Sara Situ v. American First National Bank

• Court: District Court, C.D. California
• Decided: August 20, 2019
• Docket: 2:19-cv-05846
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 O 2 JS6 3 Remand to LASC, Case No. 19STCV19564 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 11 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 12 13 14 SARA SITU, an individual, ) CV 19-5846-RSWL-AGRx ) 15 Plaintiff, ) ) ORDER re: Plaintiff’s 16 ) Motion to Amend v. ) Complaint [11]; and 17 ) Plaintiff’s Motion to ) Remand [12]; Defendants 18 AMERICAN FIRST NATIONAL ) Wu and You’s Motion to BANK; HENRY WU, an ) Dismiss [10] 19 individual; JOANNE YOU, an ) individual; and DOES 1 ) 20 through 25, inclusive, ) ) 21 ) Defendants. ) 22 ) 23 Currently before the Court Plaintiff Sara Situ’s 24 (“Plaintiff”) Motion to Amend the Complaint [11] and 25 Motion to Remand [12]; and Defendants Henry Wu (“Wu”) 26 and Joanne You’s (“You”) Motion to Dismiss [10]. 27 Having reviewed all papers submitted pertaining to 28 these Motions, the Court NOW FINDS AND RULES AS 1 FOLLOWS: the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend; 2 GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand; and DENIES as MOOT 3 Defendants Wu and You’s Motion to Dismiss. 4 I. BACKGROUND 5 A. Factual Background 6 Plaintiff began working for AFNB on March 1, 2016. 7 Notice of Removal, Ex. 9, Compl. ¶ 8, ECF No. 1-9. 8 Plaintiff was assigned to work at the City of Industry 9 branch under Peter Lam (“Lam”), the Executive Vice 10 President and California Regional Manager. Id. ¶ 10. 11 In April 2018, Plaintiff was assigned to also work at 12 AFNB’s Alhambra branch location under the supervision 13 of Lan Fong (“Fong”). Id. ¶ 11. Plaintiff reported to 14 the Alhambra branch approximately three times a week, 15 and the City of Industry branch twice a week. Id. ¶ 16 12. 17 Beginning in August 2018, Plaintiff began suffering 18 from adjustment disorder, anxiety, and depression. Id. 19 ¶ 12. On or about October 23, 2018, Plaintiff’s 20 treating physician placed her on medical leave from 21 October 25, 2018, to November 9, 2018. Id. ¶ 13. On 22 or about October 24, 2018, Plaintiff reported to work 23 to inform her supervisor, Fong, of her doctor’s request 24 for medical leave. Id. ¶ 14. Fong allegedly expressed 25 his dissatisfaction with Plaintiff’s request, asked for 26 details and grounds for medical leave, and asked to see 27 the doctor’s note. Id. On or about November 7, 2018, 28 Plaintiff’s doctor extended her medical leave to 1 December 7, 2018. Id. ¶ 15. While on leave, Plaintiff 2 remained in contact with AFNB’s Human Resources 3 Department, and provided their representative, You, 4 with updates and doctor notes. Id. ¶ 16. 5 Plaintiff’s doctor again extended her medical leave 6 to January 11, 2019. Id. ¶ 17. When Plaintiff 7 returned to work the following day, her co-workers 8 seemed surprised to see her, and after being unable to 9 reach You, Plaintiff left a message informing of her 10 return. Id. ¶¶ 18, 19. Plaintiff did not receive a 11 message from anyone from Human Resources, and later 12 that day, she discovered a new employee had been 13 allegedly hired to replace her while she was on medical 14 leave. Id. ¶¶ 20, 21. Plaintiff alleges that her 15 office keys no longer worked, and that another 16 employee, Simon Lin (“Lin”), informed her that he was 17 instructed to change the locks and take her keys from 18 her. Id. ¶ 22. Plaintiff again tried to reach Human 19 Resources and You told her she would get back to her. 20 Plaintiff alleges that AFNB did not give her any 21 work to do on January 14 or 15, and that on January 16, 22 2019, Lin told Plaintiff that AFNB’s chairman, Wu, had 23 asked for Plaintiff to call him. Id. ¶¶ 24, 25. 24 Plaintiff called Wu, who informed her that she was 25 terminated because she was “no longer needed.” Id. ¶ 26 26. Plaintiff alleges that Wu offered Plaintiff a 27 severance package with only one month pay, and after 28 Plaintiff did not respond, he offered her two months’ 1 pay. Id. Later that day, Plaintiff was told by You 2 that Wu asked for Plaintiff to sign a resignation 3 letter. Id. ¶ 27. Plaintiff protested and made clear 4 that she was not resigning. Id. Plaintiff claims that 5 she received several more calls from You pressuring her 6 to resign, offering two months’ pay in exchange, and 7 that this contact continued for several days. Id. ¶ 8 28. 