Sandoval v. San Diego, County of

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: August 29, 2024
• Docket: 3:16-cv-01004
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 ANA SANDOVAL, et al., Case No.: 3:16-cv-01004-BEN-AGS

9 Plaintiffs, ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ 10 v. MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW 11 COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, et al.,

12 Defendants. [ECF No. 174, 194, 195] 13

14 Before the Court is Defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law. ECF No. 15 194 (“Mot.”). 1 The motion is fully briefed. ECF Nos. 198 (“Oppo.”), 199 (“Reply”). 16 For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ motion is DENIED. 17 I. BACKGROUND 18 Facts. The facts of this case have been set forth in previous orders and will not be 19 extensively repeated here.2 This Order assumes familiarity with the facts of the case. 20 21

22 23 1 Defendants also filed a separate motion under Rule 50(b) which memorializes the separate nature of their qualified immunity argument. See ECF No. 195. However, this 24 document does not contain any discussion, but directs the Court to the applicable 25 discussion in the Defendants’ Rule 50(a) motion. Compare ECF No. 195 (50b motion) with 194 (50a motion). Accordingly, ECF No. 194 is considered the operative motion for 26 the purposes of this Order. 27 2 See Order Granting in Part Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 39. 28 1 Procedural History. Prior to trial, the parties jointly moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s 2 wrongful death and medical negligence claims. See ECF No. 145. These were the last 3 claims connected to Plaintiffs Ana Sandoval, Ronnie Sandoval Jr. and Josiah Sandoval. 4 Id. Accordingly, this left the Estate of Ronnie Sandoval as the sole remaining Plaintiff, 5 bringing two claims for trial: (1) Section 1983 Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical 6 Need against Nurse Defendants Harris, DeGuzman and Llamado; and (2) Section 1983 7 Policy/Custom Relating to MOC1 against County of San Diego. Id. 8 Trial commenced on April 15, 2024. ECF No. 153. Defendants made an oral 9 motion for judgment as a matter of law at the close of Plaintiff’s case on April 22, 2024. 10 See ECF No. 174 (Docket Entry for Oral Motion); ECF No. 177, 4/22 AM Trial Trans. at 11 906:1-5. The motion was immediately taken under submission and Defendants presented 12 their case in chief. 4/22 AM Trial Trans. at 906:4-5. Accordingly, the briefing currently 13 before the Court is argument related to Defendants’ initial, oral motion for judgment. 14 ECF No. 193, 4/25 PM Trial Trans. at 1448:24-25 to 1449:1-19.3 15 On April 25, 2024, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff on its deliberate 16 indifference claim against Nurse Defendants Romeo DeGuzman and Dana Harris. ECF 17 No. 189 (Verdict). The jury did not find Nurse Llamado or the County liable. Id. 18 II. LEGAL STANDARD 19 Rule 50 requires a court to render judgment as a matter of law when a party has 20 been fully heard on an issue, and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a 21 reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod., 22 Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 135 (2000). Thus, the court must review all the evidence in the 23 record, cf., e.g., Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 24 (1986), drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, but making no 25 credibility determinations or weighing any evidence, e.g., Lytle v. Household Mfg., Inc., 26

