MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED this Memorandum Decision shall not be Jul 26 2019, 7:48 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any CLERK court except for the purpose of establishing Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Marielena Duerring Curtis T. Hill, Jr. South Bend, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana Samuel J. Dayton Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Samantha L. Lotaki, July 26, 2019 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 19A-CR-376 v. Appeal from the St. Joseph Superior Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Margot F. Reagan, Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge The Honorable Julie P. Verheye, Magistrate Trial Court Cause No. 71D04-1806-CM-2339
Bailey, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-376 | July 26, 2019 Page 1 of 7 Case Summary [1] For her actions during a bar fight, Samantha L. Lotaki (“Lotaki”) was
convicted of Disorderly Conduct, as a Class B misdemeanor.1 On appeal, she
presents the sole issue of whether the State presented sufficient evidence to
rebut her claim of self-defense. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History [2] In the early morning of June 29, 2018, South Bend Police Department Officer
Joseph Galea (“Officer Galea”) responded to a call that there was “a large fight
involving pool sticks” at the Peddler’s Pub. (Tr. 4.) On arrival, several men
outside told the officer he “needed to get in there in a hurry.” (Tr. 4.) From the
parking lot, he could see “pool sticks flying and several people involved in a
melee[.]” (Tr. 7.) Inside he encountered a “chaotic” scene, with “tables and
chairs kicked over, bottles broken all over the floor, some blood dripping from
the corner.” (Tr. 6-7.) He saw approximately six or seven women had
cornered a woman later identified as Adriana Diaz (“Diaz”) over by a pool
table. Several women were striking at Diaz, and she was bleeding from above
her eye. Officer Galea then saw Lotaki punch Diaz in the head. The officer
immediately entered the fray, grabbed Lotaki, and took her outside, where he
placed her in handcuffs until backup arrived.
1 Ind. Code § 35-45-1-3(a)(1).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-376 | July 26, 2019 Page 2 of 7 [3] Lotaki was charged with Battery Resulting in Bodily Injury, as a Class A
misdemeanor (“Count 1”),2 and disorderly conduct. The State later moved to
dismiss Count 1. Following a bench trial at which both Officer Galea and
Lotaki testified, Lotaki was convicted of the remaining charge. She now
appeals.
Discussion and Decision [4] A person who recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally engages in fighting or in
tumultuous conduct commits disorderly conduct. I.C. § 35-45-1-3(a)(1). Lotaki
does not dispute that she engaged in disorderly conduct. Rather, she challenges
the sufficiency of the evidence presented to rebut her claim of self-defense.
[5] It is the policy of the State of Indiana that people have a right to defend
themselves and third parties from physical harm and crime. I.C. § 35-41-3-2(a).
“A person is justified in using reasonable force against any other person to
protect the person or a third person from what the person reasonably believes to
be the imminent use of unlawful force.” I.C. § 35-41-3-2(c). “A valid claim of
self-defense is legal justification for an otherwise criminal act.” Coleman v. State,
946 N.E.2d 1160, 1165 (Ind. 2011). To prevail on a self-defense claim, a
defendant must have acted without fault, been in a place where he or she had a
right to be, and been in reasonable fear or apprehension of bodily harm.
2 I.C. § 35-42-2-1(c)(1), (d)(1).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-376 | July 26, 2019 Page 3 of 7 Weedman v. State, 21 N.E.3d 873, 891-92 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. The
amount of force used by the defendant must be proportionate to the urgency of
the situation. Id. at 892. Thus, when a person has used more force than
necessary to repel an attack, the right to self-defense is extinguished, and the
victim becomes the perpetrator. Hollowell v. State, 707 N.E.2d 1014, 1021 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1999).
[6] When a defendant raises a claim of self-defense and the claim finds support in
the evidence, the State bears the burden of negating at least one of the necessary
elements. Wilson v. State, 770 N.E.2d 799, 800 (Ind. 2002). On appeal, the
standard of review for a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence to rebut a claim
of self-defense is the same as for any sufficiency of the evidence claim. Id. at
801. We neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility. Id. If there
is sufficient evidence of probative value to support the conclusion of the trier of
fact, then the judgment will not be disturbed. Id. We will reverse only if no
reasonable person could say that self-defense was negated by the State beyond a
reasonable doubt. Id. at 800-01.
