Sanchez v. United States Bureau of Land Management

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: May 29, 2024
• Docket: 1:23-cv-01698
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 ----oo0oo---- 11 12 VICTOR SANCHEZ and ANGELINA No. 1:23-cv-01698 WBS SAB SANCHEZ, individually and as 13 Husband and Wife, UBALDO SANCHEZ, an individual and doing 14 business as Strathmore Ag ORDER RE: MOTIONS TO DISMISS Supply, 15 Plaintiffs, 16 v. 17 FRIANT WATER AUTHORITY, a public 18 agency of the State of California, UNITED STATES BUREAU 19 OF RECLAMATION, an agency of the United States of America, and 20 TULARE COUNTY, a county of California, 21 Defendants. 22

23 ----oo0oo---- 24 Plaintiffs Victor Sanchez, Angelina Sanchez, and Ubaldo 25 Sanchez bring this action asserting trespass to land (Claim 1), 26 injunctive relief (Claim 2), negligence (Claim 4), and 27 unreasonable diversion of surface water (Claim 5) against 28 1 defendants Friant Water Authority (“Friant”), United States 2 Bureau of Reclamation (the “Bureau”), and Tulare County. (Compl. 3 (Docket No. 1).) Plaintiffs also bring an inverse condemnation 4 claim (Claim 3) against Friant and the County. (Id.) Friant and 5 the Bureau now move to dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(1) 6 and 12(b)(6). (Friant Mot. (Docket No. 12); U.S. Mot. (Docket 7 No. 20-1).) 8 As the parties are familiar with the claims and 9 allegations in the complaint, the court will not recite them in 10 detail here. 11 I. Federal Tort Claims Act Jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. § 12 1346(b)(1)) (Claims 1, 2, 4, 5 -- Against the United States) 13 Plaintiffs argue that the court has jurisdiction under 14 the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1), 15 over the claims asserted against the Bureau because the Bureau is 16 a federal agency of the United States Government.1 (See Compl ¶ 17 9.) Both Friant and the United States contest this 18 jurisdictional basis and argue that the United States is not a 19 proper party to this action. 20 All of plaintiffs’ claims relate centrally to a failure 21 to timely and adequately pump stormwater out of the Reservoir 22 Property.2 (See Compl. ¶¶ 14, 31, 38, 55-56, 64-65.) 23 1 The only proper defendant in an FTCA suit is the United 24 States, and “the federal agency cannot be sued in its own name.” FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 476 (1994) (internal quotation marks 25 omitted). The court accordingly construes allegations directed 26 against the Bureau as directed against the United States. 27 2 Plaintiffs’ negligence claim additionally alleges a failure to properly maintain the pumps. (Compl. ¶ 55.) 28 1 Additionally, plaintiffs clearly allege that the County owns the 2 Reservoir Property and the pumps affixed to it (id. ¶ 47), and 3 that Friant operates the Friant-Kern Canal and decides when 4 surface water may be pumped into it (id. ¶ 48). Further, 5 plaintiffs allege that a County employee promised but failed to 6 operate temporary pumps throughout the night, and that this 7 failure proximately caused the initial flooding of his property. 8 (Id. ¶¶ 15-17.) 9 In fact, the only allegation that plaintiffs direct 10 squarely at the United States concerns its technical ownership of 11 the Friant-Kern Canal. (Id. ¶ 4.) However, the operation and 12 maintenance of the Friant-Kern Canal and “related in-line control 13 facilities; wasteways, laterals, holding reservoirs, turnouts and 14 measuring devices, associated water level control devices and 15 water level recording instruments; appurtenant equipment, 16 structures and maintenance buildings” -- altogether the “Project 17 Works” -- is subject to a Cooperative Agreement between Friant 18 and the United States, which places under Friant’s sole purview 19 the “complete operation and maintenance” of the Project Works, as 20 well as “the performance, funding, and financing of emergency or 21 unusual operation and maintenance.” (Jackson Decl. (Docket No. 22 20-2) Ex. A (“Cooperative Agreement”) pp. 3, 5, 8.) 23 Accordingly, the United States asserts sovereign 24 immunity under the independent contractor exception to the FTCA’s 25 limited waiver of immunity.3 (U.S. Mot. at 9-12.) “[T]he 26 3 The court ponders why the doctrine is styled as an 27 “exception,” as opposed to an exclusion, since the FTCA expressly provides that the term “‘Federal agency’ . . . does not include 28 any contractor with the United States . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 2671. 1 independent contractor exception [protects] the United States 2 from vicarious liability for the negligent acts of its 3 independent contractors.” Edison v. United States, 822 F.3d 510, 4 518 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Yanez v. United States, 63 F.3d 870, 5 872 n.1 (9th Cir. 1995)). “[T]he critical test for 6 distinguishing an agent from a contractor is the existence of 7 federal authority to control and supervise the detailed physical 8 performance and day to day operations of the contractor.” Autery 9 v. United States, 424 F.3d 944, 956 (9th Cir. 2005) (citations 10 omitted). 11 Subject to that critical test, the court concludes that 12 the independent contractor exception applies here.4 The 13 Cooperative Agreement clearly delegates all responsibilities 14 regarding physical performance and day-to-day operations 15 regarding the Project Works to Friant. In addition, no facts 16 show that the relationship between Friant and the United States 17 was in practice anything contrary to what was set forth in the 18 Cooperative Agreement. The Ninth Circuit has also found that the 19 independent contractor exception applies in an analogous 20 situation involving the contractual transfer of care, operation, 21 and maintenance of an irrigation project from the United States 22 to a water utility association. See Borquez v. United States, 23 773 F.2d 1050, 1052-53 (9th Cir. 1985) (“The government, having 24 validly transferred operation, care and maintenance, is also not 25 liable for any acts or omissions of the Association. The 26 4 The court therefore need not consider the United 27 States’s argument regarding the discretionary function exception or its more specific claim-by-claim arguments. 28 1 liability of the United States extends only to the negligence of 2 employees.”).5 3 Accordingly, the court will dismiss plaintiffs’ claims 4 as asserted against the United States and decline subject matter 5 jurisdiction based on the FTCA. 6 II. Federal Question Jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. § 1331) (Claim 3 -- 7 Against Friant and County) 8 However, the court still retains jurisdiction over this 9 action pursuant to federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 10 1331, because plaintiffs assert an inverse condemnation claim 11 partly under the Fifth Amendment’s takings clause.6 (Compl. ¶¶

