Santos Alexis Gonzalez Esquivel v. Christopher Chestnut, et al.

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: January 20, 2026
• Docket: 1:25-cv-01353
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 7 8 9

10 11 SANTOS ALEXIS GONZALEZ ESQUIVEL, ) Case No.: 1:25-cv-01353-SKO (HC) ) 12 Petitioner, ) ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO ) ASSIGN DISTRICT JUDGE TO CASE 13 ) ) FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO 14 v. ) DENY RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO DISMISS 15 ) AND GRANT PETITION ) 16 CHRISTOPHER CHESTNUT, et al., ) [Docs. 1, 9] ) 17 Respondents. ) [21-DAY OBJECTION DEADLINE] ) 18 )

19 20 Petitioner is an immigration detainee proceeding with counsel with a petition for writ of habeas 21 corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 22 Petitioner filed the instant petition on October 9, 2025. (Doc. 3.) On November 26, 2025, 23 Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition. (Doc. 9.) On December 10, 2025, Petitioner filed an 24 opposition. (Doc. 11.) 25 Petitioner challenges his continued detention by the Bureau of Immigration and Customs 26 Enforcement (“ICE”). He claims his prolonged detention without a bond hearing violates his 27 procedural due process rights under the Fifth Amendment. He claims he should be immediately 28 1 released, or alternatively, provided a bond hearing before an immigration judge (“IJ”) at which the 2 Government must justify his continued detention by clear and convincing evidence. 3 For the reasons discussed below, the Court will recommend Respondent’s motion to dismiss be 4 DENIED, the petition be GRANTED, and Respondents be DIRECTED to provide Petitioner with a 5 bond hearing before an immigration judge. 6 I. BACKGROUND 7 Petitioner is a native and citizen of Mexico. (Doc. 10-1 at 2.) He entered the United States on 8 an unknown date without inspection. (Doc. 10-1 at 5.) On May 2, 2012, Petitioner came to the 9 attention of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) after Petitioner was incarcerated in 10 Sonoma County Jail for violations of Cal. Penal Code § 459 (burglary) and § 466 (possession of 11 burglary tools). (Doc. 10 at 2.) On May 4, 2012, Petitioner was placed in removal proceedings with the 12 issuance of a Notice to Appear charging him as an alien present without admission or parole and 13 charging him with removability under Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) § 212(a)(6)(A)(i). 14 (Doc. 10 at 2.) On May 7, 2012, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) released Petitioner on 15 a $15,000 bond. (Doc. 10 at 2.) 16 On September 11, 2012, Petitioner appeared at his first master calendar hearing. (Doc. 10 at 2.) 17 The IJ sustained the removal charges and ordered Petitioner removed to Mexico. (Doc. 10 at 2.) On 18 September 20, 2013, the IJ granted Petitioner’s motion to administratively close the case. (Doc. 10 at 19 3.) 20 On March 5, 2025, after DHS conducted an initial custody determination, DHS apprehended 21 Petitioner during a check-in based on his criminal history. (Doc. 10 at 3.) Among other criminal 22 history, on August 28, 2024, Petitioner was convicted of violating Cal. Penal Code § 273.5(A) 23 (infliction of corporal injury on a spouse) and Cal. Vehicle Code § 14601.2(A) (driving on a 24 suspended license/DUI special violation). (Doc. 10 at 3.) 25 On March 7, 2025, DHS filed a motion to re-calendar Petitioner’s previously administratively 26 closed case. (Doc. 10 at 3.) On March 12, 2025, the IJ granted the motion and rescheduled the master 27 calendar hearing for March 27, 2025. (Doc. 10 at 3.) 28 1 On March 27, 2025, at the master calendar hearing, Petitioner filed a motion to continue the 2 hearing to file applications for relief. (Doc. 10 at 3.) The IJ granted Petitioner’s request and continued 3 the hearing to May 7, 2025. (Doc. 10 at 3.) 4 On April 7, 2025, Petitioner filed a bond redetermination request. (Doc. 10 at 3.) On April 17, 5 2025, Petitioner, through counsel, withdrew his bond request without prejudice. (Doc. 10 at 3.) 6 On May 1, 2025, Petitioner filed a second bond redetermination request. (Doc. 10 at 3.) On 7 May 8, 2025, the IJ held a bond hearing and denied Petitioner’s request, finding Petitioner did not 8 meet his burden to establish he was not a danger to the community. (Doc. 10 at 3.) Petitioner did not 9 appeal the decision. 10 On May 7, 2025, at the master calendar hearing, Petitioner again requested a continuance to 11 file an application for relief from removal. (Doc. 10 at 3.) The IJ granted the request and reset the 12 hearing to June 18, 2025. (Doc. 10 at 3.) The hearing was rescheduled by the IJ to June 26, 2025. 13 (Doc. 10 at 4.) 14 At the June 26, 2025, master calendar hearing, Petitioner requested a further continuance to file 15 supplemental documents and file another application for relief from removal. (Doc. 10 at 4.) The IJ 16 granted the request and continued the hearing to August 14, 2025. (Doc. 10 at 4.) 