Samuel Storchheim v. T. Stevens Daugherty

410 F.2d 1393, 56 C.C.P.A. 1147, 161 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 679, 1969 CCPA LEXIS 321
CourtCourt of Customs and Patent Appeals
DecidedMay 22, 1969
DocketPatent Appeal 8151
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 410 F.2d 1393 (Samuel Storchheim v. T. Stevens Daugherty) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Customs and Patent Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Samuel Storchheim v. T. Stevens Daugherty, 410 F.2d 1393, 56 C.C.P.A. 1147, 161 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 679, 1969 CCPA LEXIS 321 (ccpa 1969).

Opinions

ALMOND, Judge.

This appeal is from the decision of the Patent Office Board of Patent Interferences in an interference1 involving appellant’s continuation-in-part application2 of an earlier filed parent application 3 and appellee’s patent,4 awarding priority to the patentee Daugherty.

The invention involved relates to a process for forming aluminum sheet, or the like, by passing preheated aluminum particles between a pair of nip rolls. Claim 11 of the Daugherty patent, which forms the sole count of the interference, reads as follows:

The method of making a continuous length of aluminous metal, comprising the steps of: preheating particles of aluminous metal substantially all of which are coarser than 60 mesh and individually covered with a surface layer of aluminum oxide, to a temperature in the range from about 750 °F. to about 1000 °F.; feeding the preheated particles in free-flowing condition to the nip of a pair of work rolls; and rolling the particles in a single pass between said rolls to form a fully densified and self-supporting length of aluminous metal.

The sole issue is appellant’s right to make the count based upon the disclosure of his 1958 parent application.

On that issue the board narrowed the area of inquiry as follows:

We agree with Storchheim and the Primary Examiner to the extent that we find the disclosure in application 742,-471 provides clear and sufficient support for every limitation in the count in issue except that set forth in the following language with our parenthetical inclusion, thus
“Substantially all of which (preheated particles of aluminous metal) are coarser than 60 mesh.”
We note that in coming to this conclusion we have not overlooked the fact that the size of the particles, as well as the temperature to which they are heated and presence of a surface of aluminum oxide “individually” covering each particle, has effect on the “free-flowing” condition of the particles.

On examination of the disclosure of the 1958 Storchheim application, the board found nothing therein to support the limitation that substantially all the particles [1395]*1395should be coarser than 605 mesh, and stated:

By his disclosure, Storchheim has clearly set only an upper limit on the size of particles he uses, without regard for the lower limit of fineness and without any apparent appreciation of any criticality as to particle size.
On the basis of this record we hold that Storchheim does not have sufficient support for the specific thing set forth in the count in issue. The broad teaching in his application is in no way tantamount to a teaching or suggestion of using aluminum particles of the size set forth in the count in issue, i. e. “substantially all * * * coarser than60 mesh.” * * *

The board also considered the Storch-heim 1958 disclosure to see whether it disclosed the “gist of the invention” defined by the count, in view of our statement in Hall v. Taylor, 332 F.2d 844, 51 CCPA 1420, that:

We find in the Draeger opinion what we consider the key to determining whether a disclosure supports a claim for ' interference purposes — the key which appellant himself recognizes— viz., does the disclosure teach the gist of the invention defined by the claim? While we realize that all limitations of a claim must be considered in deciding what invention is defined, it is futile merely to compare quantitatively range limits and numbers set out in counts with range limits and numbers disclosed in an allegedly supporting specification. Closer scrutiny is required to get at the essence of what invention the count purports to define.

The board decided that Storchheim’s parent application did not disclose the gist of the invention defined by the count, stating:

We believe on the basis of the record reviewed in the foregoing that the gist of the invention disclosed and claimed by Daugherty resides to a substantial degree in the recognition of the advantages to be obtained from the use of an aluminum powder having particles of a size above a critical minimum mesh size and that he has set it forth in limiting his claims, particularly claim 11, to the use of particle sizes above that minimum.
We find nothing in the disclosure of Storchheim which evidences any such appreciation of the solution to the problems of sticking and explosions or any thought of limiting the minimum size of particles to be used. On the contrary, Storchheim teaches the use of powders of subsieve size (minum 325 mesh) and, as noted before, asserts that particle size is not critical.

The board concluded:

Finally, we believe that irrespective of which of the approaches discussed above is taken in arriving at a conclusion in this case, the rule expressed in Segall v. Sims et al., 47 CCPA 886; 275 F.2d 661; 125 USPQ 394; 1960 C.D. 224 and restated in the case of Smith v. Wehn, 50 CCPA 1544; 796 O.G. 860; 318 F.2d 325; 138 USPQ 52; 1963 C.D. 790 (794) is applicable here. Thus :
When an applicant copies a claim from a patent, he must show that he is entitled to make the claim. All limitations in the copied claim will be considered material in determining applicant's right to make the claim, and doubts arising as to applicant’s right to make the claim must be resolved against him.
Consistent with that rule we hold that there is substantial doubt as to Storch-heim’s right to the benefit of his earlier filed application Ser. No. 742,471 as a constructive reduction to practice [1396]*1396of the invention here in issue and, therefore, that he is not entitled to it.

Here appellant contends that the limitation that substantially all the particles should be greater than 60 mesh, is not a critical limitation of the invention defined by the count. In the parlance used in patent prosecution, we customarily understand a critical limitation to be one essential either to the operativeness of the invention or to the patent-ability of the claims. Here, appellant argues that “substantially all * * * coarser than 60 mesh” is not a critical limitation in the operative sense because the limitation, though preferable for operative reasons in the practice of Daugherty’s invention to enhance free flowing of Daugherty’s acicular shape particles and to avoid explosion hazard when creating the particles in the manner contemplated by Daugherty, is not critical to the operation of the invention defined by the count which does not specify particle shape and which recites oxide coated, aluminum particles which are not pyrophoric. Further, appellant argues, the limitation “substantially all * * * coarser than 60 mesh” is not a critical limitation in the patentability sense either in view of the allowance to Daugherty of claims of broader scope reciting particles substantially all of which are coarser than 200 mesh.

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Bluebook (online)
410 F.2d 1393, 56 C.C.P.A. 1147, 161 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 679, 1969 CCPA LEXIS 321, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/samuel-storchheim-v-t-stevens-daugherty-ccpa-1969.