Santa Barbara County Air Pollution Control District v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

31 F.3d 1179, 308 U.S. App. D.C. 172
CourtCourt of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
DecidedAugust 12, 1994
DocketNo. 92-1569
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 31 F.3d 1179 (Santa Barbara County Air Pollution Control District v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Santa Barbara County Air Pollution Control District v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 31 F.3d 1179, 308 U.S. App. D.C. 172 (D.C. Cir. 1994).

Opinions

[1180]*1180Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge BUCKLEY.

Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge STEPHEN F. WILLIAMS.

BUCKLEY, Circuit Judge:

The County of Santa Barbara Air Pollution Control District (“Santa Barbara” or “County”) challenges the Environmental Protection Agency’s regulations governing air pollution from sources on the Outer Continental Shelf (“OCS”). We uphold the EPA’s regulations insofar as they refuse regulation of in-transit maritime vessels as OCS sources; we conclude, however, that the Act requires that OCS sources within 25 miles of shore be subject to offset requirements identical to those applicable to sources in the corresponding onshore area. We vacate the regulations insofar as they do not provide for such treatment.

I.

In 1990, Congress assigned the EPA the responsibility for controlling air pollution produced over extensive areas of the OCS. Congress did so by adding section 328 to the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401 et seq. (1988 & Supp.1990) (“Act”). See 42 U.S.C. § 7627 (Supp. II 1990). Subsection (a)(1) of section 328 requires the Administrator of the EPA to

establish requirements to control air pollution from Outer Continental Shelf sources [within such areas] to attain and maintain Federal and State ambient air quality standards and to comply with the provisions of part C of subchapter I of this chapter. For such sources located within 25 miles of the seaward boundary of such States, such requirements shall be the same as would be applicable if the source were located in the corresponding onshore area, and shall include, but not be limited to, State and local requirements for emission controls, emissions limitations, offsets, permitting, monitoring, testing, and reporting.

Id. § 7627(a)(1). Subsection (a)(4) defines OCS sources as follows:

(C) Outer Continental Shelf source. The terms “Outer Continental Shelf source” and “OCS source” include any equipment, activity, or facility which—
(i) emits or has the potential to emit any air pollutant,
(ii) is regulated or authorized under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act ..., and
(iii) is located on the Outer Continental Shelf or in or on waters above the Outer Continental Shelf.
Such activities include, but are not limited to, platform and drill ship exploration, construction, development, production, processing, and transportation. For purposes of this subsection, emissions from any vessel servicing or associated with an OCS source, including emissions while at the OCS source or en route to or from the OCS source within 25 miles of the OCS source, shall be considered direct emissions from the OCS source.

Id. § 7627(a)(4)(C).

Responding to its new obligations, the EPA published a proposed OCS rule in late 1991, Outer Continental Shelf Air Regulations—Proposed Rule, 56 Fed.Reg. 63,774 (1991), and a final rule on September 4,1992. Outer Continental Shelf Air Regulations—Final Rule, 57 Fed.Reg. 40,792 (1992). Santa Barbara contends that the final rule contravenes section 328 in two respects: First, it fails to include marine vessels in transit among OCS sources; second, its air pollution offset provisions do not treat OCS sources within 25 miles of the shore in the same manner that corresponding onshore sources are treated.

II.

Section 307 of the Clean Air Act states that a court “may reverse any [action of the Administrator that is] found to be ... in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right....” 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9)(C) (1988). Our review of the EPA regulations follows the familiar Chevron analysis:

When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which it adminis[1181]*1181ters, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, ... the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2781-82, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984) (footnotes omitted).

A. Regulation of Marine Vessels

Each party argues that Congress has directly spoken to the “in transit” issue and that the text of section 328 unambiguously' supports its position. Thus the County argues that the EPA’s construction is owed no deference, while the EPA asserts that none is necessary. The County contends that the language of subsection (a)(1) requires the Administrator “to control air pollution from Outer Continental Shelf sources,” which it interprets to include marine vessels in transit, in the same manner as “if the source were located in the corresponding onshore area.” 42 U.S.C. § 7627(a)(1). The EPA, on the other hand, maintains that the definition of OCS source in subsection (a)(4)(C) makes clear that marine vessels in transit are excluded. See id. § 7627(a)(4)(C).

The County’s position would be unassailable if vessels in transit were unambiguously included within the statutory meaning of “Outer Continental Shelf sources.” Yet as the EPA points out, that phrase is defined in subsection (a)(4), which mentions vessels in only two contexts: “drill ship exploration” and

emissions from any vessel servicing or associated with an OCS source, including emissions while at the OCS source or en route to or from the OCS source within 25 miles of the OCS source, shall be considered direct emissions from the OCS source.

Id. § 7627(a)(4)(C) (emphasis added). The definitional provision thus fails to make specific mention of vessels in transit. We do not find this silence to be dispositive; rather, we view the provision as ambiguous, at least insofar as the status of vessels in transit is concerned. The agency defines OCS source to include vessels only when they are:

(1) Permanently or temporarily attached to the seabed and erected thereon and used for the purpose of exploring, developing or producing resources therefrom, within the meaning of section 4(a)(1) of OCSLA (43 U.S.C. § 1331 et seq.); or
(2) Physically attached to an OCS facility, in which ease only the stationary source aspects of the vessels will be regulated.

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31 F.3d 1179, 308 U.S. App. D.C. 172, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/santa-barbara-county-air-pollution-control-district-v-us-environmental-cadc-1994.