Amended Complaint 4 (CTAC). See Dkt. # 193. 5 Defendant James Jackson operated a YouTube channel under the moniker “Onision,” 6 alongside his now-spouse Defendant Lucas Jackson, who went by the online names “Laineybot,” 7 “Lainey,” or “Kai.”1 Dkt. # 193 ¶¶ 69–70. Defendant Nesiamotu, Inc. is a Washington State 8 corporation that Defendants used to operate their YouTube channel. Id. ¶ 71. Plaintiffs Regina 9 Alonso and “Sarah” (a pseudonym, see Dkt. # 13) are residents of Florida and Michigan 10 respectively. Dkt. # 193 ¶¶ 60–63. 11 Onision has operated a YouTube account since January 2006. Id. ¶ 150. This YouTube 12 account “targeted underage girls and provided content that appealed to that age group, such as 13 comments on body image, appearance, self-identity, suicide ideology and similar topics.” Id. ¶ 14 152. Onision began a relationship with Lainey in 2012, when the latter was a minor, and then 15 married Lainey later that year. Id. ¶¶ 180, 183. Around that time, Onision began operating 16 online forums, which he promoted in his videos to boost his fandom. Id. ¶ 187. 17 In September 2012, Plaintiff Regina Alonso, then 14 years old, became a fan of Onision’s 18 YouTube videos and began interacting with Lainey on Instagram. Id. ¶¶ 205–207. Regina and 19 Lainey would speak daily, and eventually, Regina became a moderator of the Onision Forums. 20 Id. ¶¶ 210, 213. The relationship developed further, and when Regina was 17 years old, Lainey 21 22
23 1 When referring to Defendants individually, this order uses interchangeably James Jackson and “Onision,” and Lucas Jackson and “Lainey.” When referring to James and Lucas Jackson collectively, 24 this order uses “the Jackson Defendants” or simply “Defendants.” 1 posted messages to Twitter stating that the two were “dating.” Id. ¶ 227. Lainey posted another 2 message stating, “in other news, i’m totes sending regina nudes rn” (sic) and posted a screenshot 3 of an apparently suggestive text message exchange with a contact labelled “Regina.” Id. ¶ 228.
4 Lainey would request and receive nude photographs from Regina. Id. ¶¶ 230, 233–234. And in 5 2015, Lainey encouraged Regina to visit Lainey and Onision in Washington state and offered to 6 pay for Regina’s travel expenses. Id. ¶¶ 236–37. But Regina’s mother did not permit her to 7 travel, id. ¶ 240, and Regina did not visit Onision or Lainey, see generally id. 8 Plaintiff Sarah became a fan of Onision and Lainey’s videos at age 13 and began to 9 interact with Lainey on Twitter. Id. ¶ 245. Sarah also joined an online group chat for fans of the 10 couple moderated by Regina. Id. ¶¶ 246–47. Lainey contacted Sarah about a year later, after 11 asking Regina if her friend Sarah was trustworthy. Id. ¶¶ 249–51. At the time, Sarah was 14 12 years old. Id. Lainey, Sarah, and Regina formed a group chat together titled “The Three
13 Musketeers.” Id. ¶ 256. In this group chat, Lainey, Sarah, and Regina discussed sexualized and 14 explicit topics. Id. ¶¶ 258–60, 262. On September 15, 2016, Sarah, then 16, flew to Washington 15 on Lainey’s invitation and returned to Michigan after a few days. Id. ¶ 275, 277, 283. After this 16 first trip, Sarah’s mother awarded Lainey “guardianship” of Sarah. Id. ¶ 284–85. Later, Sarah 17 made five trips at Defendants’ invitation and expense between 2016 and 2018. Id. ¶¶ 56, 287, 18 305–06, 308, 310, 331. During these trips, Onision, and at times Lainey, would physically touch 19 Sarah in a sexual manner. Id. ¶¶ 291–97, 303. 20 In August 2018, Sarah turned 18. Id. ¶ 277 (describing Sarah’s birthday as falling on 21 August 15). In January 2019, Sarah, coerced by Defendants, posted a video online stating that 22 “she did not engage in sexual relations while underage.” Id. ¶¶ 335–36. Sarah then traveled
