SANDRA A. MCLAUGHLIN, Personal Representative v. KATHY T. SHEA.

• Court: Massachusetts Appeals Court
• Decided: January 20, 2026
• Docket: 24-P-1083
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

24-P-1083

SANDRA A. MCLAUGHLIN, personal representative,1

vs.

KATHY T. SHEA.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The plaintiff, Sandra A. McLaughlin, as the personal

representative of the estate of John R. McLaughlin, appeals from

a judgment entered in the Probate and Family Court dismissing

John McLaughlin's equity complaint. Sandra2 claims, as she did

at trial, that the defendant, Kathy T. Shea (Shea), obtained

real estate from Ralph Caldwell (the decedent) through fraud and

undue influence. Sandra further claims that the decedent lacked

the requisite capacity to deed the property to Shea. We affirm.

1 Of the estate of John R. McLaughlin.

2Because Sandra McLaughlin and her late husband, John McLaughlin, share a last name, we refer to them by their first names to avoid confusion. Background. The decedent died on July 27, 2020, at age

ninety-two. He never married, had no children, and was survived

by his five nieces and nephews, including John and Shea. The

decedent lived in a home he owned in Charlestown (the

Charlestown property) for many years before his death.3 John

lived with the decedent at the Charlestown property from

approximately 1984 to April 1996. John married Sandra on August

4, 1996.

On October 4, 1984, the decedent executed a will in which

he nominated his niece, Shea, as the executrix, and devised his

estate to his sister in trust for the benefit of his mother.

Both of his sisters predeceased him. On September 16, 2011, the

decedent executed another will, again nominating Shea as the

executrix and devising the Charlestown property to his nephew,

John. If John predeceased the decedent, then the Charlestown

property would pass in equal shares to Shea and to one of the

decedent's other nieces. Also on September 16, 2011, the

decedent executed a durable power of attorney and a health care

proxy naming Shea as his attorney-in-fact and health care agent.

3 The decedent acquired the home in Charlestown by deed from his mother and an abutting parcel of property by deed from the Boston Redevelopment Authority. As the distinction is immaterial to this appeal, we also refer to both parcels of property collectively as "the Charlestown property."

2 Sandra testified that on that same date, the decedent "told her

he had changed his will to leave [the Charlestown property] to

[John]." She further testified that she and John were under the

belief that the property would pass to them upon the decedent's

death, and thus she and John helped coordinate and pay for

repairs at the Charlestown property.

In 2020, the decedent became critically ill and was

hospitalized from June 22 through July 9, 2020. Initially, he

was not allowed visitors due to COVID-19 precautions, but

"[w]hen visitors were permitted, Ms. Shea visited the [d]ecedent

every evening."4 Although the decedent was weak while in the

hospital, he was able to carry on conversations, was aware of

what was going on, and could make his own decisions. The judge

credited Shea's testimony that in January or February 2020, the

decedent told her that he "was going to give her" the

Charlestown property and, while he was in the hospital, told her

to contact an attorney because "he wanted to get it done." On

July 8, 2020, Shea contacted Attorney Bradford Fortin, an

4 Sandra testified that she and John did not visit the decedent in the hospital because they were told he was heavily sedated and hallucinating; the judge, however, did not credit this testimony.

3 attorney she previously hired for other matters,5 to assist the

decedent with making changes to his estate plan. The decedent

and Attorney Fortin spoke on the phone and Attorney Fortin

warned the decedent that leaving the Charlestown property to

Shea would "make [John] unhappy" because the decedent had left

the property to him in the 2011 will.

On July 9, 2020, the decedent was discharged from the

hospital to Shea's home for hospice care, and Shea cared for him

until his death. Around this time, the decedent's primary care

physician noted that the decedent experienced some delirium and

was prescribed medication.6

On July 15, 2020, Attorney Fortin met with the decedent in

person at Shea's home and testified that the decedent was clean-

shaven, his clothes were clean, and he appeared "alert, clear-

headed, and focused."7 The judge found that Shea was not in the

5 Attorney Fortin represented Shea in or around 2011 and assisted her with income taxes, probating her mother's estate, and her own estate planning.

6 The decedent was prescribed oxycodone and Seroquel, and medical records indicated, inter alia, that he was "confused at night."

