Santiago Ramirez v. Secretary of DOD

CourtCourt of Appeals for the First Circuit
DecidedAugust 16, 1995
Docket94-1394
StatusPublished

This text of Santiago Ramirez v. Secretary of DOD (Santiago Ramirez v. Secretary of DOD) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the First Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Santiago Ramirez v. Secretary of DOD, (1st Cir. 1995).

Opinion

USCA1 Opinion



UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
____________________

No. 94-1394

LYNETTE SANTIAGO-RAMIREZ, ET AL.,

Plaintiffs - Appellants,

v.

SECRETARY OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
OF THE U.S.A., ET AL.,

Defendants - Appellees.

____________________

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

[Hon. Juan M. P rez-Gim nez, U.S. District Judge] ___________________

____________________

Before

Torruella, Chief Judge, ___________

Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge, ____________________

and Boyle,* Senior District Judge. _____________________

_____________________

John Ward-Llamb as for appellants. __________________
Isabel Mu oz-Acosta, Assistant United States Attorney, with ___________________
whom Guillermo Gil, United States Attorney, was on brief for _____________
appellees.

____________________

August 16, 1995
____________________

____________________

* Of the District of Rhode Island, sitting by designation.

BOYLE, Senior District Judge. The questions presented BOYLE, Senior District Judge. _____________________

on appeal in this case are the following: whether this Court's

statement, in its prior reversal of the district court, that the

complaint might be read to state a cause of action for

intentional infliction of emotional distress constitutes the "law

of the case" which binds the district court and, if not, whether

the district court's subsequent dismissal was proper. Because we

find that this Court did not previously express its view as to

the law applicable to this case and that the district court

correctly dismissed the case, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND I. BACKGROUND ______________

We summarize the facts only briefly as they are laid

out in detail in our prior opinion. See Santiago Ram rez v. ___ ________________

Secretary of the Department of Defense, 984 F.2d 16 (1st Cir. ________________________________________

1993). Because this is a review of a grant of summary judgment,

we view the facts in a light most favorable to the non-movant.

See Coyne v. Taber Partners, 53 F.3d 454, 457 (1st Cir. 1995). ___ _____ ______________

Appellant, Santiago, worked as a cashier at Fort Buchanan's Army

Post Exchange Store. The store's policy prohibited employees

from carrying merchandise through the front door. On June 29,

1990, Santiago and a co-employee violated this policy when they

removed bags containing store merchandise through the front

entrance. They placed these bags in the trunk of the co-

employee's car. Unbeknownst to Santiago, the bags contained

stolen merchandise. The Safety and Security Manager and

Santiago's supervisor questioned her for a total of 45 minutes

-2-

concerning this breach of store policy. Santiago told them that

she did not know that the merchandise was stolen but was aware of

the store's regulation that prohibited employees from carrying

merchandise through the front door. She was later terminated for

violating this regulation. The District Court granted the

defendant's motion to dismiss based on its finding that Santiago

did not give the defendant adequate notice of her suit as

required by the Federal Tort Claims Act. See 28 U.S.C. 2675 ___

(1994). Santiago appealed.

We found that a letter Santiago had sent to the

defendants satisfied the statute's notice requirement. See ___

Santiago, 984 F.2d at 19. Because the government is not immune ________

from suit based on a claim of intentional infliction of emotional

distress, we stated that the complaint "might be read to plead a

cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional

distress." Id. at 20. We, therefore, remanded to the District ___

Court for a determination as to whether Santiago's complaint

could be read to state a cause of action for intentional

infliction of emotional distress. Santiago, 984 F.2d at 19. See ________ ___

also, 28 U.S.C. 2680(h) (1994). ____

The district court again granted the defendant's motion

to dismiss, holding that under Puerto Rico law the facts alleged

in the complaint did not state a claim for intentional infliction

of emotional distress and the action was thus barred by Puerto

Rico's Workmen's Accident and Compensation Act. Santiago has

again appealed.

-3-

II. DISCUSSION II. DISCUSSION _______________

The Law of the Case The Law of the Case ___________________

Santiago asserts that this Court held that her claim

could go forward on the theory of intentional infliction of

emotional distress. She claims that the district court was bound

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