17 On August 14, 2025, at the rescheduled master calendar hearing, Petitioner filed another 18 request for continuance to file an additional application for removal. (Doc. 10 at 4.) The IJ granted the 19 request and continued the hearing to October 16, 2025. (Doc. 10 at 4.) 20 At the October 16, 2025, master calendar hearing, the IJ set the merits hearing for November 5, 21 2025. (Doc. 10 at 4.) 22 At the November 5, 2025, merits hearing, the IJ conducted a full evidentiary hearing and 23 denied Petitioner’s application for relief, finding Petitioner ineligible for asylum, withholding of 24 removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture. (Doc. 10 at 4.) The IJ ordered Petitioner 25 removed to Mexico. (Doc. 10 at 4.) Petitioner’s appeal was due by December 5, 2025. 26 ///// 27 ///// 28 ///// 1 II. DISCUSSION 2 A. Jurisdiction 3 A district court may grant a writ of habeas corpus when the petitioner “is in custody in 4 violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). 5 “[D]istrict courts retain jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to consider habeas challenges to 6 immigration detention that are sufficiently independent of the merits of [a] removal order.” Lopez- 7 Marroquin v. Barr, 955 F.3d 759, 759 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1211–12 8 (9th Cir. 2011)). Pertinent here, the Supreme Court specifically directed that federal courts have 9 jurisdiction to review a constitutional challenge to a non-citizen’s detention. See Demore v. Kim, 538 10 U.S. 510, 517 (2003). 11 B. Sections 1226(a) and 1226(c) 12 The parties acknowledge that Petitioner has been detained for over 10 months after DHS 13 apprehended Petitioner during a routine check-in. Respondent contends Petitioner was arrested and 14 detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) due to his prior criminal history. Petitioner contends he is 15 entitled to a bond hearing because he is being detained under § 1226(a), and even assuming § 1226(c) 16 applies to him, he is entitled to a bond hearing because detention has become so unreasonably 17 prolonged as to violate his Fifth Amendment due process rights. As discussed below, whether 18 Petitioner is being detained under § 1226(a) or (c), he should be provided with a bond hearing. 19 In Casas-Castrillon v. Department of Homeland Security, 535 F.3d 942 (9th Cir.2008), the 20 Ninth Circuit considered the prolonged detention of aliens under § 1226(a) while seeking direct 21 judicial review of their administratively final orders of removal. The petitioner in that case, a legal 22 permanent resident, had been detained in 2001, when the government commenced removal 23 proceedings against him based on his having been convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude. 24 See id. at 944-45. The petitioner remained in detention for the next seven years. During that time, 25 Petitioner was in removal proceedings before the immigration court, BIA, and the Ninth Circuit. Id. 26 The Ninth Circuit concluded that, “as a matter of statutory interpretation,” “§ 1226(a) requires the 27 Attorney General to provide aliens with a bond hearing before an immigration judge to determine the 28 necessity of their ongoing detention.” See id. at 950-52. The Ninth Circuit concluded that “an alien is 1 entitled to release on bond unless the ‘government establishes that he is a flight risk or will be a danger 2 to the community.’” Id. at 951 (quoting Tijani v. Willis, 430 F.3d 1241, 1242 (9th Cir.2005)). 3 On the other hand, section 1226(c) states that the Attorney General “shall take into custody any 4 alien who” falls into one of the enumerated categories involving criminal offenses and terrorist 5 activities. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1). Section 1226(c)(2) provides that the Attorney General may release an 6 alien described in § 1226(c)(1) “‘only if the Attorney General decides’ both that doing so is necessary 7 for witness-protection purposes and that the alien will not pose a danger or flight risk.” Jennings v. 8 Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 303 (2018) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(2)) (emphasis in original). In 9 Jennings, the Supreme Court held that “together with § 1226(a), § 1226(c) makes clear that detention 10 of aliens within its scope must continue ‘pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed 11 from the United States.’” Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)). Further, the Supreme Court noted that “[b]y 12 expressly stating that the covered aliens may be released ‘only if’ certain conditions are met, 8 U.S.C. 13 § 1226(c)(2), the statute expressly and unequivocally imposes an affirmative prohibition on releasing 14 detained aliens under any other conditions.” Id. at 304. Thus, the Supreme Court held that “§ 1226(c) 15 mandates detention of any alien falling within its scope and that detention may end prior to the 16 conclusion of removal proceedings ‘only if’ the alien is released for witness-protection purposes.” Id. 17 In support of his argument that § 1226(a) applies, Petitioner points out that an immigration 18 judge denied release on bond on May 7, 2025, specifically finding that “Petitioner