Sanchez Gutierrez v. Bank of America

• Court: District Court, N.D. Texas
• Decided: July 17, 2025
• Docket: 3:25-cv-01194
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION MIGUEL A. GUTIERREZ SANCHEZ, § § Plaintiff, § § V. § No. 3:25-cv-1194-B-BN § BANK OF AMERICA, § § Defendant. § FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE Plaintiff Miguel A. Gutierrez Sanchez filed a pro se complaint seeking help obtaining access to a bank account. See Dkt. No. 3. And United States District Judge Jane J. Boyle referred the lawsuit to the undersigned United States magistrate judge for screening under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and a standing order of reference. Gutierrez Sanchez was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). See Dkt. No. 6. And the undersigned issued a notice of deficiency and order identifying deficiencies with the complaint and requiring Gutierrez Sanchez to file an amended complaint by June 13, 2025. See Dkt. No. 7. But Gutierrez Sanchez has not filed an amended complaint. And the undersigned enters these findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation that the Court should dismiss the complaint with prejudice. Discussion A district court is required to screen a civil complaint filed IFP (that is, without payment of the filing fee) and may summarily dismiss that complaint (or any portion of it) if the complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). “The language of § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) tracks the language of Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6).” Black v. Warren, 134 F.3d 732, 733-34 (5th Cir. 1998) (per curiam). And “[i]t is well-established that a district court may dismiss a complaint on its own motion under [Rule] 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may granted.” Starrett v. U.S. Dep’t of Defense, No. 3:18-cv-2851-M-BH, 2018 WL 6069969, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 30, 2018) (citing Carroll v. Fort James Corp., 470 F.3d 1171 (5th Cir. 2006)), rec. accepted, 2018 WL 6068991 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 20, 2018), aff’d, 763 F.

App’x 383 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 142 (2019). A district court may exercise its “inherent authority ... to dismiss a complaint on its own motion ... ‘as long as the procedure employed is fair.’” Gaffney v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 294 F. App’x 975, 977 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (quoting Carroll, 470 F.3d at 1177; citation omitted). “[F]airness in this context requires both notice of the court’s intention to

dismiss sua sponte and an opportunity to respond.” Id. (cleaned up; quoting Lozano v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, FSB, 489 F.3d 636, 643 (5th Cir. 2007)); see also Carver v. Atwood, 18 F.4th 494, 498 (5th Cir. 2021) (“The broad rule is that ‘a district court may dismiss a claim on its own motion as long as the procedure employed is fair.’ More specifically, ‘fairness in this context requires both notice of the court’s intention and an opportunity to respond’ before dismissing sua sponte with prejudice.” (citations omitted)). And these findings, conclusions, and recommendations provide notice, while the period for filing objections affords an opportunity to respond. See, e.g., Starrett,

2018 WL 6069969, at *2 (citations omitted). A district court has authority to dismiss an action as “factually frivolous” related to claims where “the facts alleged are clearly baseless, a category encompassing allegations that are fanciful, fantastic, and delusional.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992) (cleaned up; quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 327-28 (1989)); see also id. at 33 (Dismissal “is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible, whether or not

there are judicially noticeable facts available to contradict them.”)). A review of Gutierrez Sanchez’s filings reflects that the complaint does not identify any claim. It requests help obtaining access to a bank account but does not set out any cognizable claim over which this Court has jurisdiction beyond speculating that the bank has denied access to the account “maybe because [of] racism or prejudice.” Dkt. No. 3 at 2. This speculative and conclusory allegation is

insufficient to state a claim. So the complaint should be dismissed with prejudice. Ordinarily, a pro se plaintiff should be granted leave to amend his complaint before dismissal, but Gutierrez Sanchez has already been informed that his complaint was deficient and given an opportunity to amend. He did not do so. And leave is not required when a plaintiff has already pled his “best case.” Brewster v. Dretke, 587 F.3d 764, 767-68 (5th Cir. 2009). Gutierrez Sanchez has failed to state or suggest a cognizable claim or any facts from which a cognizable claim can be inferred. Based on the most deferential review of his complaint, it is highly unlikely that, given another opportunity, Gutierrez Sanchez could allege cogent and

viable legal claims over which this Court has jurisdiction. Thus, the undersigned concludes that granting leave to amend under these circumstances would be futile and cause needless delay. Recommendation The Court should dismiss the complaint with prejudice. A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these

findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by

reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Assn, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996). DATED: July 17, 2025 : :

DAVID L. HORAN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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