23 back to Defendants’ residence, where Defendants forced her into a sexual encounter soon after 24 1 her arrival. Id. ¶¶ 344–66. She was then coerced into signing an “NDA”2 before returning to 2 Michigan. Id. ¶¶ 369, 374. Sarah made three more visits to Defendants in 2019. Id. ¶¶ 378–79, 3 382. Later in 2019, after Sarah’s final visit to Defendants’ residence, Onision began posting 4 videos online stating that Sarah had sexually assaulted him and was also blackmailing him. Id. 5 ¶¶ 384, 390–91, 396. 6 B. Procedural Background 7 This case’s procedural history is complex. In 2023, Plaintiffs filed separate suits against 8 Google, its subsidiary YouTube (collectively, the YouTube Defendants), and the Jackson 9 Defendants in Florida and Michigan. That fall, both cases were transferred to separate judges in 10 the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. Plaintiffs amended their 11 complaint several times, and on November 1, 2024, both cases were reassigned to the same 12 judge. Dkt. # 162. In March 2025, Plaintiffs’ cases were consolidated, Dkt. # 189. Plaintiffs
13 then jointly filed the CTAC. See Dkt. # 193. 14 On June 24, 2025, the California district court granted the YouTube Defendants’ motion 15 to dismiss and transferred the case to this Court. See Dkt. # 210. After the dismissal, these 16 claims from the CTAC survive: Counts I and II (Plaintiff Alonso’s claim under the Trafficking 17 Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591, 1595), Counts III, IV, and 18 V (Plaintiff Alonso’s claims under 18 U.S.C. § 2255, known as “Masha’s Law”), Counts VI, VII, 19 VIII, and IX (Plaintiff Sarah’s TVPRA and related Masha’s Law claims), Count X (Plaintiff 20 Sarah’s defamation per se claim against Defendant James Jackson), and Count XII (Plaintiff 21 Sarah’s California civil claim under California Code of Civil Procedure § 340.16 against the 22
2 The CTAC does not state the title of the document. Defendants have attached to their motion to 23 dismiss an image of a document bearing the title “Mutual Non-Disclosure Agreement” signed by “Sarah” with the last name redacted and “Gregory Avarog” or “Averoe,” dated January 18, 2019. Dkt. # 224-6 at 24 8–9. Defendants represent that this document is a copy of the NDA as executed by Sarah and Defendants. 1 Jackson Defendants).3 Because the California court also terminated Defendants’ then-pending 2 motion to dismiss, see Dkt. # 212, Defendants filed another motion to dismiss, which is now 3 before the Court. See Dkt. # 224. That dismissal motion also includes a request that this Court 4 sever the plaintiffs’ claims from each other. After moving to dismiss, Defendants moved for 5 sanctions against Plaintiffs’ counsel. See Dkt. # 237. 6 III DISCUSSION 7 A. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss 8 The bulk of Defendants’ motion seeks dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims. 9 1. Motion to dismiss standards 10 Rule 12(b)(6) applies to motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 12(b)(6). In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “the district court must accept all material 12 allegations in the complaint as true, and construe them in the light most favorable to the non- 13 moving party.” Chubb Custom Ins. Co. v. Space Sys./Loral, Inc., 710 F.3d 946, 956 (9th Cir. 14 2013) (citing Moyo v. Gomez, 32 F.3d 1382, 1384 (9th Cir. 1994)). It must also draw all 15 reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Wyler Summit P’ship v. Turner Broad. 16 Sys., Inc., 135 F.3d 658, 663 (9th Cir. 1998). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must 17 contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 18 face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 19 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content 20 that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 21 misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Dismissal is proper only if the 22 23
3 In the CTAC, Plaintiffs’ counsel appears to cite California Penal Code § 340.16, but no such 24 provision in the California Penal Code exists. It appears that counsel intended to cite the Civil Code. 1 plaintiffs have not alleged a “cognizable legal theory” or there is an “absence of sufficient facts 2 alleged to support a cognizable legal theory.” Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 3 2001).
