Santoyo v. Peoples Gas Light and Coke Co.

2025 IL App (1st) 241602-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: August 6, 2025
• Docket: 1-24-1602
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2025 IL App (1st) 241602-U No. 1-24-1602 Order filed August 6, 2025 Third Division

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ RUBEN SANTOYO, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Cook County. ) v. ) ) PEOPLES GAS LIGHT AND COKE COMPANY and ) No. 24 M5 1736 THE ILLINOIS COMMERCE COMMISSION, ) ) Defendants ) ) Honorable (Peoples Gas Light and Coke Company, Defendant- ) Nicole Castillo, Appellee). ) Judge, presiding.

JUSTICE REYES delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Martin and D.B. Walker concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: We affirm the circuit court’s dismissal order where the Illinois Commerce Commission had exclusive jurisdiction over plaintiff’s complaint.

¶2 Plaintiff Ruben Santoyo appeals from the circuit court’s order granting defendant Peoples

Gas Light and Coke Company’s (Peoples Gas) motion to dismiss his complaint pursuant to section No. 1-24-1602

2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2024)) for failure to exhaust

administrative remedies before the Illinois Commerce Commission (ICC). On appeal, plaintiff

argues that the court erred in dismissing his complaint because his claims are properly within the

jurisdiction of the circuit court and do not fall within the ICC’s exclusive jurisdiction. We affirm.

¶3 As an initial matter, we note that the record on appeal does not include a report of

proceedings or an acceptable substitute. Although plaintiff drafted a bystander’s report in lieu of a

transcript of proceedings, that report was not certified by the circuit court as supreme court rules

require. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 323(c) (eff. July 1, 2017) (only a certified bystander’s report shall be

included in the record on appeal). We glean the following facts from the common law record.

¶4 On February 29, 2024, plaintiff filed a complaint in the circuit court of Cook County

against defendants Peoples Gas and the ICC, alleging he was improperly billed for natural gas

services. Plaintiff claimed that beginning in 2021, he “noticed irregularities in his gas usage.” He

contacted Peoples Gas for assistance, but “the problem persisted.” Plaintiff then contacted the ICC.

His complaint states, “In subsequent communications with ICC and Peoples Gas representatives,

Plaintiff highlighted discrepancies in gas usage data provided by the utility company and expressed

frustration with the lack of resolution.”

¶5 In his complaint, plaintiff asserted four causes of action: breach of contract for “failing to

provide accurate billing statements and resolve disputes regarding gas usage and charges,”

“consumer protection violations,” negligence, and fraud. He sought monetary damages for

“compensation for financial losses, additional expenses incurred, emotional distress, and other

damages,” as well as correction of billing errors and injunctive relief ordering defendants “to cease

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deceptive practices, provide accurate billing statements, and comply with all applicable laws and

regulations.”

¶6 Plaintiff attached five exhibits to his complaint. Exhibit A was an email dated September

19, 2023, in which an ICC representative informed plaintiff that Peoples Gas was trying to reach

him to resolve his complaint and advised him to speak to the company. On September 21, 2023,

plaintiff replied that he had noticed a “discrepancy” in his gas bills that “raise[d] concerns about

the accuracy of the gas meter” and asked for “insights and suggestions on how to proceed with

[his] claim.” Exhibit B was a Peoples Gas bill dated August 30, 2022, reflecting a monthly gas

service total of $65.59 and a total balance due of $2,718.82. Exhibit C was a bill from

Commonwealth Edison dated August 25, 2023, reflecting a monthly electric service total of $11.21

and a total balance due of $307.47. Exhibit D was a printout of plaintiff’s Peoples Gas account

comparing his gas bill from August 30, 2022, with his bill from August 30, 2023, and reflecting a

total amount due of $4,706.84 as of August 30, 2023.

¶7 Exhibit E was an email exchange between plaintiff and the ICC representative that included

the representative’s September 19, 2023, email contained in Exhibit A. The exchange showed that

on October 16, 2023, plaintiff wrote, “Have you had the time to make a comparison yet?” On

October 17, 2023, the representative again told plaintiff that Peoples Gas was trying to reach him

and asked for his phone number. An hour later, the representative sent another email stating

Peoples Gas was trying to reach plaintiff and directing him to speak to the company. On October

18, 2023, plaintiff replied that he had spoken to a Peoples Gas representative, but “she was also

having a hard time deciphering my inquiries. After being on the phone with her for about an hour,

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she mentioned that if I wished to escalate this matter with you, it’s within my rights.” The record

contains no response from the ICC. On December 21, 2023, plaintiff emailed, “So?”

¶8 Peoples Gas filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to section 2-619 of the

Code, listing both itself and the ICC in the caption of the motion. It requested that the circuit court

“dismiss the entire complaint” because the ICC had exclusive jurisdiction over rate and billing

disputes and plaintiff had failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The record does not reflect an

appearance by the ICC. Plaintiff filed a response, arguing his claims extended beyond the ICC’s

exclusive jurisdiction. In reply, Peoples Gas repeated its jurisdictional arguments and further

asserted plaintiff’s complaint failed to adequately state a cause of action.

