Santiago-Ramirez v. Sec. Def.

CourtCourt of Appeals for the First Circuit
DecidedJanuary 27, 1993
Docket92-1143
StatusPublished

This text of Santiago-Ramirez v. Sec. Def. (Santiago-Ramirez v. Sec. Def.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the First Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Santiago-Ramirez v. Sec. Def., (1st Cir. 1993).

Opinion

USCA1 Opinion


January 27, 1993
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

____________________

No. 92-1143

LYNETTE SANTIAGO-RAMIREZ,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, ET AL.,

Defendants, Appellees.

____________________

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

[Hon. Juan M. Perez-Gimenez, U.S. District Judge]
___________________

____________________

Before

Cyr, Circuit Judge,
_____________
Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge,
____________________
Fuste,* District Judge.
______________

____________________

John Ward Llambias was on brief for appellant.
__________________
Isabel Munoz Acosta, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom
___________________
Daniel F. Lopez Romo, United States Attorney, was on brief for
_______________________
appellees.

____________________

____________________

_____________________

*Of the District of Puerto Rico, sitting by designation.

FUSTE, District Judge. The main question presented in
______________

this appeal is whether appellant properly notified the agency for

which she worked, the Army and Air Force Exchange Service,

(AAFES), of her potential federal tort claim. The district court

found the letter sent to the agency by appellant's lawyer

deficient for purposes of the statutory notice provision of the

Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 2675(a). We find that under

this circuit's flexible rule regarding notice requirements for

federal tort claims, the letter was sufficient as to part of the

claim.

I.
I.

BACKGROUND
BACKGROUND
__________

Appellant, Lynette Santiago-Ram rez, was removed from

her post at the cash register of Fort Buchanan's Army Post

Exchange store on June 29, 1990, under suspicion of having taken

part in an employee theft ring. She was interrogated for about

forty-five minutes in her supervisor's office. She was then

taken to the office of Mr. Jacques Zayde, the Safety and Security

Manager of the Exchange, where she was again subjected to a

forty-five-minute interrogation. Appellant alleges that, among

other things, she was threatened with investigation by the FBI.

After what she alleges was considerable harassment in complete

disregard for her pregnant condition, she eventually signed a

typewritten statement. She was then returned to the office of

her supervisor, who informed her that she had been terminated

from her job. Upon concluding the investigation, no charges were

pressed against plaintiff.

On September 25, 1990, appellant's attorney sent a

letter to the Director of Administration of the AAFES, stating

that appellant was filing an administrative complaint. The

letter specifically mentioned that appellant was mistreated by

officers and agents of the agency in a manner which resulted in

"emotional distress and mental suffering." The letter further

stated the exact remedy which appellant was requesting from the

agency: "reinstallation of Mrs. Santiago to her position, the

payment of any salaries and benefits and the reinstatement of any

rights she would have earned if not improperly discharged and the

amount of $50,000.00." The agency replied with a letter that

indicated it was treating the case as a routine dismissal under

military regulations. The letter stated that "Ms. Santiago's

rights to reinstatement were governed by the provisions of Army

Regulation (AR) 60-21/Air Force Regulation (AFR) 147-15." These

regulations require that an appeal of an adverse action be

brought within twenty-one days. Since appellant's letter had

been sent after the twenty-one-day period, the agency indicated

that it could take no action because she lacked a regulatory

basis for a review of her complaint. The agency letter, while

addressing the reinstatement and back-pay claim, did not respond

to the claim for damages for emotional distress.

After receiving this letter, appellant filed the

present suit in the United States District Court. She brought

-3-
3

suit against her employer, AAFES, as well as her immediate

supervisor, Mayra Moore, and the security manager, Jacques Zayde,

under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346(a)(2), and the Federal

Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346, 2671-2680. The district

court dismissed the suit after substituting the United States as

the proper party. The district court found that appellant's

letter did not give the agency sufficient notice of appellant's

claim and that appellant's complaint stated a cause of action for

false imprisonment, a cause of action excepted under the statute.

28 U.S.C. 2680(h). Appellant now appeals the dismissal of the

claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act.

II.
II.

FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
_______________________

A. Administrative Requirements of the FTCA
A. Administrative Requirements of the FTCA
_______________________________________

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