San Diego University for Integrative Studies v. Katherine Westerlund, in her official capacity as Chief, School Certification Unit, Student and Exchange Visitor Program, et al.

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: January 22, 2026
• Docket: 3:24-cv-01701
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 SAN DIEGO UNIVERSITY FOR Case No.: 24-cv-01701-AGS-KSC INTEGRATIVE STUDIES, 12 ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S Plaintiff, 13 MOTION TO COMPEL THE FULL v. ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD 14 DKT. NO. 66 KATHERINE WESTERLUND, in her 15 official capacity as Chief, School 16 Certification Unit, Student and Exchange Visitor Program, et al., 17 Defendants. 18

19 20 Presently before the Court is plaintiff’s Motion to Compel the Full Administrative 21 Record (“Motion”). Doc. No. 66. Defendants oppose the Motion. Dkt. No. 78. As set forth 22 below, plaintiff’s Motion is DENIED. 23 I. INTRODUCTION 24 Plaintiff San Diego University for Integrative Studies is a postsecondary educational 25 institution whose student population is comprised primarily of international students. Dkt. 26 No. 1 at 6. Defendants are Katherine Westerlund, in their official capacity as the Chief, 27 School Certification Unit, Student and Exchange Visitor Program (“SEVP”), Todd Lyons, 28 in their official capacity as Acting Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 1 (“ICE”) , and Kristi Noem, in their official capacity as Secretary of United States 2 Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”)2. Id. “[SEVP] is a part of the National Security 3 Investigations Division and acts as a bridge for government organizations that have an 4 interest in information on nonimmigrants whose primary reason for coming to the United 5 States is to be students.” Id. at 7. SEVP manages schools, nonimmigrant students in the F 6 and M visa classifications, and their dependents on behalf of DHS. Id. The Department of 7 State (“DoS”) manages Exchange Visitor Programs, nonimmigrant exchange visitors in the 8 J visa classification, and their dependents. Id. Both SEVP and DoS use the Student and 9 Exchange Visitor Information System (“SEVIS”) to track and monitor schools; exchange 10 visitor programs; and F, M and J nonimmigrants while they visit the United States and 11 participate in the U.S. education system. Id. 12 On January 2, 2024, after administrative review, defendants withdrew plaintiff’s 13 SEVIS certification because plaintiff “failed to timely report the physical relocation of its 14 main instructional site” and “failed to report its loss of the state licensing necessary to 15 qualify graduates of degree programs.” Dkt. No. 1-4 at 6-13. 16 On September 23, 2024, plaintiff filed this case seeking declaratory and injunctive 17 relief under the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”) and requesting the Court compel 18 defendants to: 19 (1) to reverse their final decision that [plaintiff’s] change of mailing address to another address on the same campus constituted a change of school 20 location, and 21 (2) to reverse their decision to punish [plaintiff] for not advising it soon 22 enough of an unsettled, discrete state licensing issue which was settled in 23 [plaintiff’s] favor.