did not meet his 19 burden to establish that he is not a danger to the community.” (Doc. 10-1 at 31.) Petitioner is correct 20 that if he were being held pursuant to § 1226(c), no such bond hearing would be available. Under § 21 1226(c)(1), only if the Attorney General determined that Petitioner’s release was necessary for 22 witness-protection purposes could an alien be released on bond. This lends weight to Petitioner’s 23 argument that he is being held under § 1226(a), since Respondents are treating him as such. 24 Respondent points to Petitioner’s lengthy criminal history in support of its argument that 25 Petitioner is being held under § 1226(c). Petitioner sustained convictions for burglary and possession 26 of burglary tools in 2012, but was released on bond. (Doc. 10-1 at 29.) Petitioner then sustained 27 numerous convictions which were all misdemeanors. (Doc. 10-1 at 29.) None of the convictions 28 appear to meet the requirements of § 1226(c)(1). Therefore, it appears Petitioner is being detained 1 under § 1226(a) and entitled to a bond hearing. Even if Petitioner were being held pursuant to 2 §1226(c), as discussed below, the Court finds Petitioner should be given a bond hearing. 3 C. Prolonged Detention under § 1226(c) 4 The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause provides that “[n]o person shall be ... deprived of 5 life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” “It is well established that the Fifth Amendment 6 entitles aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings,” Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 7 (1993), and “[a] statute permitting indefinite detention of an alien would raise a serious constitutional 8 problem,” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). The Supreme Court nevertheless has 9 recognized that “[d]etention during deportation proceedings is a constitutionally permissible part of 10 [the deportation] process.” Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 531 (2003); see also Carlson v. Landon, 342 11 U.S. 524, 538 (1952) (“[d]etention is necessarily a part of this deportation procedure”). 12 In Zadvydas, 533 U.S. 678, the Court considered a due process challenge to detention of aliens 13 under 8 U.S.C. § 1231, which governs detention following a final order of removal. The Court in 14 Zadvydas read § 1231 to authorize continued detention of an alien following the 90-day removal 15 period for only such time as is reasonably necessary to secure the alien's removal. Id. at 699. 16 Zadvydas is materially different from the present case. In Zadvydas, the aliens challenging their 17 detention following final orders of deportation were ones for whom removal was “no longer 18 practically attainable.” Id. at 690. The Court observed that where, as there, “detention's goal is no 19 longer practically attainable, detention no longer bears a reasonable relation to the purpose for which 20 the individual was committed.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Zadvydas 21 distinguished § 1231 from § 1226 on these very grounds, noting that “post-removal-period detention, 22 unlike detention pending a determination of removability, has no obvious termination point.” Id. at 23 697. Here, however, removal is practically attainable. As the Supreme Court noted in Jennings, 24 “detention under § 1226(c) has a definite termination point: the conclusion of removal proceedings.” 25 Jennings, 583 U.S. at 304. 26 In Demore v. Kim, a lawful permanent resident alien challenged the no-bail provision of the 27 Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), contending his six-month detention violated due process 28 because he had not been provided an individualized bond hearing. 538 U.S. 510. The Supreme Court 1 rejected this claim, observing first that Congress, in its “broad power over naturalization and 2 immigration proceedings,” “regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to United 3 States citizens.” Id. at 521 (quoting Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1976)). Additionally, 4 detention pending removal necessarily serves the purpose of preventing aliens from fleeing prior to or 5 during removal proceedings. Id. at 527-28. The Court also noted that detention under § 1226(c) has a 6 definite termination point. Id. at 529. Although the Supreme Court did not specify an outer limit as to 7 what constitutes a permissible detention period, it acknowledged that “the detention at stake under § 8 1226(c) lasts roughly a month and a half in the vast majority of cases ... and about five months in the 9 minority of cases in which the alien chooses to appeal.” Id. at 530. Nevertheless, the majority held 10 that six months did not run afoul of the due process clause in part because the delayed proceedings 11 were the result of the alien's own requests. Id. at 530–31. 