9 B. Procedural Background 10 Plaintiff filed her Complaint in Los Angeles 11 Superior Court on June 4, 2019 [1-9] alleging various 12 violations of the Fair Employment and Housing Act 13 (“FEHA”): (1) disability discrimination; (2) failure to 14 engage in the interactive process; (3) failure to 15 provide reasonable accommodations; (4) harassment; (5) 16 failure to prevent discrimination, harassment, and 17 retaliation; and (6) wrongful termination in violation 18 of public policy. On July 8, 2019, Defendants removed 19 the Action to this Court [1]. On July 11, 2019, 20 Defendants Wu and You filed the instant Motion to 21 Dismiss [10]. On July 18, 2019, Plaintiff filed the 22 instant Motion to Amend the Complaint [11] to add 23 additional facts related to Lan Fong and to add him as 24 a Defendant. Also on July 18, 2019, Plaintiff filed 25 the instant Motion to Remand [12]. 26 II. DISCUSSION 27 A. Legal Standard 28 1. Leave to Amend 1 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e), “if after removal 2 the plaintiff seeks to join additional defendants whose 3 joinder would destroy subject matter jurisdiction, the 4 court may deny joinder, or permit joinder and remand 5 the action to the State court.” The “decision 6 regarding joinder of a diversity destroying defendant 7 is left to the discretion of the district court.” 8 Newcombe v. Adolf Coors Co., 157 F.3d 686, 691 (9th 9 Cir. 1998). 10 Under Section 1447(e) courts consider the following 11 factors: “(1) whether the party sought to be joined is 12 needed for just adjudication and would be joined under 13 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a); (2) whether the 14 statute of limitations would prevent the filing of a 15 new action against the new defendant in state court; 16 (3) whether there has been an unexplained delay in 17 seeking to join the new defendant; (4) whether 18 plaintiff seeks to join the new party solely to defeat 19 federal jurisdiction; (5) whether denial of the joinder 20 would prejudice the plaintiff; and (6) the strength of 21 the claims against the new defendant. See Boon v. 22 Allstate Ins. Co., 229 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1020 (C.D. 23 Cal. 2002) (citing Clinco v. Roberts, 41 F. Supp. 2d 24 1080, 1082 (C.D. Cal. 1999)). 25 2. Remand 26 Civil actions may be removed from state court if a 27 federal court has original jurisdiction. See Syngenta 28 Crop Prot., Inc. v. Henson, 123 S. Ct. 366, 370 (2002) 1 (“Under the plain terms of § 1441(a), in order properly 2 to remove [an] action pursuant to that 3 provision, . . . original subject-matter jurisdiction 4 [must] lie[] in the federal courts.”). Diversity 5 jurisdiction exists in all civil actions between 6 citizens of different states where the amount in 7 controversy exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and 8 costs. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. There must be complete 9 diversity of citizenship, meaning “each of the 10 plaintiffs must be a citizen of a different state than 11 each of the defendants.” Morris v. Princess Cruises, 12 Inc., 236 F.3d 1061, 1067 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing 13 Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 117 S. Ct. 467, 472 (1996)). 14 Federal question jurisdiction exists in “all civil 15 actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or 16 treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 17 “The burden of establishing jurisdiction falls on 18 the party invoking the removal statute, which is 19 strictly construed against removal.” Sullivan v. First 20 Affiliated Sec., Inc., 813 F.2d 1368, 1371 (9th Cir. 21 1987) (internal citations omitted). Courts resolve all 22 ambiguities “in favor of remand to state court.” 23 Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1042 (9th 24 Cir. 2009) (citing Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 25 566 (9th Cir. 1992)). A removed case must be remanded 26 “[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears that 27 the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.” 28 28 U.S.C. § 1447©. 1 /// 2 /// 3 B. Discussion 4 1. Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend 5 Plaintiff seeks leave to amend her Complaint to add 6 Fong as a defendant in this Action to all of 7 Plaintiff’s claims under FEHA, Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940 8 et. seq. Specifically, Plaintiff seeks amendment to 9 add the following additional facts regarding Fong: 10 Plaintiff became increasingly stressed at work because of Fong’s management. Plaintiff 11 excelled in her position and was able to handle her job duties with little to no supervisor. 12 Despite Plaintiff’s 20 years of experience, Fong repeatedly interfered with Plaintiff’s work and 13 customers and micromanaged Plaintiff’s assignments, even requiring Plaintiff to report 14 everything she did to Fong. Plaintiff also became increasingly stressed by Fong after Fong 15 repeatedly forced Plaintiff to use a flawed underwriting system that created confusion and 16 frustration amongst employees and customers. 17 FAC ¶ 14, ECF No. 11-2. 18 On, or around, October 24, 2018, Plaintiff 19 reported to work and provided her doctor’s note requesting medical leave to First National and 20 then informed her supervisor, Lan Fong. Fong expressed his dissatisfaction with Plaintiff’s 21 request for medical leave. Fong then demanded that Plaintiff give Fong details about her 22 medical condition and grounds for her medical leave. Plaintiff refused to tell Fong her 23 private medical issue. Fong again demanded that she know Plaintiff’s medical condition, even 24 threatening to deny Plaintiff’s medical leave if Plaintiff did not tell Fong what the medical 25 condition was. Plaintiff repeatedly refused to disclose her condition. Fong became 26 increasingly upset with Plaintiff. Fong eventually demanded that she see Plaintiff’s 27 doctor’s note. Plaintiff complied and provided her doctor note to Fong. 28 1 FAC ¶ 17. This Action is before the Court on diversity 2 jurisdiction, as Plaintiff is a California resident, 3 Defendant AFNB is a Texas corporation, and Defendants 4 You and Wu are both residents of Texas. Notice of 5 Removal 3:20-4:13, ECF No. 1. Plaintiff brings this 6 Motion to Amend to add Fong, a California resident, as 7 a defendant. Declaration of Yalda Satar ISO Mot. to 8 Amend (“Satar Decl.”) ¶ 9(b), ECF No. 11-1. Because 9 Plaintiff brings this Motion post-removal to add a 10 defendant that would destroy diversity, the Court 11 addresses the 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e) factors in turn 12 below. 13 a. Necessary Party 14 Rule 19(a) provides that joinder is required if, in 15 the absence of the person, “the court cannot accord 16 complete relief among the parties” or if that person 17 “claims an interest relating to the subject of the 18 action and is so situated” that proceeding without the 19 person would “impair the person's ability to protect 20 the interest,” thus leaving that party susceptible to 21 multiple, or inconsistent obligations. While courts 22 consider the standard set forth under Rule 19 in 23 determining whether to permit joinder under section 24 1447(e), “amendment under § 1447(e) is a less 25 restrictive standard than for joinder under [Rule 19].” 26 Mkrtchian v. AT&T Mobility Servs., LLC, No. LACV 16- 27 09102-VAP (AJWx), 2017 WL 2957931, at *2 (C.D. Cal. 28 July 7, 2017) (citing IBC Aviation Services, Inc. v. 1 Compania Mexicana de Aviacion, S.A. de C.V., 125 F. 2 Supp. 2d 1008, 1011–12 (N.D. Cal. 2000)). “The 3 standard is met when failure to join will lead to 4 separate and redundant actions,” but it is not met when 5 “defendants are only tangentially related to the cause 6 of action or would not prevent complete relief.” Id. 7 at 1012. 8 Here, Plaintiff alleges Fong made Plaintiff 9 “increasingly stressed” at work by, among other things, 10 micromanaging her work and repeatedly demanding details 11 of Plaintiff’s medical conditions to the point where he 12 threatened to deny Plaintiff’s medical leave if she did 13 not tell him. FAC ¶¶ 14, 17. This alleged conduct 14 bears more than a tangential relationship to this 15 Action. Disallowing amendment to add Fong would thus 16 hinder Plaintiff from asserting her rights against 17 employees directly involved in this Action, as it would 18 require “inefficient, duplicative litigation in two 19 separate fora.” See, Fonseca, 2019 WL 2903960, at *2 20 (citing IBC Aviation, 125 F. Supp. 2d at 1012). The 21 Court thus finds that this factor favors amendment. 22 b. Statute of Limitations 23 The next factor is whether the statute of 24 limitations would affect a plaintiff’s ability to bring 25 a separate suit against the new party. Clinco, 41 F. 26 Supp. 2d at 1083. Plaintiff has not given any 27 indication that her claims would be barred by a statute 28 of limitations, and as such, this factor weighs against 1 amendment. 