27 3 Accordingly, while Plaintiff argues Defendants’ motion is procedurally improper, 28 1 494 U.S. 545, 554–555 (1990). The latter functions are for the jury, not the court. 2 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). A jury’s verdict must be 3 upheld if it is supported by substantial evidence, which is evidence adequate to support 4 the jury’s conclusion, even if it is also possible to draw a contrary conclusion. DSPT 5 Int’l, Inc. v. Nahum, 624 F.3d 1213, 1218 (9th Cir. 2010). 6 “[T]he court should give credence to the evidence favoring the nonmovant as well 7 as that ‘evidence supporting the moving party that is uncontradicted and unimpeached, at 8 least to the extent that that evidence comes from disinterested witnesses.” Reeves at 151. 9 Taking a motion under submission and ruling on it after the jury returns a verdict is 10 proper practice. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b) advisory committee’s note. However, the court 11 “may not substitute its view of the evidence for that of the jury.” Winarto v. Toshiba Am. 12 Elecs. Components, Inc., 274 F.3d 1276, 1283 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Johnson v. 13 Paradise Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 251 F.3d 1222, 1227 (9th Cir. 2001)). 14 III. ANALYSIS 15 A. Overview of Ninth Circuit Opinion 16 In 2021, the Ninth Circuit vacated this Court’s grant of summary judgment, in part 17 due to an intervening clarification of standards applied to Fourteenth Amendment claims 18 for denial of needed medical care. Sandoval v. Cnty. of San Diego, 985 F.3d 657, 668- 19 669 (9th Cir. 2021). Accordingly, jail officials fail to provide constitutionally adequate 20 medical care when they: (1) make an intentional decision with respect to medical 21 treatment; (2) which put plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering serious harm; (3) they did 22 not take reasonable available measures to abate that risk, even though a reasonable 23 official in the circumstances would have appreciated the high degree of risk involved— 24 making the consequences of their conduct obvious; and (4) by not taking such measures, 25 the defendant caused plaintiff’s injuries. Sandoval, 985 F.3d at 669. (citation omitted). 26 “To satisfy the third element, the plaintiff must show that the defendant’s actions were 27 ‘objectively unreasonable’ which requires a showing of ‘more than negligence but less 28 1 than subjective intent—something akin to reckless disregard.’” Id. (quoting Gordon v. 2 Cnty. of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1125 (9th Cir. 2018)). 3 When analyzing this case, the Ninth Circuit determined the Nurse Defendants were 4 not entitled to summary judgment. Id. at 670-71. The Ninth Circuit further determined 5 the Nurse Defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity because a reasonable jury 6 could find their actions were deliberately indifferent under the objectively unreasonable 7 standard and Sandoval’s rights were clearly established at the time. Id. at 678-81. The 8 parties contest the impact of this ruling on the current motion. 9 B. Substantive Arguments 10 Defendants make four main arguments in their motion: (1) Plaintiff failed to 11 establish the third element because it did not present evidence concerning the standard of 12 care; (2) Plaintiff failed to establish causation because its expert’s opinions were 13 speculative; (3) Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity; and (4) Plaintiff’s loss of 14 life damages are entirely speculative. These arguments are addressed in turn below. 15 1. Standard of Care & Expert Testimony 16 Defendants argue Plaintiff was required to present evidence establishing the 17 standard of care for jail nurses. Mot. at 8-15. Essentially, Defendants argue that without 18 establishing the standard of care, the jury has insufficient evidence to conclude how a 19 reasonable correctional nurse would have acted and what alternative measures were 20 reasonably available to them. Mot. at 8. Defendants further argue the standard of care 21 must be established by expert testimony. Id. at 9-10. 