4 When evaluating a motion to dismiss, the court considers the complaint but may also 5 consider other materials, such as “documents attached to the complaint, documents incorporated 6 by reference in the complaint, [and] matters of judicial notice—without converting the motion to 7 dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.” United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th 8 Cir. 2003). 9 2. Analysis 10 Defendants say that the Court should dismiss Plaintiffs’ TVPRA and related federal 11 claims because the CTAC does not allege a “commercial sex act,” “trafficking venture,” or any 12 predicate offenses involving a minor. Dkt. # 224 at 8–11. Defendants make the same argument
13 about Plaintiffs’ state-law claims “for defamation, emotional distress, and related torts,” id. at 11, 14 but also appear to argue that, if the Court dismisses Plaintiffs’ federal claims, it should also 15 decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ remaining state-law claims under 16 Rule 12(b)(1). See id. at 6–8. Defendants’ motion to dismiss does not address Plaintiff Sarah’s 17 California civil claim, though it does seek dismissal of the entire CTAC. Defendants also say 18 that Plaintiffs’ TVPRA claims sound in fraud and do not meet the particularity requirements for 19 pleading fraud under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). Id. at 9. 20 Plaintiffs respond that Defendants’ motion to dismiss is untimely. See Dkt. # 232 at 6–7. 21 Plaintiffs say that Defendants had 21 days from July 8, 2025—the date that the order transferring 22 the case from California to Washington federal court became final—to file an answer or a
23 motion to dismiss, which computes to July 29, 2025. Id. at 6 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 24 12(a)(1)(A)(i)). Defendants did not request any extension and filed the present motion to dismiss 1 on August 12, 2025. Plaintiffs also contend that even if the Court accepts Defendants’ Motion as 2 timely, it should fail substantively, as the CTAC plausibly pleads TVPRA and Masha’s Law 3 claims as well as the other state claims under Rule 12(b)(6). Id. at 9–13.
4 As for Plaintiffs’ timeliness argument, the Court will consider Defendants’ dismissal 5 motion. In the Ninth Circuit, parties may generally file a Rule 12(b) motion at “any time before 6 the responsive pleading is filed.” Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Alla Med. Servs., Inc., 855 F.2d 1470, 7 1474 (9th Cir. 1988). “[A]s long as a party is not in default, courts have considered late motions 8 to dismiss even when no responsive pleading has been filed and no extension for filing granted 9 by the court.” Atigeo LLC v. Offshore Ltd., D, 2014 WL 239096, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 22, 10 2014) (collecting cases). The Court also considers that pro se litigants are “entitled to some 11 latitude and leniency with procedural matters.” Perrotte v. Johnson, 2017 WL 35499, at *3 12 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2017) (citing Haines v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980)). Defendants are not in
13 default, and Plaintiffs do not appear to be prejudiced by the 14-day delay. 14 Next, the Court notes that attached to the dismissal motion are two affidavits by 15 Defendants. See Dkt. ## 224-1, 224-2. Defendants appear to have attached about 200 exhibits to 16 these affidavits, and they cite them throughout their dismissal motion. But on a motion to 17 dismiss, the Court may only consider the pleadings and matters of judicial notice. See Atigeo, 18 2014 WL 239096, at *4 (rejecting the defendants’ attempt to “supplement the pleadings” by 19 attaching a declaration to a motion to dismiss) (citing Ritchie, 342 F.3d at 908). The Court thus 20 declines to consider the documents at Dkt. ## 224-1 through 224-10 in its resolution of this 21 motion. 22 Finally, as for the substance of Plaintiffs’ claims, the Court notes that Defendants make
