Sanjuan v. IBP, Inc.

78 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20214, 1999 WL 1289136
CourtDistrict Court, D. Kansas
DecidedDecember 17, 1999
Docket94-1541-DES
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 78 F. Supp. 2d 1195 (Sanjuan v. IBP, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Kansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sanjuan v. IBP, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20214, 1999 WL 1289136 (D. Kan. 1999).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

SAFFELS, District Judge.

This matter is before the court on a punitive damage award proceeding. Both parties filed briefs as to the proper amount of punitive damages. A hearing was held in which both parties presented evidence. After hearing oral arguments, the court is ready to rule.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff brought a retaliatory discharge action against his employer, IBP, Inc (“IBP”). Plaintiff claimed that IBP discharged him in retaliation for exercising his rights under the Workers Compensation Act. IBP argued that the plaintiff was discharged due to poor work performance. The jury found that the plaintiff could have returned to his job and that IBP discharged the plaintiff in retaliation for exercising his rights under the Workers Compensation Act. The total jury award was $99,532.00. The jury awarded $97,-032.00 for past wages and $2,500.00 for embarrassment, humiliation and emotional distress. The jury also found that IBP acted in a willful, wanton or malicious manner in terminating the plaintiff and plaintiff was entitled to punitive damages.

II. DISCUSSION

The court instructed the jury that punitive damages would not be allowed unless the jury found the defendant acted willfully, “with a designed purpose or intent on the part of a person to do wrong or to cause an injury to another,” or wantonly, “with a realization of the imminence of danger and a reckless disregard or complete indifference to the probable consequences of the act,” or maliciously, with “intent to do a harmful act without a reasonable justification or excuse.” Because the jury was not asked to specify which category, the court must assume the jury found at the very least the defendant acted wantonly.

, While the jury determines whether to award punitive damages, it is the responsibility of the trial court to determine the appropriate amount of the punitive damages in a separate proceeding. Kan.Stat. Ann. 60-3702(a). “Punitive damages are imposed by way of punishing a party for *1196 malicious or vindictive acts or for a willful and wanton invasion of another party’s rights, the purpose being to restrain him and to deter others from the commission of like wrongs.” Ramirez v. IBP, Inc., 950 F.Supp. 1074, 1077 (D.Kan.1996) (citing Henderson v. Hassur, 225 Kan. 678, 594 P.2d 650 (1979)).

The Kansas statute lists seven factors the court may consider in determining the amount of punitive damages:

(1) The likelihood at the time of the alleged misconduct that serious harm would arise from the defendant’s misconduct;
(2) the degree of the defendant’s awareness of that likelihood;
(3) the profitability of the defendant’s misconduct;
(4) the duration of the misconduct and any intentional concealment of it;
(5) the attitude and conduct of the defendant upon discovery of the misconduct;
(6) the financial condition of the defendant; and
(7) the total deterrent effect of other damages and punishment imposed upon the defendant as a result of the misconduct, including, but not limited to, compensatory, exemplary and punitive damage awards to persons in situations similar to those of the claimant and the severity of the criminal penalties to which the defendant has been or may be subjected.

Kan.Stat.Ann. § 60-3702(b). This list is not exclusive. Scheufler v. General Host Corp., 915 F.Supp. 236, 241 (D.Kan.1996). “Having tried the case, the court should evaluate all relevant evidence and, in the exercise of reasonable discretion, arrive at a punitive damage award which furthers the purposes of restraint and deterrence.” Ramirez, 950 F.Supp. at 1077 (citing Citizens State Bank v. Shearson Lehman Bros., 874 F.Supp. 307, 310 (D.Kan.1994)). The court evaluates each factor below.

A. Likelihood of Serious Harm Arising from Defendant’s Conduct and Degree of Defendant’s Awareness of Such Harm.

The misconduct at issue in this case is IBP’s discharge of plaintiff in retaliation for exercising his rights under the Worker’s Compensation Act. There was substantial evidence presented at trial that IBP retaliated against Sanjuan. This case does not involve the serious harm of death or personal injury. However, this case does involve the serious financial and emotional harm that loss of employment causes.

The plaintiff immigrated from Mexico when he was sixteen with a twelfth grade education. Before he began working at IBP, plaintiff worked in agricultural fields, picking fruit and vegetables. When he was twenty, plaintiff got a job at IBP in processing. Plaintiff worked at IBP from 1988 until he was fired on December 23, 1992. At the time he was fired, plaintiff was married and had three children to support. Although Sanjuan speaks conversational English, he needs an interpreter for more complex issues. There was evidence presented at trial that Sanjuan used an interpreter to communicate with management at IBP on several occasions. With plaintiffs work history and limited ability to speak English, there is no doubt that plaintiff would have difficulty finding new employment opportunities.

The harm caused by loss of employment is increased when an employee is physically injured. “The emotional and financial harm from termination is exacerbated when the worker is physically injured, for the chances of finding other employment are decreased not only by the firing but by the injury.” Ramirez, 950 F.Supp. at 1078. The plaintiff indeed had difficulty finding another job. Sanjuan was unable to find steady work for three years. He eventually found a job in construction, which he currently holds today. IBP argues that Sanjuan could easily have found work at other meat processing plants lo *1197 cated in the Finney County area. Sanjuan was allegedly fired for poor work performance. It is not likely that an employer would hire a person who was fired from a similar job for poor work performance.

There was also a serious risk that plaintiff would suffer emotional harm due to the loss of his job and his lack of employment prospects. There was evidence presented at trial that the plaintiff suffered from emotional distress. Sanjuan’s marriage and family also suffered. The jury awarded $2,500.00 to plaintiff for embarrassment, humiliation, and emotional distress. There was a strong likelihood that Sanjuan would sustain serious harm when IBP fired him in retaliation for exercising his rights under the Workers Compensation Act.

IBP should not be surprised that firing a person with plaintiffs injury, work history, and limited ability to speak English would result in serious harm. IBP argues that there was no threat of serious harm because Sanjuan represented that he was totally disabled. This argument is without merit. Sanjuan worked every day until he was fired.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
78 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20214, 1999 WL 1289136, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sanjuan-v-ibp-inc-ksd-1999.