NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NOS. A-5708-17T2 A-0450-18T2
SAMUEL MEJIA, Individually and as Administrator and Administrator ad Prosequendum of the Estate of TANIA MEJIA,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
v.
QUEST DIAGNOSTICS, INC., TERESITA LANIO, LINDA PHAM SIMON B. SANTOS, M.D., and SIMON B. SANTOS MEDICAL GROUP, LLC,
Defendants-Respondents. ________________________________
QUEST DIAGNOSTICS INC., TERESITA LANIO and LINDA PHAM,
Third-Party Plaintiffs,
JACINTO FERNANDEZ, M.D., Third-Party Defendant- Appellant,
and
SIMON B. SANTOS, M.D.,
Third-Party Defendant- Respondent. ___________________________________
SAMUEL MEJIA, Individually and as Administrator and Administrator ad Prosequendum of the Estate of TANIA MEJIA,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
QUEST DIAGNOSTICS, INC., TERESITA LANIO, LINDA PHAM, SIMON B. SANTOS, M.D., and SIMON B. SANTOS MEDICAL GROUP, LLC,
Defendants. _____________________________
QUEST DIAGNOSTICS INC., TERESITA LANIO, and LINDA PHAM,
Third-Party Plaintiffs/ Respondents,
A-5708-17T2 2 JACINTO FERNANDEZ, M.D., and SIMON B. SANTOS, M.D.,
Third-Party Defendants/ Respondents. _____________________________________
Argued January 29, 2019 – Decided March 4, 2019
Before Judges Hoffman and Firko.
On appeal from an interlocutory order of Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County, Docket No. L-4240-14.
William L. Brennan argued the cause for appellant Jacinto Fernandez, M.D. in A-5708-17 (The Law Office of William L. Brennan, attorneys; William L. Brennan, of counsel and on the briefs; John G. Kilbride, Mary Grace Callahan and Abbey True Harris, on the briefs).
Brian E. Mahoney argued the cause for respondents Samuel Mejia, Individually and as Administrator and Administrator ad Prosequendum of the Estate of Tania Mejia in A-5708-17 (Blume, Forte, Fried, Zerres & Molinari, PC, attorneys; Carol L. Forte, of counsel; Brian E. Mahoney, on the brief).
Michael T. Hensley argued the cause for respondents Quest Diagnostics Inc., Teresita Lanio and Linda Pham in A-5708-17 (Bressler Amery Ross, PC, attorneys; Michael T. Hensley, on the brief).
William J. Buckley argued the cause for respondents Simon B. Santos, M.D., and Simon B. Santos Medical Group, LLC in A-5708-17 (Schenck, Price, Smith & King, LLP, attorneys; William J. Buckley and Terrence John Hull, on the brief).
A-5708-17T2 3 Epstein Becker & Green, PC, attorneys for amicus curiae New Jersey Doctor-Patient Alliance in A-5708- 17 (Anthony Argiropoulos and William Gibson, of counsel and on the brief).
Brian E. Mahoney argued the cause for appellants Samuel Mejia, Individually and as Administrator and Administrator ad Prosequendum of the Estate of Tania Mejia in A-0450-18 (Blume, Forte, Fried, Zerres & Molinari, PC, attorneys; Carol L. Forte, of counsel; Brian E. Mahoney, on the brief).
Michael T. Hensley argued the cause for respondents Quest Diagnostics Inc., Teresita Lanio and Linda Pham in A-0450-18 (Bressler Amery Ross, PC, attorneys; Michael T. Hensley and Jorkeell Echeverria, on the brief).
William J. Buckley argued the cause for respondents Simon B. Santos, M.D., and Simon B. Santos Medical Group, LLC in A-0450-18 (Schenck, Price, Smith & King, LLP, attorneys; William J. Buckley and Terrence John Hull, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
By leave granted in this medical malpractice action, we consider back to
back interlocutory appeals, which we consolidate for purposes of this opinion.
In the first appeal, Docket Number A-5708-17, third-party defendant Dr. Jacinto
Fernandez seeks the reversal of a June 19, 2018 order denying his motion for
dismissal. In the second appeal, Docket Number A-0450-18, plaintiff Samuel
Mejia, individually and as administrator of the estate of his late wife, Tania
A-5708-17T2 4 Mejia (decedent), seeks the reversal of a July 13, 2018 order denying his motion
for reconsideration regarding an expert witness issue. Following our review of
the record,1 we affirm the order denying dismissal of the third-party complaint
against Dr. Fernandez and we reverse the order denying plaintiff's motion for
reconsideration.