22 Plaintiff responds that mandating the standard of care be established via expert 23 testimony is an evidentiary requirement under California state law, specifically related to 24 medical malpractice claims. Oppo. at 15-18. As such, Plaintiff argues this is not a bright 25 line requirement applicable to Fourteenth Amendment claims. Id. 26 27 28 1 Defendants cite Hutchinson v. U.S., 838 F.2d 390 (9th Cir. 1988). The plaintiff in 2 Hutchinson was a prisoner in San Diego experiencing lower back pain. Hutchinson, 838 3 F.2d at 392. The plaintiff in Hutchinson was seen twice by jail staff, who determined her 4 symptoms were consistent with a urinary tract infection or kidney stone and prescribed 5 antibiotics. Id. at 392. After her release, the plaintiff underwent surgery for removal of a 6 kidney stone. Id. She then filed suit, bringing medical negligence, Eighth and Fifth 7 Amendment claims regarding the medical treatment she received in prison. Id. The 8 Ninth Circuit upheld the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the 9 defendants. Id. at 395. When discussing the plaintiff’s state law claim, the Ninth Circuit 10 reasoned: “This standard of care, which is the basic issue in malpractice actions, can only 11 be proven by expert testimony.” Id. at 392. However, the portion of Hutchinson 12 discussing the plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim does not discuss expert testimony or 13 the standard of care. Id. at 394.5 14 Post Hutchinson, some district courts in the Ninth Circuit have concluded expert 15 testimony is not necessary to establish deliberate indifference, specifically distinguishing 16 Hutchinson on this point. See Herrera-Cubias v. Fox, No. 08-cv-0517-TUC-AWT, 2012 17 WL 12539503 at *7 (D. Ariz. Sept. 10, 2012) (“Reliance on Hutchinson is misplaced, 18 however, because the case deals with the evaluation of the standard of care in medical 19 malpractices suits pursuant to California state law. Further, Hutchinson states that expert 20 evidence is not required when the type of conduct required by the circumstances is within 21 common knowledge.”); Gonzalez v. Ahmed, 67 F.Supp.3d 1145, 1156 (N.D. Cal. 2014) 22 23 24 4 All but one of Defendants’ other citations supporting this argument are California 25 appellate decisions, discussing state law medical malpractice or negligence claims. See Mot. at 8-9. 26

27 5 Whether this is because the Court considered the discussion duplicative, the Eighth Amendment analysis contains a subjective element, or the Court did not find expert 28 1 (“[E]xpert evidence is not required to show deliberate indifference.”); Ball v. Kootenai 2 Cnty., No. 14-cv-00246-EJL-CWD, 2016 WL 4974949 at *5 (D. Idaho Sept. 16, 2016) 3 (“…Defendants’ argument that expert testimony is required to prove the deliberate 4 indifference element of Ball’s constitutional claims…is not supported by Ninth Circuit 5 law—no such requirement exists.”); cf. Estate of Wilson by and through Jackson v. Cnty. 6 of San Diego, No. 20-cv-00457-RBM-DEB, 2023 WL 8360011 at *3 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 7 2023). 8 Given the above precedent, the Court concludes there is no bright line rule that 9 expert testimony on the standard of care is required to establish deliberate indifference. 10 However, these decisions suggest that whether such expert testimony is necessary 11 depends on the specific facts and circumstances of the case. Relying on the “obvious to 12 laymen” exception noted by Hutchinson, district courts have found under certain 13 circumstances, “probing, complex questions concerning medical diagnosis and 14 judgment[,]” are unnecessary. See Reidhead v. Arizona, 2014 WL 2861046 at *5 (D. Az. 15 Jun. 24, 20214) (quoting Ledford v. Sullivan, 105 F.3d 354, 359 (9th Cir. 1997)); see also 16 Sanders v. York, 446 Fed. Appx. 40, 43 (9th Cir. 2011). 17 For example, in Herrera-Cubias, the district court concluded the plaintiff did not 18 need expert testimony to prove his Fourteenth Amendment claim because “[i]t is within 19 the common knowledge of laymen that an individual complaining of debilitating eyesight 20 should see an eye specialist.” 2012 WL 12539503 at *7. The district court in Gonzalez 21 reached a similar conclusion because, “[u]nder Plaintiff’s version of the facts, Dr. Ahmed 22 flatly refused to examine him because Dr. Ahmed was tired at the end of the day…” 67 23 F.Supp.3d at 1156-57. 