¶9 On June 25, 2024, the circuit court granted the motion to dismiss. In its written order, the

court stated “Defendant Peoples Gas’[s] motion to dismiss is hereby granted without prejudice, as

plaintiff failed to follow administrative remedies. The motion is hereby granted until the plaintiff

exercises and exhausts such administrative remedies.” Plaintiff appeals.

¶ 10 Prior to briefing in this court, Peoples Gas filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, arguing the

circuit court’s June 25, 2024, order is not final and appealable because it was entered “without

prejudice.” This court denied the motion, noting “ ‘the effect of a dismissal order is determined by

its substance, and not by the incantation of any particular magic words’ ” (Schal Bovis, Inc. v.

Casualty Insurance Co., 314 Ill. App. 3d 562, 568 (1999)). Santoyo v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke

Co., 1-24-1602 (Jan. 15, 2025) (unpublished disposition order). We explained:

“The circuit court’s order here, based on the motion of Peoples Gas, was clearly based on

its finding that [plaintiff] could not file a claim in the circuit court, other than one for

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administrative review, because of the exclusive jurisdiction of the [ICC]. That may well be

correct, but its finding to that effect is a final and appealable order.” Id.

¶ 11 On appeal, plaintiff argues that his causes of action do not fall within the ICC’s exclusive

jurisdiction and that he had exhausted administrative remedies.

¶ 12 Peoples Gas responds this court lacks jurisdiction because the circuit court entered no

orders as to its codefendant ICC, and because the circuit court’s written order was issued “without

prejudice” and “contemplated a further pleading after Plaintiff exhausted remedies.” In the

alternative, it argues that the circuit court properly dismissed the complaint.

¶ 13 This court has jurisdiction to consider the appeal. Peoples Gas requested that the circuit

court “dismiss the entire complaint” for lack of jurisdiction, and the circuit court did just that. No

appearance or motion by the ICC was required. Indeed, a court may raise the issue of subject matter

jurisdiction sua sponte at any time, as lack of subject matter jurisdiction deprives it of all power

except to dismiss the action. See Brandon v. Bonell, 368 Ill. App. 3d 492, 501-02 (2006); see also

J & J Ventures Gaming, LLC v. Wild, Inc., 2016 IL 119870, ¶¶ 16-17, 38 (upholding appellate

court’s reversal of circuit court’s judgment where Illinois Gaming Board had exclusive jurisdiction

over the matter, although no party challenged circuit court’s subject matter jurisdiction). Because

the complaint was dismissed in its entirety for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, there are no

surviving claims against the ICC, and no written Rule 304(a) finding was required for plaintiff to

appeal. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 304(a) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016) (an appeal from a final judgment as to fewer

than all parties requires a written finding from the trial court).

¶ 14 Second, we reiterate our earlier determination that the fact the circuit court wrote the words

“without prejudice” is not dispositive of the question of jurisdiction. Santoyo v. Peoples Gas Light

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& Coke Co., 1-24-1602 (Jan. 15, 2025) (citing Schal Bovis, 314 Ill. App. 3d at 568). As mentioned,

the circuit court dismissed plaintiff’s complaint for lack of jurisdiction after determining plaintiff

had failed to exhaust administrative remedies before the ICC. This was a final and appealable

judgment.

¶ 15 On appeal, the only issue before this court is whether the circuit court correctly determined

that it lacked jurisdiction over plaintiff’s February 29, 2024, complaint. See Nestle USA, Inc. v.

Dunlap, 365 Ill. App. 3d 727, 731 (2006) (on appeal from order granting a motion to dismiss, this

court reviewed only the circuit court’s determination that it lacked jurisdiction over the claim).

¶ 16 Section 2-619(a)(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure provides for involuntary dismissal of a

complaint where the circuit court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action. 735 ILCS

5/2-619(a)(1) (West 2024). We review a circuit court’s dismissal order pursuant to section 2-619

de novo. Rideaux v. Winter, 2020 IL App (1st) 190646, ¶ 4. On review, our task is to determine

whether a genuine issue of material fact should have precluded the dismissal or, absent an issue of

fact, whether dismissal is proper as a matter of law. Id. We accept as true all well-pleaded facts in

the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Id.

¶ 17 The Public Utilities Act vests the ICC with exclusive jurisdiction to review complaints

regarding “any rate or other charge of any public utility” and empowers the ICC to order a utility

to make reparations. 220 ILCS 5/9-252 (West 2024); see also Sheffler v. Commonwealth Edison

Co., 2011 IL 110166, ¶¶ 41-42. A claim falls within the ICC’s exclusive jurisdiction if the nature

of the relief sought is reparations for unjust rates, excessive charges, or inadequate service. Id.