[7] At trial, Lotaki testified that the fracas began when one of her friends got into a
verbal altercation with a woman in Diaz’s group. She further testified that she
felt “unsafe” and “threatened” at the time she struck Diaz (Tr. 20), and that she
only used physical force after she was first “physically assaulted.” (Tr. 19.)
Thus, Lotaki argues that she raised a valid claim of self-defense because she had
a right to be in the bar, did not instigate the fight, and “in throwing a single
punch reacted reasonably to the threat that she faced[.]” (Appellant’s Br. 4.)
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-376 | July 26, 2019 Page 4 of 7 She also contends that the State failed to negate her claim of self-defense
because there was no evidence that her actions were disproportionate to any
assault that had been perpetrated on her.
[8] The evidence fairly establishes that Lotaki had a right to be at the Peddler’s Pub
and did not start the brawl. However, we do not reweigh evidence or the
credibility of witnesses on appeal. Wilson, 770 N.E.2d at 801. Notwithstanding
Lotaki’s testimony that she felt threatened and had been attacked, Officer Galea
testified that at the time Lotaki struck Diaz in the head, Diaz was backed into a
corner, several women were striking at Diaz, and Diaz was bleeding above the
eye. Officer Galea’s testimony was sufficient evidence from which the trial
court could have reasonably concluded that Lotaki (1) was not in reasonable
fear or apprehension of bodily harm at the time she struck Diaz, or (2) used
more force than necessary to repel any attack that may have previously
occurred.
[9] Affirmed.
Pyle, J., concurs. Riley, J., concurs in result with separate opinion.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-376 | July 26, 2019 Page 5 of 7 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Samantha L. Lotaki, Court of Appeals Case No. 19A-CR-376 Appellant-Defendant,
v.
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MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED this Memorandum Decision shall not be Jul 26 2019, 7:48 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any CLERK court except for the purpose of establishing Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Marielena Duerring Curtis T. Hill, Jr. South Bend, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana Samuel J. Dayton Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Samantha L. Lotaki, July 26, 2019 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 19A-CR-376 v. Appeal from the St. Joseph Superior Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Margot F. Reagan, Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge The Honorable Julie P. Verheye, Magistrate Trial Court Cause No. 71D04-1806-CM-2339
Bailey, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-376 | July 26, 2019 Page 1 of 7 Case Summary [1] For her actions during a bar fight, Samantha L. Lotaki (“Lotaki”) was
convicted of Disorderly Conduct, as a Class B misdemeanor.1 On appeal, she
presents the sole issue of whether the State presented sufficient evidence to
rebut her claim of self-defense. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History [2] In the early morning of June 29, 2018, South Bend Police Department Officer
Joseph Galea (“Officer Galea”) responded to a call that there was “a large fight
involving pool sticks” at the Peddler’s Pub. (Tr. 4.) On arrival, several men
outside told the officer he “needed to get in there in a hurry.” (Tr. 4.) From the
parking lot, he could see “pool sticks flying and several people involved in a
melee[.]” (Tr. 7.) Inside he encountered a “chaotic” scene, with “tables and
chairs kicked over, bottles broken all over the floor, some blood dripping from
the corner.” (Tr. 6-7.) He saw approximately six or seven women had
cornered a woman later identified as Adriana Diaz (“Diaz”) over by a pool
table. Several women were striking at Diaz, and she was bleeding from above
her eye. Officer Galea then saw Lotaki punch Diaz in the head. The officer
immediately entered the fray, grabbed Lotaki, and took her outside, where he
placed her in handcuffs until backup arrived.
1 Ind. Code § 35-45-1-3(a)(1).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-376 | July 26, 2019 Page 2 of 7 [3] Lotaki was charged with Battery Resulting in Bodily Injury, as a Class A
misdemeanor (“Count 1”),2 and disorderly conduct. The State later moved to
dismiss Count 1. Following a bench trial at which both Officer Galea and
Lotaki testified, Lotaki was convicted of the remaining charge. She now
appeals.
Discussion and Decision [4] A person who recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally engages in fighting or in
tumultuous conduct commits disorderly conduct. I.C. § 35-45-1-3(a)(1). Lotaki
does not dispute that she engaged in disorderly conduct. Rather, she challenges
the sufficiency of the evidence presented to rebut her claim of self-defense.
[5] It is the policy of the State of Indiana that people have a right to defend
themselves and third parties from physical harm and crime. I.C. § 35-41-3-2(a).