24 However, in a case involving differences of medical opinion outside of common 25 knowledge or experience, at least one district court found expert testimony was required 26 to establish deliberate indifference. See Hesse v. Cnty. of Sacramento, No. 21-cv-1931- 27 WBS-KJN, 2024 WL 494007 at *7 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2024) (“The appropriate treatment 28 1 for the injury to plaintiff’s right finger is not something within a layperson’s common 2 knowledge.”).6 3 Accordingly, whether Plaintiff was required to provide expert testimony regarding 4 the standard of care involves an examination of the particular circumstances faced by 5 each Defendant. 6 i. Nurse DeGuzman 7 Plaintiff argues the objectively unreasonable element was established when Nurse 8 DeGuzman essentially refused to conduct any meaningful assessment of Sandoval, 9 making the risk of harm obvious even to a layperson. Oppo. at 18-21. Defendants argue 10 that regardless of this exception, “while it was ‘obvious’ to a layperson that Sandoval was 11 sweaty, tired, and possibly ‘under the influence’ it is not obvious to a layperson that a 12 sweaty possibly under-the-influence person needs any, let alone a particular type of 13 medical care…” Reply at 4. 14 The Court concludes expert testimony was not required and the jury’s verdict is 15 supported by sufficient evidence. Plaintiff established DeGuzman made two decisions 16 with respect to care of Sandoval, and the consequences of those decisions are obvious 17 and within a layperson’s knowledge. First, DeGuzman did not attempt to determine the 18 nature of Sandoval’s illness. Several Deputies who interacted with Sandoval prior to his 19 placement in the MOC1 holding cell testified they believed Sandoval needed to be 20 assessed by medical personnel.7 DeGuzman himself testified that if nurses see a 21

22 23 6 Hesse was deciding an unopposed motion for summary judgment. Hesse, 2024 WL 494007 at *7. Hesse first notes the layman exception, stating “[e]xcept where the type of 24 conduct required by the particular circumstances is within the common knowledge of 25 laymen, the standard of care can only be proven by expert testimony.” Hesse cites to Hutchinson without comment regarding the distinction between Hutchinson’s discussion 26 of state law and federal law claims. Id. 27 7 See (1) Dep. Martinez, expedited process to get Sandoval to second floor for medical 28 1 problem, they are required to take vital signs. ECF No. 162 (“4/17 AM Trans.”) at 354:6- 2 8. However, after a twenty second blood sugar test, DeGuzman made no further efforts 3 to identify the cause of Sandoval’s condition. 4/17 AM Trans. at 360:2-12 (blood sugar 4 normal), 378:21-379:4 (no longer my responsibility). DeGuzman did not perform any 5 further assessments or check on Sandoval for the remainder of his shift other than 6 glancing at him through the window when he walked by periodically. 4/17 AM Trans. at 7 379:5-22. Defendants argue in their brief that the decision not to assess Sandoval was 8 reasonable given a full assessment would occur “soon.” See Mot. at 11 (soon), at 12 (in a 9 matter of hours), at 23 (a few hours). However, during trial, Defendants made a point to 10 emphasize just the opposite—that it could take days for an inmate to complete the intake 11 process.8 12 Second, around 7:21 p.m., Deputy Fox asked nursing staff why Sandoval was 13 placed in MOC1. ECF No. 160 (“4/16 PM Trans.”) at 210:10-23.9 Nurse DeGuzman, 14 standing mere feet away, did not respond to the question despite being the only person 15 present who had any knowledge of why Sandoval was in MOC1. 4/17 AM Trans. at 381- 16 82, Trial Exhibit 40. DeGuzman further did not notify any of the nurses coming on shift 17 18 Sandoval sweating “profusely” such that front of his shirt “noticeably wet” (ECF No. 19 180, 4/23 PM Trans. at 1229:23-1230:6), kept an eye on Sandoval because he was 20 concerned about him (Id. at 1233:18-25); (3) Dep. Chavez, told DeGuzman Sandoval was sweating, lethargic and confused (ECF No. 159, 4/15 AM Trans. at 72:20-73:3), asked 21 DeGuzman to do a more thorough evaluation, not just blood sugar test (Id. at 93:16-19). 