7 Attorney Fortin testified that his practice when meeting with elderly clients was to assess their cognitive ability to ensure that they know what they are doing. The decedent knew the year and month, although not the exact date, and he also knew who the president was. The decedent said he had not taken any medications that day and that he had two sisters who had passed away. The decedent was aware that John was sick at this

4 room while Attorney Fortin and the decedent talked. The

decedent signed two deeds, conveying a remainder interest in the

Charlestown property to Shea, and reserving for himself a life

estate. The judge credited Shea's testimony that she never

asked for the "Charlestown real estate." Later that day, John

and Sandra visited the decedent and testified that they did not

engage in a conversation with him because of his pain level.

The decedent died on July 27, 2020 -- twelve days after the

signing of the deeds.

On December 8, 2020, John filed the underlying case as an

equity action alleging fraud or undue influence by Shea, and

that the decedent lacked the capacity to execute the deeds. On

November 16, 2022, following John's death, Sandra substituted

herself as plaintiff and personal representative of John's

estate. The judge determined the burden of proving undue

influence remained on Sandra as the challenger, even though Shea

was a fiduciary.

time, and the decedent told Attorney Fortin that he did not want the real estate to go to Sandra if John died. The decedent also explained to Attorney Fortin that he was not fond of Sandra; he wanted the property to stay in the family; and he thought that Sandra, a real estate agent, would sell the property. Attorney Fortin asked if he was being forced in any way to sign the deeds and if he was afraid that Shea would stop caring for him if he did not transfer the real estate. The decedent responded "absolutely not and said that Ms. Shea was like a daughter to him."

5 Upon consideration of all the evidence, the judge found

that the deeds signed by the decedent were not the product of

fraud or undue influence and that the decedent had the capacity

to execute the deeds. Sandra filed a notice of appeal on May 7,

2024.

Discussion. 1. Undue influence. Sandra challenges the

judge's allocation of the burden of proof on the issue of undue

influence as well as the judge's conclusion of law that there

was no undue influence. We discuss each in turn.

a. Burden of proof. "To prove undue influence, a

contestant must show 'that an (1) unnatural disposition has been

made (2) by a person susceptible to undue influence to the

advantage of someone (3) with an opportunity to exercise undue

influence and (4) who in fact has used that opportunity to

procure the contested disposition through improper means.'"

Maimonides Sch. v. Coles, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 240, 255-256 (2008),

quoting O'Rourke v. Hunter, 446 Mass. 814, 828 (2006). "In a

will contest involving allegations of undue influence, the

burden of proof ordinarily rests with the party contesting the

will." Matter of the Estate of Moretti, 69 Mass. App. Ct. 642,

651 (2007). "[I]n cases involving a fiduciary, the fiduciary

who benefits in a transaction with the person for whom [she] is

a fiduciary bears the burden of establishing that the

6 transaction did not violate [her] obligations" (quotation and

citation omitted).8 Matter of the Estate of Urban, 102 Mass.

App. Ct. 284, 290 (2023). However, "[t]he burden of proving the

absence of undue influence shifts to the fiduciary only where

[she] has actually taken part in the questioned transaction"

(citation omitted). Id.

Sandra argues that the judge erred in allocating the burden

of proving undue influence to her because Shea was a fiduciary

under the power of attorney and health care proxy. We disagree.

There is no evidence that Shea "ha[d] actually taken part in the

questioned transaction" (citation omitted). Matter of the

Estate of Urban, 102 Mass. App. Ct. at 290. Shea was not

present during the execution of the deeds and there is no

evidence that she asked Attorney Fortin to prepare the documents

or directed provisions of the deeds. Moreover, the record

supports the judge's findings that Attorney Fortin provided

independent counsel to the decedent and that Shea neither asked

Attorney Fortin to have the deeds executed nor directed him

regarding the provisions. Indeed, Attorney Fortin made every

effort to explain to the decedent, and did explain, each part of

the deeds, without Shea's participation or involvement.

