Sanchez v. BAY SHORES MEDICAL GROUP

89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 634, 75 Cal. App. 4th 946, 99 Daily Journal DAR 10863, 99 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 8513, 1999 Cal. App. LEXIS 932
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
DecidedOctober 21, 1999
DocketB124489
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 634 (Sanchez v. BAY SHORES MEDICAL GROUP) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering California Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sanchez v. BAY SHORES MEDICAL GROUP, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 634, 75 Cal. App. 4th 946, 99 Daily Journal DAR 10863, 99 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 8513, 1999 Cal. App. LEXIS 932 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).

Opinion

Opinion

GRIGNON, J.

Plaintiffs prevailing in a medical malpractice action were awarded the fees of their medical experts as an item of costs. Because, in a *948 medical malpractice action, fees of medical expert witnesses not ordered by the court are not statutorily authorized as an item of costs, the trial court had no authority to award those fees as costs. We modify the cost award and otherwise affirm the order.

Facts and Procedural Background

Plaintiffs and respondents Beverly Sanchez, Roxane Sanchez-Dundon, and Edward Sanchez (collectively Sanchez), the widow and children of decedent Edwin Sanchez, sued defendants and appellants Bay Shores Medical Group and Steven A. Maier, M.D. (collectively Dr. Maier) for medical malpractice in this wrongful death action. Dr. Maier failed to timely diagnose the decedent’s colon cancer. A jury found in favor of Sanchez. Sanchez filed a memorandum of costs requesting, among other items, expert witness fees. Dr. Maier filed a motion to strike the expert witness fees as costs. The trial court granted the motion to strike as to the fees of an economic expert, but denied the motion as to the fees of medical experts. Dr. Maier appealed from the cost award.

Discussion

“The ‘costs’ of a civil action consist of the expenses of litigation .... Under the common law rule, parties to litigation must bear their own costs. The right to recover any of such costs is determined entirely by statute. ‘It is axiomatic that the right to recover costs is purely statutory, and, in the absence of an authorizing statute, no costs can be recovered by either party.’” (Davis v. KGO-T.V., Inc. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 436, 439 [71 Cal.Rptr.2d 452, 950 P.2d 567].) A trial court has no discretion to award costs not statutorily authorized. (Id. at p. 442.)

Code of Civil Procedure section 1032, subdivision (b) entitles the prevailing party in an action to recover costs as a matter of right. Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5, subdivision (a) sets forth the items that are allowable as costs under Code of Civil Procedure section 1032. The allowable items include “[flees of expert witnesses ordered by the court.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (a)(8).) Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5, subdivision (b) limits the items that are allowable as costs, and specifically prohibits fees of expert witnesses not ordered by the court, “except when expressly authorized by law.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (b)(1).)

“The Legislature has reserved to itself the power to determine selectively the types of actions and circumstances in which expert witness fees should be recoverable as costs and such fees may not otherwise be recovered *949 in a cost award.” (Ripley v. Pappadopoulos (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1616, 1625 [28 Cal.Rptr.2d 878].) The Legislature has exercised this power by creating a number of statutory exceptions to the general prohibition against recovering expert witness fees as costs. By statute, the Legislature has expressly authorized the shifting of expert witness fees as costs in certain types of actions. 1 (Davis v. KGO-T.V., Inc., supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 442; Jensen v. BMW of North America, Inc. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 112, 138 [41 Cal.Rptr.2d 295].) No statute expressly authorizes as allowable costs in medical malpractice actions the fees of medical experts not ordered by the court.

Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5 does not define “expert witnesses ordered by the court.” However, the purpose of the statute was to codify existing case law. “As explained in an analysis prepared by the Assembly Judiciary Committee, Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5 was intended not to alter existing law but, instead, to eliminate confusion by specifying for general purposes ‘which costs are and which costs are not allowable.’ (Assem. Jud. Com., 3d reading analysis of Sen. Bill No. 654 (1985-1986 Reg. Sess.) Apr. 17, 1986, p. 1.) The lists of allowable and nonallowable costs included in the statute, it explains, ‘are essentially restatements of existing law, and to a large extent are codifications of case law.’ (Ibid.) ‘The California Judges Association (CJA), which is the source of this bill, states that the existing law, rules and procedures relating to the awarding of litigation costs are hard to find and hard to follow. This bill is intended to rectify that situation by enacting comprehensive statutory lists of which costs are and are not allowable so that litigants and judges will no longer have to search through myriad statutes, cases and treatises in order to determine whether a particular cost item is allowable. CJA states that the list is not intended to substantively change existing law but rather to, as nearly as possible, merely restate it in a central statutory location.’ (Id. at p. 2.)” (Davis v. KGO-T.V., Inc., supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 441.)

When Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5 was enacted in 1986, existing case law provided that the fee of an expert witness appointed by the *950 court under Evidence Code sections 730 2 and 731 3 was allowable as a cost, while the fee of an expert not so appointed was not allowable. (Evid. Code § 733 4 ; Metropolitan Water Dist. v. Adams (1944) 23 Cal.2d 770, 773-774 [147 P.2d 6]; ABC Egg Ranch v. Abdelnour (1963) 223 Cal.App.2d 12, 18-19 [35 Cal.Rptr. 487]; Kennedy v. Byrum (1962) 201 Cal.App.2d 474, 482-483 [20 Cal.Rptr. 98] [all interpreting Code Civ. Proc., former § 1871, the predecessor statute of Evid. Code, §§ 730-733].) Accordingly, an expert witness ordered by the court is one who has been appointed by the court pursuant to Evidence Code section 730 or other statutory authority. In the absence of an order of the trial court appointing an expert witness, the fees of an expert witness are not recoverable as costs under Code of Civil Procedure section 1032. (Davis v. KGO-T.V., Inc., supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 439- 442.) The reason for the distinction is related to the partiality of the expert witness. “ ‘[W]here, as here, an [expert] is not appointed by the court but is employed by one of the parties, “the temptation to act in the interest of such party must be apparent” and “the court should not require the opposite party to pay for the services thus rendered.” ’ [Citations.]” (Id. at pp. 440- 441.)

Sanchez argues that medical experts are necessary in medical malpractice actions in order for a plaintiff to meet its burden of proof as to the standard of care and breach of the standard of care elements. Thus, Sanchez asserts medical experts in medical malpractice actions have effectively been ordered by the court.

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89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 634, 75 Cal. App. 4th 946, 99 Daily Journal DAR 10863, 99 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 8513, 1999 Cal. App. LEXIS 932, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sanchez-v-bay-shores-medical-group-calctapp-1999.