22 8 See e.g., ECF No. 159, Defense Opening Statement at 42:1-5, “And you can wait at 23 these holding cells for a long time. Sometimes it’s just 45 minutes. Sometimes it’s hours. You’re going to hear sometimes you can wait until the next day. The booking 24 process can take days. It’s a long process.” 25 9 At this time, Deputy Fox observed Sandoval sweating, lethargic, slurring his words, and 26 “too intoxicated to go through the booking process” (ECF No. 160, 4/16 PM Trans. at 27 211:5-25), Fox assumed Sandoval was in MOC1 for observation by medical staff (Id. at 213:13-16). 28 1 about Sandoval. See ECF No. 167, 4/18 PM Trans. at 608:1-25 (Llamado) (Nurse 2 DeGuzman told her about sobering cell patients but not Sandoval in MOC1); (Harris) Id. 3 at 695:6-696:6 (expectation that nurses to provide information to oncoming shift for 4 patients in holding cells like MOC1). This aligns with the Ninth Circuit’s description of 5 the evidence it found compelling, that DeGuzman “failed to check on Sandoval at any 6 point during the remaining six hours of his shift. Worse still, when his shift was over, 7 [DeGuzman] did not relay any information about Sandoval to the nurses who replaced 8 him. This left the night shift nurses with no way of knowing that Sandoval was being 9 held in MOC1 for medical reasons.” Sandoval, 670. 10 Applying the Rule 50 standard, the Court finds there was sufficient evidence for a 11 reasonable jury to conclude that DeGuzman’s actions were deliberately indifferent 12 because “a reasonable nurse who was told that Sandoval was shaking, tired, and 13 disoriented10—and who was specifically directed by a deputy to evaluate Sandoval ‘more 14 thoroughly’—would have understood that Sandoval faced a ‘substantial risk of suffering 15 serious harm.’” Sandoval, at 670 (quoting Gordon, 888 F.3d at 11245). Similar to the 16 doctor in Gonzalez, the issue for DeGuzman is more akin to a “flat out refusal” to 17 provide care rather than a difference in medical opinion. The Court does not find expert 18 testimony regarding the standard of care was necessary to establish deliberate 19 indifference under these circumstances. 20 ii. Nurse Harris 21 Plaintiff argues it adequately established Nurse Harris’ deliberate indifference 22 through evidence of Harris’ deviations from the standard nursing procedures (“SNPs”) 23 and the fact that other medical and non-medical personnel on the scene, including the 24

25 10 In their brief and at trial, Defendants emphasize the difference between a layperson’s 26 understanding of disoriented and the medical definition of disoriented, arguing 27 Sandoval’s condition did not fall into the medical definition of the term. However, as the Ninth Circuit noted, “Sweating and being so disoriented that officers observe and 28 1 Charge Nurse, urged Harris to take different action (i.e., call paramedics instead of 2 EMTs). Oppo. at 23-26. Defendants argue the decision to call EMT versus paramedics 3 was one of medical judgment and point to conflicting evidence regarding whether 4 Sandoval was actively having a seizure during the entire encounter or not. Mot. at 13-14. 5 The Court concludes expert testimony regarding the standard of care was also 6 unnecessary to determine Nurse Harris’ deliberate indifference. The jury’s verdict is 7 supported by sufficient evidence that the consequences of Nurse Harris’ choices were 8 apparent even to a layperson. And while not expert testimony regarding the standard of 9 care, Plaintiff did present two threads of evidence showing Nurse Harris’ decision 10 making deviated from enumerated expectations and procedures at the jail. First, her 11 decision did not align with the SNP related to seizures and seizure activity. Trial Ex. 77 12 (Seizure SNP). Contrary to Defendants’ assertions, Sandoval did not need to have been 13 having an