Santoyo v. United States

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: May 7, 2025
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2025-1317
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ___________________________________ ) RUBEN SANTOYO, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 25-1317 (UNA) ) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) ) Defendant. ) ___________________________________ )

MEMORANDUM OPINION This matter is before the Court on consideration of Ruben Santoyo’s application to

proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) and his pro se complaint (ECF No. 1). The Court grants

the application and, for the reasons discussed below, dismisses the complaint and this civil

action.

Plaintiff describes himself as “the founder and principal architect of Sail Phones

Collective™, a multi-tiered investigative and media-focused enterprise dedicated to exposing

systemic misconduct and advancing digital sovereignty.” Compl. at 2-3. He alleges that his

“journalistic efforts have been met with disproportionate responses, targeted interference, and

surveillance behavior indicating institutional discomfort with his presence and pursuits.” Id. at 3.

In vague and conclusory terms, Plaintiff alleges that the United States has subjected him “to

unwarranted surveillance, including vehicle tailing, physical proximity targeting, and

plainclothes placement of individuals near his residence,” Compl. at 4, have engaged in activities

constituting “a pattern of psychological disruption and behavioral manipulation,” id. According

to Plaintiff, these and other actions “frequently correlate with periods of active litigation,” id. at

5, in federal courts. He faults the federal courts for subjecting his “lawsuits and FOIA requests

1 [to] unlawful denials, delays, and dismissals.” Id. By way of example, Plaintiff refers to

litigation in and sanctions imposed by the United States District Court for the Northern District

of Illinois, see id. at 10-13, and alleges that the court’s conduct was “designed to chill Plaintiff’s

journalistic and legal expression,” id. at 5.1 For alleged violations of rights protected under the

First, Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, Plaintiff

requests a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and compensatory and punitive damages. See

id. at 5-7.

Plaintiff’s reliance on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the Federal

Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), is misplaced. In Bivens, the Supreme Court

“recognized for the first time an implied private action for damages against federal officers

alleged to have violated a citizen’s constitutional rights.” Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534

U.S. 61, 66 (2001). But a Bivens claim cannot be brought against the United States, federal

government agencies, or federal employees in their official capacities, see, e.g., Witchard v.

Surampudi, No. 24-cv-0296 (DLF), 2025 WL 928708, at *3 (D.D.C. Mar. 27, 2025) (dismissing

Bivens claims against United States, three federal agencies, a Justice Department attorney, and a

federal judge), and there are no factual allegations identifying a particular federal official or

employee personally involved in the purported violation of Plaintiff’s rights, see, e.g., Ransom v.

Dorko, No. 23-cv-2601 (RC), 2025 WL 870320, at *5 (D.D.C. Mar. 20, 2025) (dismissing claims

against Secretary of Homeland Security and supervisors based on alleged wrongdoing of

subordinates); see also Simpkins v. District of Columbia, 108 F.3d 366, 369 (D.C. Cir. 1997)

1 See Order, Santoyo v. City of Chicago, No. 1:22-cv-3559 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 2, 2025) (ECF No. 186) (imposing $1500 sanction); see also Executive Committee Order, In re Santoyo, No. 1:25- cv-4558 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 30, 2025) (barring Plaintiff from filing any new civil cases until he pays $900 in unpaid filing fees and the $1500 sanction imposed in No. 1:22-cv-3559). 2 (“The complaint must at least allege that the defendant federal official was personally involved

in the illegal conduct.”).

Plaintiff is no more successful under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), see 28

U.S.C. §§ 2671–80, which operates as a limited waiver of sovereign immunity rendering the

United States amenable to suit for certain, but not all, tort claims, see, e.g., Richards v. United

States, 369 U.S. 1, 6 (1962). “In order to bring suit under the FTCA, . . . a claimant must first

satisfy the FTCA’s exhaustion requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a),” Norton v. United States,

530 F. Supp. 3d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2021), and Plaintiff does not allege he “presented [his] claim to the

appropriate Federal agency,” 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a), prior to filing this lawsuit. Even if Plaintiff

had presented his claim, the United States “has not rendered itself liable under the FTCA for

constitutional tort claims.” Johnson v. Fenty, No. 10-5105, 2010 WL 4340344, at *1 (D.C. Cir.

Oct. 1, 2010) (per curiam) (quoting FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 478 (1994)).

Plaintiff’s civil RICO claim also fails. Generally, RICO, see 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq.,

requires that a plaintiff establish “(1) the conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern of

racketeering activity,” Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 62 (1997). The complaint’s

unsupported assertion that “Defendant and its subsidiaries engaged in a pattern of racketeering

acts including suppression of information, interference, and obstruction of justice,” Compl. at 6,

falls far short of “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

The Court will, accordingly, dismiss Plaintiff’s Section 1983, Bivens, FTCA and RICO

claims. Without a federal claim remaining, the Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over

3 Plaintiff’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

A separate order will issue.

DATE: May 7, 2025 RANDOLPH D. MOSS United States District Judge