Sanjuana Rangel-Fonseca v. Jefferson Sessions

707 F. App'x 871
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedDecember 20, 2017
Docket15-73855
StatusUnpublished

This text of 707 F. App'x 871 (Sanjuana Rangel-Fonseca v. Jefferson Sessions) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sanjuana Rangel-Fonseca v. Jefferson Sessions, 707 F. App'x 871 (9th Cir. 2017).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM **

Sanjuana Rangel-Fonseca, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions pro.se for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing her appeal from an immigration judge’s decision denying her applications for cancellation of removal, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings, Zehatye v. Gonzales 458 F.3d 1182, 1184-85 (9th Cir. 2006), and review de novo questions of law, Vinh Tan Nguyen v. Holder, 763 F.3d 1022, 1027 (9th Cir. 2014). We grant in part and deny in part the petition for review, and remand.

The agency did not have the benefit of our decision in Ramirez-Contreras v. Sessions, 858 F.3d 1298 (9th Cir. 2017), holding that California Vehicle Code § 2800.2(a) is not a crime involving moral turpitude, when it determined that Rangel-Fonseca’s conviction under § 2800.2(a) was categorically a crime involving moral turpitude. We therefore remand for the agency to consider Rangel-Fonseca’s eligibility for cancellation of removal. See Ramirez-Contreras, 858 F.3d at 1306 (holding § 2800.2 is indivisible).

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s conclusion that Rangel-Fonseca failed to establish a nexus between the harm she fears and a protected ground. See Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010) (“An alien’s desire to be free from harassment by criminals motivated by theft or random violence by gang members bears no nexus to a protected ground.”). Thus, her withholding of removal claim fails.

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of Rangel-Fonseca’s CAT claim because she did not demonstrate a particularized threat of torture, and her generalized evidence of violence and crime in Mexico is insufficient to meet the standard for relief. See Delgado-Ortiz v. Holder, 600 F.3d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 2010).

Each party shall bear its own costs for this petition for review.

PETITION FOR REVIEW GRANTED in part; DENIED in part; REMANDED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

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Related

Delgado-Ortiz v. Holder
600 F.3d 1148 (Ninth Circuit, 2010)
Antonio v. Sygma Network, Inc.
458 F.3d 1177 (Tenth Circuit, 2006)
Zetino v. Holder
622 F.3d 1007 (Ninth Circuit, 2010)
Vinh Nguyen v. Eric Holder, Jr.
763 F.3d 1022 (Ninth Circuit, 2014)
Moises Ramirez-Contreras v. Jefferson Sessions
858 F.3d 1298 (Ninth Circuit, 2017)

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Bluebook (online)
707 F. App'x 871, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sanjuana-rangel-fonseca-v-jefferson-sessions-ca9-2017.