¶¶ 42, 54-55. This is true even where a claim is labeled as fraud or breach of contract where “the

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essence of the claim is that a utility has charged too much for the service provided.” City of

Chicago ex rel. Thrasher v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 159 Ill. App. 3d 1076, 1079-80 (1987).

¶ 18 By contrast, the circuit court may assert jurisdiction over well-pled claims that a utility has

wronged a plaintiff in other ways. See, e.g., Thomas v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 2011 IL

App (1st) 102868, ¶¶ 15, 22 (circuit court had jurisdiction over claim that utility unlawfully

attempted to collect a debt after discharge in bankruptcy); Flournoy v. Ameritech, 351 Ill. App. 3d

583, 586 (2004) (same, over claim that prison telephone service fraudulently collected multiple

charges for calls); Sutherland v. Illinois Bell, 254 Ill. App. 3d 983, 993 (1993) (same, over claim

that utility charged for services that were not ordered).

¶ 19 Here, plaintiff asserted causes of action for breach of contract, unspecified “consumer

protection violations,” negligence, and fraud. However, each of these claims arises from his vague

allegation of “irregularities” in his gas bills. The relief he requested—including financial

compensation, “[c]orrection of billing errors,” and an injunction to “cease deceptive practices” and

“provide accurate billing statements”—amounts to reparations for improper billing. Although

plaintiff uses the language of fraud and deception, the essence of his complaint remains, in the

words of our supreme court, that Peoples Gas “charged too much.” See Sheffler, 2011 IL 110166,

¶ 42. If the essence of plaintiff’s complaint was that Peoples Gas had “done something else to

wrong” him, then his claim would be for civil damages over which the circuit court would have

jurisdiction. Id. But because the nature of the relief he sought was reparations for unjust rates,

excessive charges, or inadequate service, plaintiff’s complaint falls within the exclusive

jurisdiction of the ICC. See id. ¶¶ 41-42, 54-55.

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¶ 20 Plaintiff maintains that he exhausted the administrative remedies available to him by

contacting the ICC. He argues its lack of response to his emails “left him without an effective

administrative remedy, justifying his recourse to the courts.”

¶ 21 Under the “exhaustion doctrine,” a party generally cannot seek review of an administrative

decision without first pursuing all available administrative remedies. Goral v. Dart, 2020 IL

125085, ¶ 37. Where the ICC has exclusive jurisdiction, it is axiomatic that a plaintiff must exhaust

the ICC’s administrative remedies before he may request relief in the circuit court. Sutherland,

254 Ill. App. 3d at 990.

¶ 22 ICC regulations prescribe procedures for a customer to pursue complaints against a utility.

A customer may file an informal complaint. 83 Ill. Adm. Code § 200.160 (eff. May 30, 1986). An

informal complaint may be oral or in writing and must include a concise statement of facts, the

specific relief requested, and the name and contact information of both the complaining person

and the person against whom the complaint is made. Id. Although the ICC investigates and

attempts to resolve informal complaints without formal action, the customer still has the right to

file a formal complaint. Id.

¶ 23 A formal complaint must be in writing and verified and requires more detail. 83 Ill. Adm.

Code § 200.170 (eff. Oct. 15, 2000). A customer who files a formal complaint has access to

discovery and, if the complaint is not resolved through other means, an evidentiary hearing before

the ICC. See generally 83 Ill. Adm. Code 200. Subparts C-E (prescribing hearing procedures).

Once the ICC issues an order or decision on the formal complaint, the customer may appeal

directly to the appellate court. 220 ILCS 5/10-201(a) (West 2024).

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¶ 24 The exhibits attached to plaintiff’s complaint show that plaintiff exchanged emails with an

ICC representative, who requested his phone number and advised him that Peoples Gas was

attempting to reach him without success. Plaintiff did not provide his phone number and responded

that he had already spoken to a Peoples Gas representative, who “mentioned that if I wished to

escalate this matter with you, it’s within my rights.” Two months later, plaintiff emailed again,

“So?”

¶ 25 Plaintiff did not exhaust the ICC’s administrative remedies with this email exchange.

Although plaintiff told the representative he “noticed irregularities in [his] gas usage,” he did not

explain what the irregularities were, how Peoples Gas was responsible, or what he wanted the ICC

to do. He did not, therefore, concisely state the facts or request any specific relief as required for

an informal complaint. See 83 Ill. Adm. Code § 200.160 (eff. May 30, 1986). Further, no evidence

suggests plaintiff ever filed a formal complaint with the ICC, or that the ICC issued any order or

decision in the matter. Plaintiff does not argue that any exception to the exhaustion doctrine

applies, such as exhaustion of one of multiple remedies available, or where the pursuit of an

administrative remedy would be futile. See Castaneda v. Illinois Human Rights Comm’n, 132 Ill.

2d 304, 308-09 (1989) (listing recognized exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine). The circuit court

thus properly dismissed plaintiff’s complaint for this reason, as well.

¶ 26 For these reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s action.

¶ 27 Affirmed.

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