Santos Herrera Lanza v. Operations, San Diego Field Office, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, et al.

Opinion

I SANTOS HERRERA LANZA, Case No.: 26-CV-3215 JAO (JLB) Petitioner.) ORDER GRANTING WRIT OF ] V. HABEAS CORPUS

Operations, San Diego Field Office, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, et al., Respondents. Before the Court is Petitioner Santos Herrera Lanza’s Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (ECF No. 6). Also before the Court is a1 Respondents Patrick Divver’s (Field Office Director of Enforcement and Removal Operations, San Diego Field Office, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”’)), Markwayne Mullin’s (Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security), Todd Lyon’s (Director of ICE), Todd Blanche’s (Acting Attorney General of the United States), and Christopher LaRose’s (Warden of Otay Mesa Detention Center) (collectively, “Respondents” or the “Government’”) Return to the Petition (ECF No. 8).

For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS the Petition on due process grounds. Petitioner is a Honduran national who entered the United States in 2018 and was detained at the Paseo Del Norte Border Patrol Processing Center. See ECF No. 6 at 2. After about eight days of detention, Petitioner was released to pursue his asylum claim. See id. In April 2026, ICE re-detained Petitioner at work. See id. A federal prisoner challenging the execution of his or her sentence, rather than the legality of the sentence itself, may file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the district of his confinement pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The sole judicial body able to review challenges to final orders of deportation, exclusion, or removal is the court of appeals. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1252; see also Alvarez—Barajas v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing REAL ID Act, Pub. L. No. 109- 119 Stat. 231, § 106(a)). However, for claims challenging ancillary or collateral /issues arising independently from the removal process—for example, a claim of indefinite detention—federal habeas corpus jurisdiction remains in the district court. Nadarajah v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 1069, 1076 (9th Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018); Alvarez v. Sessions, 338 F. Supp. 3d 1042, 1048-49 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (citations omitted). Petitioner argues that the summary revocation of his release from his 2018 detention without notice or a hearing violates the Due Process Clause. ECF No. 6 at 3. Respondents maintain that “Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2),” but “acknowledge[] that this Court, and Courts in this District, have repeatedly reached the opposite conclusion under the same and/or similar facts.” See ECF No. 8 at 1-2. Thus, they “do[] not oppose the petition.” See id. The Court concludes that Petitioner’s current detention violates the Due Process Clause.

l The Fifth Amendment guarantees that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. “[T]he Due Process Clause applies to all “persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (9th Cir. 2001). “[I]t is well established that the Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings.” Reno v. Flores, 507 292, 306 (1993). The Due Process Clause generally “requires some kind of a hearing before the State deprives a person of liberty or property.” Zinermon v. Burch, U.S. 113, 127 (1990). “Even individuals who face significant constraints on their liberty or over whose liberty the government wields significant discretion retain a protected interest in their liberty.” Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 2025) (citations omitted). Although the initial decision to detain or release an /individual may be within the government’s discretion, “the government’s decision to release an individual from custody creates ‘an implicit promise,’ upon which that individual may rely, that their liberty ‘will be revoked only if [they] fail[] to live up to the ... conditions [of release].’” Jd. (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972)). “Thus, even when ICE has the initial discretion to detain or release a noncitizen pending removal proceedings, after that individual is released from custody she has a protected liberty interest in remaining out of custody.” Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1032 (citing Romero v. Kaiser, 2022 WL 1443250, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 6, 2022)). Petitioner has been out of custody since 2018, when the government implicitly determined he was not a danger to the community or a flight risk and released him from detention. See ECF No. 6 at 4. There is no suggestion that Petitioner violated the terms of his release in the nearly eight years he has been out of detention. See generally ECF Nos. 6, 8. Petitioner thus has a protected liberty interest continuing to remain out of custody. See, e.g., Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1034 (“[Petitioner’s] release from ICE custody after [his] initial apprehension reflected a determination by the government that was neither a flight risk nor a danger to the community, and [Petitioner] has a strong

