REINHARDT, Circuit Judge:
I. BACKGROUND
The San Diego Committee Against Registration and the Draft (CARD) appeals the district court’s denial of its request for a preliminary injunction enjoining the Governing Board of Grossmont Union High School District (the Board) from enforcing certain policies, rules and regulations, pursuant to which the Board has rejected an anti-draft advertisement submitted by CARD for placement in a number of the district’s student newspapers.1
CARD is a non-profit organization located in San Diego County, California that is actively involved in counseling young men on alternatives to compulsory military service. CARD’S membership consists of both students and non-students. The Board is the governing body of the Grossmont Union School District and retains ultimate responsibility for the adoption and enforcement of policies, rules and regulations relating to administration of the district’s schools, including policies affecting the student newspapers.
In October, 1982, CARD sought to purchase advertising space from five student newspapers published by high schools within the district. According to CARD, its advertisement was directed toward providing information and counseling to male students regarding alternatives to military service. CARD’S requests were referred to faculty advisors for review and subsequently submitted to the principals of the five high schools. The principals, in turn, requested Robert Pyle, Superintendent of the school district, to issue a policy guideline.
On November 8, 1982, Bob King, Acting Assistant Superintendent, issued a di[1473]*1473rective instructing all principals to reject CARD’S requests on the ground that publication of the advertisements would contribute to the solicitation of illegal acts by the district’s students.2 On January 17, 1983, CARD filed an administrative claim with the Board in which it sought reversal of the Superintendent’s decision. This claim was rejected on February 3, 1983.
On March 16, 1983, CARD brought suit against the Board pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982), alleging that the Board’s actions and policies had deprived CARD of its rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. CARD sought, inter alia, to enjoin the Board from enforcing those policies, rules and regulations that had resulted in the rejection of CARD’S advertisements. CARD argued, as it does here, that because the Board permitted military service advertising, including various military recruitment advertisements, to be published in the five high school newspapers, it could not constitutionally exclude CARD’S proffered advertisement.
The district court found that “[t]he student newspapers in the Grossmont High School District are limited in nature as a public forum.” The district court also found that the military service advertisements that had appeared in the student newspapers were “non-political and offer[ed] vocational opportunities to the students.” Finally, the district court found that the Grossmont Union High School District policies permitting publication of political speech by students only and restricting newspaper access by non-students to commercial speech were “reasonable in light of the purpose of school publications.” The district court concluded that CARD had failed to show either probable success on the merits of its claim or that it had raised a question that was sufficiently serious to warrant issuance of a preliminary injunction. In this appeal, CARD contends that the district court erred in concluding that it had failed to meet the higher standard— the probability of success on the merits. We agree, although we do not intend to suggest that meeting the lower standard— the raising of a serious question — would not have been sufficient to warrant the relief sought.3
II. JURISDICTION
As a threshold matter, we address the Board’s contention that we lack jurisdiction to hear this appeal as a result of CARD’S failure to file its formal notice of appeal within the period of time prescribed by Fed.R.App.P. 4(a). In relevant part, Rule 4(a) provides that
[i]n a civil case in which an appeal is permitted by law as of right ... the notice of appeal ... shall be filed with the clerk of the district court within 30 [1474]*1474days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from ...4
The provisions of Rule 4(a) are both mandatory and jurisdictional. Browder v. Director, Illinois Department of Corrections, 434 U.S. 257, 264, 98 S.Ct. 556, 560, 54 L.Ed.2d 521 (1978).
The district court entered an order denying CARD’S request for a preliminary injunction on June 14, 1983. On June 24, 1983 rather than filing a notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a), as it should have, CARD filed a motion for permission to appeal the order under Ped.R.App.P. 5(a). The latter rule provides that a district judge may certify an appeal from an order not otherwise appealable. The district court denied this motion on July 11, 1983. On July 19, 1983, CARD filed a Rule 4(a) notice of appeal.
Because CARD’S formal Rule 4(a) notice of appeal was not filed within the period of time required by the rule, its appeal is timely only if we construe its Rule 5(a) motion as a notice of appeal. Fed.R.App. 3(c) requires us to construe CARD’S Rule 5(a) motion in that manner. Rule 3(c) provides that “[a]n appeal shall ' not be dismissed for informality of form or title of the notice of appeal.” Pursuant to this rule, we are required to broadly construe the notice of appeal provisions of Rule 4(a). See Cel-A-Pak v. California Agricultural Labor Relations Board, 680 F.2d 664, 667 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1071, 103 S.Ct. 491, 74 L.Ed.2d 633 (1982) (Rule 3(c) mandates liberality in determining compliance with Rule 4(a)). Moreover, we have discretion, where the interests of substantive justice require it, to disregard irregularities in the form or procedure for filing a notice of appeal. Id.