24 25 1 Todd Lyons became Acting Director of ICE on March 9, 2025, and, therefore, is 26 automatically substituted as the defendant. Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d). 27 2 Kristi Noem became Secretary of DHS on January 25, 2024, and, therefore, is 28 1 Dkt. No. 1 at 2, 17; Dkt. No. 1-4. On December 12, 2024, the Hon. Andrew G. Schopler 2 granted in part plaintiff’s preliminary injunction motion, enjoining defendants from 3 revoking, reducing, or changing plaintiff’s SEVP certification or SEVIS access while this 4 case is pending. Dkt. No. 29. 5 On September 26, 2025, defendants filed the Administrative Record (“AR”), which 6 includes certification by SEVP Section Chief Panayiota who attests “the documents and 7 materials listed in the attached [AR] Index consist of the administrative record constituting 8 all documents and materials considered by ICE in its decision to withdraw [plaintiff’s] 9 certification to enroll foreign students.” Dkt. No. 60. Plaintiff then filed the pending 10 Motion, contending “defendants did not lodge the complete [AR]” and requesting the Court 11 “compel the full [AR] and . . . the deposition of defendant Westerlund.” Dkt. No. 66 at 9, 12 12. 13 II. LEGAL STANDARD 14 The APA directs the Court to “review the whole record or those parts of it cited by 15 a party.” 5 U.S.C.A. § 706 (West). The “whole record” is “the full administrative record 16 that was before the Secretary at the time he made his decision.” Citizens to Pres. Overton 17 Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420, 91 S.Ct. 814, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971), abrogated on 18 other grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 97 S.Ct. 980, 51 L.Ed.2d 192 (1977). 19 This includes “all documents and materials directly or indirectly considered by agency 20 decision-makers and includes evidence contrary to the agency’s position.” Thompson v. 21 U.S. Dep't of Lab., 885 F.2d 551, 555 (9th Cir. 1989) (citation modified). 22 Generally reviewing courts are limited to considering only materials in the 23 administrative record. Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Forest Serv., 100 F.3d 1443, 24 1450 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142, 93 S. Ct. 1241, 36 L. Ed. 25 2d 106 (1973) (“[T]he focal point for judicial review should be the administrative record 26 already in existence, not some new record made initially in the reviewing court.”). 27 However, a party may seek to add extra-record documents, i.e., supplement, an incomplete 28 administrative record or a complete one. See e.g. Alegre v. United States, No. 16-CV-2442- 1 AJB-KSC, 2021 WL 4934982, at *3 (S.D. Cal. July 29, 2021) (discussing motion to 2 complete record and motion to supplement record.) 3 A. Completeness of the AR 4 Defendants’ certification of the AR creates a “presumption of regularity.” Pinnacle 5 Armor, Inc. v. United States, 923 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1232 (E.D. Cal. 2013); see also Bar 6 MK Ranches v. Yuetter, 994 F.2d 735, 739–40 (10th Cir. 1993) (while the agency “may 7 not unilaterally determine what constitutes the administrative record” the courts “assume[] 8 the agency properly designated the administrative record absent clear evidence to the 9 contrary”) 10 To rebut the presumption, a plaintiff “must put forth concrete evidence to show that 11 the record is incomplete.” Alegre, 2021 WL 4934982, at *4 (citation modified). Plaintiff 12 must (1) “identify reasonable, non-speculative grounds for the belief that the documents 13 were considered by the agency and not included in the record” and (2) “identify the 14 materials allegedly omitted from the record with sufficient specificity, as opposed to 15 merely proffering broad categories of documents and data that are ‘likely’ to exist as a 16 result of other documents that are included in the administrative record.” Id. It is 17 insufficient for a plaintiff to “simply ... assert [ ] that the documents are relevant, were 18 before ... [the agency] at the time it made its decision, and were inadequately considered.” 19 Pac. Shores Subdivision, California Water Dist. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 448 F. Supp. 20 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2006) 21 B. Supplementation of Incomplete Record 22 “The administrative record prepared by the agency may be supplemented by extra- 23 record materials in an APA case under four narrow exceptions: (1) when it needs to 24 determine whether the agency has considered all relevant factors and has explained its 25 decision; (2) when the agency has relied upon documents or materials not included in the 26 record; (3) when it is necessary to explain technical terms or complex matters; and (4) 27 when a plaintiff makes a showing of agency bad faith.” Pinnacle Armor, Inc., 923 F. Supp. 28 2d at 1231; Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 100 F.3d at 1450. 1 III. DISCUSSION 2 Plaintiff claims defendants relied on information they did not include in the AR, 3 which can be a basis for the Court to include extra-record documents in the AR under either 4 standard. Dkt. No. 66. Plaintiff argues “defendants did not lodge the complete [AR]” and 5 should have included: 6 A. Documents which show (1) what triggered defendants to notice that [plaintiff] had changed locations, and (2) what deliberations and actions 7 defendants took after they noticed the change on or about June 17, 2021, 8 and before January 27, 2022, when [plaintiff] gave defendants formal notice that it had changed its main address to its former satellite location. 9 . . . ; 10 B. Help Desk tickets from calls SDUIS made to the SEVP Response Center. 11 . . . ; [and] 12 C. Emails regarding [plaintiff]. 13

