Sandoval Wholesales, Inc. v. Williams Trucking, Inc.

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Georgia
DecidedSeptember 26, 2025
Docket6:25-cv-00071
StatusUnknown

This text of Sandoval Wholesales, Inc. v. Williams Trucking, Inc. (Sandoval Wholesales, Inc. v. Williams Trucking, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sandoval Wholesales, Inc. v. Williams Trucking, Inc., (S.D. Ga. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA STATESBORO DIVISION

SANDOVAL WHOLESALES, Case No. 6:25-cv-00071-RSB-BKE INC.,

Plaintiff, vs. WILLIAMS TRUCKING, INC. d/b/a WILLIAMS PRODUCE; BETTY ANN WILLIAMS; RONNIE LEE WILLIAMS; RODNEY BRYAN WILLIAMS; and PAMELA BOULWARE, Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING EX-PARTE MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Plaintiff Sandoval Wholesales, Inc.’s (“Sandoval”), Ex-Parte Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (“Motion”). The Court has reviewed the Motion, the Memorandum in Support, the Affidavit of Alfredo Sandoval, (“Sandoval Aff.”), and the Certification of Plaintiff’s Counsel why notice should not be required in accordance with Rule 65 (b)(1)(B). This Court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the Motion on September 24, 2025. Having considered the entirety of the record and for the reasons stated at the hearing and set forth below, the Court GRANTS the Motion. BACKGROUND Plaintiff is a licensed buyer and seller of wholesale quantities of

perishable agricultural commodities (“Produce”) by the United States Department of Agriculture (“USDA”). Sandoval Aff. ¶¶3-4. Defendant, Williams Trucking, Inc. dba Williams Produce (“Williams Produce”), is also a produce dealer subject to and licensed under the Perishable Agricultural

Commodities Act of 1930 (“PACA”), 7 U.S.C. § 499a et seq., by the USDA. Sandoval Aff. ¶5. On September 10, 2025, Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit against Williams Produce, and multiple individual defendants, seeking relief under the

Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act of 1930 (“PACA”), 7 U.S.C. § 499a et seq., and state law. ECF No. 1. Plaintiff asserts claims against Williams Produce for violation of PACA (Count I, II and III) and breach of contract (Count IV). Plaintiff also brings claims against co-defendants for breach of

fiduciary duty (Count V), conversion and unlawful retention of PACA trust assets (Count VI), constructive trust (Counts VII and IX), and declaratory relief (Counts VIII and X). Id. Plaintiff represents that between June 2023 and January 2025, it sold

$209,113.50 in Produce to Williams Produce, of which all remains unpaid. ECF No. 1; Sandoval Aff. ¶16. Plaintiff maintains that it preserved its interest in the PACA trust assets of Williams Produce by delivering to it invoices that included the required PACA statutory trust language. Sandoval Aff. ¶19. Since receipts of the invoices, Williams Produce has not paid in full for the produce

pursuant to the agreed payment terms. Sandoval Aff. ¶16. According to Plaintiff, Defendant Betty Ann Williams (“Betty”) is the CEO of Williams Produce and Defendant Pamela Boulware (“Pam) was the CFO of Williams Produce and as such, controlled, or were in a position to

control the PACA Trust Assets held by it. Sandoval Aff. ¶11. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Betty and Pam failed to direct Williams Produce to use proceeds received by it from the sale of perishable agricultural commodities to pay the PACA trust debt owed to Plaintiff. Plaintiff also asserts that Williams

Produce demonstrated its inability to pay Plaintiff when Pam informed Plaintiff that it would be shutting down its South Carolina operations and to file a reparation action against it in order to receive payment. Sandoval Aff. ¶21. It therefore appears that there is a likelihood that Defendant Williams

Produce is in severe financial jeopardy, and that PACA Trust Assets have been dissipated and that such dissipation will continue absent injunctive relief. Plaintiff seeks an ex-parte Temporary Restraining Order to maintain the status quo by preventing Defendants from dissipating assets that are subject

to the PACA trust. Rule 65(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes entry of a temporary restraining order without notice to the adverse party only if: (1) it clearly appears from specific facts shown by affidavit or verified complaint that immediate and irreparable injury, loss or damage will result before the adverse party can be heard in opposition, and (2) the

applicant's attorney certifies the reasons that notice should not be required. Plaintiff relies upon Frio Ice, S.A. v. Sunfruit, Inc., 918 F.2d 154, 158 (11th Cir. 1990), which authorizes this court to grant the requested relief pursuant to PACA. A violation of the PACA trust establishes irreparable harm. As noted

in the legislative history of the PACA, once dissipation has occurred, recovery of trust assets is all but impossible. H. R. Rep. No. 543, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code & Admin. News 405, 411; J.R. Brooks & Son, Inc. v. Norman's Country Market, Inc., 98 B. R. 47 (Bankr. N.D. Fla.

1989). On the basis of the Plaintiff’s Motion, the supporting Affidavit and he evidence proffered at the hearing, it appears that Defendant Williams Produce is dissipating PACA trust assets, that such dissipation of PACA trust assets

are threatened with further dissipation, that Plaintiff will suffer immediate and irreparable injury as a result of such dissipation of Plaintiff’s beneficial interest in the statutory trust created by 7 U.S.C. §499e(c), and that such dissipation will continue in the absence of injunctive relief. Defendant

Williams Produce does not appear to be in a position to pay Plaintiff’s claims, thereby warranting the relief requested by the Plaintiff. JSG Trading Corp. v. Tray-Wrap, Inc., 917 F. 2d 75 (2nd Cir. 1990). DISCUSSION The Eleventh Circuit has explained that the four factors to be considered

in determining whether to grant a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction are the same. Schiavo ex. Rel Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1223, 1225 (11th Cir. 2005). Namely, a movant must establish “(1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) that irreparable injury will

be suffered if the relief is not granted; (3) that the threatened injury outweighs the harm the relief would inflict on the non-movant; and (4) that entry of the relief would serve the public interest.” Id. at 1225-26 (citing Ingram v. Ault, 50 F. 3d 898, 900 (11th Cir. 1995); Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1176 (11th Cir.

2000)). “The primary difference between the entry of a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction is that a temporary restraining order may be entered before the defendant has an adequate opportunity to respond, even if notice has been provided.” Textron Fin. Corp. v. Unique Marine, Inc., No. 08-

10082-CIV, 2008 WL 4716965, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 22, 2008). Further, a temporary restraining order may be granted without notice to the adverse party only if: (1) specific facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint clearly show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the

movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition, and (2) the movant’s attorney certifies in writing any efforts made to give notice and the reasons why it should not be required. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

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Related

Ingram v. Ault
50 F.3d 898 (Eleventh Circuit, 1995)
Theresa Marie Schindler Schiavo v. Michael Schiavo
403 F.3d 1223 (Eleventh Circuit, 2005)
Jsg Trading Corp. v. Tray-Wrap, Inc.
917 F.2d 75 (Second Circuit, 1990)

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Sandoval Wholesales, Inc. v. Williams Trucking, Inc., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sandoval-wholesales-inc-v-williams-trucking-inc-gasd-2025.