In Cel-A-Pak, we recognized that documents not formally denominated notices of appeal have nevertheless been treated as such “as long as they clearly evince the party’s intent to appeal and provide notice to both the opposing party and the court.” Id. (citations omitted). See also Cobb v. Lewis, 488 F.2d 41, 44 (5th Cir.1974). Here, CARD’S Rule 5(a) motion, filed ten days after entry of the district court’s order, provided clear notice to both the court and the Board that CARD intended to appeal the order. Accordingly, we construe this motion as a Rule 4(a) notice of appeal which we find to have been timely filed.5
III. THE PUBLIC FORUM DOCTRINE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
CARD contends, in essence, that because others’ advertisements relating to military service were published in several Grossmont high school newspapers, the Board could not exclude CARD’S advertisement, particularly since CARD’S advertisement presented an opposing viewpoint to the position taken in the previous ads.
The values embodied in the First Amendment require the state, under certain circumstances, to provide members of the public with access to its facilities for purposes of speech. Certain state facilities, which may be appropriately used for communication, enjoy special constitutional status as “public forums.” See generally Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, — U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 3439, 87 L.Ed.2d 567 (1985); Perry Edu[1475]*1475cation Association v. Perry Local Educators’ Association, 460 U.S. 37, 103 S.Ct. 948, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983). In these public forums, the First Amendment narrowly circumscribes the government’s power to exclude or regulate speech. Of course, a state’s mere ownership or control of a facility does not, in itself, guarantee access under the First Amendment. United States Postal Service v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Associations, 453 U.S. 114, 129-30, 101 S.Ct. 2676, 2685, 69 L.Ed.2d 517 (1981). Similarly, merely permitting public access to a government facility does not necessarily open it for use as a public forum. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836, 96 S.Ct. 1211, 1216, 47 L.Ed.2d 505 (1976). However, even with respect to nonpublic forums, the state may not act unreasonably. Cornelius, 105 S.Ct. at 3448.
In Perry and Cornelius, the Supreme Court identified three types of forums to which the public’s right of access varies, as does the type of limitations the state may impose upon the right. The Court first focused on “places which by long tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate,” such as streets and parks, where “the rights of the state to limit expressive activity are sharply circumscribed.” Perry, 460 U.S. at 45, 103 S.Ct. at 954; accord Cornelius, 105 S.Ct. at 3449. The Court stated that
[i]n these quintessential public forums, the government may not prohibit all communicative activity. For the state to enforce a content-based exclusion it must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end. The state may also enforce regulations of the time, place and manner of expression which are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication.
Perry, 460 U.S. at 45, 103 S.Ct. at 955 (citations omitted); accord Cornelius, 105 S.Ct. at 3448-49.
The second type of public forum on which the Court focused consists of “public property which the State has opened for use by the public as a place for expressive activity.” Perry, 460 U.S. at 45, 103 S.Ct. at 955; accord Cornelius, 105 S.Ct. at 3449. The courts have come to call this type of public forum a “limited public forum” or a “public forum by designation.” In such a forum, “[t]he Constitution forbids a state to enforce certain exclusions from a forum generally open to the public even if it was not required to create the forum in the first place.” Perry, 460 U.S. at 45, 103 S.Ct. at 955; accord Cornelius, 105 S.Ct. at 3449. A limited public forum may, depending on its nature and the nature of the state’s actions, be open to the general public for the discussion of all topics, or there may be limitations on the groups allowed to use the forums or the topics that can be discussed. Thus, a limited public forum may be open to certain groups for the discussion of any topic, Perry, 460 U.S. at 46 n. 7, 103 S.Ct. at 955 n. 7 (citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 102 S.Ct. 269, 70 L.Ed.2d 440 (1981)), or to the entire public for the discussion of certain topics, Perry, 460 U.S. at 46 n. 7, 103 S.Ct. at 955 n. 7 (citing City of Madison Joint School District v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm’n, 429 U.S. 167, 97 S.Ct. 421, 50 L.Ed.2d 376 (1976)), or some combination of the two.
Once the state has created a limited public forum, its ability to impose further constraints on the type of speech permitted in that forum is quite restricted:
[although a State is not required to indefinitely retain the open character of the facility, as long as it does so it is bound by the same standards as apply in a traditional public forum. Reasonable time, place and manner regulations are permissible, and a content-based prohibition must be narrowly drawn to effectuate a compelling state interest.
