Sanchez v. Dell'Isola, Lujan, Leon Guerrero, Aragon, Sharma, Fullerton and Worker's Comp Commission

Opinion

1 3..?..- w!§:..:=::=a .r*"'*l we* \__;'.: l"-"1-4 t * | -I{

1 .l..;'Z*" .* J 1

2 a*~»~. . ,z g Lr r : 1 gov ¢*U to HI S : I S 3

4 BY 'TD 5

8 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM 9

10 THERESE F.N. SANCHEZ, SP CASE NO.: SP0124-18 11 Petitioner, 12 vs. DECISION AND ORDER Re: Petitioner's Motion to Request The 13 DAVID DELL'ISOLA as Director of Department Adjudication of All Outstanding Motions And 14 of Labor and WCC Commissioner, DORIS F. for Attorneys' Fees And Costs LUJAN, as WCC Member, VINCENT E. LEON 15 GUERROERO, ESQ., as WCC Member, JOSEPH CLAVERIA, CPA, as WCC Member, 16 CANDISE ARAGON, as WCC Member, SANJAY SHARMA, as WCC Member, 17 JOANNALYNN FULLERTON, as WCC Administrator and the WORKER'S 18 COMPENSATION COMMISSION, DOE 1-8 19 Respondents. 20

21 INTRODUCTION

22 This matter came before the Honorable Judge Anita A. Sukola on November 12, 23 2020, upon Petitioner's Motion to Request the Adjudication of All Outstanding Motions 24 and for Attorneys' Fees and Costs. Petitioner, Therese F.N. Sanchez ("Sanchez"), is 25 represented by Attorney John Richard Bordallo Bell, Esq. The Respondents, the Worker's

26 Compensation Commission, et al., ("WCC"), are represented by Chief Deputy Attorney

27 General Shannon J. Taitano. For the reasons set forth below the Motion to Request the

28 Adjudication of All Outstanding Motions and for Attorneys' Fees and Costs is DENIED.

SPOl24-18, Sanchez v. David Dell'Isola, et al. Page1 of 9 Decision and Order (Motion to Request Adjudication). 1 BACKGROUND

2 Petitioner Sanchez was injured at work, in the scope of her employment, while an

3 employee of the Department of Education, on August 13, 2015. Verified Pet. Writ. Mand.

4 qt 2 (July 19, 2018). Sanchez filed a Form 201 providing notice, of her allegedly work

5 related injury, the same day. Id. '][ 13. The WCC denied her claim on September 9, 2015,

6 in a filed Form 207, finding Sanchez failed to establish a causal connection between the

7 injury and her work environment. Id. iI 14. Pursuant to 22 GCA § 9l20(c), Sanchez

8 requested a hearing, submitting all the required forms and documents, to the WCC on

9 March 9, 2017. Id. 'll 15-17. The WCC did not set a hearing for over sixteen (16) months.

Id. 7 18. In response, Sanchez filed a Verified Petition for Writ of Mandamus with this 10 Court, seeking to force the WCC to hold a hearing on her claims on July 19, 2018. 11 Later, on September 14, 2020, Sanchez filed a Motion Requesting Judicial Notice. 12 In that motion, Sanchez requested this Court take judicial notice that the Director of the 13 WCC has the authority to rule on any jurisdictional issues pre-hearing, and any other 14 hearing related issues, according to the applicable Workers Compensation and 15 Administrative Adjudication Act statutes. Mot. for Judicial Notice at 9-10 (Sept. 14, 16 2020). This motion was an attempt to undercut WCC claims that a hearing was not held 17 because a quorum could not be met due to the novel Coronavirus Pandemic, and other 18 factors. 19 This Court had not ruled on the outstanding Motion Requesting Judicial Notice and 20 the Verified Petition, when on September 25, 2020, the WCC held a meeting via Zoom, 21 and denied Sanchez's claim as untimely. Mot. to Request Adjudication at 8 (Oct. 22, 22 2020). A written order, memorializing the decision, was issued on October 6, 2020. Id. 23 Sanchez filed the current Motion to Request the Adjudication of All Outstanding Motions 24 and for Attorneys' Fees on October 22, 2020, arguing that she "successfully obtained the 25 relief sought by this proceeding," and thus is entitled to reasonable attorney fees under 7 26 GCA § 26603. Id. at 10. Pursuant to that end, Sanchez requests that this Court adjudicate 27 the pending motion and verified petition in her favor. 28 The WCC argues that Sanchez was not successful in obtaining relief because the

SP0124-18, Sanchez v. David Dell'Isola, et al. Page 2 of 9 Decision and Order (Motion to Request Adjudication). 1 WCC decision denying her claim, rendered the Motion for Judicial Notice and Verified

2 Petition moot, and made the relief sought by those proceedings unobtainable. Resp't

3 Opp'n to Mot. for Adjudication at 3-4 (Oct. 30, 2020). Further, according to the WCC,

4 Title 7 of the Guam Annotated Code, Section 26603 does not apply to the case before us,

5 and thus, the standard American Rule for attorney fees must apply. Id. at 5. The Court

6 heard oral arguments in this matter on November 12, 2020, and subsequently took this

7 matter under advisement.