active seizure throughout the entire encounter in order to trigger this SNP. Id. 14 at 2. Every witness, other than Harris, observed Sandoval was either experiencing a 15 seizure or seizure like activity, and/or was unresponsive.11 Second, Harris disregarded a 16 directive from Charge Nurse Bautista to request paramedics, a directive echoed by others 17 around her. ECF No. 165, 4/18 AM Trans. at 554:1-5.12 Charge Nurse Bautista testified 18 19 20 11 (1) Deputy Shawcroft, Sandoval had “grayish color” (4/17 PM Trans. at 454:22-25), 21 “slumped over and fell on the ground and had a seizure”(Id. at 452:24-25), “I just know, when he was seizing, that he hit his head once[,]” (Id. at 457:17-21), “no response, 22 tightening of the body” (Id. at 468:1-5); (2) Deputy Fox, Sandoval “shaking” and 23 “unresponsive” (4/16 PM Trans. at 215:3-22); (3) Deputy Andrade, Sandoval was breathing but unresponsive (4/17 PM Trans. at 492:9-21), unresponsive throughout 24 encounter (Id. at 496:17-25); (4) Nurse Llamado, Sandoval appeared to be having a 25 seizure (ECF No. 167, 4/18 PM Trans. at 616:22-617:6), unresponsive with “tremors of the upper arms and upper body” (Id. at 617:13-19), Sandoval was “still seizing” as of 26 1:08 am, since 12:55 am (Id. at 623:1-8). 27 12 See also Deputy Andrade, requesting paramedics multiple times (4/17 PM Trans. at 28 1 that if she gave a directive to call paramedics, she would expect that instruction to be 2 followed. Id. at 554:9-12. It was not. 3 This evidence also aligns with the Ninth Circuit’s assessment, that “[t]here can be 4 no debate that a reasonable nurse would understand that an individual who is 5 unresponsive and seizing faces a substantial risk of suffering serious harm.” Sandoval, at 6 670. Accordingly, the Court concludes under the Rule 50 standard, there was sufficient 7 evidence to support the conclusion that Nurse Harris acted with deliberate indifference, 8 “even if it is possible to draw the opposite conclusion.” DSPT Int’l, Inc., 624 F.3d at 9 1218. 10 2. Causation & Dr. Falgiani 11 Defendants argue Plaintiff failed to present evidence on the causation element by 12 attacking the conclusions of Plaintiff’s expert, Dr. Falgiani. Mot. at 17-20. Defendants 13 essentially argue that Dr. Falgiani’s opinions are too speculative because Falgiani 14 admitted he did not know what Sandoval’s vitals were during the time he sat in MOC1. 15 Mot. at 17. Defendants also argue Dr. Falgiani’s opinion that Sandoval likely had a 16 “treatable arrythmia” prior to his flatline is also speculative because there was “no 17 evidence, knowledge, or opinion that what treatable arrythmia, if any, was present prior 18 to Sandoval going into pulseless electrical activity.” Mot. at 19. 19 These arguments are somewhat circular. Central to Plaintiff’s theory of liability is 20 that Sandoval was placed in a cell without any meaningful medical assessment, which 21 would have included measuring vital signs. For Defendants to argue that any expert 22 testimony on causation is speculative because no one monitored Sandoval or checked his 23 vitals actually strikes at the heart of the deliberate indifference at issue. This lack of 24 information regarding Sandoval’s condition during the eight hours he sat in the cell is the 25 whole point and is necessarily the result of Defendants’ decisions.13 Plaintiff’s theory is 26

27 13 Regarding DeGuzman and sobering cells specifically, Defendants’ motion is somewhat 28 1 that if Sandoval had been properly monitored, his deteriorating condition would have 2 been discovered. And if it had been discovered, it would have been successfully treated. 3 Further, there was circumstantial evidence of Sandoval’s deteriorating condition in the 4 form of observations by deputies who interacted with Sandoval prior to his placement in 5 MOC1, and the observations of those who were in the cell with Sandoval during his 6 ultimately terminal collapse. 