Perry, 460 U.S. at 46, 103 S.Ct. at 955 (citations omitted). “Thus the identical broad free speech rights attach to the first and second types of public forums,” Cinevision Corp. v. City of Burbank, 745 F.2d [1476]*1476560, 569 (9th Cir.1984), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 2115, 85 L.Ed.2d 480 (1985); accord Cornelius, 105 S.Ct. at 3448, although in the latter type of forums those broad rights apply only within the particular boundaries of the specific forum that has been established.
The third type of forum is “[p]ublic property ... which is not by tradition or designation a forum for public communication,” Cinevision, 745 F.2d at 569 n. 8 (quoting Perry, 460 U.S. at 46, 103 S.Ct. at 955), such as a military base or jail. The Court recognized that this type of forum is governed by standards different from those applicable to the first two. The Court stated that
[i]n addition to time, place and manner regulations, the state may reserve the forum for its intended purposes, communicative or otherwise, as long as the regulation on speech is reasonable.
Perry, 460 U.S. at 46, 103 S.Ct. at 955 (emphasis added); accord Cornelius, 105 5. Ct. at 3448. “The existence of reasonable grounds for limiting access to a nonpublic forum, however, will not save a regulation that is in reality a facade for viewpoint-based discrimination.” Cornelius, 105 S.Ct. at 3454.
IV. SCHOOL NEWSPAPERS AS A LIMITED PUBLIC FORUM
The Board first contends that the school newspapers fall into the third category of forums, non-public forums. We disagree, and hold that the newspapers fall into the second category, limited public forums. In deciding whether a particular forum is a limited public forum or a nonpublic forum, we must determine what type of forum the government intended to create. Cornelius, 105 S.Ct. at 3449. The government’s intent is evidenced by “[its] policy and practice ... [as well as] the nature of the property and its compatibility with expressive activity.” Id.
In the case before us, the evidence clearly indicates an intent to create a limited public forum. Newspapers, including the Board’s, are devoted entirely to expressive activity. Everything that appears in a newspaper is speech, whether commercial, political, artistic, or some other type. It is difficult to think of any other kind of property that is more compatible with expressive activity. In addition, the admitted policy and practice of the Board is to allow a particular group — the students — to discuss any topic in the newspapers, subject only to certain conditions not relevant to the issues before us. Thus, under the test enumerated in Cornelius, the Board’s newspapers, like most other school papers, constitute, at a minimum, a limited public forum of the type found in Widmar. See supra pp. 1475-76.
The Board also allows non-students to use the forum it has created in the newspapers. The Board’s admitted policy and practice is to allow members of the general public to avail themselves of,the forum as long as their speech consists of advertisements offering goods, services, or vocational opportunities to students. Because the newspapers are open to the entire public for the discussion of these limited topics, the Board has also created a limited public forum of the type found in City of Madison. See supra pp. 1475-76.6
As a result, the dispute between the Board and CARD reduces itself to a debate over the precise limitations on the topics that may be discussed by non-students in the limited public forum the Board has created. The Board argues that it permits [1477]*1477non-students to engage only in non-political commercial speech in the newspapers. It claims that the military service advertisements were non-political, but that CARD’S ad is not. The district court, agreed with the Board and found that the military service advertisements published in the newspapers (1) offered vocational or career opportunities to students and (2) were non-political.
We agree with the first part of the district court’s finding but disagree with the second. The advertisements regarding military service career opportunities are different from most career ads in several important respects. First, most career ads are commercial in nature. They involve the advertiser’s “economic interests.” Central Hudson Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 557, 561, 100 S.Ct. 2343, 2348, 65 L.Ed.2d 341 (1980). The “commercial speech” doctrine
“rests heavily on the ‘common sense’ distinction between speech proposing a commercial transaction and other varieties of speech.” Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, — U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 2265, 2275, 85 L.Ed.2d 652 (1985) (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56, 98 S.Ct. 1912, 1918-19, 56 L.Ed.2d 444 (1978)). Here, the government’s interest in promoting military service is not an economic one; it is essentially political or governmental. Nor is any commercial transaction being proposed.
