Santiago v. Anthony Annucci

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedAugust 5, 2020
Docket7:20-cv-04530
StatusUnknown

This text of Santiago v. Anthony Annucci (Santiago v. Anthony Annucci) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Santiago v. Anthony Annucci, (S.D.N.Y. 2020).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK HERACLIO SANTIAGO, Plaintiff, . 20-CV-4530 (KMK) -against- ORDER OF SERVICE D.O.C.CS, ef al, Defendants.

KENNETH M. KARAS, United States District Judge: Plaintiff Heralio Santiago (“Plaintiff”), currently incarcerated at Fishkill Correctional Facility, brings this pro se Action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants DOCCS, Superintendent Leory Fields, and Bureau Chief Derek Jones violated his constitutional rights. (See generally Compl. (Dkt. No. 2).) By order dated July 27, 2020, the Court granted Plaintiff's request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis. (See Dkt, No. 4.) I. Standard of Review The Court must dismiss a complaint, or any portion thereof, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see also Abbas ¥. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir, 2007) (discussing a court’s authority to screen and dismiss claims of prisoners proceeding in forma pauperis). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed, R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir, 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v, Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474-75 (2d Cir, 2006) (quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original).

IJ. Discussion A. Replacement of Defendant DOCCS Plaintiff names DOCCS, a state agency, as a Defendant in his Complaint. However, state agencies, including DOCCS, and state officials acting in their official capacities are generally not

“nersons” subject to suit under § 1983. See Rush v. Fischer, 923 F. Supp. 2d 545, 548 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (explaining that state agencies are not subject to suit under § 1983); Will v. Michigan Dept of State Police, 491 U.S, 58, 71 (1989) (explaining that state officials sued in their official capacities cannot be sued under § 1983). Nevertheless, “a state official in his or her official capacity, when sued for injunctive relief, would be a person under § 1983 because ‘official-

capacity actions for prospective relief are not treated as actions against the State.’” Will, 491

U.S. at 71 1.10 (quoting Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S., at 167, n.14). Accordingly, in light of

Plaintiff's pro se status and clear intention to seek injunctive relief from the Acting Commissioner of DOCCS, Anthony Annucci, the Court construes the complaint as asserting claims against Annucci, and directs the Clerk of Court to amend the caption of this Action to

replace DOCCS with Acting Commissioner Anthony Annucci. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 21 (“On motion or on its own, the court may at any time, on just terms, add or drop a party.”). This amendment is without prejudice to any defenses Annucci may wish to assert. The Court simultaneously dismisses DOCCS from the Action. B, Order of Service Because Plaintiff has been granted permission to proceed IFP, he is entitled to rely on the

Court and the U.S, Marshals Service to effect service. Walker v Schult, 717 F.3d. 119, 123 n.6 (2d Cir, 2013); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (“The officers of the court shall issue and serve all

process ... in [IFP] cases.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3) (the court must order the Marshals Service to

serve if the plaintiff is authorized to proceed IFP)). Although Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure generally requires that the summons and complaint be served within 90 days of

the date the complaint is filed, Plaintiff is proceeding IFP and could not have served the

summons and complaint until the Court reviewed the complaint and ordered that a summons be

The Court therefore extends the time to serve until 90 days after the date the summons is

issued. If the complaint is not served within that time, Plaintiff should request an extension of

time for service, See Meilleur v. Strong, 682 F.3d 56, 63 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that it is the

plaintiff’s responsibility to request an extension of time for service); see also Murray v. Pataki, 378 F. App’x 50, 52 (2d Cir. 2010) (“As long as the [plaintiff proceeding IFP] provides the

information necessary to identify the defendant, the Marshals’ failure to effect service automatically constitutes ‘good cause’ for an extension of time within the meaning of Rule

4(m).”). To allow Plaintiff to effect service on Defendants Anthony Annucci, Leroy Fields, and

Derek Jones through the U.S. Marshals Service, the Clerk of Court is instructed to fill outa U.S,

Marshals Service Process Receipt and Return form (CUSM-285 form”) for each of these

Defendants. The Clerk of Court is further instructed to issue summonses and deliver to the

Marshals Service all the paperwork necessary for the Marshals Service to effect service upon these defendants. Plaintiff must notify the Court in writing if his address changes, and the Court may dismiss the action if Plaintiff fails to do so. If]. Conclusion The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a copy of this Order to Plaintiff, together with an information package.

The Court dismisses DOCCS from the Action, and directs the Clerk of Court to amend

the caption so as to replace DOCCS with DOCCS Acting Commissioner Anthony Annucci. The Clerk of Court is further instructed to complete the USM-285 forms with the

addresses for Annucci, Fields, and Jones and deliver all documents necessary to effect service to

the U.S. Marshals Service. The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would

not be taken in good faith, and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of an

appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962). SO ORDERED. Dated: August ¢, 2020 AY White Plains, New York if fbn KENNETH M, KARAS United States District Judge

DEFENDANTS AND SERVICE ADDRESSES

1. Anthony Annucci, Acting Commissioner of DOCCS Building 2, State Campus Albany, New York 12226-2050 2. Leroy Fields, First Deputy Superintendent Fishkill Correctional Facility 18 Strack Drive Beacon, NY 12508 3. Bronx IV Area Office Bureau Chief Jones 14 Bruckner Boulevard Bronx, NY 10454

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Related

Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Murray v. Pataki
378 F. App'x 50 (Second Circuit, 2010)
Meilleur v. Strong
682 F.3d 56 (Second Circuit, 2012)
Walker v. Schult
717 F.3d 119 (Second Circuit, 2013)
Harris v. Mills
572 F.3d 66 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Rush v. Fischer
923 F. Supp. 2d 545 (S.D. New York, 2013)

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