Sanone Ex Rel. Sanone v. J. C. Penney Co.

404 P.2d 248, 17 Utah 2d 46, 1965 Utah LEXIS 445
CourtUtah Supreme Court
DecidedJuly 22, 1965
Docket10047
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 404 P.2d 248 (Sanone Ex Rel. Sanone v. J. C. Penney Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Utah Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sanone Ex Rel. Sanone v. J. C. Penney Co., 404 P.2d 248, 17 Utah 2d 46, 1965 Utah LEXIS 445 (Utah 1965).

Opinions

[48]*48McDonough, justice.

Selanie Sanone, a two and one-half year old girl, sued (by her parents) for injuries suffered on the escalator in the defendant’s store in downtown Salt Lake City. From a jury verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of $12,500 defendant appeals.

On the afternoon of June 29, 1961, Mrs. John G. Sanone had Selanie with her shopping on the second floor of defendant’s store. As they stepped on the descending escalator, she took Selanie’s hand and the little girl stood beside her. Halfway down Selanie cried, “Mommy, my foot is caught” and her mother instinctively pulled her up into her arms. It was found that the skin and muscle tissue of Selanie’s leg had been severely tom. She was immediately taken to the hospital and treated. From the evidence and the pictures, there appears to be a deep and severe laceration and scarring of the leg from just below her knee to just above her ankle.

Due to the nature of an escalator it was impossible for the plaintiff to know or to show just what caused her injury. The trial court submitted the case to the jury on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. This is the principal error charged by the defendant.

It is common knowledge that escalators are widely used in public buildings, particularly in department stores, and that thousands of people, including children, use them daily without injury. It is certainly not unreasonable for one to assume that it is safe to use them in the manner and for the purpose for which they were intended. Nor does it depart from reason to draw the inference that if an escalator is so used and an injury occurs there was something wrong in either the construction, maintenance, or operation of the escalator.1

The effect of the doctrine of res ipsa, loquitur is to authorize the jury to draw an inference of negligence where such circumstances exist. Inasmuch as the escalator was under the exclusive control of the defendant, the test for the application of the doctrine is fulfilled.2

There is further complication in this case in the fact that the trial court submitted to the jury some special interrogatories, the answer to one of which defendant now con[49]*49tends is inconsistent with the general verdict. It is the opinion of this court that these various interrogatories would have been confusing to the jury and of little value to the trial court or to this court in passing upon the validity of the verdict. Sparing the necessity of setting them forth or discussing them in detail, the defendant’s contention can he disposed of hy these observations.

Once the proper foundation for the application of res ipsa loquitur was established, that was a sufficient basis for submitting the case to the jury and for the finding of a verdict. The fact that in response to special interrogatories the jury failed to find any specific negligence will not defeat the general verdict. It is plain that if the jury were required also to find specific acts of negligence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur would be nullified and could just as well be eliminated from the case.

A second observation is also pertinent : the jury’s general verdict is not necessarily defeated by a showing on the part of the defendant that it did not know the cause of the accident. It would be defeated only if the jury were sufficiently persuaded by the evidence of non-negligence of the defendant that they refused to render the general verdict, which is not the situation shown here.

One further point requires mention. Defendant also contends that if this verdict be affirmed, that it should be allowed its third-party complaint against the Elevator Service and Supply Company, which was dismissed without prejudice in the lower court. With this proposition we agree.

Affirmed. Costs to plaintiff (respondent).

CROCKETT and WADE, JJ., concur.

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Sanone Ex Rel. Sanone v. J. C. Penney Co.
404 P.2d 248 (Utah Supreme Court, 1965)

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Bluebook (online)
404 P.2d 248, 17 Utah 2d 46, 1965 Utah LEXIS 445, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sanone-ex-rel-sanone-v-j-c-penney-co-utah-1965.