12 5 Plaintiffs’ only argument in opposition is that there 13 are insufficient facts to determine which specific pieces of property and appurtenances fall under the Cooperative Agreement. 14 (Docket No. 23 at 4-6.) First, plaintiffs mistake who has the burden of proof to show the existence of subject matter 15 jurisdiction. See In re Dynamic Random Access Memory Antitrust Litigation, 546 F.3d 981, 984 (9th Cir. 2008) (burden lies with 16 party asserting subject matter jurisdiction). Second, plaintiffs themselves clearly allege that the County owns the Reservoir 17 Property and the pumps affixed to it. (Compl. ¶ 47). Even by 18 plaintiffs’ allegations, these are the only pieces of property and appurtenances genuinely at issue here. 19 6 Plaintiffs bring their inverse condemnation claim under 20 both the federal and California constitutions. California courts generally construe the federal and California takings clauses 21 congruently. Small Property Owners of San Francisco v. City and 22 County of San Francisco, 141 Cal.App.4th 1388, 1396 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 2006) (citing San Remo Hotel L.P. v. City And County of 23 San Francisco, 27 Cal. 4th 643, 661 (2002) (“[W]e appear to have construed the [federal and state constitutional takings] clauses 24 congruently.”)); see also San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & County of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, 337 n.18, (2005) (assuming “that 25 the California Supreme Court was correct in its determination that California takings law is coextensive with federal law”). 26 The parties do not contend there is any material difference 27 between federal and California takings jurisprudence. The court will proceed accordingly. 28 1 59-68.) 2 To establish an inverse condemnation claim, a plaintiff 3 must show that the defendant affirmatively or intentionally 4 engaged in an act giving rise to the claim. See Parker v. United 5 States, 93 Fed. Cl. 159, 163, aff’d, 401 F. App’x 531 (Fed. Cir. 6 2010) (“The plaintiff must plead that the [] government has 7 performed some affirmative act that caused the divestiture of her 8 property interest.”); Customer Co. v. City of Sacramento, 10 Cal. 9 4th 368, 381 (1995) (“[that] damage caused by the negligent 10 conduct of public employees or a public entity does not fall 11 within the aegis of [the takings clause] -- has been followed 12 repeatedly and uniformly [for] more than 60 years”); Arreola v. 13 Monterey County, 99 Cal. App. 4th 722, 742 (Cal. App. 6th Dist. 14 2002) (“The fundamental justification for inverse liability is 15 that the government, acting in furtherance of public objectives, 16 is taking a calculated risk that private property may be damaged. 17 That is why simple negligence cannot support the Constitutional 18 claim.”) (citations omitted); Mercury Cas. Co. v. City of 19 Pasadena, 14 Cal. App. 5th 917, 925 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2017) 20 (“Inverse condemnation liability does not arise out of general 21 tort liability, such as negligent acts in the day-to-day 22 maintenance or operation of a public improvement”). 23 Here, plaintiffs fail to allege that defendants took 24 any such affirmative action. Even construing plaintiffs’ every 25 allegation as true and granting plaintiffs every reasonable 26 factual inference, the complaint only provides an accounting of 27 defendants’ failures -- failure to run the small pumps throughout 28 the night on January 9 (Compl. ¶ 17), failure to turn on or 1 authorize the use of the large pumps thereafter (id. ¶¶ 15, 17, 2 31), and failure to properly maintain the pumps (id. ¶ 39).7 3 Accordingly, the court will dismiss this claim and 4 extinguish federal question jurisdiction over this action. 5 III. Supplemental Jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. § 1367) (Claims 1, 2, 6 4, 5 -- Against Friant and County) 7 Still, federal courts have “supplemental jurisdiction 8 over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action 9 within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same 10 case or controversy under Article III of the United States 11 Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).8 However, a district court 12 “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction . . . [if] the 13 district court has dismissed all claims over which it has 14 original jurisdiction.” Id. at § 1367(c); see also Acri v. 15 Varian Assocs., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1001 n.3 (9th Cir. 1997) (en 16 banc) (district courts may decline sua sponte to exercise 17 supplemental jurisdiction). 18 “[I]n the usual case in which all federal-law claims