23 no specific dismissal arguments for the claims in Count XII (the California sexual abuse claims). 24 Because the Court sees no reason to dismiss these claims sua sponte, it declines to dismiss them 1 and does not address them below. The Court considers each of Plaintiffs’ remaining claims in 2 turn. For the reasons below, the Court concludes that the CTAC alleges sufficient factual matter 3 for each claim to survive a motion to dismiss. It thus DENIES Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss in
4 full. 5 a. Plaintiffs’ TVPRA claims 6 Section 1591 of the TVPRA provides criminal penalties for anyone who knowingly 7 “recruits, entices, harbors, transports, provides, obtains, advertises, maintains, patronizes, or 8 solicits by any means a person . . . who has not attained the age of 18 years” to “engage in a 9 commercial sex act.” Under § 1591(b)(2), anyone who benefits from such activity may also be 10 liable. A “commercial sex act” is “any sex act, on account of which anything of value is given to 11 or received by any person.” 18 U.S.C. § 1591(e)(3). Section 1595 of the Act provides for civil 12 remedies for violating Section 1591. In an unpublished opinion, the Ninth Circuit recognized
13 that the term “commercial sex act” under Section 1591 is not “limited to sexual intercourse for 14 money.” United States v. Bazar, 747 Fed. App’x 454, 456 (9th Cir. 2018).4 And a court in the 15 Ninth Circuit has determined that a quid pro quo is not required. See Acevedo v. eXp Realty, 16 LLC, 713 F. Supp. 3d 740, 772 (C.D. Cal. 2024) (“The coexistence of the sex act and the thing of 17 value is the exchange necessary to satisfy a commercial sex act” under the TVPRA). Another 18 has noted that Sections 1591 and 1595 “contain expansive language that the courts should 19 20
21 4 Defendants cite United States v. Todd, 627 F.3d 329, 334–35 (9th Cir. 2010), for the proposition that the TVPRA requires “specific evidence of commercial activity,” but as discussed below, Plaintiffs do 22 allege such activity within the meaning of the statute. Defendants also cite Doe v. Twitter, 555 F. Supp. 3d 889, 917–18 (N.D. Cal. 2021), aff’d in part, rev’d in part and remanded sub nom. Doe # 1 v. Twitter, Inc., 2023 WL 3220912 (9th Cir. May 3, 2023), in support of the proposition. But in Doe, the court 23 dismissed the plaintiff[s]’ TVPRA claims under 47 U.S.C. § 230, the statute absolving content-hosting platforms from civil liability in certain cases. Because the Jackson Defendants are not content-hosting 24 platforms, Doe is also not on point. 1 interpret broadly.” A.B. v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 3d 1018, 1024 (D. Or. 2 2021). 3 Plaintiffs proceed under 18 U.S.C. § 1595, which provides for civil remedies for anyone
4 who “is a victim of a violation of [Section 1591] “against the perpetrator (or whoever knowingly 5 benefits, or attempts or conspires to benefit, financially or by receiving anything of value from 6 participation in a venture which that person knew or should have known has engaged in an act in 7 violation of this chapter” (emphasis added). Thus, Section 1595 allows for civil remedies against 8 both those who directly perpetrate acts proscribed under § 1591 and those who “knowingly 9 benefit[] or conspire[] to benefit” from those acts. Id. 10 The CTAC sufficiently pleads a TVPRA claim for Plaintiff Alonso. She alleges “upon 11 information and belief” that she was invited to travel from Florida to Defendants’ home in 12 Washington “so that [Onision] could engage in sexual acts” with her. Id. ¶ 239. Plaintiffs may
13 plead on information and belief “where the belief is based on factual information that makes the 14 inference of culpability plausible.” Soo Park v. Thompson, 851 F.3d 910, 928 (9th Cir. 2017) 15 (quoting Arista Records, LLC v. Doe 3, 604 F.3d 110, 120 (2d Cir. 2010). Plaintiffs’ belief 16 appears to be based on allegations that Defendants requested and received nude photographs 17 from Plaintiff Alonso, that Defendant Lainey appeared topless in video calls, and she texted lewd 18 commentary to Plaintiff. See Dkt. # 193 ¶¶ 229–235. Thus, Plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient 19 to demonstrate that Defendants “entice[d]” or solicit[ed]” Plaintiff Alonso for sex acts. The 20 CTAC also sufficiently alleges something of value: Defendants offered to pay for all of Alonso’s 21 travel expenses, id. ¶ 237, and made her a volunteer forum moderator, which was either 22 personally significant to her and/or saved the Jackson Defendants the cost of paying an actual