2 /// 3 c. Timeliness 4 The Court must also consider whether there was 5 undue delay in adding the non-diverse party. Clinco, 6 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1083. Plaintiff filed her Complaint 7 in state court on July 8, 2019. Defendants removed 8 this Action on July 9, 2019, and Plaintiff filed her 9 Motion to Amend to add Fong as a defendant on July 18, 10 2019, after first seeking, unsuccessfully, Defendants’ 11 stipulation to the requested amendment. This case is 12 thus in its infancy as it was filed about a month ago. 13 Given that the instant Motions are the first to be 14 filed in this case, and that discovery has yet to 15 begin, the Court finds that there was not undue delay 16 following removal. See Forward-Rossi v. Jaguar Land 17 Rover North America, LLC, No. 2:16-cv-00949-CAS (Ksx), 18 2016 WL 3396925, at *3 (C.D. Cal. June 13, 2016) 19 (holding that delay of four months after action was 20 removed was not unreasonable); see also Yang v. 21 Swissport USA, Inc., No. C 09-03823 SI, 2010 WL 22 2680800, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 6, 2010) (granting 23 plaintiffs' motion to amend filed nine months after 24 removal where “no dispositive motions have been filed, 25 and the discovery completed thus far [would] be 26 relevant whether the case is litigated in [federal] 27 court or state court”). As such, this factor weighs in 28 favor of granting leave to amend. 1 /// 2 /// 3 d. Motive for Joinder 4 “[T]he motive of a plaintiff in seeking the joinder 5 of an additional defendant is relevant to a trial 6 court's decision to grant the plaintiff leave to amend 7 his original complaint.” Clinco, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 8 1083. “Motive is particularly important in removal 9 jurisdiction cases where the consequences of joining a 10 new defendant may defeat the court's jurisdiction.” 11 Boon v. Allstate Ins. Co., 229 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1023 12 (C.D. Cal. 2002). However, “[s]uspicion of diversity 13 destroying amendments is not as important now that § 14 1447(e) gives courts more flexibility in dealing with 15 the addition of such defendants.” Mkrtchian, 2017 WL 16 2957931, at *3 (internal citations omitted). 17 Courts consider three factors when analyzing motive 18 within this context: (1) whether the plaintiff was 19 aware of the removal at the time of amendment; (2) 20 whether the plaintiff’s amendment contains only minor 21 changes to the original complaint; and (3) whether the 22 plaintiff has provided an explanation for its delay in 23 asserting claims against the non-diverse defendant. 24 San Jose Neurospine v. Cigna Health & Life Ins. Co., 25 No. 16-CV-05061-LHK, 2016 WL 7242139, at *10-11 (N.D. 26 Cal. Dec. 15, 2016). 27 Here, Defendants argue that the timing and 28 substance of Plaintiff’s proposed amendments 1 demonstrate that her sole motivation is to destroy 2 diversity jurisdiction. Indeed, Defendants removed the 3 Action on July 8, 2019, and within four days, on July 4 July 18, 2019, Plaintiff filed her Motion to Amend the 5 Complaint. Defendants further point out that when 6 Plaintiff filed her original Complaint, without Fong, 7 she believed that Wu and You were California residents. 8 See Compl. ¶¶ 3-4. Fong was already a part of the 9 narrative in Plaintiff’s original Complaint, in which 10 Plaintiff identified him as her supervisor and alleged 11 that he “expressed dissatisfaction with Plaintiff’s 12 request for medical leave” and asked to see her 13 doctor’s note. Compl. ¶¶ 11, 14. The proposed FAC 14 merely expands upon this allegation in the from of two 15 paragraphs, adding that Plaintiff became “increasingly 16 stressed at work” because of Fong and his management, 17 and also adding that he threatened to deny her medical 18 leave if she did not provide the details of her medical 19 condition. FAC ¶¶ 14, 17. In evaluating the 20 differences between the original Complaint and 21 Plaintiff’s proposed FAC, the changes are minor, 22 lending to an inference of improper motive. San Jose 23 Neurospine, 2016 WL 7242139, at *10 (“[C]ourts have 24 inferred an improper motive where the plaintiff's 25 proposed amended complaint contains only minor or 26 insignificant changes to the original complaint.”) 