8 DISCUSSION

9 Guam follows the American Rule for attorney fees. Fleming v. Quigley, 2003 10 Guam 4 'll 7. "Under the American Rule, parties bear their own litigation expenses, 11 including attorney's fees." Id. (citing Alaska Pipeline Serv. Co., v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 12 U.S. 240, 247 (l975)). However, "[i]f an exception applies, fee-shifting is allowed." Id. 13 "The exceptions to the American rule include where attorney's fees are: (l) authorized by 14 statute, (2) authorized by contract, or (3) allowed in judicially-established equitable 15 circumstances." Id. 16 Here, Sanchez argues that fee-shifting is authorized by statute. He cites Title 7 of 17 the Guam Annotated Code, Section 26603, which states 18

19 Costs and reasonable attorney's fees shall be allowed of course to a government of Guam employee upon a judgment in the employee's favor in cases against the 20 go vernment o f Guam in which t he emplo yee seeks t o enfo rce plaint iffs 21 employment rights as a government employee, whether or not plaintiff has ceased to be an employee at the time of the filing of the action, upon a judgment in 22 plaintiffs favor, in which the court or jury funds that the employee has been deprived of his or her rights as an employee of the government of Guam. 23

24 7 GCA § 26603.

25 Sanchez requests that the court enter judgment as to the Verified Petition and the

26 Motion Requesting Judicial Notice so that he may apply the statute and receive attorney

27 fees. In response, the WCC argues that no judgment was rendered in the employee's favor, 28

SPOl24-18, Sanchez v. David Dell'Isola, et al. Page 3 of 9 Decision and Order (Motion to Request Adjudication). and judgment cannot be entered at this time because the controversy is now moot. 1

1. The Controversv Is Moot And The Public Interest Exception 3 Does Not Applv 4 The Supreme Court of Guam has stated, "[t]he test for moistness is whether 'the 5 issues involved in the trial court no longer exist' because intervening events ....[have] 6

7 render[ed] it impossible for the court to grant the complaining party effectual relief."

8 Timon Partners, LLC v. Shin, 2008 Guam 15 '][ 37 (quoting In re A. Minor, 537 N.E.2d 7,

9 10 (Ill. 1989)). As such, "[c]ourts may not give opinions upon moot questions or abstract 10 propositions." Town House Dap 'r Stores v. Ann, 2000 Guam 32 '][9 (quoting Calderon v. 11 Moore, 518 U.S. 149, 150 (l996)). Further, "[g]enera1 principles of moistness apply to writ 12 petitions." Gridley v. Gridley, 83 Ca1.Rptr.3d 715, 738 (Cal. Cr. App 2008). The WCC, 13

14 therefore argues, that the decision to deny Sanchez's claim, acted as an intervening event

15 that rendered relief, in the form of a judicial mandate for a hearing, impossible. 16 However, there are exceptions to the moistness doctrine, including the public 17 interest exception. In Guam, "[a] court has authority to decide cases that are 'functionally 18 justiciable' and present 'important public issues of statewide significance that should be 19

20 decided imnlediately."' People v. Blas, 2016 Guam 19 iI 23 (quoting State v. Rod, 359

21 N.W.2d 573, 576 (Minn. 1984)). See also Californians for Alternatives to Toxics v.

22 Department of Pesticide Regulation, 39 Cal. Rptr. ad 393, 406 (Cad. Ct. App 2006)("if a 23 [mooted] matter is of general public interest and is likely to recur in the future, a 24 resolution of the issue by the court is appropriate"). However, in order for an issue to be a 25 matter of public importance, "it must affect the rights or interests of the public at large or 26

27 have statewide ramifications." Sposato v. Sposato, 570 N.W.2d 212, 213 (N.D. 1997). See

SP0124-18, Sanchez v. David Dell'Isola, et al. Page 4 of 9 Decision and Order (Motion to Request Adjudication). also Leak v. High Point City Council, 213 S.E.2d 386, 388 (N.C. Ct. App. 1975). Further, 1