23 moderator or doing the work themselves. See id. ¶ 416. Thus, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged 24 1 that the Jackson Defendants “entice[d]” or solicit[ed]” Plaintiff “to engage in a commercial sex 2 act.” 3 The CTAC also sufficiently alleges TVPRA claims for Plaintiff Sarah. As alleged,
4 Plaintiff Sarah received several free trips, lived at the Jackson Defendants’ expense while staying 5 with them, and appeared in several of their monetized YouTube videos,5 all before the age of 6 majority in 2016. See Dkt. # 193 ¶¶ 495, 535. During one such trip, the Jackson Defendants 7 touched her in a sexual manner several times. See Dkt. # 193 ¶¶ 293–95. Thus, the CTAC 8 plausibly alleges that the Jackson Defendants “transport[ed]” a minor for a “commercial sexual 9 act,” where the “commercial” element is satisfied by the value of the trips, Sarah’s maintenance 10 at their home, and her appearances in the monetized YouTube videos. 18 U.S.C. § 1591. 11 Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs have not pleaded a venture or the use of force, fraud, 12 or coercion. See Dkt. # 224 at 8–9. But Defendants may be subject to perpetrator liability under 13 § 1595, which does not require that Plaintiffs plead a venture. Plaintiffs have also alleged that 14 they were minors when they were initially subject to Defendants’ conduct, which obviates any 15 force, fraud, or coercion requirement in Section 1591. See Dkt. # 193 ¶¶ 226–27 (Plaintiff 16 Regina); id. ¶ 277 (Plaintiff Sarah). 17 Last, TVPRA claims are not fraud claims and Rule 9(b) does not apply. See, e.g., 18 Acevedo, 713 F. Supp. 3d at 762 (applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 to a TVPRA 19 claim). 20 21 22
23 5 The Jackson Defendants’ YouTube channels were monetized when Sarah appeared in them. See Dkt. # 193 ¶¶ 31–32; id. ¶ 146 (alleging that Onision’s YouTube videos were monetized until January 24 2021). 1 b. Plaintiffs’ Masha’s Law claims 2 Masha’s Law, 18 U.S.C. § 2255, provides for civil remedies for any “person who, while a 3 minor, . . . suffers personal injury as a result” of several predicate offenses “regardless of
4 whether the injury occurred while such person was a minor.” These predicate offenses include, 5 as pertinent here, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591 (applied above), 2422, which prohibits the actual or 6 attempted inducement or enticement of anyone to travel across state lines to engage in “any 7 sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense,” and 2252A, which 8 prohibits the receipt or distribution of child pornography. Child pornography consists of 9 depictions of minors “engaging in sexually explicit conduct,” 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(3)(B), 10 which in turn means actual or simulated sexual intercourse, bestiality, masturbation, sadistic or 11 masochistic abuse, or “lascivious exhibition of the anus, genitals, or pubic area of any person.” 12 18 U.S.C. § 2256. Courts have generally held that a defendant need not have been convicted of
13 the predicate offense for liability under Masha’s Law, “although this question of law has not 14 been fully developed in [the Ninth] Circuit.” See E.M. v. Varsity Brands, LLC, 2024 WL 15 2808183, at *6 (C. D. Cal. May 31, 2024) (collecting cases); accord Elden v. Nirvana, L.L.C., 16 802 F. Supp. 3d 1211, 1221 n.8 (C.D. Cal. 2025). 17 The CTAC brings Masha’s Law claims for Plaintiff Alonso under each of the three 18 predicate offenses listed above. It alleges personal injuries flowing from Defendants’ actions,6 19 Dkt. 193 ¶¶ 442–44, and that Alonso was a minor when the actions occurred, id. ¶ 61, both 20 requirements of Masha’s Law under any predicate offense. As discussed above, Plaintiff Alonso 21
