Santana v. Stadium Ctr., LLC.

2024 NY Slip Op 51027(U)
CourtNew York Supreme Court, Bronx County
DecidedAugust 9, 2024
DocketIndex No. 800331/2023E
StatusUnpublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 2024 NY Slip Op 51027(U) (Santana v. Stadium Ctr., LLC.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court, Bronx County primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Santana v. Stadium Ctr., LLC., 2024 NY Slip Op 51027(U) (N.Y. Super. Ct. 2024).

Opinion

Santana v Stadium Ctr., LLC. (2024 NY Slip Op 51027(U)) [*1]
Santana v Stadium Ctr., LLC.
2024 NY Slip Op 51027(U)
Decided on August 9, 2024
Supreme Court, Bronx County
Hummel, J.
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.


Decided on August 9, 2024
Supreme Court, Bronx County


Carmen Santana, Plaintiff,

against

Stadium Center, LLC., Defendant.




Index No. 800331/2023E

Plaintiff

MARTIN L GINSBERG Firm Name: Law Offices of Martin L. Ginsberg, P.C. Address: 185 Froehlich Farm Blvd., Woodbury, NY 11797 Phone: 718-805-2300 Fax: 516-364-3717 Service E-mail: mginsberg_law@verizon.net

Defendant THOMAS E LIPTAK Firm Name: KENNEY, SHELTON, LIPTAK & NOWAK, L.L.P Address: The Calumet Building 233 Franklin Street, Buffalo, NY 14202 Phone: 716-853-3801 Service E-mail: TELiptak@kslnlaw.com Other E-mails: samcilwraith@kslnlaw.com
Veronica G. Hummel, J.

In accordance with CPLR 2219(a), the decision herein is made upon consideration of all of the papers filed by the parties in NYSCEF in connection with defendant STADIUM CENTER, LLC's motion (Seq. No. 1) for an Order, pursuant to CPLR § 3216 and CPLR § 1021, dismissing plaintiff CARMEN SANTANA'S complaint based on the failure to prosecute the action and the failure to substitute a representative for the deceased plaintiff within a reasonable time. There is no opposition to the motion.

This action arises out of an alleged trip and fall that occurred on July 29, 2022. The Summons and Complaint was filed on January 9, 2023, and served upon defendant through Secretary of State on February 8, 2023. Limited Liability Company Law § 303. It appears that little if any action has been taken by plaintiff to litigate this action in the past year. On April 17, 2023, plaintiff requested a Preliminary Conference, and on July 10, 2023, counsel for plaintiff [*2]informed defendant by letter that plaintiff had passed away.

Six months later, on January 10, 2024, defendant served a Ninety (90) Day Demand for Resumption of Prosecution Notice to pursuant to CPLR §3216 on plaintiff's attorney. The demand required plaintiff to recommence prosecution, complete discovery, and file a Note of Issue by April 9,2024.

Of note, plaintiff has not uploaded proof of death and the action is not marked "stayed" in the court records. As the parties agree that plaintiff is deceased, however, the death of a party is therefore admitted and the action is stayed by law. CPLR §1015.

The death of a party that affects the merits of an action divests the court of jurisdiction and stays the proceedings until a proper substitution has been made pursuant to CPLR §1015(a)(Thomas v Rubin, 197 AD3d 1061 [1st Dept 2021]; see Feurtado v Page, 163 AD3d 926 [2d Dept 2018]; NYCTL 2004-A Trust v Archer, 131 AD3d 1213, 1214 [2d Dept 2015]; see generally Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB as Trustee of Residential Credit Opportunities Trust v. Lau, 227 AD3d 561 [1st Dept 2024]; CPLR §§1015, 1021). Moreover, any determination rendered without such substitution will generally be deemed a nullity (Erin Construction & Development, Co, Inc., v Hartford Services, Ltd., 176 AD3d 633 [1st Dept 2019]; see Fazilov v Acosta, 228 AD3d 910 [2d Dept 2024]; Vapnersh v Tabak, 131 AD3d 47 [2d Dept 2015]). The death of a party also generally terminates his or her attorney's authority to act on behalf of the deceased party (Snipes v Schmidt, 161 AD3d 670 [1st Dept 2018]; see Fazilov v Acosta, supra; Rumola v Maimonides Medical Center, 37 AD3d 696 [2d Dept 2007]; Vapnersh v Tabak, supra; compare Perez v. City of New York, 95 AD3d 675 [1st Dept 2012]); Reed v Grossi, 59 AD3d 509 [2d Dept 2009]).

CPLR §3216-Want of Prosecution

That part of the motion that seeks to dismiss the lawsuit based on a failure to prosecute pursuant to CPLR § 3216 is denied. CPLR §3216 requires that three conditions be fulfilled: (1) issue has been joined; (2) one year has elapsed from the joinder of issue; and (3) the court or a party has served a written demand that the plaintiff file a note of issue within 90 days. In addition, CPLR § 3216(a)(3) explicitly provides that:

"The court or party seeking such relief, as the case may be, shall have served a written demand by registered or certified mail requiring the party against whom such relief is sought to resume prosecution of the action and to serve and file a note of issue within ninety days after receipt of such demand . . . "

In this case, the plaintiff is deceased. As such, the action is stayed, and plaintiff's attorney is without authority to act on behalf of the deceased plaintiff in the lawsuit. At the moment, therefore, no one is empowered to respond to the Ninety (90) Day Notice or to this motion to protect the interests of plaintiff's estate. Hence, any determination dismissing the case pursuant to CPLR §3216 without a substitution would be a nullity. (Erin Construction & Development, Co., Inc., v Hartford Services, Ltd., supra). In any event, defendant fails to provide any proof that service of the Ninety (90) Day Notice was made upon plaintiff by registered or certified mail, as required by CPLR §3216(a)(3), and the motion is denied on said ground as well. Accordingly, the part of the motion that seeks to dismiss the action based on CPLR §3216 is denied.

CPLR §1021-Dismissal for Failure to Substitute

CPLR §1021 provides an exception to the principle that the Supreme Court is divested of jurisdiction to act during an automatic stay based on a party's death (Feurtado v Page, supra; Rumola v Maimonides Med. Ctr., supra).The statute provides that "if the event requiring substitution occurs before final judgment and substitution is not made within a reasonable time, the action may be dismissed as to the party for whom substitution should have been made." (CPLR §1021; see generally Strum v Bressler, 214 AD3d 465 [1st Dept 2023]).

In order to protect the interests of nonparties to the lawsuit, however, a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR §1021 must include notice of the motion not just to the parties to the action, but, in fact, notice must be given to all persons interested in the decedent's estate (Fazilov v Acosta; supra; Feurtado v Page, supra; Barnabas v Boodoo, 134 AD3d 970, 971-972 [2d Dept 2015]; Rumola v Maimonides Med. Ctr., supra). Specifically, the statute requires that:

"Whether or not it occurs before or after final judgment, if the event requiring substitution is the death of a party, and timely substitution has not been made, the court, before proceeding further, shall, on such notice as it may in its discretion direct, order the persons interested in the decedent's estate to show cause why the action or appeal should not be dismissed".


The Supreme Court must therefore first obtain jurisdiction over the persons interested in the decedent's estate by having nonparties served as prescribed in CPLR Article 3 (Gonzalez v Ford Motor Co., 295 AD2d 474 [2d Dept 2002]).

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Related

Santana v. Stadium Ctr., LLC.
2024 NY Slip Op 51027(U) (New York Supreme Court, Bronx County, 2024)

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Bluebook (online)
2024 NY Slip Op 51027(U), Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/santana-v-stadium-ctr-llc-nysupctbrnx-2024.