12 In analyzing whether prolonged detention violates due process, many courts have looked to 13 Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Demore, which clarified that, “since the Due Process Clause 14 prohibits arbitrary deprivations of liberty, a lawful permanent resident alien such as respondent could 15 be entitled to an individualized determination as to his risk of flight and dangerousness if the 16 continued detention became unreasonable or unjustified.” Id. at 532 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 17 Numerous circuit and district courts, including this Court, have found that unreasonably long detention 18 periods may violate the due process clause. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Marin (“Rodriguez IV”), 909 F.3d 19 252, 256 (9th Cir. 2018) (the Ninth Circuit asserted “grave doubts that any statute that allows for 20 arbitrary prolonged detention without any process is constitutional....”); Diop v. ICE/Homeland Sec., 21 656 F.3d 221, 235 (3d Cir. 2011) (detention of an alien for a period of nearly three years without 22 further inquiry into whether it was necessary to ensure his appearance at the removal proceedings or to 23 prevent a risk of danger to the community, was unreasonable, and, therefore, a violation of the Due 24 Process Clause”); Diep v. Wofford, 1:24-cv-01238-SKO (HC) (E.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2025); Riego v. 25 Scott, 2025 WL 660535 (E.D. Cal. 2025); Jensen v. Garland, 2023 WL 3246522 (C.D.Cal. 2023); 26 M.T.B. v. Byers, 2024 WL 3881843 (E.D. Ky. 2024); Sanchez-Rivera v. Matuszewski, 2023 WL 27 139801 (S.D. Cal. 2023); Banda v. McAleenan, 385 F.Supp.3d 1099 (W.D. Wash. 2019). 28 1 The Ninth Circuit has also noted that many courts have applied the Mathews1 test in 2 considering due process challenges in the immigration context. Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 3 1189, 1206 (9th Cir. 2022). However, the Supreme Court, when confronted with constitutional 4 challenges to immigration detention, has not resolved them through express application of Mathews. 5 See, e.g., Demore, 538 U.S. at 523, 526–29; see also Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 168, 6 122 S.Ct. 694, 151 L.Ed.2d 597 (2002) (“[W]e have never viewed Mathews as announcing an all- 7 embracing test for deciding due process claims.”). Nevertheless, several district courts in the Ninth 8 Circuit including this Court have employed the Mathews test in the context of evaluating whether due 9 process entitles a petitioner to a bond hearing. See, e.g., Jensen v. Garland, 2023 WL 3246522, at *4 10 (C.D. Cal. 2023); Galdillo v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 2021 WL 4839502, at *3 (C.D. Cal. 2021); 11 Jimenez v. Wolf, 2020 WL 510347, at *3 (N.D. Cal. 2020); Riego v. Scott, 2025 WL 660535 (E.D. 12 Cal. 2025). 13 The Ninth Circuit has also noted the common use of the Mathews test and assumed (without 14 deciding) that it applies to due process claims in the immigration detention context. Rodriguez Diaz v. 15 Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1206-07 (9th Cir. 2022). Thus, the Court finds application of the Mathews test 16 in this case appropriate. 17 Under the Mathews test, the “identification of the specific dictates of due process generally 18 requires consideration of three distinct factors.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334–35. “First, the private 19 interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such 20 interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute 21 procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the 22 fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would 23 entail.” Id. at 335. 24 In the first factor, the Court evaluates Petitioner’s private interest in being free from detention 25 against the government’s stated interests in protecting the public from a risk of danger and any risk of 26 flight to avoid removal. Petitioner has been detained over 10 months. This period is greater than the 27

28 1 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 1 six-month presumptively reasonable period set forth in Zadvydas, and will likely be twice as long once 2 this case is resolved. 533 U.S. at 701. 3 In Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, the Ninth Circuit stated that “in evaluating the first prong of the 4 Mathews analysis, it is not sufficient to simply count the months of detention and leave it at that. The 5 process received during this time, the further process that was available to him, and the fact that his 6 detention was prolonged due to his decision to challenge his removal order must also be considered. 7 53 F.4th at 1208. The Ninth Circuit stated it was “important not to overstate the strength of 8 Petitioner’s showing under the first Mathews factor.” 53 F.4th at 1213. This was so, according to the 9 Ninth Circuit, because detentions longer than six months were considered “prolonged” in the context 10 of detentions “for which no individualized bond hearings had taken place at all.” In Rodriguez Diaz, 11 the petitioner had received a bond hearing after he was detained. Id. at 1207. Here, like the petitioner 12 in Rodriguez Diaz, Petitioner has received a bond hearing. The IJ determined Petitioner had not 13 established he was not a danger to the public if released and denied release on bond. Thus, Petitioner 14 received process during the detention period. The bond hearing, however, took place approximately 8 15 months ago. Petitioner has spent a prolonged period of time in detention since then, without any 16 further inquiry into whether detention is still required. Thus, the first factor tends to weigh in favor of 17 Petitioner. 