22 6 Defendants say that Plaintiffs “must allege a causal link between a predicate offense and a specific injury” under Masha’s Law. In support of this proposition, they cite Doe v. Schneider, 667 F. 23 Supp. 2d, 524, 533 (E.D. Pa. 2009). See Dkt. # 224 at 11. But Doe is not binding on this Court. It also does not provide any support for Defendants’ proposition. See id. at 533 (discussing an intentional 24 infliction of emotional distress claim). 1 has sufficiently pleaded a Section 1591 claim. Second, Plaintiff Alonso also sufficiently pleads 2 a Masha’s Law claim under Section 2242. She alleges that Defendant Lucas Jackson offered to 3 pay for then-minor Plaintiff Alonso to visit Defendants in order to have sex with her. See above
4 at 9–10 (citing Dkt. # 193 at ¶¶ 236–39). Sex with Plaintiff Alonso at that time, along with the 5 other alleged circumstances, would be a violation of Section 1591, which is a crime. Thus, with 6 respect to those two predicates, Plaintiff Alonso has sufficiently alleged a Section 2242 violation. 7 But her Masha’s Law claim predicated on Section 2252A must be dismissed because the nude 8 photographs she alleges were exchanged do not appear to satisfy the statutory definition of child 9 pornography. She alleges that the images depicted her “exposed breasts” and “exposed 10 buttocks,” Dkt. # 193 ¶¶ 233–34, but she does not allege that they show any “sexually explicit 11 conduct” involving sexual intercourse or a “lascivious exhibition of the anus, genitals, or pubic 12 area.” 18 U.S.C. § 2256. Because the exchanged images were not “child pornography” under
13 the statutory definition, her Masha’s Law claim under that predicate offense fails. Thus, the 14 Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss with respect to Count III of the CTAC (Dkt. # 15 193 ¶¶ 432–445). 16 The CTAC brings Masha’s Law claims for Plaintiff Sarah under Sections 1591 and 2242. 17 She also alleges personal injury (Dkt. # 193 ¶¶ 537–42) and that she was a minor when she 18 suffered the harm (id. ¶ 63). As discussed above, Plaintiff Sarah has sufficiently pleaded a 19 Section 1591 claim. The same facts also support a Section 2242 claim: She alleges that 20 Defendants persuaded her to travel to Washington state to engage in a commercial sex act under 21 Section 1591. See id.7. 22
23 7 Plaintiffs’ brief in opposition states that Plaintiffs alleged the Masha’s Law predicate offense of aggravated sexual abuse under Section 2241. See Dkt. 232 at 12. But Plaintiffs have not alleged a 24 Section 2241 violation in their complaint. See generally Dkt. # 193. 1 c. Plaintiff Sarah’s defamation claim 2 Under Washington common law, a plaintiff must plead four elements to make out a claim 3 for defamation: a false statement, its publication, fault, and damages. See Duc Tan v. Le, 177
4 Wash.3d 649, 662, 300 P.3d 356 (Wash. 2000). “Defamation per se” occurs when a statement is 5 defamatory “on its face” or “actionable without proof of special damage.” Caruso v. Loc. Union 6 No. 690 of the Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 100 Wash.2d 343, 353, 670 P.2d 240 (Wash. 2000). “The 7 imputation of a criminal offense involving moral turpitude has been held to be clearly libelous 8 per se,” id., notwithstanding that whether a given communication constitutes defamation or libel 9 per se can generally be either a question of law or fact, in the latter case decidable by a jury. See 10 Maison de France, Ltd. v. Mais Oui!, Inc., 126 Wash. App. 34, 43, 108 P.3d 787 (Wash. Ct. 11 App. 2005). 12 Under this standard, the CTAC pleads defamation per se. Plaintiff Sarah alleges that
13 Defendant James Jackson published YouTube videos in 2022 in which he stated that Plaintiff 14 Sarah was “sexually extort[ing]” him, that she had raped him and was a rapist, and that she is a 15 known criminal and felon. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 570–75. These statements impute a criminal offense 16 of moral turpitude onto Plaintiff Sarah, which could constitute defamation per se if Plaintiff can 17 also prove that the statements were made. Cf. Caruso, 100 Wash.3d at 353. 18 Defendants suggest that Plaintiff Sarah must show “severe emotional distress or 19 outrageous conduct” to make out a defamation claim. But Defendants’ cited case discusses the 20 tort of outrage, not defamation. Dkt. # 224 at 11–12 (citing Kloepfel v. Bokor, 149 Wash.2d 192, 21 196, 66 P.3d 630 (Wash. 2003)). Defendants also suggest that they possess evidence implying 22 that Defendant James Jackson’s statement was true, which would be an absolute defense. Id. at
