Samir PAUDEL v. Kristi NOEM, et al.

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: November 21, 2025
• Docket: 3:25-cv-03174
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 Samir PAUDEL, Case No.: 25-cv-3174-AGS-BLM

4 Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 5 v. APPOINT COUNSEL (ECF 2) AND REQUIRING RESPONSE 6 Kristi NOEM, et al., 7 Respondents. 8

9 Petitioner Samir Paudel requests appointed counsel and emergency injunctive relief 10 in support of his habeas corpus petition. (See ECF 2, 3); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (habeas 11 corpus). For the reasons below, the Court will grant the motion to appoint counsel and 12 order a response to the petition and to the injunctive-relief request. 13 APPOINTED COUNSEL 14 Courts may appoint an attorney for an “impoverished habeas petitioner” when “the 15 interests of justice so require.” Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1234 (9th Cir. 1984) 16 (cleaned up); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B). In this assessment, courts evaluate a 17 petitioner’s (a) “likelihood of success on the merits” and (b) “ability . . . to articulate his 18 claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved.” Wilborn v. 19 Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986). 20 As a threshold matter, Paudel sufficiently alleges that he “cannot afford an attorney.” 21 (See ECF 2, at 2.) Paudel’s “only savings are about $50 to $100 in commissary” and he 22 only earns “$5 per week” as a “cleaner at Otay Mesa Detention Center.” (ECF 2, at 2.) 23 Turning to his likelihood of success, Paudel argues that he will establish that his 24 continued custody is unlawful because, among other things, it “violates the statute 25 authorizing detention,” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a). (ECF 1, at 6.) That statutory provision requires 26 that “an alien [who] is ordered removed” be detained for “90 days” after the date the “order 27 of removal” became “administratively final,” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(a), and it permits 28 continued, discretionary detention after that, id. § 1231(a)(6). The “presumptively 1 reasonable period of detention” is “six months,” while longer custodial periods become 2 more constitutionally doubtful. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001). And 3 “indefinite, perhaps permanent, detention” poses “a serious constitutional threat.” Id. at 4 699. Paudel has been “detained” beyond this presumptively reasonable six-month period— 5 it has been “over 8 months since his removal order became final.” (ECF 1, at 3.) So, he 6 seems likely to succeed on the merits. 7 The complexity of the legal issues also favor appointing an attorney. The parties here 8 must interpret intricate statutes and grapple with detention-related common law. See, e.g., 9 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6); Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. This undertaking is within the 10 immigration legal context, which has “provoked comparisons to a morass, a Gordian knot, 11 and King Minos’s labyrinth in ancient Crete,” Torres v. Barr, 976 F.3d 918, 923 (9th Cir. 12 2020) (cleaned up), and been deemed “second only to the Internal Revenue Code in 13 complexity,” United States v. Ahumada-Aguilar, 295 F.3d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 2002) 14 (quotations omitted). 15 While Paudel’s habeas petition and motions sensibly grapple with these complex 16 issues, “Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc.,” “drafted the instant petition” and offered 17 “assistance” with all filings. (ECF 2, at 1 n.1.) Without that aid, it’s not clear that Paudel 18 would have successfully framed these arguments himself. So, he has adequately shown that 19 he cannot articulate his claims without a lawyer. See, e.g., Nguyen v. Warden, No. 25-cv- 20 2441-AGS-MMP, 2025 WL 2971654, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2025) (appointing counsel 21 for a habeas petitioner whose claims implicated similar immigration authorities). 22 Paudel’s attorney-appointment request is GRANTED. As Federal Defenders of 23 San Diego has expressed its willingness to represent Paudel, it is appointed as counsel for 24 him. 25 SCREENING 26 Given Paudel’s likelihood of success, as discussed above, his habeas petition 27 necessarily survives the required screening for “frivolous” or “incredible” habeas 28 applications. See Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, 1 4; id., Rule 1(b) (permitting use of Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases to any 2 ||““habeas corpus petition”); Neiss v. Bludworth, 114 F.4th 1038, 1045 (9th Cir. 2024). 3 By November 26, 2025, respondents must answer the petition as well as the 4 ||injunctive-relief motion. Any reply is due December 4, 2025. The Court will hold oral 5 argument on December 10, 2025, at 2:00 p.m. 6 || Dated: November 21, 2025

8 Hon. Andrew G. Schopler 9 United States District Judge 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28