Santiago Ramirez v. Secretary of DOD
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Bluebook
Santiago Ramirez v. Secretary of DOD, (1st Cir. 1995).
Opinion
USCA1 Opinion
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
____________________
No. 94-1394
LYNETTE SANTIAGO-RAMIREZ, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
SECRETARY OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
OF THE U.S.A., ET AL.,
Defendants - Appellees.
____________________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Juan M. P rez-Gim nez, U.S. District Judge] ___________________
____________________
Before
Torruella, Chief Judge, ___________
Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge, ____________________
and Boyle,* Senior District Judge. _____________________
_____________________
John Ward-Llamb as for appellants. __________________
Isabel Mu oz-Acosta, Assistant United States Attorney, with ___________________
whom Guillermo Gil, United States Attorney, was on brief for _____________
appellees.
____________________
August 16, 1995
____________________
____________________
* Of the District of Rhode Island, sitting by designation.
BOYLE, Senior District Judge. The questions presented BOYLE, Senior District Judge. _____________________
on appeal in this case are the following: whether this Court's
statement, in its prior reversal of the district court, that the
complaint might be read to state a cause of action for
intentional infliction of emotional distress constitutes the "law
of the case" which binds the district court and, if not, whether
the district court's subsequent dismissal was proper. Because we
find that this Court did not previously express its view as to
the law applicable to this case and that the district court
correctly dismissed the case, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND I. BACKGROUND ______________
We summarize the facts only briefly as they are laid
out in detail in our prior opinion. See Santiago Ram rez v. ___ ________________
Secretary of the Department of Defense, 984 F.2d 16 (1st Cir. ________________________________________
1993). Because this is a review of a grant of summary judgment,
we view the facts in a light most favorable to the non-movant.
See Coyne v. Taber Partners, 53 F.3d 454, 457 (1st Cir. 1995). ___ _____ ______________
Appellant, Santiago, worked as a cashier at Fort Buchanan's Army
Post Exchange Store. The store's policy prohibited employees
from carrying merchandise through the front door. On June 29,
1990, Santiago and a co-employee violated this policy when they
removed bags containing store merchandise through the front
entrance. They placed these bags in the trunk of the co-
employee's car. Unbeknownst to Santiago, the bags contained
stolen merchandise. The Safety and Security Manager and
Santiago's supervisor questioned her for a total of 45 minutes
-2-
concerning this breach of store policy. Santiago told them that
she did not know that the merchandise was stolen but was aware of
the store's regulation that prohibited employees from carrying
merchandise through the front door. She was later terminated for
violating this regulation. The District Court granted the
defendant's motion to dismiss based on its finding that Santiago
did not give the defendant adequate notice of her suit as
required by the Federal Tort Claims Act. See 28 U.S.C. 2675 ___
(1994). Santiago appealed.
We found that a letter Santiago had sent to the
defendants satisfied the statute's notice requirement. See ___
Santiago, 984 F.2d at 19. Because the government is not immune ________
from suit based on a claim of intentional infliction of emotional
distress, we stated that the complaint "might be read to plead a
cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional
distress." Id. at 20. We, therefore, remanded to the District ___
Court for a determination as to whether Santiago's complaint
could be read to state a cause of action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress. Santiago, 984 F.2d at 19. See ________ ___
also, 28 U.S.C. 2680(h) (1994). ____
The district court again granted the defendant's motion
to dismiss, holding that under Puerto Rico law the facts alleged
in the complaint did not state a claim for intentional infliction
of emotional distress and the action was thus barred by Puerto
Rico's Workmen's Accident and Compensation Act. Santiago has
again appealed.
-3-
II. DISCUSSION II. DISCUSSION _______________
The Law of the Case The Law of the Case ___________________
Santiago asserts that this Court held that her claim
could go forward on the theory of intentional infliction of
emotional distress. She claims that the district court was bound
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