I.
Decedent visited defendant Dr. Simon Santos, a family practitioner, in
May, June, and July of 2010, with complaints of kidney and stomach pain,
headaches, vomiting, leg and toe numbness, insomnia, and dizziness. Dr. Santos
sent decedent for CT scans, which revealed a potential mass in her uterus. The
record contains no evidence that Dr. Santos reviewed the CT scan results with
decedent nor did he send the results to decedent's gynecologist.
In December 2010 and December 2011, decedent underwent PAP smears,
which the Quest defendants 2 interpreted as normal. In June 2012, Dr. Jacinto
1 The failure of the parties to supply a joint appendix unnecessarily hampered our review of the record. We remind the parties that one of the "purposes of the court rules [is] to facilitate and expedite litigation . . . and parties are urged to join in the preparation of a joint appendix." Paolercio v. Wright, 1 N.J. 121, 123 (1948); R. 2:6-1. 2 For ease of reference, we refer to defendant Quest Diagnostics, Inc., and its employees, defendants Teresita Laino and Linda Pham, as the Quest defendants. A-5708-17T2 5 Fernandez, decedent's long-time gynecologist, diagnosed her with cervical
cancer; she died approximately six months later, at the age of thirty-nine. In
addition to plaintiff, decedent was survived by a fifteen-year-old daughter.
In June 2014, plaintiff filed a complaint alleging the Quest defendants
failed to detect decedent's cancer via the PAP smears. The Quest defendants
filed a third-party complaint against Dr. Fernandez, seeking indemnification and
contribution. The trial judge granted the Quest defendants' motion to declare
they "are not required to serve an Affidavit of Merit with respect to their third[-
]party claims sounding in contribution and indemnification against" Dr.
Fernandez.
Even though the Quest defendants sued Dr. Fernandez, plaintiff did not
move to add Dr. Fernandez as a direct defendant. In a certification, plaintiff's
counsel explained, "[A]t the very outset of our involvement in this matter, we
had a board certified Obstetrician/Gynecologist review the records relevant to a
potential medical malpractice claim against" Dr. Fernandez, and that expert
reported finding "no basis" to assert Dr. Fernandez "deviated from accepted
standards of care." As a result, plaintiff's counsel concluded his firm was "duty-
A-5708-17T2 6 bound to refrain from presenting a claim against" Dr. Fernandez, citing
applicable rules and statutes.3
In March 2016, the trial court granted the Quest defendants' motion for
leave to file a third-party complaint to add Dr. Santos as a third-party defendant.
Drs. Fernandez and Santos sought indemnity and contribution from each other.
The court then granted plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint to include
direct claims against Dr. Santos and his medical group.
The trial court set a May 31, 2017 deadline for the parties to serve expert
reports. Relevant to this appeal, plaintiff produced a report from Dr. Thomas
Rutherford and Dr. Santos produced a report from Dr. Matthew Boente.
In January 2018, defense counsel took Dr. Rutherford's deposition.
Approximately one month later, counsel for Dr. Santos announced the
withdrawal of Dr. Boente, while at the same time serving a report from a new
expert, Dr. Stephen Rubin, without leave of court. Counsel for Dr. Santos
advised that Dr. Boente "is no longer able to serve as an expert in this matter
due to a personal issue."
3 Specifically, plaintiff's counsel cited, "[Rule of Professional Conduct] 3.1 (meritorious claims and contentions), Rule 1:4-8 (frivolous litigation, attorneys), N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1 (frivolous litigation, parties), and N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-41 ("The Patients First Act")." A-5708-17T2 7 Dr. Rubin's report contained dramatically different opinions than Dr.
Boente's report. For example, Dr. Boente's report stated that decedent had no
cancer in July 2010, at the time plaintiff alleges that Dr. Santos committed
malpractice. In contrast, Dr. Rubin stated that decedent did have cancer in July
2010, but asserted she had limited treatment options.
Upon receipt of Dr. Rubin's report, plaintiff filed a motion to bar Dr.
