Sandra Marie Rose v. State of Arkansas

2025 Ark. App. 267

• Court: Court of Appeals of Arkansas
• Decided: April 30, 2025
• Status: Published

Opinion

Cite as 2025 Ark. App. 267 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION II No. CR-24-505

SANDRA MARIE ROSE Opinion Delivered April 30, 2025

APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE SEBASTIAN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, FORT V. SMITH DISTRICT [NOS. 66FCR-21-688 & 66FCR-22-233] STATE OF ARKANSAS APPELLEE HONORABLE R. GUNNER DELAY, JUDGE

AFFIRMED

ROBERT J. GLADWIN, Judge

This is an appeal from the Sebastian County Circuit Court’s denial of appellant

Sandra Marie Rose’s petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Arkansas Rule of

Criminal Procedure 37.1 (2024). Rose argues on appeal that the circuit court erred in

denying her petition because there was insufficient evidence to support her conviction; she

was denied effective assistance of counsel; she was illegally sentenced; and the State abused

its discretion by admitting her prior drug convictions to enhance all charges. We affirm.

I. Background Facts

On August 6, 2021, Rose was arrested for possessing over two hundred grams of

methamphetamine, four ounces of marijuana, pipes, scales, and two firearms. Subsequently, on March 5, 2022, Rose was arrested for possessing over an ounce of fentanyl, two hundred

grams of methamphetamine, and four ounces of marijuana.

On November 15, 2023, Rose entered a negotiated plea of guilty as a habitual

offender to simultaneous possession of drugs and firearms; felon in possession of a firearm;

trafficking fentanyl; and two counts each of trafficking methamphetamine, possession of

marijuana with the purpose to deliver, and maintaining a premises for drug activity. At the

plea hearing, Rose acknowledged that she understood the charges; the possible penalties; the

plea; and the waiver of a jury trial and related rights, such as the right to appeal. Rose also

affirmatively stated that there were no threats, promises, or coercion used against her to

obtain her guilty plea. Accordingly, the court accepted the State’s recommended concurrent

sentence of fifty years’ imprisonment with an additional thirty years’ suspended imposition

of sentence for each Class Y felony, forty years’ imprisonment for the Class B felony, and

thirty years’ imprisonment for each Class C felony. The sentencing order was entered on

December 4, 2023.

On February 27, 2024, Rose filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief pursuant

to Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.1. She asserted the following three claims of

ineffective assistance of counsel: (1) defense counsel was ineffective for failing to advise her

that her conduct did not meet the elements of the charges; (2) defense counsel was ineffective

for failing to advise her of a more favorable plea offer, making her guilty plea uninformed;

and (3) defense counsel was ineffective for coercing her into a plea by informing her of an

incorrect likely outcome if she went to trial.

2 A hearing was held on the petition on June 11, 2024. Rose testified that her prior

two defense counsel initially presented her with a plea offer of thirty years at 50 percent

parole eligibility—which she was willing to accept; however, defense counsel Christina

Scherrey testified there was no offer extended by the State that was more favorable than the

one Rose accepted. Rose alleged she believed that the firearm charges and habitual-offender

status would be dropped as part of the plea agreement and, moreover, that she was coerced

into accepting the plea agreement because defense counsel advised that she would face four

separate trials and a potentially lengthy sentence if the cases proceeded to trial. The State

admitted into evidence a letter that Scherrey sent to Rose after she was assigned to her case

that detailed the charges, the penalties, the State’s offer as to each charge, and her

professional opinion of the offer versus taking the charges to trial.

On June 20, 2024, the circuit court entered its order denying Rose’s petition for

postconviction relief. The circuit court held that Rose failed to meet the burden of proof

required to be granted postconviction relief. Rose timely filed her notice of appeal; this

appeal followed.

II. Standard of Review

This court does not reverse a denial of postconviction relief unless the circuit court’s

findings are clearly erroneous. Reed v. State, 2011 Ark. 115. A finding is clearly erroneous

when, although there is evidence to support it, the appellate court, after reviewing the entire

evidence, is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id.

The benchmark question to be resolved in judging a claim of ineffective assistance of

3 counsel is whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the

adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result. Norris

v. State, 2013 Ark. 205, 427 S.W.3d 626. We assess the effectiveness of counsel under a two-

prong standard as set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668 (1984). Lowe v. State, 2012 Ark. 185, 423 S.W.3d 6. Under the Strickland test,

a claimant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient, and the claimant must also

show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense to the extent that the appellant

was deprived of a fair trial. Id. A claimant must satisfy both prongs of the test, and it is

unnecessary to examine both components of the inquiry if the petitioner fails to satisfy either

requirement. See Pennington v. State, 2013 Ark. 39.

A petitioner claiming ineffective assistance must first show that counsel made errors

so serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed to the petitioner by

the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Walton v. State, 2013 Ark. 254.

There is a strong presumption that trial counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of

reasonable professional assistance, and an appellant has the burden of overcoming this

presumption by identifying specific acts or omissions of trial counsel, which, when viewed

from counsel’s perspective at the time of the trial, could not have been the result of

reasonable professional judgment. Id.

In order to meet the second prong of the test, a claimant must show that there is a

reasonable probability that the fact-finder’s decision would have been different absent

counsel’s errors. Delamar v. State, 2011 Ark. 87. A reasonable probability is a probability

4 sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial. Id.