23 12 (arguing that Sarah’s claims “suggest[] the victimization of the Jacksons”); see Maison de 24 France, 126 Wash. App. at 45 (“Truth is an absolute defense to a per se defamatory statement.”). 1 But that evidence, even assuming it is evidence, may not be considered when evaluating their 2 motion to dismiss. See Ritchie, 342 F.3d at 908.8 Last, Defendants claim that Plaintiff’s 3 defamation action is time-barred under Revised Code of Washington 4.16.080, which provides 4 for a two-year limitations period for most tort actions. But the CTAC alleges that the most 5 recent defamatory statement occurred in 2025, which falls within the two-year limitations period. 6 See also Eastwood v. Cascade Broad. Co., 106 Wash. 2d 466, 469, 722 P.2d 1295 (1986) 7 (applying two-year statute of limitations under RCW 4.16.080 to a defamation action).9 8 (limitations period for civil remedies under the TVPRA); see 18 U.S.C. § 2255(b) (Masha’s Law 9 limitations period). 10 B. Defendants’ Motion for Severance of Claims 11 Defendants also move to sever Plaintiff Regina’s and Plaintiff Sarah’s claims. Though 12 Defendants do not state as much, the Court understands Defendants’ severance motion as offered 13 as an alternative remedy to dismissal, since dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims would obviate the 14 need to sever them. The California federal court consolidated Plaintiffs’ cases into one under 15 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a). See Dkt. # 189. It considered and overruled Defendants’ 16 objections and renewed objections to that consolidation. See Dkt. # 192 (minute order). 17 Defendants argue that, under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 20 and 21, Plaintiffs’ claims 18 should be severed because of their differing subject matter, their lack of shared evidence or legal 19 theory, and the risk of jury confusion. See Dkt. # 224 at 12–14. Plaintiffs respond that the cases 20
21 8 Defendants suggest that “police reports” are judicially noticeable, but they cite no authority for this proposition, nor is the Court aware of any. See, e.g., Dkt. # 224 at 2–3, 12. 22 9 Defendants also state in their brief that “Regina’s 2012–2016 allegations and Sarah’s 2016– 2019 allegations pre-2020 are barred by 2023, as her awareness by 2019 forecloses tolling under RCW 4.16.340.” Dkt. # 224 at 12. If this is a timeliness argument about any of Plaintiffs’ TVPRA or Masha’s 23 Law claims (it appears in the same paragraph arguing against the timeliness of Plaintiff Sarah’s defamation claim), TVPRA claims have a ten-year limitations period and Masha’s Law claims may be 24 brought at any time. See 18 U.S.C. § 1595(c). 1 were consolidated by order of the California district court and so their joinder is law of the case 2 and may not be reconsidered by this Court. 3 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20 permits joinder of parties if, as relevant here, their
4 claims arise “out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences” 5 and “any question of law or fact common to all plaintiffs will arise in the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 6 20. Rule 21 permits severance of joined parties “at any time, on just terms.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. 7 And Rule 42 permits consolidation of cases if they “involve common questions of law or fact.” 8 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 42. 9 Defendants’ argument lacks merit. Plaintiffs are correct that the law-of-the-case doctrine 10 prevents this Court from severing Plaintiffs’ cases. “Under the law of the case doctrine, a court 11 is ordinarily precluded from reexamining an issue previously decided by the same court, or a 12 higher court, in the same case.” Richardson v. United States, 841 F.2d 993, 996 (9th Cir. 1988).