| || interest in remaining at liberty unless [he] no longer meets those criteria.””); Noori v. LaRose, 807 F. Supp. 3d 1146, 1164 (“Petitioner is not an ‘arriving’ noncitizen but one that has [been] present in our country for over a year. This substantial amount of time indicates he is afforded the Fifth Amendment’s guaranteed due process before removal.”); Alvarenga Matute v. Wofford, 807 F. Supp. 3d 1120, 1129 (E.D. Cal. 2025) (finding the petitioner had a protected liberty interest in his release). As Petitioner has a protected liberty interest, the Due Process Clause requires procedural protections before he can be deprived of that interest. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). To determine which procedures are constitutionally sufficient to satisfy the Due Process Clause, the Court must apply the Mathews factors. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. Courts must consider: (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official B action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the Government’s interest including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” The Court finds that all three factors support a determination that the Government’s re-detention of Petitioner without notification, reasoning, or an opportunity to be heard, denied Petitioner of his due process rights. First, as discussed above, Petitioner has a significant liberty interest in remaining out of custody pursuant to release in 2018. “Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty [the Due Process Clause] protects.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690; see also Morrissey, 408 U.S. 471 482 (“Subject to the conditions of his parole, he can be gainfully employed and is free be with family and friends and to form the other enduring attachments of normal life.”).

l Second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest is high as Respondents revoked Petitioner’s release from custody without providing Petitioner with notification, reasoning, or a hearing. Since the government’s initial determination in 2018 that Petitioner should be released because he posed no danger to the community and was not a flight risk, there is no evidence that these findings have changed. See Saravia v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1176 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (“Release reflects a determination by the government that the noncitizen is not a danger to the community or flight risk.”). Indeed, after his release from custody, Petitioner has apparently complied with all conditions of release. “Once a noncitizen has been released, the law prohibits federal agents from rearresting him merely because he is subject to removal proceedings. Rather, the federal agents must be able to present evidence of materially changed circumstances—namely, evidence that the noncitizen is in fact dangerous or has become }/a flight risk[.]” Saravia, 280 F. Supp. 3d at 1176. “Where as here, ‘the petitioner has not received any bond or custody hearing,’ ‘the risk of an erroneous deprivation of liberty is high’ because neither the government nor [Petitioner] has had an opportunity to determine whether there is any valid basis for [his] detention.” Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1035 (quoting Singh v. Andrews, 803 F. Supp. 3d 1035, 1047 (E.D. Cal. 2025)) (cleaned Third, the Government’s interest in detaining Petitioner without notice, reasoning, and a hearing is “low.” See Alvarenga Matute, 807 F. Supp. 3d at 1130; Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1036; Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F. Supp. 3d 963, 970 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (“Tf the government wishes to re-arrest [Petitioner] at any point, it has the power to take steps toward doing so; but its interest in doing so without a hearing is low.’’). Therefore, because Respondents detained Petitioner by revoking his release in violation of the Due Process Clause, his detention is unlawful. See, e.g., Monroy Martinez v. Lyons, 2026 WL 1047937, at * 5 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2026) (granting a writ of habeas corpus on due process grounds where the petitioner’s release on bond was revoked); Navarro Sanchez v. LaRose, 2025 WL 2770629, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 26,

2025) (granting a writ of habeas corpus releasing petitioner from custody to the conditions of her preexisting parole on due process grounds). Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1), and ORDERS Respondents to immediately release Petitioner from custody subject to the conditions of his preexisting release. The Court ORDERS, prior to any re-detention of Petitioner, that Petitioner is entitled to notice of the reasons for revocation of his release on bond and a hearing before a neutral decision maker to determine whether detention is warranted. The government shall bear the burden of establishing, by clear and convincing evidence, that Petitioner poses a danger to the }community or a risk of flight. See, e.g., Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1038. The Parties are ORDERED to file a Joint Status Report by July 16, 2026, confirming that Petitioner has released. Dated: July 2, 2026

wy) Vy” □ Jill A. Otake 7 United States District Judge Qa ge