27 (quoting Forward-Rossi, 2016 WL 3396925, at *4). 28 Plaintiff claims that following Defendants’ 1 removal, Plaintiff’s counsel contacted Plaintiff to 2 confirm Wu and You’s residence and it was only then 3 that additional information related to Fong and a 4 hostile work environment was discovered. However, this 5 neglects to explain why this information was not 6 discovered before the original Complaint was filed. 7 Because Fong was included in the original Complaint, 8 Plaintiff was at least aware of Fong’s role and 9 involvement at that time yet did not include him as a 10 defendant. 11 Taken together, these factors suggest an improper 12 motive to destroy diversity. Accordingly, this weighs 13 against allowing amendment. 14 e. Prejudice to Plaintiff 15 The next factor considers whether Plaintiff will 16 suffer undue prejudice if joinder is denied. Boon, 229 17 F. Supp. 2d at 1025. While AFNB remains as a defendant 18 and potential source of recovery for Plaintiff, 19 “[c]ourts have found significant prejudice where claims 20 against proposed non-diverse defendants are so 21 intimately connected to those against an original 22 defendant that denial of joinder would force a 23 plaintiff to choose whether to pursue redundant 24 litigation in another forum at the risk of inconsistent 25 results, or forego valid claims against the non-diverse 26 defendants.” Mkrtchian, 2017 WL 2957931 at *4 27 (internal citations omitted); see also Yenokian v. BMW 28 of North America, LLC, No. CV 18-4897 JFW (RAOx), 2018 1 WL 6177230, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2018) (allowing 2 amendment in part because “to pursue parallel actions 3 that involve claims that arise out of the same factual 4 occurrence would require significant time and expense, 5 thereby prejudicing Plaintiff”). 6 As already discussed, the claims against Fong arise 7 out of the same factual occurrence and it would 8 prejudice Plaintiff to pursue parallel actions. This 9 is particularly so in light of the fact that discovery 10 has not yet begun, and as such, allowing amendment will 11 not prejudice Defendants. See IBC Aviation, 125 F. 12 Supp. 2d at 1013 (finding denying amendment will 13 require redundant litigation “while allowing amendment 14 will not prejudice [d]efendants as discovery as not yet 15 begun”). Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of 16 allowing amendment. 17 f. Strength of the Claim 18 The existence of a facially valid claim against the 19 non-diverse party weighs in favor of permitting 20 joinder. Forward-Rossi v. Jaguar LandRover N. Am., 21 LLC, No. 216-CV-00949-CAS-KSX, 2016 WL 339625, at *4 22 (C.D. Cal. June 13, 2016) (citation omitted). 23 Plaintiff proposes to bring all six FEHA claims from 24 her original Complaint against Fong: (1) disability 25 discrimination; (2) failure to engage in the 26 interactive process; (3) failure to provide reasonable 27 accommodations; (4) harassment; (5) failure to prevent 28 discrimination, harassment, and retaliation; and (6) 1 wrongful termination in violation of public policy. 2 3 Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot present a 4 viable claim against Fong because, as a supervisor 5 acting on behalf of his employer, he cannot be held 6 personally liable for the decision to terminate 7 Plaintiff as an employee. However, not all of 8 Plaintiff’s claims are predicated on her alleged 9 wrongful termination. Plaintiff’s fifth cause of 10 action for harassment claims that she suffered 11 “humiliation, embarrassment, mental anguish, 12 nervousness, anxiety, depression, and severe emotional 13 distress” due to her work environment, that Plaintiff 14 now alleges Fong contributed to. Compl. ¶¶ 75-78. 15 FEHA prohibits harassment of an employee. Cal. 16 Gov't Code § 12940(j)(1). “To establish a claim for 17 harassment, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) she 18 is a member of a protected group; (2) she was subjected 19 to harassment because she belonged to this group; and 20 (3) the alleged harassment was so severe that it 21 created a hostile work environment.” Lawler v. 22 Montblanc North America, LLC, 704 F.3d 1235, 1244; see 23 also Thompson v. City of Monrovia, 186 Cal. App. 4th 24 860, 876 (2010). The plaintiff must further show a 25 “concerted pattern of harassment of a repeated, routine 26 or a generalized nature.” Lawler, 704 F.3d at 1235 27 (citation omitted). 