Rubin as an expert, noting that his report "was served on February 15, 2018,
over five months after the deadlines for service of defense expert reports, " and
approximately ten weeks before the discovery end date. In addition to the late
submission of Dr. Rubin's report, plaintiff's counsel explained why "the late
service of this entirely new expert report significantly prejudices the plaintiff[:]
19. Dr. Rubin's report contains entirely new opinions not previously espoused by Dr. Boente. The experts differ on everything from the percentages of [decedent's] chances of survival at any given time to whether the plaintiff even had cancer in July 2010. Dr. Rubin also includes a new opinion regarding the plausibility of certain treatments due to [decedent's] religious beliefs. [4]
....
21. Dr. Rubin's new opinion concerning the availability of surgical treatments due to [decedent's] religious beliefs, if permitted, would require plaintiff's counsel
4 Plaintiff's decedent was a Jehovah's Witness. A-5708-17T2 8 to find and retain an entirely new expert on bloodless surgery to rebut this new claim."
Notwithstanding plaintiff's contentions, the trial court denied plaintiff's
motion to bar Dr. Rubin, noting, "Counsel has sufficient time to depose [Dr.
Rubin] and have their expert comment on the opinions of Dr. Rubin prior to the
existing [d]iscovery [e]nd [d]ate of April 30, 2018."
In response to Dr. Rubin's report, on April 11, 2018, plaintiff served a
report from a new expert, Dr. John P. Koulos. Defendants filed a motion to bar
the report. On May 11, 2018, a different judge granted defendants' motion,
apparently concluding that the judge who denied plaintiff's motion to bar Dr.
Rubin had already addressed this issue since she printed on the order barring Dr.
Koulos' report, "as per the court[']s March 16, 2018 order." 5 After the court
denied plaintiff's motion for reconsideration, plaintiff sought leave for
interlocutory review, which we granted.
In April 2018, Dr. Fernandez filed a motion seeking to have the court treat
him "as the defendants were treated in Burt v. West Jersey Health Systems, 339
N.J. Super. 296 (App. Div. 2001) and Jones v. Morey's Pier, Inc., 230 N.J. 142
(2017)." Pursuant to those cases, Dr. Fernandez argued that plaintiff could not
5 Of note, Dr. Koulos did not issue his report until April 10, 2018, over three weeks after the court's March 16, 2018 order. A-5708-17T2 9 recover from him indirectly or directly; as a result, he should not have to
participate in the trial. According to this argument, while the jury could
apportion liability to Dr. Fernandez, the verdict would not make him financially
liable because plaintiff had not sued him directly – any liability apportioned to
him would simply reduce the amount plaintiff could recover from the other
defendants.
Plaintiff opposed the motion, distinguishing the case under review from
Jones and Burt. The Quest defendants did not take any position on the motion.
The trial court decided the motion on the papers, and entered an order denying
Dr. Fernandez's motion. The order included the following reasoning: "Denied.
[Third-party] defendants in Jones and Burt were dismissed meritoriously. There
is no basis for dismissal of movant here." After the court denied the motion, Dr.
Fernandez sought leave for interlocutory review, which we granted.
II.
We first address Dr. Fernandez's appeal. He argues that because plaintiff
did not include him as a defendant, he "should be treated as the defendants were
treated in Burt and Jones," and dismissed from the case. Dr. Fernandez argues
the court should allow the remaining parties to present evidence of his alleged
negligence at trial, and if the jury apportions any fault to him, the court would
A-5708-17T2 10 simply deduct that proportionate share from plaintiff's recovery. The argument
advanced by Dr. Fernandez assumes that he faces no potential liability to the
Quest defendants or Dr. Santos on their contribution claims for damages
awarded to plaintiff. We reject this argument since circumstances remain where
Dr. Fernandez could face financial responsibility on a contribution claim.
Burt concerned a medical malpractice case in which the plaintiff sued a
hospital, an anesthesia practice, and employees of both entities. After the trial
court dismissed the plaintiff's claim against the anesthesia practice because the
plaintiff did not timely file an affidavit of merit against it, the plaintiff moved
to bar the hospital from asserting third-party claims against the anesthesia
practice. The trial court granted the motion, and the hospital appealed, arguing
the court's order deprived it of its statutory right to contribution. We reversed,
finding that the purposes of the Affidavit of Merit Statute, the Joint Tortfeasor
Contribution Law, and the Comparative Negligence Act, were best served by
dismissing the hospital's third-party contribution claims against the anesthesia
practice and reducing the plaintiff's recovery against the hospital by the
percentage of negligence allocated to the practice.