7 Finally, the Court cannot conclude that Dr. Falgiani’s testimony was so flawed or 8 so speculative that it should not have been presented to the jury. Defendants challenged 9 Dr. Falgiani’s causation opinions in a motion in limine. ECF No. 83 at 4-7. The Court 10 found Dr. Falgiani’s opinions passed Daubert scrutiny, and maintains this view. ECF 11 No. 130 at 7-8. Dr. Falgiani and Defense expert Dr. Minns ultimately had similar 12 qualifications and experience. Compare ECF No. 160, 4/16 PM Trans. at 233-244 13 (Falgiani’s qualifications and experience) with ECF No. 177, 4/22 AM Trans. at 922-930 14 (Minns’ qualifications and experience). While Defendants certainly argue their expert 15 was more qualified, to give one expert’s testimony more weight over the other is not the 16 Court’s role on a Rule 50 motion, but it is the province of the jury. Lytle, 494 U.S. at 17 554-55. Accordingly, the Court does not find Defendants’ argument regarding Dr. 18 Falgiani’s causation opinions persuasive. 19 3. Qualified Immunity 20 Qualified immunity contains two elements: (1) violation of the plaintiff’s 21 constitutional right; and (2) whether that right was clearly established at the time. 22 Sandoval, at 671 (quoting Horton by Horton v. City of Santa Maria, 915 F.3d 592, 599 23 (9th Cir. 2019)). Defendants’ arguments regarding the first prong of qualified immunity 24

25 frequently.” Mot. at 17. However, on the same page Defendants also assert, “[t]here was 26 no evidence indicating that Mr. Sandoval’s vital signs were deteriorating during his time 27 in the cell such that additional checks, such as every four hours in a sobering cell, would have revealed changes.” Mot. at 17 (emphasis added). 28 1 are identical to their arguments regarding the standard of care. Mot. at 21-23. For the 2 second prong, Defendants argue Plaintiff failed to identify caselaw that would establish 3 Sandoval’s right to care was “clearly established.” Id. at 22. However, the Ninth Circuit 4 directly ruled that Sandoval’s rights were clearly established in its 2021 opinion. See 5 Sandoval, 678-79. This is binding on the Court. While the Defendants argue there are 6 substantial differences between the evidence the Ninth Circuit reviewed on summary 7 judgment and the evidence presented at trial, the Court is not convinced.14 Given the 8 Court’s findings above on the first prong, and the Ninth Circuit’s binding opinion in 9 Sandoval on the second, the Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity. 10 4. Loss of Life Damages 11 The jury awarded Plaintiff $2,750,000 for Sandoval’s loss of life. Verdict at. 5. 12 Defendants make three attacks on the jury’s loss of life award: (1) Plaintiff’s counsel 13 made an impermissible comment during closing argument regarding making a 14 “statement” about Sandoval’s loss of life; (2) the damages are speculative; and (3) loss of 15 life damages were not allowed under California law at the time of Sandoval’s death. 16 Mot. at 24-25. These will be addressed in reverse order. 17 i. Loss of Life Damages & California Law. This issue was raised during the 18 parties’ briefing on the jury instructions. See ECF No. 148 at 125-129. The Court 19 determined that controlling Ninth Circuit precedent clearly permitted loss of life as a 20 category of damages for the jury to consider for Section 1983 claims. ECF No. 187 at 21 25; see also Chaudhry v. City of Los Angeles, 751 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2014) and 22

23 14 Defendants’ list of differences in evidence are largely based on inferences and weight 24 that can be drawn from evidence, not whether the evidence was presented at all. See 25 Mot. at 5-7. For example, Defendants argue that contrary to the Ninth Circuit’s opinion that Sandoval was unmonitored for eight hours, evidence at trial showed Sandoval was 26 “checked hourly by deputies.” Mot. at 5. First, the Court notes the Ninth Circuit 27 describes this as “almost entirely unmonitored[.]” Sandoval, at 663. Second, evidence that deputies glanced at Sandoval through a window to perform an hourly head count 28 1 Valenzuela v. City of Anaheim, 6 F.4th 1098 (9th Cir. 2021). Defendants reprise their 2 argument that loss of life damages are foreclosed by Robertson v. Wegmann which 3 directs courts to apply the survivorship laws of the forum state for Section 1983 claims. 