14 Id. at 6, 9. Plaintiff contends because “defendants terminated [plaintiff]’s access to SEVIS 15 in part based upon the alleged failure to inform SEVP of the change of address, the 16 communications that [plaintiff] had with SEVP, including the calls to the help line that 17 would be noted in help desk tickets, are extremely relevant to whether that decision was 18 arbitrary and capricious.” Id. at 11. 19 Plaintiff also claims these “obvious omissions” indicate defendants acted in bad faith 20 and justify the deposition of defendant Westerlund.3 Id. at 6, 12. 21 A. Documents re: Notice of Address Change & Defendants’ Response 22 Plaintiff claims these “missing documents would show (1) what triggered defendants 23 to notice that [plaintiff] had changed locations, and (2) what deliberations and actions 24 defendants took after they noticed the change on or about June 17, 2021, and before January 25

26 27 3 Plaintiff does not argue the “relevant factors” exception applies, or that additional information or documents are necessary to explain technical terms or complex matters, so 28 1 27, 2022, when [plaintiff] gave defendants formal notice that it had changed its main 2 address to its former satellite location.” Id. at 10. 3 Plaintiff claims a “screenshot not in the record of the website for USA Language 4 Center, a different entity” which was informally produced by defendants’ counsel and 5 apparently4 shows USA Language Center’s address “raises the serious question of whether 6 defendant Westerlund’s decision to terminate [plaintiff]’s access to SEVIS was based upon 7 records contained in USA Language Center’s file” and is “clear evidence that defendants 8 directly, or at a minimum indirectly, considered documents outside the [AR].” Id. at 7; Id. 9 at 14-15. Defendants do not dispute they had this information but deny they considered it 10 in connection with plaintiff’s certification. See Dkt. No. 78-1 at 4 (Sgardelis’s second 11 declaration, averring “SEVP did not rely on the document or its contents when deciding to 12 withdraw [plaintiff]’s certification.”). 13 Plaintiff’s analysis is speculative and does not provide concrete evidence defendants 14 directly or indirectly considered USA Language Center’s website when they withdrew 15 plaintiff’s SEVIS certification. See Sara Lee Corp. v. Am. Bakers Ass'n, 252 F.R.D. 31, 34 16 (D.D.C. 2008) (“plaintiff must do more than imply that the documents at issue were in the 17 [government agency’s] possession. . . . Rather, plaintiff must prove that the documents 18 were before the actual decisionmakers involved in the determination.”); see also Dunn v. 19 F.D.I.C., 2012 WL 1986042, *5 (C.D. Cal. May 31, 2012) (“[T]he crux of the analysis is 20 whether the documents or materials ... were actually considered, directly or indirectly, by 21 the agency decision makers.”). Moreover, plaintiff offers no evidence to support its claim 22 defendants withheld documents reflecting deliberations or actions taken after they noticed 23 plaintiff’s address change. 24 / / 25

