Sampson v. Cottongim

61 S.W.2d 309, 249 Ky. 670, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 583
CourtCourt of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976)
DecidedMay 16, 1933
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 61 S.W.2d 309 (Sampson v. Cottongim) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976) primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sampson v. Cottongim, 61 S.W.2d 309, 249 Ky. 670, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 583 (Ky. 1933).

Opinion

OPINION op the Court by

Judge Richardson

Reversing.

The right to specific performance of a contract to convey land is the decisive question presented, herein. Such right is not an absolute one, hut rests entirely on judicial discretion, to he exercised according to settled principles of 'equity and not arbitrarily, yet always according to the facts of the particular case.

“An application for specific performance is an appeal to the sound discretion of the court and one of the principles which controls the exercise of this discretion is that specific performance of a contract will not be decreed where its enforcement will he inequitable under the particular facts as they .exist. This is in accordance with the general doctrine of equity, that when a party comes into a court of chancery seeking equity, he must have clean hands and is bound to do justice and not ask the court to become an instrument of inequity. Therefore, before relief will be granted it must appear that good conscience and substantial justice require it. * * * A party is not permitted to sleep over his rights to the prejudice of the party on whom he makes a claim, and who by the delay may be deprived of the evidence and means of effectually defending himself. Therefore the demand must be made within a reasonable time"; otherwise the claim is considered stale and a court of equity which is .never active in relief against conscience' or public convenience has always, refused its aid to stale demands when a party has slept on his rights and acquiesced for a great length of time. Nothing can call forth into activity a court of equity but conscience, good faith and reasonable diligence. When these are wanting the court is passive and does nothing.” 10 R. C. L. p. 388; Glenn v. Lowther, 219 Ky. 383, 293 S. W. 947.

With these principles in mind, we shall now review the facts without considering the objections to the pleadings. In 1906, 1907, or 1908, Plem D. Sampson, R. 0. Campbell, and Dr. Bennett entered into a written contract whereby it was agreed that Flem D. Samoson. would purchase in his name and accept deeds to mineral rights in land situated in Clay county, Ky. To do this, John Sampson was engaged by them to go into Clay county and purchase mineral rights, and accept deeds. *672 in the name of Flem D. Sampson, at the price per acre which they authorized- and directed. He did this, and accepted deeds for a large acreage. To acquire one particular tract known as the Sherman Smith land, he was required to, and purchased, the fee, in order to get the. mineral rights therein, at the price of $4 per acre, and the deed to it was taken in the name of Plem D. Sampson. The deeds to the mineral rights, including the Sherman Smith land, were recorded in the county court clerk’s office of Clay county, the county in which the land was situated. Campbell and Bennett paid their portion of the purchase price, and the wages of John Sampson and his helpers, including their expenses, and Plem D. Sampson paid his portion thereof. The deeds thus acquired were recorded not later than 1908, and, when the acreage they desired was procured, Plem D. Sampson, Campbell, and Bennett terminated their connection with John Sampson. Thereafter, on the 15th day of June 1910, John Sampson and Jacob Howard entered into a written contract in which John Sampson agreed to buy, and furnish to Howard, 4,000 acres of mineral rights in and under land on Collins fork of Goose creek in Knox and Clay counties, within a boundary agreed on by Howard and Matt H. Beddo. John Sampson agreed to furnish deeds,, with covenant of general warranty, to Howard for 1,000 acres, and like deeds to Matt H. Beddo for 3,000 acres. Howard agreed to pay John Sampson $5 per acre therefor to the amount of $5,000. It was also stipulated in the writing that Howard and John Sampson were to obtain options on adjoining tracts in both their names, one-half to belong to each of them. In pursuance to this contract, during the year 1910, John Sampson went into Clay county and began to carry it out. He acquired deeds to the mineral rights on a large number of tracts in the vicinity of the land owned by John L. Cottongim. John Sampson endeavored to purchase and accept deeds to the tracts so they would constitute a block of 1,000 acres. While so engaged, some time during the year 1910, he went in company with White and Prank Smith, a deputy county clerk, to the home of John L. Cotton-gim, John Sampson claims, for the purpose of procuring an option on Cottongim’s mineral rights on his home tract. Prom this point the story of John L. Cot-tongim begins, and the divergence of his, and the Samp-sons ’, asservations furnishes the issues to be determined. *673 To establish his canse of action, John L. Cottongim appeared as a witness on three occasions, viz., on May 18, 1931, July 25, 1931, and December 18, 1931. It is appropriate to observe that Cottongim admits that, after the date fixed by him, Smith, and White as the date John Sampson entered into a writing with him, at his home, he entered into a written contract with G-. W. Smith by which he agreed to sell to Smith “all of the mineral of every character and kind, class, order, genera, species, sub-species and variety,” in and under the tract of land, concerning which he now asserts he and John Sampson executed and delivered the writing, upon which he bases his cause of action. In one deposition he claims the transaction between him and John Sampson occurred about the year 1913 or 1914; in another, that it happened in 1911, 1912, or 1913. To make accuracy assured, we here adopt a portion of Cottongim’s deposition, taken as upon cross-examination:

“Q. Didn’t John Sampson give you a writing for himself or Flem D. Sampson, agreeing to convey to you the Sherman Smith tract of land? A. He never gave me any writing, but he was to come back the next week and make deeds, he claimed that he did not have time that evening.
“Q. Now you gave John Sampson a writing whereby you agreed to convey your land or the minerals in it, except the oil or gas rights. Why didn’t you require a writing from John Sampson requiring him or his brother, the defendant, F. D. Sampson to convey the Sherman Smith tract to you? A. He stated he would be back the next week and have the land surveyed, and he would make deeds, that he did not have time to give me a writing that evening, and that he would send the surveyor the next week and run out my land, but John was not there. * * *
“Q. Why didn’t you require John Sampson to give yon. a bond and agree for Flem D. Sampson in that to convey the Sherman Smith surface and oil and gas to you? A. Well, I will tell you, he said le would be back the next week and would have ■our land run out and make deeds.
“Q. So you took John Sampson’s word for it, ■didn’t you? A. That much of it.
*674 “Q. When lie said lie wouldn’t have time, or something’ like that, and would be hack next week and run it out and make deeds, I guess you thought it would be all right not to have any bond from him for the Sherman Smith land? A. I knew that I needed it, but he claimed to be in such a hurry, he talked me out of it. John had already got mine.
“Q.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
61 S.W.2d 309, 249 Ky. 670, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 583, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sampson-v-cottongim-kyctapphigh-1933.