4 Mot. at 25 n.5 (citing Robertson, 436 U.S. 584, 589-90 (1978)). Robertson is in harmony 5 with Chaudhry and Valenzuela—Robertson found that the survivorship law of the forum 6 state must be applied unless inconsistent with the purposes of Section 1983. Robertson, 7 436 U.S. at 589-90. This is exactly what the Ninth Circuit determined in Valenzuela: 8 “[P]rohibiting loss of life damages would run afoul of § 1983’s remedial 9 purpose…Following Chaudhry, the court held that § 377.34’s prohibition of loss of life 10 damages was inconsistent with § 1983.” Id. at 1103. 11 ii. Speculative Nature of Damages. Defendants argue that loss of life damages are 12 speculative because jurors have never experienced death. Mot. at 25. The Ninth Circuit 13 in Valenzuela also addressed and rejected this exact argument. Valenzuela, 6 F.4th at 14 1103.15 Defendants also argue loss of life damages are also too speculative because 15 Plaintiff presented no evidence regarding Sandoval’s life or who he was as a person. 16 Mot. at 25. However, Defendants cite no legal authority directing any particular type of 17 evidence is required for a jury to place a value on this type of non-economic “loss of life” 18 damages. As Plaintiff pointed out, the evidence did show Sandoval was an otherwise 19 healthy forty-seven year old, and Defendants offered their condolences and expressed 20 remorse on the stand regarding the fact that Sandoval would “miss life” and “life 21 milestones.” Oppo. at 30. The Court agrees with Plaintiff that the jury permissibly used 22 their collective judgment to place a monetary value on what is essentially intangible. The 23 Court concludes this is a situation where it is sensible to leave “the decision-making on a 24

25 15 “Defendants argue that loss of life damages are too speculative because juries have 26 never experienced death. But juries are regularly asked to assess damages without direct 27 sensory experience of the issue before them…And it is still better for juries to decide whether a plaintiff has received sufficient compensation than for our court to draw 28 1 matter most suitable for a jury, to the jury.” Holzhauer v. Golden Gate Bridge Highway, 2 Fed.Appx. 843, 845 (9th Cir. 2018). 3 iii. Plaintiff’s Statement in Closing. Finally, Defendants argue that Plaintiff made 4 || an inappropriate comment during closing argument that impermissibly invited the jury to 5 ||““make a statement” about the value of Sandoval’s life. Mot. at 24; see also ECF No.191, 6 AM Trans. at 1269:10-24. The Court notes Defendants did not object to this 7 ||comment during trial. “In order for misconduct during closing arguments to warrant 8 reversal, it must so permeate the trial as to lead to the conclusion that the jury was 9 || necessarily influenced by passion and prejudice in reaching its verdict.” K.J-P. v. Cnty. of 10 || San Diego, 621 F.Supp.3d 1097, 1152 (S.D. Cal. 2022) (quoting Cooper v. Firestone Tire 11 Rubber Co., 945 F.2d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 1991) (cleaned up).!© The Court does not 12 || find Plaintiff's statements regarding the “impossible task” of putting a value on human 13 || life and invitation for the jury to “make a statement about the value of life lost” rises to 14 || the level of permeation required for reversal. Accordingly, the Court will not disturb the 15 ||jury’s verdict for loss of life damages. 16 IV. CONCLUSION 17 For the foregoing reasons, the Defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law 18 |}is DENIED. 19 IT IS SO ORDERED. . 20 ||DATED: August 29, 2024 / | i (4 AMAA é 1 OGER T. BE United States District Judgé 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 16 Defendants in KP. similarly waited until post trial motion to object to a statement made in plaintiff's closing argument. 521 F.Supp.3d at 1152. 15