28 Here, Plaintiff alleges that beginning in August 1 2018, she began suffering from adjustment disorder, 2 anxiety, and depression. FAC ¶ 15. Plaintiff claims 3 that when she came to work on October 24, 2018 and 4 informed Fong of her request for medical leave, Fong 5 demanded details of her condition, and continued to 6 demand such information after she refused to divulge 7 the details. FAC ¶ 17. Plaintiff further alleges that 8 Fong threatened to deny Plaintiff medical leave if she 9 did not tell him the details, and after “repeatedly 10 refus[ing] to disclose her condition,” “Fong became 11 increasingly upset with Plaintiff”. Id. Plaintiff 12 also claims that she became “increasingly stressed at 13 work” because of Fong’s management, despite her twenty 14 years of experience and that she “excelled in her 15 position and was able to handle her job duties with 16 little to no supervis[ion]”. Id. ¶ 14. 17 Plaintiff’s allegations that Fong “repeatedly 18 interfered” with her work, “micromanaged” her 19 assignments, and required her to “report everything she 20 did to Fong” lend towards Fong’s management within the 21 scope of his employment and are generally not 22 considered to be harassing conduct. Compl. ¶ 14; see 23 Lawler, 704 F.3d at 1244 (explaining that a harassment 24 claim “consists of actions outside the scope of job 25 duties which are not of a type necessary to business 26 and personnel management,” and do not include “actions 27 such as hiring and firing, job or project assignments, 28 . . . promotion or demotion, and performance 1 evaluations . . . .”). However, the allegations that 2 Fong repeatedly demanded to know the details of 3 Plaintiff’s medical conditions and threatened her 4 medical leave as an attempt to force Plaintiff to 5 divulge such details are outside the scope of job 6 duties, and Defendant fails to demonstrate that such 7 facts could not pose a legitimate harassment claim. 8 Thus, at this stage, the Court cannot say that 9 Plaintiff has no possible harassment claim against Fong 10 based upon the proposed alleged facts. See Good v. 11 Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 5 F. Supp. 2d 804, 807 12 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (“[T]he defendant must demonstrate 13 that there is no possibility that the plaintiff will be 14 able to establish a cause of action in [s]tate court 15 against the alleged sham defendant.”). Defendant fails 16 to demonstrate that Plaintiff does not have a facially 17 legitimate claim against Fong, and “[w]here one of the 18 proposed claims appears to have merit, the Court need 19 not address the others.” Mkrtchian, 2017 WL 2957931, 20 at *4 (citation omitted). As such, this factor weighs 21 in favor of allowing amendment. 22 In sum, while the motive for joinder does not weigh 23 in favor of allowing amendment, the Court finds that 24 the majority of factors do favor amendment and exercise 25 discretion under Section 1447(e) to permit Plaintiff to 26 add Fong as a defendant in this Action. As such, the 27 Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend. 28 2. Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand 1 This case is before the Court on the basis of 2 diversity jurisdiction. As discussed above, the Court 3 granted Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend her Complaint to 4 add Fong as a defendant. Because both Fong and 5 Plaintiff are California residents, the Court no longer 6 has complete diversity. Accordingly, the Court lacks 7 subject matter jurisdiction and GRANTS Plaintiff’s 8 Motion to Remand. Because the Court finds that it no 9 longer has subject matter jurisdiction, the Court does 10 not reach the merits of Defendant Wu and You’s Motion 11 to Dismiss. Accordingly, the Court DENIES as MOOT 12 Defendant Wu and You’s Motion to Dismiss. 13 III. CONCLUSION 14 Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS 15 Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend; GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion 16 to Remand; and DENIES as MOOT Defendant Wu and You’s 17 Motion to Dismiss. This case is remanded to the Los 18 Angeles County Superior Court, Case No. 19STCV19564. 19 The clerk shall close this case. 20 21 22 IT IS SO ORDERED. 23 24 DATED: August 20, 2019 s/ RONALD S.W. LEW 25 HONORABLE RONALD S.W. LEW Senior U.S. District Judge 26 27 28