2 "[i]t has .... been consistently held that only exceptional cases, where the urgency of

3 establishing a rule of future conduct is imperative and manifest, will justify a departure

4 from our general practice." J.B. Lyon Co. v. Morris, 185 N.E. 711 (N.Y. 1933). Finally, 5 unless the case is "a suit to enforce a public right .... [than] [t]he interest of the public is 6 purely incidental, - an interest in the settlement of legal principle, - just as may happen in 7

8 any suit." Atkinson v. Galan, 28 N.E. 380 (Ill. 1885). See alsoSposato, 570 N.W.2d 212,

9 213 (Hading a suit for grandparent visitation moot because while visitation rights in

10 general are in the public interest, the order had no statewide implications and questions of 11 constitutionality were not raised at the trial court.) 12 Here, while the WCC decisions and procedures may be in the public interest, as 13 they affect all those seeking worker's compensation, this specific order would have no 14

15 statewide implications. Rather, a grant of her Verified Petition for Writ of Mandamus

16 would only effect Sanchez and her potential right to receive attorney fees. Further,

17 Sanchez raised no constitutional issues in the current action, and thus, this is not a suit to 18 enforce a public right, but rather an individual concern, in the pursuit of attorney fees. A 19 decision in the favor of Sanchez, and the grant of her Verified Petition, would not affect 20 the ways in which the WCC carries out its business, and thus would not affect the body 21

22 politic at all. As such, the Court finds that the controversy is moot and the public interest

23 exception to the moistness doctrine does not apply. 24 2. The WCC Is A Governmental Entitv and the Voluntary 25 Cessation Doctrine Does Not Applv in This Case

26 "Guam's mandamus statute is derived from California Code of Civil Procedure 27

28 Sections 1085." Agama Beach Condominium Homeowners' Association v. Mafias, 2013

SP0124-18, Sanchez v. David Dell'Isola, et al. Page 5 of 9 Decision and Order (Motion to Request Adjudication). Guam 9 'Il 35, See 7 GCA § 31202. Thus, California cases are persuasive as to mandamus 1

2 issues. Sanchez cites a California case for the proposition that "[t]he voluntary cessation of

3 allegedly wrongful conduct destroys the justiciability of a controversy and renders an

4 action moot unless there is a reasonable expectation the allegedly wrongful conduct will 5 be repeated." Roger v. County of Riverside, 257 Cal. Rptr. ad 556, 583 (Cal. Ct. App 6 2020) (emphasis in original). See also Knox v. Serv. Emus. Int'l Union, Local 1000, 132 S. 7

8 Cr. 2277, 2287 (2012)("[t]he voluntary cessation of challenged conduct does not moot a

9 case, because dismissal of the case would permit a resumption of the challenged conduct

10 as soon as the case was dismissed"). However, a request for relief can be mooted by a 11 defendant's voluntary cessation of the challenged conduct if the defendant can 12 demonstrate that it is absolutely clear the alleged wrongful behavior could not reasonably 13 be expected to recur." Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services 14

15 (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000). Accordingly, a private party defendant has the

16 burden to prove that the wrongful behavior will not recur.

17 However, "we treat the voluntary cessation of challenged conduct by government 18 officials 'with more solicitude .... than similar action by private parties." Board of 19 Trustees of Glazing Health and Welfare Trust v. Chambers, 941 F.3d 1195, 1198 (9th Cir. 20 2019) (quoting Am. Cargo Transl. Inc. v. United States, 625 F.3d 1176, 1180 (9th Cir. 21

22 2010)). "[T]he repeal, amendment, or expiration of challenged legislation [or policy] is

23 generally enough to render a case moot and appropriate for dismissal." Id. In order for a 24 governmental entity to be reasonably expected to resume the challenged conduct there 25 must be evidence that the entity plans to do so or already has done so. See City of 26 Mesquite v. Aladdin 's Castle, Inc., 102 U.S. 656, 662-63 (1993). See also MeCarvey v. 27

28 Hill, 385 F.3d 846, 849 (5th Cir. 2004).

SPOl24-18, Sanchez v. David Dell'Isola, et al. Page 6 of 9 Decision and Order (Motion to Request Adjudication). Here, the WCC is a governmental entity acting under the authority of the 1