Jones involved the death of an eleven-year-old girl after she fell from an
amusement park ride. 230 N.J. at 147. The injury occurred during a visit to the
A-5708-17T2 11 park while on a school trip. Ibid. The girl's parents sued the park, but not the
school, and the park failed to file the required notice of claim against the school
as required under the Tort Claims Act. Id. at 147-48. The park did eventually
name the school as a third-party defendant. Id. at 148. Our Supreme Court
determined that because the park did not file a timely Tort Claims Act notice,
the school could not be liable for indemnity or contribution. Id. at 148-49. Thus,
the court had to dismiss the claim against the school. Nonetheless, the court
held that the park could offer evidence of the school's negligence at trial, which
would reduce the damages awarded to plaintiffs by the percentage of fault
allocated to the school. Id. at 149.
We find Burt and Jones distinguishable from the case under review. Those
cases concerned third-party defendants previously dismissed on the merits. As
explained by the motion judge here, Dr. Fernandez remains an active party, not
a third-party defendant dismissed on the merits. Further, neither Burt nor Jones
addressed whether the third-party defendant involved in those cases needed to
attend trial because the court previously dismissed the claims against them.
We also reject the fundamental premise of the argument advanced by Dr.
Fernandez, that "he cannot be financially responsible for damages awarded to
. . . plaintiff, either directly or through contribution." The Comparative
A-5708-17T2 12 Negligence Act provides that a plaintiff is entitled to collect the full amount of
the damages awarded from any party that the factfinder determines to be sixty
percent or more responsible for the total damages. N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.3(a). In a
different subsection of the same statute, the Act affords to a defendant
"compelled to pay more than his percentage share" of the damages a contribution
claim against joint tortfeasors. N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.3(e). The Joint Tortfeasors
Contribution Law, N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-3, defines that contribution claim.
Considered together, the three provisions envision an equitable outcome: if the
plaintiff collects the full amount of damages from a defendant adjudged 60
percent or more, but less than 100 percent at fault, that defendant may assert a
contribution claim against a joint tortfeasor for any damages in excess of its
allocated share. N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.3(a), 5.3(e); N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-3. With the
benefit of its contribution claim against joint tortfeasors, the defendant will
ordinarily pay a percentage of damages that is consonant with the factfinder's
allocation of fault. Ibid.
We are satisfied that the Quest defendants and Dr. Santos were entitled to
implead Dr. Fernandez and prove his responsibility as a joint tortfeasor so as to
limit any allocation of its own fault for plaintiff's damages, and thereby limit
any award against it. The Quest defendants and Dr. Santos may assert this claim
A-5708-17T2 13 even though plaintiff, having declined to name Dr. Fernandez as a direct
defendant, is not "in a position to recover damages from the defendant at issue."
Town of Kearny v. Brandt, 214 N.J. 76, 103 (2013). Of course, the Quest
defendants and Dr. Santos bear the burden of proof on their third-party
contribution claims. Miraglia v. Miraglia, 106 N.J. Super. 266, 270 (App. Div.
1969).
Here, we discern no reason to excuse Dr. Fernandez from attending trial.
He may participate at trial, and the jury can apportion fault in compliance with
the mandates of Jones and Burt. If the jury should adjudge either the Quest
defendants or Dr. Santos to be sixty percent or more at fault, and also adjudge a
percentage of fault against Dr. Fernandez, then in that circumstance, Dr.
Fernandez would be financially responsible for damages on the contribution
claim of the co-defendant adjudged sixty percent or more at fault.
Even if we were to accept the premise of Dr. Fernandez that he cannot be
financially responsible for damages awarded to plaintiff on a contribution claim,
we conclude it would unfairly prejudice plaintiff, this late in the proceedings, to
require plaintiff to present a defense of Dr. Fernandez. At the point Dr.
Fernandez filed his motion to excuse him from participation in the trial, the case
was nearly four years old, after the entry of nine case management orders and
A-5708-17T2 14 the expiration of expert witness deadlines. We also note that Dr. Fernandez
previously retained an expert on his own behalf – Dr. William Ainslie – and
served a report from him. Thus, we affirm the trial court's order denying Dr.
Fernandez treatment pursuant to Jones and Burt.
III.