Ultimately, the judge concluded that there was no credible

8 Sandra does not contest that Shea was a fiduciary.

7 evidence that Shea ever acted as the decedent's attorney-in-fact

and that under the facts of the present case delineated supra,

the burden of proof "does not shift to Ms. Shea." The record,

analyzed in view of the judge's detailed findings and

credibility determinations, supports this conclusion.9

b. Undue influence. Sandra does not challenge the

findings of fact made by the judge and instead challenges the

judge's conclusion of law that Shea did not exert undue

influence on the decedent. Thus, the only question before us is

whether the findings made by the judge were sufficient to

9 Sandra argues, in the alternative, that the judge erred by not lowering the burden of proof due to Shea's "confidential" relationship with the decedent. "'[W]here a confidential relationship exists it generally takes less to establish undue influence on the part of beneficiaries' than in the ordinary case" where no such relationship exists. Cleary v. Cleary, 427 Mass. 286, 290 n.2 (1998), quoting Tetrault v. Mahoney, Hawkes & Goldings, 425 Mass. 456, 465 (1997). Confidential and fiduciary relationships are distinct types of relationships with different legal implications. See Heinrich v. Silvernail, 23 Mass. App. Ct. 218, 225 & n.8 (1986). Here, Shea does not cite any persuasive Massachusetts precedent to support her argument. In any event, "[w]hether a relationship of trust and confidence exists is a question of fact," Markell v. Sidney B. Pfeifer Found., Inc., 9 Mass. App. Ct. 412, 444 (1980), and we discern no clear error in the judge's findings which have ample support in the record. See note 10, infra. See also Rempelakis v. Russell, 65 Mass. App. Ct. 557, 566 n.13 (2006) ("a fiduciary relationship plainly existed by virtue of the power of attorney . . . and we do not consider what the outcome might be in a confidential, but not fiduciary, relationship"); Collins v. Huculak, 57 Mass. App. Ct. 387, 394 (2003) ("a confidential relationship does not arise merely by reason of family ties" [citation omitted]).

8 warrant her conclusion of law. See Smolak v. Kulpinski, 11

Mass. App. Ct. 1001, 1001 (1981). See also First Penn. Mtge.

Trust v. Dorchester Sav. Bank, 395 Mass. 614, 621 (1985)

("appellate courts must constantly have in mind that their

function is not to decide factual issues de novo" [citation

omitted]).

The judge found that an unnatural disposition was not made,

and Shea did not procure the contested disposition through

improper means. As detailed above, the judge's findings have

ample support in the record, and thus we cannot say that the

judge erred. See Maimonides Sch., 71 Mass. App. Ct. at 255-

256.10

10Assuming, arguendo, that Sandra did challenge the judge's findings of fact, her claim would still fail. We review findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard. "A finding is clearly erroneous . . . when there is no evidence to support it, or when, 'although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.'" Michelon v. Deschler, 96 Mass. App. Ct. 815, 816 (2020), quoting Care & Protection of Olga, 57 Mass. App. Ct. 821, 824 (2003). Here, the judge's finding that the decedent's gift to Shea was not an unnatural disposition is not clearly erroneous. Shea had a close relationship with the decedent and cared for him as his health was failing. While he was in the hospital, she talked with him every day on the phone, and once visits were permitted, she visited him every evening and upon his discharge, assisted him with his daily needs. Shea was able to ensure that he did not go to a nursing home. The judge also credited evidence that John was sick in July 2020, that the decedent was aware of his sickness, and that the decedent did not want the property to go to Sandra in the event of John's death. Here again, although

9 c. Capacity to deed. Sandra next alleges that the judge

erred by finding that the decedent had the requisite capacity to

deed the property to Shea. Shea only challenges the judge's

conclusions of law, which we review de novo. See Kitras v.

Aquinnah, 474 Mass. 132, 139, cert. denied, 580 U.S. 1000

(2016). The argument is unavailing.

The parties and the judge analyzed the capacity to deed

under both the testamentary capacity standard and the

contractual capacity standard. Indeed, the standards are

distinct, but the capacity to contract is the standard

applicable to deeds.11 See Farnum v. Silvano, 27 Mass. App. Ct.

the parties contested these issues at trial, the record supports the judge's findings.

11Deeds differ from wills and other testamentary instruments in ways that bear upon the level of mental capacity required to execute them. Unlike wills, which remain revocable until death, deeds are irrevocable once delivered, absent limited circumstances such as mutual mistake. See Swan v. Sayles, 165 Mass. 177, 178 (1896); Ward v. Ward, 70 Mass. App. Ct. 366, 369 (2007). Because an irrevocable conveyance effects an immediate transfer of property interests, it may permanently deplete resources the grantor may still need during life. See Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills & Other Donative Transfers § 8.1 comment d (2003); Ryan v. Colombo, 77 Or. App. 71, 79-80 (1985). In contrast, a will allows the testator to retain control over the property for the remainder of life and to modify the disposition at any time before death. Swan, supra.