19 7 Plaintiffs do allege that “[t]he damage caused by [sic] the Sanchez Property was the result of the inherent risks 20 associated with the construction, design and maintenance of the 21 Reservoir Property.” (Compl. ¶ 49.) However, plaintiffs also allege that, during a thirty-five-year period, their property 22 never flooded to the point of imperiling their personal property, and that defendants diligently used water pumps to drain the 23 Reservoir Property on the rare occasions that it became flooded. (Id. ¶¶ 13-14.) This undercuts any argument that defendant’s 24 affirmative actions regarding the construction, design, and maintenance of the Reservoir Property caused the Sanchez Property 25 to flood. It also reinforces defendants’ alleged failure to 26 engage the pumps as the causal locus of harm. 27 8 There is no diversity jurisdiction in this case because the parties are not diverse. 28 1 are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be 2 considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine -- judicial 3 economy, convenience, fairness and comity -- will point toward 4 declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law 5 claims.” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 6 (1988). This case is no exception. The first three factors 7 favor no particular forum. Comity, however, strongly favors the 8 declination of federal supplemental jurisdiction because the 9 remaining defendants are both California entities with a complex 10 legal and regulatory relationship. In addition, plaintiffs’ 11 fifth claim for unreasonable diversion of surface water 12 implicates an especially complex body of state law better 13 reserved for the California courts to resolve. 14 D. Leave to Amend 15 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 directs the court to 16 freely grant leave to amend “when justice so requires.” Fed. R. 17 Civ. P. 15(a)(2). “[T]his policy is to be applied with extreme 18 liberality.” Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Rose, 893 F.2d 19 1074, 1079 (9th Cir. 1990). Accordingly, plaintiffs will be 20 given leave to amend their complaint to properly assert claims 21 against the United States inverse condemnation claims against 22 Friant and the County, if they are able to do so consistent with 23 this Order. 24 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants Friant Water 25 Authority and the United States’s motions to dismiss plaintiffs’ 26 complaint (Docket Nos. 12, 20) be, and the same hereby are, 27 GRANTED. Plaintiffs’ complaint (Docket No. 1) is DISMISSED. 28 Plaintiffs have twenty (20) days from the issuance of this Order eee IIE IERIE DE RGD IGGE) III) RENEE EI

1 to file an amended complaint, if they are able to do so 2 consistent with this Order. 3 | Dated: May 29, 2024 he bloom HK Ld. bE 4 WILLIAM B. SHUBB UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28