18 As to the second factor, “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of [Petitioner’s] interest through 19 the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards,” 20 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335, the Court finds this factor also weighs in favor of Petitioner. The “risk of 21 an erroneous deprivation of [a petitioner's] interest is high” where “[h]e has not received any bond or 22 custody redetermination hearing[.]” Jimenez, 2020 WL 510347, at *3. Here, although Petitioner was 23 previously provided a bond hearing, it was over eight months ago, and it is not clear when detention 24 will end. Thus, the risk of erroneous deprivation weighs in favor of granting a second bond hearing. 25 In the third factor, the Court weighs the government’s interest, “including the function 26 involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute requirement would 27 entail.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. As previously discussed, the government has a strong interest in 28 effecting removal. Demore, 538 U.S. at 531. As other courts have recognized, however, the key 1 government interest at stake here “is not the continued detention of Petitioner, but the government's 2 ability to detain him without a bond hearing.” Zagal-Alcaraz v. ICE Field Office Director, 2020 WL 3 1862254, at *7 (D. Or. 2020) (collecting cases). Petitioner was provided a bond hearing over eight 4 months ago. Providing another bond hearing would not undercut the government’s asserted interest in 5 effecting removal. Indeed, the purpose of a bond hearing is to inquire whether the alien presents a 6 flight risk or danger to the community. See In re Guerra, 24 I.&N. Dec. 37 (B.I.A. 2006). Given “the 7 minimal cost of conducting a bond hearing, and the ability of the IJ to adjudicate the ultimate legal 8 issue as to whether Petitioner's continued detention is justified,” courts have concluded that “the 9 government's interest is not as weighty as Petitioner’s.” Zagal-Alcaraz, 2020 WL 1862254, *7 10 (quoting Lopez Reyes v. Bonnar, 362 F. Supp. 3d 762, 777 (N.D. Cal. 2019)). The Court agrees with 11 this analysis. Although the Government has a strong interest, it is outweighed by Petitioner’s interest. 12 The three Mathews factors weigh in Petitioner’s favor and outweigh the government’s interest 13 in further detention without inquiry into whether he currently presents a flight risk or danger to the 14 community. The Court thus finds that Petitioner’s prolonged detention without a bond hearing before 15 an IJ violates his Fifth Amendment due process rights. 16 In summary, Petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing under either § 1226(a) or § 1226(c). 17 III. ORDER 18 The Clerk of Court is directed to randomly assign a District Judge to this case. 19 IV. RECOMMENDATION 20 For the foregoing reasons, the Court RECOMMENDS that Respondent’s motion to dismiss be 21 DENIED, the petition be GRANTED, and Respondents be DIRECTED to provide Petitioner with a 22 bond hearing before an immigration judge at which Respondents must justify Petitioner’s continued 23 detention by clear and convincing evidence. 24 This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the United States District Court Judge 25 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the Local 26 Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within twenty- 27 one (21) days after being served with a copy of this Findings and Recommendation, a party may file 28 written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. Id. The document should be 1 captioned, “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation” and shall not exceed 2 fifteen (15) pages, except by leave of court with good cause shown. The Court will not consider 3 exhibits attached to the Objections. To the extent a party wishes to refer to any exhibit(s), the party 4 should reference the exhibit in the record by its CM/ECF document and page number, when possible, 5 or otherwise reference the exhibit with specificity. Any pages filed in excess of the fifteen (15) page 6 limitation may be disregarded by the District Judge when reviewing these Findings and 7 Recommendations pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file 8 objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. 9 Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838-39 (9th Cir. 2014). This recommendation is not an order that is 10 immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 11 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court's 12 judgment. 13 14 IT IS SO ORDERED.

15 Dated: January 16, 2026 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto . 16 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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