Indeed, even in a case like the one before us, where a grantor conveys a remainder interest in property through a deed while retaining a life estate, the grantor's control over the property during the grantor's life is constrained. In such a

10 536, 536, 538 (1989). The capacity to contract is a standard

more demanding than testamentary capacity. See Maimonides Sch.,

71 Mass. App. Ct. at 251. It requires the ability to

"understand the nature and quality of the transaction" and to

"grasp its significance." Id., quoting Krasner v. Berk, 366

Mass. 464, 467 (1974). "[A]n agreement is voidable by a person

who, due to mental illness or defect, lacked the capacity to

contract at the time of entering into the agreement" (quotation

and citation omitted). Dacey v. Burgess, 491 Mass. 311, 318

(2023). "We have required proof that the person in question was

too weak in mind to execute the deed with understanding of its

meaning, effect and consequences" (quotation and citation

omitted). Krasner, supra. "[I]t is a question of fact whether

a person was competent to enter into a transaction . . . ."

Sparrow v. Demonico, 461 Mass. 322, 328 (2012). "The burden is

on the party seeking to void the contract to establish that the

circumstance, the grantor's present interest is subject to the future interests of the grantee and constrained by duties to avoid waste, thereby limiting the grantor's control over the property during life. See, e.g., Lodigiani v. Paré, 103 Mass. App. Ct. 140, 144 (2023). Because a deed can irrevocably affect both present and future property interests and restrict the grantor's control during life, the mental capacity required to execute such a conveyance must be sufficient to understand and consent to these binding consequences. Thus, the governing standard for capacity to execute a deed is contractual capacity. See Farnum, 27 Mass. App. Ct. at 536, 538.

11 person was incapacitated at the time of the transaction." Id.

at 327.

In the present case, there was sufficient credible evidence

to demonstrate the decedent's capacity to contract. While there

was some evidence of his delirium and confusion in the hospital,

there was no expert testimony regarding the decedent's medical

conditions or the effect of his prescribed medications.

Moreover, Attorney Fortin met with the decedent and discussed

his health issues, the fact that the deed would upset John, and

confirmed that the decedent wanted to convey the real estate to

Shea because she was "like a daughter to him." There is some

evidence of incapacity, including, inter alia, that the

decedent's signature differed from previous signatures; however,

there was also credible evidence that Attorney Fortin was aware

that the decedent's vision was impaired and that he explained

the deeds to the decedent. As the judge concluded, there was no

credible evidence that Shea or Attorney Fortin had reason to

suspect that the decedent was incapable of contracting and, to

the contrary, Attorney Fortin confirmed that the decedent was

able to understand the consequences of deeding the property to

Shea. Contrast Farnum, 27 Mass. App. Ct. at 540. Furthermore,

the judge found that the decedent had legitimate reasons for

12 doing so, and the record supports those findings. Thus, we

cannot say that the judge erred as a matter of law.

d. Barker affidavit. Finally, Sandra contends that the

judge erred by not crediting the affidavit of Nurse Barker, a

visiting nurse who was involved in caring for the decedent in

June and July of 2015. "We accord the credibility

determinations of the judge who heard the testimony of the

parties . . . [and] observed their demeanor the utmost

deference" (quotation and citation omitted). Ginsberg v.

Blacker, 67 Mass. App. Ct. 139, 140 n.3 (2006). See id. at

147-148. Nurse Barker submitted an affidavit averring, inter

alia, that on July 15, 2020, the decedent was "presenting with

an altered mental status that rendered him not competent." In

July 2022, however, Nurse Barker suffered a stroke which

impacted her ability to speak. At trial she provided "one-word,

affirmative answers to questions" on direct examination, and

"one-word answers that were not responsive to the questions

asked" on cross-examination. The judge found that "[i]t is not

clear whether she did not understand the questions, did not

remember the answers, or was unable to express herself due to

her stroke," and gave little weight to her affidavit and

testimony. Our review yet again confirms that the judge's

13 findings are supported by the record, and thus we discern no

error.12

Judgment affirmed.

By the Court (Blake, C.J., Neyman & Grant, JJ.13),

Clerk

Entered: January 20, 2026.

12 Shea's request for attorney's fees and costs is denied.

13 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.