Santopietro v. Howell

District Court, D. Nevada·Decided May 28, 2024·No. 2:12-cv-01648·Unknown

Opinion

Kelly H. Dove, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 10569 SNELL & WILMER L.L.P. 3883 Howard Hughes Parkway, Suite 1100 Las Vegas, Nevada 89169 Telephone (702) 784-5200 Facsimile (702) 784-5252 Email: kdove@swlaw.com Attorneys for Plaintiff Michele Santopietro, an Individual, CASE NO. 2:12-cv-01648-JCM-EJY Plaintiff, JOINT PRETRIAL ORDER v. Las Vegas Police Department Officers C. Howell (Badge 9634), F. Lopez-Rosende (Badge 8864), and K. Crawford (Badge 10050), Defendants. After pretrial proceedings in this case, IT IS ORDERED: I. This case arises out of the arrest of Plaintiff Michele Santopietro (“Santopietro”) and Lea Patrick (“Patrick”) in May 2011 by Defendants Clayborn Howell, Christine Crawford, and Francisco Lopez-Rosende (collectively, the “Officers”) for doing business without a license. (ECF No. 55 at 1.) Specifically, Santopietro and Patrick were in costume on the Las Vegas Strip as police characters. Like other street performers there, they were working for tips, typically given by passersby who approached them and asked to be photographed with them. The Officers were running a plainclothes operation in which they approached street performers, among others, to evaluate their conduct. In this case, Howell agreed up front to tip, indicating before posing for a picture with the performers that he understood and agreed that the performers worked for tips. The Officers all agree that they were lying to the extent they promised a tip, and that lying this way is entirely proper since they are law officers. Howell got the picture he wanted and for which he agreed to pay, and walked off. After Patrick reminded Howell of his prior agreement to tip, the Officers arrested them both for doing business without a license. Santopietro sued the Officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 asserting that the arrest violated the First Amendment and other rights under the United States and Nevada constitutions. (ECF No. 29.) Santopietro seeks damages for what she contends was a wrongful arrest and imprisonment, the violation of her constitutional rights, and her attorneys’ fees as provided for under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 1985, and any other applicable law. Plaintiff – Michele Santopietro Defendants -- Clayborn Howell, Christine Crawford, and Francisco Lopez-Rosende Plaintiff’s Contentions Plaintiff brought eleven causes of action: (1) Violation of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Free Speech); (2) Violation of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Free Speech); Violation of Nevada Constitution, Article 1, Section 9 (Free Speech); (4) Violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution (Unreasonable Search and Seizure); (5) Violation of Nevada Constitution, Article 1, Section 18 (Unreasonable Search and Seizure); (6) Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Substantive Due Process); (7) Violation of Nevada Constitution, Article 1, Section 8 (Substantive Due Process); (8) Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Procedural Due Process); (9) Violation of Nevada Constitution, Article 1, Section 8 (Procedural Due Process); (10) Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (11) Violation of Nevada Constitution, Article 1, Section 1 (Equal Protection). Plaintiff abandoned her Sixth, Eighth and Tenth Causes of Action. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (causes of action 1 and 2), a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant (1) acted under color of state law; and (2) deprived plaintiff of a constitutional right. See Long v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006). Police officers effecting an arrest as officers are “acting under the color of State law” for the purposes of Section 1983, even if the offending conduct was not authorized. See Cohen v. Norris, 300 F.2d 24, 30 (9th Cir. 1962). Thus, there is no dispute that the Officers here were acting under the color of state law. The Ninth Circuit’s decision has significantly narrowed the issues for trial. The Ninth Circuit held that if Santopietro did not demand deletion of the photo, her “undisputed statements and actions do not even arguably evidence a business transaction.” In other words, if the jury credits Santopietro’s version of events, she necessarily prevails on the merits. As the Ninth Circuit also held, even “[i]f Santopietro’s words or actions demonstrated that she was selling her performance, the sale would still likely warrant First Amendment protection.” But the “business” of selling protected expression can be “subject to reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions.” Determining whether Clark County Code § 6.56.030 as applied to a quid-pro-quo exchange of a photograph is a reasonable “time, place, or manner” restriction “requires an inquiry into whether the restriction: (1) is justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech; (2) is narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest; and (3) leaves open ample alternative channels for communication of the information.” If the jury determines that Santopietro sold her performance by demanding tips, the Court must determine whether the licensing ordinance as applied to sales by, rather than voluntary tips to, a street artist is a valid time, place, or manner restriction. Finally, Santopietro contends that she suffered damages as a result of her arrest and detention. Defendant’s Contentions Defendants contend that the Plaintiff was properly arrested for violating Clark County business without first having procured a license for the business. “Probable cause to arrest exists when officers have knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to lead a person of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been or is being committed by the person being arrested.” U.S. v. Lopez, 482 F.3d 1067, 1072 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964). Further, the Ninth Circuit has held that probable cause also exists “when ‘under the totality of circumstances known to the arresting officers, a prudent person would have concluded that there was a fair probability that [the defendant] had committed a crime.’” Id. (quoting U.S. v. Smith, 790 F.2d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1986). Conclusive evidence of guilt is not required to establish probable cause, though “mere suspicion” is insufficient. Id. (citing McKenzie v. Lamb, 738 F.2d 1005, 1008 (9th Cir. 1984)). The Plaintiff bears the burden

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Santopietro v. Howell, (D. Nev. 2024).

Santopietro v. Howell (Santopietro v. Howell) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Beck v. Ohio
379 U.S. 89 (Supreme Court, 1964)
Michael Cohen v. Russell K. Norris
300 F.2d 24 (Ninth Circuit, 1962)
United States v. Nile Smith
790 F.2d 789 (Ninth Circuit, 1986)
United States v. Hosvaldo Lopez
482 F.3d 1067 (Ninth Circuit, 2007)
Berger v. City of Seattle
569 F.3d 1029 (Ninth Circuit, 2009)
Beck v. City of Upland
527 F.3d 853 (Ninth Circuit, 2008)
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista
532 U.S. 318 (Supreme Court, 2001)
Menotti v. City of Seattle
409 F.3d 1113 (Ninth Circuit, 2005)
McKenzie v. Lamb
738 F.2d 1005 (Ninth Circuit, 1984)