III. Points on Appeal

Rose argues as follows: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support her conviction;

(2) her sentence was illegal due to conflicting statutes, and she was subjected to double

jeopardy; (3) her trial counsel was ineffective by failing to advise her properly, coerced her

into a plea, and did not investigate the evidence adequately; and (4) the State abused its

discretion by admitting prior drug convictions to enhance all charges.

IV. Discussion

Regarding Rose’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel argument, she maintains that the

circuit court erred by denying her postconviction relief because (1) her trial counsel obtained

Rose’s signature on the plea agreement under a false pretense that the firearm and habitual-

offender charges would be dropped; (2) counsel gave erroneous advice and used coercion to

induce Rose into signing the guilty plea; and (3) trial counsel did not investigate the evidence

adequately. Furthermore, Rose contends that she demonstrated error so fundamental to

render the judgement of conviction void. We disagree.

When a defendant pleads guilty, the only claims cognizable under Rule 37.1 are that

the plea was not made voluntarily or intelligently or that it was entered without the advice

of competent counsel. E.g., Nutt v. State, 2020 Ark. App. 137, 594 S.W.3d 907. The burden

is entirely on the claimant to provide facts that affirmatively support any claim of prejudice;

neither conclusory statements nor allegations without factual substantiation are sufficient to

overcome the presumption that counsel was effective, and such statements and allegations

5 will not warrant granting a Rule 37.1 petition. E.g., Winters v. State, 2014 Ark. 399, 441

S.W.3d 22. A defendant’s later belief that she made a mistake by pleading guilty is not a basis

for setting aside the plea. E.g., Akin v. State, 2011 Ark. 477. A defendant who, when pleading

guilty, represents to the circuit court that she understands her rights and that there is no

force or compulsion will not later be allowed to dispute those representations in

postconviction proceedings. E.g., Green v. State, 362 Ark. 459, 209 S.W.3d 339 (2005).

In making a determination of ineffective assistance of counsel, the totality of the

evidence must be considered. Springs v. State, 2012 Ark. 87, 387 S.W.3d 143. Unless a

petitioner makes both Strickland showings, it cannot be said that the conviction resulted from

a breakdown in the adversarial process that renders the result unreliable. Sales v. State, 2014

Ark. 384, 441 S.W.3d 883. Moreover, to demonstrate prejudice when an appellant pleads

guilty, he or she must show there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he

or she would not have pled and would have insisted on going to trial. E.g., Davis v. State,

2018 Ark. App. 540, 564 S.W.3d 283.

Here, in denying her petition, the circuit court held that when Rose pleaded guilty,

she admitted she understood each of the charges against her as well as the possible penalties

and, furthermore, acknowledged her status as a habitual offender. The court also noted that

the plea document signed by Rose clearly listed the same. Moreover, the court held that the

transcript of Rose’s plea reflected significant discussion about the facts of each of the charges

against Rose and her status as a habitual offender. Rose never objected to anything said

during the proceeding. When asked by the circuit court whether there had been any “force,

6 threats, or coercion of any kind used against [her] to get [her] to enter this plea,” Rose

answered, “No, sir.” Regarding Rose’s assertion that her counsel was ineffective for advising

her that rejection of the plea would result in multiple trials—the outcome of which would

likely be detrimental to Rose—the circuit court held it was not ineffective assistance to warn

a client about possible consequences and offer his or her best judgment regarding the

prospects of trial and the relative advantages of a plea agreement.

Having reviewed the transcript of the plea hearing, we hold that the circuit court did

not clearly err in denying Rose’s postconviction petition for relief. Rose stated that no one

forced or threatened her to enter into the plea agreement and expressly agreed to the exact

sentence that she received. Nothing in the transcript of the plea hearing demonstrates that

Rose felt threatened or forced by counsel, or any other party, to plead guilty or that she did

not understand her plea. To the contrary, both the transcript of the plea hearing and Rose’s

acknowledged and signed plea statement confirm that she was not forced into pleading guilty

and that she fully understood the charges and the agreement. At the plea hearing, the circuit

court said, “[T]ell me what that agreement is,” and Rose responded that it was fifty years with

thirty years suspended. Accordingly, Rose failed to prove that she was deprived of a fair trial

due to ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with her guilty plea. Furthermore, she

has not established that she would have insisted on going to trial but for her attorney’s errors.

Therefore, we hold that Rose has failed to meet the Strickland standard, and we affirm the

circuit court’s order on this point.

7 Next, Rose argues that her sentence was illegal because of conflicting statutes

concerning imposition of enhanced sentences under the firearm-enhancement statutes and

because she received “multiple punishments for the same offense” in violation of the double-

jeopardy clause. Rose’s double-jeopardy challenge related to her sentencing is not preserved;

thus, we do not reach its merits on appeal. See Dirickson v. State, 2021 Ark. 36, 617 S.W.3d

712.

Finally, Rose contends there was insufficient evidence to support her conviction and

that the State abused its discretion by admitting her prior drug convictions and an amended

plea statement. Neither of these arguments are cognizable in postconviction proceedings.

See Engstrom v. State, 2016 Ark. 45, 481 S.W.3d 435. Accordingly, we cannot address them

on appeal.

V. Conclusion

For the above-stated reasons, we hold that the circuit court’s denial of Rose’s petition

for postconviction relief was not clearly erroneous and affirm the convictions.

Affirmed.

THYER and WOOD, JJ., agree.

Sandra Marie Rose, pro se appellant.

Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: A. Evangeline Bacon, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.