26 27 4 Plaintiff did not file a copy of the screenshot, so the Court relies on the parties’ uncontested description of the document. 28 1 B. Help Desk Tickets 2 Plaintiff posits “Help Desk tickets from calls [plaintiff] made to the SEVP Response 3 Center” should have been included in the AR and “[t]he fact that they are logged is proof 4 that the(re) are records.” Dkt. No. 66 at 10. Plaintiff’s assertion, however, is speculative 5 and lacks concrete evidence that defendants directly or indirectly considered Help Desk 6 tickets in making its decision. Sara Lee Corp., 252 F.R.D. at 34; Dunn, 2012 WL 1986042, 7 *5. 8 C. Emails Regarding Plaintiff 9 Plaintiff next contends defendants wrongfully withheld emails regarding plaintiff 10 from the AR, as evidenced by five emails. Dkt. No. 66 at 10, 17-29. 11 Two emails were sent by ICE to plaintiff in March 2020 and discuss COVID-19 12 related updates and resources generally. Id. at 17-22. Plaintiff does not explain why these 13 emails should be included in the AR, nor is it apparent to the Court why they would be, as 14 they do not discuss plaintiffs SEVS certification or the reasons defendants decided to 15 withdraw it. Sara Lee Corp., 252 F.R.D. at 34; Dunn, 2012 WL 1986042, *5. 16 The third email was sent by one of defendants’ field representatives on March 25, 17 2022. Dkt. No. 66 at 23-24. She requests a date and time to conduct a site visit and provides 18 general information about the procedure for a site visit. Id. at 23-24. It is not clear how this 19 scheduling email would have directly or indirectly been considered by defendants in 20 reaching their decision because it was sent two months after “January 27, 2022, when 21 [plaintiff] gave defendants formal notice that it had changed its main address.” Id. at 10. 22 Plaintiff, therefore, has not shown concrete evidence this email was considered by 23 defendants. Sara Lee Corp., 252 F.R.D. at 34; Dunn, 2012 WL 1986042, *5. 24 The fourth document is a two sentence email sent by an ICE field representative on 25 June 1, 2022. See Dkt. No. 66 at 26-27, (“I have just returned from extended leave and 26 working through emails. Was your question(s) answered?”). Plaintiff does not explain how 27 this email would have had any bearing on defendants’ decision and, thus, does not meet its 28 1 burden with respect to this document. Sara Lee Corp., 252 F.R.D. at 34; Dunn, 2012 WL 2 1986042, *5. 3 The fifth email was sent on February 3, 2025, so it clearly should not be included in 4 the AR because it wasn’t considered in relation to defendants’ decision, which was made 5 the year prior. Dkt. No. 66 at 28-29. An administrative record need not include documents 6 that became available after the agency made its decision (“post-decisional” documents). 7 See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 8 555, 98 S.Ct. 1197, 55 L.Ed.2d 460 (1978) (judicial review is “limited . . . by the time at 9 which the decision was made.”) 10 D. Bad Faith 11 Plaintiff argues defendants’ “deliberate” withholding of the aforementioned 12 documents is bad faith and the Court, therefore, should compel defendants to produce “the 13 full administrative record.” Dkt. No. 66 at 12. As discussed above, plaintiff has not shown 14 that defendants should have included any of these documents in the AR. By extension, they 15 also have not shown defendants acted in bad faith by not including them. See Pinnacle 16 Armor, Inc., 923 F. Supp. 2d at 1243. (“For the bad faith exception to apply, normally there 17 must be a strong showing of bad faith or improper behavior before the court may inquire 18 into the thought processes of administrative decision makers.”) (citation modified). 19 E. Westerlund Deposition 20 Plaintiff also argues “obvious omissions” in the record justify a deposition of 21 defendant Westerlund because as “the author of the decision . . . [she] is in the best position 22 to know what she had access to, the agency’s intention behind its ‘investigation’ of 23 [plaintiff], whether the agency had less than pure motives in doing so, and what she 24 considered when making that decision.” Dkt. No. 66 at 6. Plaintiff’s allegation of “obvious 25 omissions” is speculative and does not support taking defendant Westerlund’s deposition. 26 See Pinnacle Armor, Inc., 923 F. Supp. 2d at 1242 (allowing “plaintiff to file a very narrow 27 motion for discovery” to determine whether governmental agency considered data not 28 1 |}included in the administrative record only after finding “non-speculative grounds” to 2 || believe the agency did so.). 3 IV. CONCLUSION 4 In sum, plaintiff has not rebutted the presumption of regularity created by 5 defendants’ certification of the AR. Plaintiff’s Motion is, therefore, DENIED. 6 IT IS SO ORDERED 7 || Dated: January 22, 2026 Me Wj:

9 Hori. Karen S. Crawford United States Magistrate Judge 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28