Sanchez v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company

CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Florida
DecidedMay 12, 2025
Docket3:21-cv-00372
StatusUnknown

This text of Sanchez v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (Sanchez v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sanchez v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, (M.D. Fla. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

CARMEN DANIELLE MORA SANCHEZ, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff, Case No.: 3:21cv-00372 -TJC-LLL

v. CLASS ACTION

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, HIDAY & RICKE, P.A., JEFF RICKE, an individual, and ROBERT HIDAY, an individual,

Defendants.

ORDER PRELIMINARILY APPROVING CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT AND SETTING FINAL APPROVAL HEARING FOR AUGUST 26, 2025

WHEREAS, Plaintiffs Carmen Danielle Mora Sanchez (“Sanchez”), Brandon Rashard Waters (“Waters”), and Kashana Sangfield (“Sangfield”) (collectively, the “Named Plaintiffs”),1 individually and as proposed class representatives on behalf of a proposed Settlement Class (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), and Defendants State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (“State Farm”), Hiday & Ricke, P.A. (“Hiday & Ricke”), Jeff Ricke (“Ricke”), and Robert Hiday (“Hiday”) (collectively,

1 Waters and Sangfield shall become Named Plaintiffs in this Action by virtue of the approval of the amendment to the operative complaint as stated in Paragraph 40 below. the “Defendants”), acting by and through their respective counsel, have agreed, subject to Court approval, to settle this Action upon the terms and conditions stated

in the Class Action Settlement Agreement filed with the Court on March 25, 2025 (the “Agreement”), which is of record at Doc. 193, Ex. 4; NOW, THEREFORE, based upon the Agreement, all of the files, records, and

proceedings herein, statements of counsel, and it appearing to the Court that a hearing should be held to determine whether the Proposed Settlement described in the Agreement should be finally approved as fair, reasonable, and adequate; IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1. The Agreement (including Exhibits)2 is hereby incorporated by reference in this Order, and all terms defined in the Agreement will have the same meanings in this Order.

2. This Court possesses jurisdiction over the subject matter of this Action and over all Parties to this Action, including the Named Plaintiffs and all Settlement Class Members. 3. The Court finds that the negotiations leading to the Agreement occurred

at arm’s length and there was sufficient discovery in this case prior to settlement. 4. As explained further herein, and for the reasons discussed at the April

2 The Exhibits are of record at Doc. 193, Ex. 5, 6, 7, and Doc. 197, Ex. 1. References to the “Exhibits” are references to these exhibits. 18, 2025 motion hearing, the record of which is incorporated by reference, Plaintiff’s Unopposed Time Sensitive Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action

Settlement and Approval of Notice Plan (Doc. 193) is GRANTED and the Court preliminarily approves the Agreement (including Exhibits), finding that the Proposed Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate to warrant providing notice to

the Settlement Class because, upon preliminary review and as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1)(B), there is sufficient information provided to determine that the Court will likely be able to approve the proposal. 5. As a threshold issue, the Court determines that the Named Plaintiffs

possess standing to represent this Settlement Class because they are members of the Settlement Class (as defined below) and allege they have suffered injury as a result of the conduct of Defendants.

6. Neither the Agreement, nor any of its terms or provisions, nor any of the negotiations or proceedings connected with it, shall be construed as an admission or concession by the Parties and the Released Parties of the truth of any of the allegations made in the Action, or of any liability, fault, or wrongdoing of any kind

whatsoever on the part of the Parties and Released Parties. 7. Courts should make a preliminary inquiry into the Rule 23 requirements prior to preliminarily approving a proposed Settlement Class. See Junior v. Infinity

Ins. Co., No. 6:18-cv-1598-Orl-78EJK, 2020 WL 8254235, at *1-2 (M.D. Fla. Jun 5, 2020), approved, 2020 WL 8254233 (M.D. Fla. June 22, 2020); In re Checking Account Overdraft Litig., 275 F.R.D. 654, 659 (S.D. Fla. 2011). This Court addresses

each factor and, for purposes of settlement, finds that the Proposed Settlement is suitable for class treatment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e). 8. The number of Settlement Class Members is so numerous that joinder

of them all is impracticable. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). For purposes of this Settlement, the Parties have identified 441 persons who potentially qualify for settlement class membership, which is sufficient to establish numerosity. See Cox v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 784 F.2d 1546, 1553 (11th Cir. 1986) (“[W]hile there is no fixed

numerosity rule, generally less than twenty-one is inadequate, more than forty adequate, with numbers between varying according to other factors.”). 9. There are questions of law and fact common to the Settlement Class.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). Each Settlement Class Member is or was a judgment debtor who was the at-fault party in an accident with a State Farm insured where such judgment debtor is believed to have had at least the minimum required insurance pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 324.021(7), the person (or their automobile insurer) tendered

payment to State Farm, and Hiday & Ricke requested the person’s driver’s license be suspended for failure to satisfy the judgment owing to State Farm. The Named Plaintiffs allege that seeking driver license suspensions was part of a common course

of conduct by Defendants with respect to the collection of unpaid subrogation judgments. 10. The claims of the Named Plaintiffs are typical of the claims of the

Settlement Class. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). The claims of the Named Plaintiffs are typical because the Named Plaintiffs fit the description of the Settlement Class Members and had their respective driver’s licenses suspended.

11. Based on their conduct in this Action, the Named Plaintiffs and Class Counsel, who are experienced class action attorneys, have demonstrated they will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Settlement Class. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4).

12. The Court finds the Proposed Settlement meets the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) for purposes of settlement because questions of law or fact common to Settlement Class Members predominate over any questions affecting only

individual members and that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy. The Named Plaintiffs take issue with an alleged common practice regarding Hiday & Ricke seeking driver’s license suspensions in situations involving judgments owed to State Farm applied to all the

Settlement Class Members. 13. The satisfaction of the Rule 23 requirements as stated herein are for settlement purposes only. Defendants maintain all defenses to certification, and this

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Bluebook (online)
Sanchez v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sanchez-v-state-farm-mutual-automobile-insurance-company-flmd-2025.