Second, it has long been recognized that the subject of military service is controversial and political in nature. There has been opposition to military service, both compulsory and voluntary, throughout our nation’s history. See, e.g., United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 85 S.Ct. 850, 13 L.Ed.2d 733 (1965) (discussing history of conscientious objection). Opposition to compulsory service — the draft — is often simply a manifestation of a more deeply rooted opposition to military service in any form. See, e.g., Wayte v. United States, — U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 1524, 84 L.Ed.2d 547 (1985); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 90 S.Ct. 1792, 26 L.Ed.2d 308 (1970); Sicurella v. United States, 348 U.S. 385, 75 S.Ct. 403, 99 L.Ed. 436 (1955). The controversy over military service led to student protests in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s. Many of our nation’s finest universities and colleges barred military recruiters from their campuses and terminated the Reserve Officer Training Corps programs they had previously offered. For other manifestations of the controversy over voluntary and involuntary military service, see; e.g., In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561, 65 S.Ct. 1307, 89 L.Ed. 1795 (1945) (attorney could properly be denied admission to state bar because of his opposition to military service); United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 49 S.Ct. 448, 73 L.Ed. 889 (1929) (alien could properly be denied citizenship due to opposition to military service); United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 51 S.Ct. 570, 75 L.Ed. 1302 (1931) (same); United States v. Bland, 283 U.S. 636, 51 S.Ct. 569, 75 L.Ed. 1319 (1931) (same); Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 66 S.Ct. 826, 90 L.Ed. 1084 (1946) (overruling Schwimmer, Macintosh, and Bland).
One need not agree with those opposed to military service in order to recognize the fact that there is indeed a well-established and continuing controversy surrounding the subject. The ads sponsored by the military advanced the position taken by the proponents of one side to that political dispute. Accordingly, the district court erred when it found that the military recruitment advertisements were non-political.7
[1478]*1478Thus, the Board has allowed certain members of the public — various military recruiters — to use its newspapers to engage in speech that is not essentially commercial in nature but that combines elements of political and commercial speech. As a result, the Board’s actual policy and practice leads, under Cornelius, to the conclusion that the Board has established the school newspapers as a limited public forum in which students can discuss any topic, and in which non-students can engage in commercial speech generally and in speech which is both political and commercial with respect to at least one important and highly controversial topic — military service. Because the Board on a number of occasions permitted the publication of advertisements advocating military service, there can be no question but that the Board intended to open the newspapers for advertisements on this topic — at least by one side to the debate.
CARD’S advertisement comes within the boundaries of the limited public forum the Board has created. Having established a limited public forum, the Board cannot, absent a compelling governmental interest, exclude speech otherwise within the boundaries of the forum. See supra pp. 1475-1476. In particular, the Board cannot allow the presentation of one side of an issue, but prohibit the presentation of the other side. City of Madison, 429 U.S. at 175-76, 97 S.Ct. at 426-27. Here, the Board permitted mixed political and commercial speech advocating military service, but attempted to bar the same type of speech opposing such service.8 The Board has failed to advance a compelling governmental interest justifying its conduct. Accordingly, the Board violated the First Amendment when it excluded CARD’S advertisements from the newspapers.9
V. NONPUBLIC FORUMS
In the alternative, we hold that even if the Board is correct in its assertion that the school newspapers are a nonpublic forum, its conduct still violated the First Amendment because its refusal to accept CARD’S ads was unreasonable and constitutes viewpoint-based discrimination.
A. Reasonableness Test
1. Generally
The Board claims that its exclusion of CARD from the newspapers was reasonable and therefore constitutional, and offers three arguments in support of this conclusion. First, the Board claims that pursuant to the District’s Publications Code, the Board may, in its discretion, restrict publication of ads proffered by non-student entities to non-political advertisements offering goods, services or vocation[1479]*1479al opportunities to students. Second, the Board urges that its refusal of CARD’S advertisement was lawful because publication of the ad would have amounted to advocacy of an illegal act. Third, the Board claims, relying principally on its Publications Code, that because publication of CARD’S advertisement would have necessarily reduced the space available to students to express themselves, the rejection of the ad was lawful.
2. Political Nature of the Ads
We have already demonstrated the fallacy in the Board’s first argument. As discussed above, p. 1477, the military recruitment advertisements were of a mixed political and commercial character. CARD’S ad pertained to the same topic, and like the recruitment ads, offered goods, services, or vocational opportunities to students. See supra note 8. Because CARD’S ad dealt with the same politically controversial topic as previously-published ads, the political character of the ad did not provide a reasonable basis for excluding it from the newspapers.
3. The Threat of Illegal Conduct
The Board urges the prospect of illegal conduct as a reason not to publish CARD’S advertisement. In the Board’s view, ’ its publication would amount to advocacy of non-registration — an illegal act.
We agree, of course, that the Board has a strong interest in promoting law abiding conduct among its students. But we are unable to conclude that its prohibiting the publication of' CARD’S advertisement serves this interest. The Board bases its argument on the fact that the organization has styled itself “The Committee Against Registration and the Draft.” The Board further contends that the advertisement, when viewed in its entirety, advocates non-registration.