13 Transferee courts, like this Court, are still bound by the law of the case. See Christianson v. Colt 14 Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 816 (1988) (law-of-the-case doctrine “applies as much to 15 the decisions of a coordinate court in the same case as to a court’s own decisions.”). The 16 California district court considered and overruled Defendants’ objections to the consolidation 17 order. See Dkt. # 189. Thus, the consolidation of Plaintiffs’ actions is the law of the case, and 18 the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion to sever. Even if the consolidation were not law of the 19 case, the actions involve “common questions of law” and arise out of the same “series of 20 transactions or occurrences” between the Jackson Defendants and teenage consumers of their 21 online content, namely, Plaintiffs. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 20. 22
23 24 1 C. Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions 2 1. Legal Standard 3 The Court may sanction parties or their lawyers under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
4 11, which applies to signed writings filed with the court; under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, which seeks to 5 penalize conduct that unreasonably and vexatiously multiplies the proceedings; or under the 6 court’s inherent power. Fink v. Gomez, 239 F.3d 989, 991 (9th Cir. 2001). 7 2. Analysis 8 Defendants move for sanctions against Plaintiffs’ counsel under Rule 11, 28 U.S.C. § 9 1927, and under the Court’s inherent power. See Dkt. # 237. This is Defendants’ second motion 10 for sanctions: Defendants’ first sanctions motion (Dkt. # 147) was denied by the California 11 federal court in which the action was previously filed. See Dkt. # 159. The Court likewise 12 denies Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions, Dkt. # 237, here.
13 Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ counsel made filings “without any factual foundation 14 that could survive even minimal pre-filing inquiry” and that the factual allegations in the 15 complaint are at points contradictory, justifying sanctions. See Dkt. # 237 at 12–13. But Rule 11 16 sanctions are merited “only in the most egregious situations.” United Nat’l Ins. Co. v. R&D 17 Latex Corp., 242 F.3d 1102, 1115 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). The allegations in the 18 CTAC are colorable and do not come close to the standard necessary to invoke Rule 11 19 sanctions. The Court thus declines to impose sanctions under Rule 11. 20 Next, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ counsel made frivolous, multiplicative filings in 21 Plaintiffs’ home states of Florida and Michigan in violation of 28 U.S.C. § 1927. See Dkt. # 237 22 at 13–14. This argument lacks merit. A plaintiff may bring TVPRA and Masha’s Law claims in
23 any appropriate federal district court. See 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a) (TVPRA); 18 U.S.C. § 2255 24 (Masha’s Law). And a “substantial part of the events” alleged in the CTAC and the 1 corresponding harm suffered by Plaintiffs took place in Florida and Michigan, permitting 2 || jurisdiction in the districts where Plaintiffs’ original complaints were filed. See 28 U.S.C.A. 3 § 1391(b)(2). The actions were only transferred to California federal court based on a forum 4 _ || Selection clause between Plaintiffs and the now-dismissed YouTube Defendants. So 28 U.S.C. § 5 1927 does not provide a basis for sanctions here. 6 Defendants also request sanctions under the Court’s inherent authority. See Dkt. # 237 at 7 8-9. For this, Defendants point to alleged “extortion” attempts by Plaintiffs’ counsel, which 8 strike the Court, as Plaintiffs say in their response brief, as settlement negotiations. See Dkt. # 9 244 at 14. The rest of Defendants’ arguments on inherent authority repeats their arguments 190 about forum-shopping and multiplicative litigation. These arguments, addressed above, have no 11 merit. The Court thus declines to sanction Plaintiffs’ counsel under its inherent authority. 12 As the Court concludes that none of Defendants’ cited authority justifies imposing 13 sanctions here, it DENIES Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions in full. 14 IV CONCLUSION 15 6 For the reasons above, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss with respect to
7 Count II of the CTAC. See Dkt. # 193 4] 432-445. The Court DENIES the rest of the motion
is to dismiss, including Defendants’ request to sever the claims. See Dkt. # 224. And the Court
19 DENIES Defendants’ motion for sanctions. See Dkt. # 237.
Dated this 4th day of February, 2026.
21 oh 4. Char John H. Chun United States District Judge 23 24