2 Department of Labor. Sanchez has provided evidence that the WCC has not regularly held

3 hearings as required by law but has not provided evidence that the WCC plans to continue 4 to do so. The WCC is provided a presumption of good faith due to its status as a 5 governmental entity. See Cargo Transl. Inc. v. United States, 625 F.3d 1176, 1180 (9th 6 Cir. 2010)). Therefore, we must dismiss the Verified Petition and the Motion Requesting 7 Judicial Notice as being moot with no exceptions applying. As such, the statute, Title 7 of 8

9 the Guam Annotated Code, Section 26603, cannot apply to the case at hand because

10 Sanchez has not received a judgment as required. See 7 GCA § 26603 ("upon a judgment 11 in Plaintiff's favor ...."). 12 3. No Other Exceptions to the American Rule Applv 13 Finally, Sanchez argues that two potential exceptions to the American Rule apply 14

15 in this case. First, she argues that the substantial benefit doctrine applies. Mot. to Request

16 Adjudication at 11 (Oct. 22, 2020). Later, she argues alternatively that the catalyst theory

17 applies. Reply to Opp'n at 4-5 (Nov. 6, 2020). 18 "The substantial benefit doctrine is an extension of the common fund doctrine 19 which applies when no common fund has been created and significant benefit . . . . has 20 nonetheless been conferred on an ascertainable class." Matter of Guardianship of Moylan, 21

22 2018 Guam 8

23 25 Cal. Rptr. ad 514, 520 (Ct. App. 2005)). "This doctrine 'rests on concepts of unjust 24 enrichment: those enriched by an economic windfall should bear their fair share of the 25 costs expended to create the benefits obtained,"' Id (quoting Ciano v. San Diego Tr. & Sav. 26 Bank, 20 Cal. Rptr. ad 581, 590 (Ct. App. 1994). "[T]he relevant question [to deciding a 27

28 substantial benefit claim] is whether a substantial benefit has been conferred on an

SP0124-18, Sanchez v. David Dell'Isola, et al. Page 7 of 9 Decision and Order (Motion to Request Adjudication). ascertainable class." Id. '][ 30. 1

2 Here, there is no easily ascertainable class. As Sanchez readily admits, "the

3 number of people standing to benefit from the decision include virtually, the entire

4 working population of the island." Mot. to Request Adjudication at 12 (emphasis in 5 original). The substantial benefit doctrine is an extension of the common fund doctrine, 6 and the United States Supreme Court has held, "in this Court's common fund and 7 common-benefit decisions, the classes of beneficiaries were small in number and easily 8

9 identifiable." Alaska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 264, n.39

10 (1975). A class consisting of all workers on the island is too large and unidentifiable to 11 successfully apply the substantial benefit exception to the American Rule. The Court, 12 therefore holds that the substantial benefit doctrine does not apply to the case at hand. 13 Finally, Sanchez argues that the catalyst theory exception applies. Under the 14

15 catalyst theory, "a plaintiff must establish that (1) the lawsuit was a catalyst motivating the

16 defendants to provide the primary relief sought, (2) that the lawsuit had merit and

17 achieved its catalytic effect .... and, (3) that the plaintiffs reasonably attempted to settle 18 the litigation prior to filing the lawsuit." Tiptop-Whittingham v. City of Los Angeles, 101 19 P.3d 174, 177 (Cal. 2004). While the catalyst theory is accepted in California, it has not 20 been accepted in Guam. See Battista v. Perez, CV1848-01, at 9 (Super. Ct. Guam May 21

22 31, 2013). Further, the United States Supreme Court has expressed reservations about the

23 catalyst theory. See Bu ckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dept. off-Iealth 24 and Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598, 606 (2001) ("[w]e cannot agree that the term 25 'prevailing party' authorizes federal courts to award attorney fees to a plaintiff who 26 reached the 'sought-after destination' without obtaining any judicial relief"). We therefore 27

28 disagree with the argument that the catalyst theory allows the shifting of attorney fees in

SPOl24-18, Sanchez v. David Dell'Isola, et al. Page 8 of 9 Decision and Order (Motion to Request Adjudication). the case before us. 1

2 CONCLUSION 3

4 Based on the foregoing, Petitioner Sanchez's Motion to Request the Adjudication

of All Outstanding Motions and Attorney Fees and Costs is D E N I E D. W£77;-ggq Nlw6eW/A/é .. I:>//7/aoav of ¢?4w» 7 ezemn/mzfa/ce.~ %'?' 7000 so ORDERED this // LT old Mfg. we //§- 65%/'~5l1/2' 8

12 HONORABLE ANITA A. SUKOLA Judge, Superior Court of Guam 13

SP0124-18, Sanchez v. David Dell'Isola, et al. Page 9 of 9 Decision and Order (Motion to Request Adjudication).