That the organization’s name implies opposition to a particular law is not, in our view, sufficient to support a conclusion that the organization advocates unlawful conduct. Moreover, there is nothing in the text of the advertisement suggesting that CARD encourages non-registration. See supra, note 1. In fact, the record discloses that according to Superintendent Pyle the Board had no evidence that the purpose of the advertisement was to stop students from registering, and that the Board had derived such intent solely from a reading of the organization’s name.
It is true that a state may act to prohibit individuals from advocating violations of the law when such advocacy is directed toward inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to accomplish that objective. See Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447, 89 S.Ct. 1827, 1829, 23 L.Ed.2d 430 (1969). “But, in our system, undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression.” Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503, 508, 89 S.Ct. 733, 737, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969). Mere speculation on the part of the state that individuals might at some time engage in illegal activity is insufficient to justify regulation. Gay Students Organization v. Bonner, 509 F.2d 652, 662 (1st Cir.1974).
The Board’s conclusion that publication of CARD’S advertisement would result in unlawful conduct was, at best, speculative. The record is devoid of any evidence that CARD advocated illegal conduct or that publication of the advertisement was likely to give rise to such conduct. To the contrary, the record indicates that CARD, through its advertisement, sought to apprise eligible students of legitimate and lawful alternatives to the draft, such as the availability of student deferments. Accordingly, we conclude that the Board’s fear of illegal advocacy did not provide a reasonable basis for excluding CARD from the newspapers.
4. Reduction of Opportunities
Finally, the Board contends that its refusal to publish CARD’S advertisement is justified by its interest, reflected in its Publications Code, in providing its students with a forum for free expression. The [1480]*1480Board claims that excluding material written or sponsored by outsiders such as CARD from its student newspapers increases the students’ opportunities to express themselves in print. We acknowledge, and the parties do not dispute, that the Board may, in light of various practical constraints, prohibit or impose limits on the amount of material from non-students that may be published in student newspapers. However, any such restriction may not be arbitrary or unreasonable. See Cornelius. The Board has offered no valid reason that distinguishes the reduction in student opportunities for freedom of expression due to publication of the recruitment ads from the reduction that would occur from publication of CARD’S advertisement; nor does the Board suggest that there is any objective system for limiting the number of ads or choosing among ads concerning the same general subject or relating to the same type of service or vocation.' The differentiation in treatment between CARD’S ad and the military’s was thus arbitrary and as a result impermissible. Accordingly, we hold that the Board’s policy on student self-expression did not provide a reasonable basis for excluding CARD from its newspapers.
5. Conclusion
The Board has failed to advance any reasonable grounds for excluding CARD’S advertisement from the newspapers.10 Accordingly, even if we assume that the newspapers are a. nonpublic forum, that is, the type of forum which receives the least protection under the First Amendment, we must conclude that the Board violated the guarantees of that amendment when it prevented the publication of CARD’S advertisement. See Cornelius, 105 S.Ct. at 3448.11
[1481]*1481B. Viewpoint-Based Discrimination
Furthermore, it appears that the Board was engaging in viewpoint-based discrimination. By allowing the publication of the military recruitment advertisements, the Board allowed the presentation of one side of a highly controversial issue. The Board provided a forum to those who advocate military service. The Board then refused, without a valid reason, to allow those who oppose military service to use the same forum. The only reasonable inference is that the Board was engaging in viewpoint discrimination. As the Supreme Court has stated, “[t]o permit one side of a debatable public question to have a monopoly in expressing its views ... is the antithesis of constitutional guarantees.” City of Madison, 429 U.S. at 175-76, 97 S.Ct. at 426-27. In other words, “the First Amendment means that the government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.” Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 65, 103 S.Ct. 2875, 2879, 77 L.Ed.2d 469 (1983) (quoting Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95, 92 S.Ct. 2286, 2289-90, 33 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972)). Viewpoint-based discrimination is not permitted even in a'nonpublic forum. Cornelius, 105 S.Ct. at 3554. Accordingly, the Board’s viewpoint discrimination provides a second ground for holding that even if the school newspapers do not constitute a public forum, the Board violated the First Amendment in excluding CARD’S advertisement.
VI. CONCLUSION
Because CARD has shown a substantial likelihood that it will prevail on the merits of its claim, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion in denying CARD’S request for a preliminary injunction. We remand the matter and, pending trial on the merits, instruct the district court to enter a preliminary injunction in favor of CARD.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.