Next, we turn to plaintiff's appeal of the trial court's discovery order
denying his motion for reconsideration of an order barring plaintiff's new expert
report. A motion for reconsideration is committed to the sound discretion of the
court, which should be "exercised in the interest of justice." Cummings v. Bahr, 295
N.J. Super. 374, 384 (App. Div. 1996) (quoting D'Atria v. D'Atria, 242 N.J. Super.
392, 401 (Ch. Div. 1990)). Reconsideration is appropriate when a court has rendered
a decision "based upon a palpably incorrect or irrational basis," or failed to consider
or "appreciate the significance of probative, competent evidence." Ibid. (quoting
D'Atria, 242 N.J. Super. at 401). We review the denial of a motion for
reconsideration to determine whether the court abused its discretionary authority.
Id. at 389.
On appeal, plaintiff argues that the court's rulings, barring plaintiff's
rebuttal expert and report, will allow the dramatically different opinions of a
substituted expert, Dr. Rubin, to stand unrebutted. These rulings, plaintiff
A-5708-17T2 15 asserts, have "the capacity to produce an unjust result at the time of trial." We
agree.
We note that Dr. Rubin's report contained new opinions that plaintiff's
initial expert did not previously address, plaintiff complied with all previous
discovery deadlines, and defendants would suffer no unfair prejudice if the court
permits plaintiff to proceed with Dr. Koulos as an expert.
Medical malpractice claims often come down to a "pitched battle of
experts," where any artificial advantage may "tip the scales" such as to affect
the ultimate outcome. Day v. Lorenc, 296 N.J. Super. 262, 269 (App. Div.
1996). Here, the court permitted Dr. Santos to withdraw his expert very late in
the case, after offering only vague "personal reasons" as an excuse. Defendant
then served the report of a new expert, whose opinions differed dramatically
from those of defendant's previous expert. By prohibiting plaintiff the
opportunity to serve a new expert report, the court deprived plaintiff not only of
the same opportunity granted to Dr. Santos, but also deprived plaintiff of the
opportunity to meaningfully respond to the new, dramatically different opinions
contained in Dr. Rubin's report. This granted Dr. Santos an unfair advantage.
In denying the motion for reconsideration, the trial court misread the
original order denying plaintiff's motion to bar Dr. Rubin's report:
A-5708-17T2 16 [T]he language of the [c]ourt's March 16, 2018 [o]rder is . . . exceedingly clear. The [c]ourt permitted the report of Dr. Rubin, with the stipulation that Plaintiff would be able to "have their expert comment on the opinions of Dr. Rubin." The court's additional language references expert in the present tense, and does not provide an avenue by which Plaintiff would be able to retain a new expert to rebut Dr. Rubin, while also collaterally rehabilitating portions of the testimony of their original expert, Dr. Rutherford. At the time of the [c]ourt's March 16, 2018 Order, Dr. Rutherford was the expert retained by Plaintiff. It therefore stands to reason, considering the use of "expert" in the present tense, that Dr. Rutherford would be permitted to opine as to Dr. Rubin's report.
At the time the previous judge entered the March 16 order, plaintiff had
not obtained a report from Dr. Koulos. It was therefore error to interpret the
March 16 order as precluding a report that did not yet exist or to deny an
application that had not yet been made. The provision of the March 16 order
that plaintiff shall "have their expert comment on the opinions of Dr. Rubin" did
not bar plaintiff from responding to Dr. Rubin with a new expert but simply
permitted plaintiff to obtain a supplemental report from Dr. Rutherford, if
plaintiff chose to do so.
As Judge Fuentes explained in Thabo v. Z Transportation, 452 N.J. Super.
359, 371 (App. Div. 2017),
The best way to foster public confidence in our civil courts is to decide cases on their merits. Discovery rules
A-5708-17T2 17 are intended to create a level playing field for all litigants and promote the resolution of civil dispute on the merits. Judges are entrusted to ensure that these rules are properly and fairly enforced.
Because the denial of plaintiff's motion for reconsideration constituted a
mistaken exercise of discretion, allowing an unlevel playing field to continue,
we reverse the order denying reconsideration and remand for the entry of an
order permitting plaintiff to substitute Dr. Koulos for Dr. Rutherford. On
remand, the trial court shall reopen discovery for thirty-five days, if requested
by defendants, to permit defendants to depose Dr. Koulos.
Affirmed, in part, and reversed and remanded, in part. We do not retain
jurisdiction.
A-5708-17T2 18