“A person is justified in using reasonable force against any other person to
protect the person or a third person from what the person reasonably believes to
be the imminent use of unlawful force.” I.C. § 35-41-3-2(c). “A valid claim of
self-defense is legal justification for an otherwise criminal act.” Coleman v. State,
946 N.E.2d 1160, 1165 (Ind. 2011). To prevail on a self-defense claim, a
defendant must have acted without fault, been in a place where he or she had a
right to be, and been in reasonable fear or apprehension of bodily harm.
2 I.C. § 35-42-2-1(c)(1), (d)(1).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-376 | July 26, 2019 Page 3 of 7 Weedman v. State, 21 N.E.3d 873, 891-92 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. The
amount of force used by the defendant must be proportionate to the urgency of
the situation. Id. at 892. Thus, when a person has used more force than
necessary to repel an attack, the right to self-defense is extinguished, and the
victim becomes the perpetrator. Hollowell v. State, 707 N.E.2d 1014, 1021 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1999).
[6] When a defendant raises a claim of self-defense and the claim finds support in
the evidence, the State bears the burden of negating at least one of the necessary
elements. Wilson v. State, 770 N.E.2d 799, 800 (Ind. 2002). On appeal, the
standard of review for a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence to rebut a claim
of self-defense is the same as for any sufficiency of the evidence claim. Id. at
801. We neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility. Id. If there
is sufficient evidence of probative value to support the conclusion of the trier of
fact, then the judgment will not be disturbed. Id. We will reverse only if no
reasonable person could say that self-defense was negated by the State beyond a
reasonable doubt. Id. at 800-01.
[7] At trial, Lotaki testified that the fracas began when one of her friends got into a
verbal altercation with a woman in Diaz’s group. She further testified that she
felt “unsafe” and “threatened” at the time she struck Diaz (Tr. 20), and that she
only used physical force after she was first “physically assaulted.” (Tr. 19.)
Thus, Lotaki argues that she raised a valid claim of self-defense because she had
a right to be in the bar, did not instigate the fight, and “in throwing a single
punch reacted reasonably to the threat that she faced[.]” (Appellant’s Br. 4.)
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-376 | July 26, 2019 Page 4 of 7 She also contends that the State failed to negate her claim of self-defense
because there was no evidence that her actions were disproportionate to any
assault that had been perpetrated on her.
[8] The evidence fairly establishes that Lotaki had a right to be at the Peddler’s Pub
and did not start the brawl. However, we do not reweigh evidence or the
credibility of witnesses on appeal. Wilson, 770 N.E.2d at 801. Notwithstanding
Lotaki’s testimony that she felt threatened and had been attacked, Officer Galea
testified that at the time Lotaki struck Diaz in the head, Diaz was backed into a
corner, several women were striking at Diaz, and Diaz was bleeding above the
eye. Officer Galea’s testimony was sufficient evidence from which the trial
court could have reasonably concluded that Lotaki (1) was not in reasonable
fear or apprehension of bodily harm at the time she struck Diaz, or (2) used
more force than necessary to repel any attack that may have previously
occurred.
[9] Affirmed.
Pyle, J., concurs. Riley, J., concurs in result with separate opinion.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-376 | July 26, 2019 Page 5 of 7 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Samantha L. Lotaki, Court of Appeals Case No. 19A-CR-376 Appellant-Defendant,
v.
State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
Riley, Judge, concurring in result.
[10] I agree that Lotaki could not successfully raise a claim of self-defense, but I
write separately because I believe that a more persuasive rationale exists for our
holding today. The self-defense statute provides that a person is not justified in
using force if
the person has entered into combat with another person or is the initial aggressor unless the person withdraws from the encounter and communicates to the other person the intent to do so and the other person nevertheless continues or threatens to continue unlawful action.
Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2(g)(3) (2013). Put another way, “[a] mutual combatant,
whether or not the initial aggressor, must declare an armistice before he or she
may claim self-defense.” Wilson v. State, 770 N.E.2d 799, 801 (Ind. 2002). Here,
Lotaki was in a group of women, one of whom had a verbal altercation with
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-376 | July 26, 2019 Page 6 of 7 Diaz. As noted above, by the time Lotaki struck Diaz, Diaz had been backed
into a corner where she was crouching down, and several women were striking
Diaz. Diaz was not charging Lotaki or menacing her at that point. The
reasonable inference to be made from Lotaki’s continued presence after Diaz
had been subdued by others was that Lotaki was a willing participant in the
fight when she struck Diaz. Lotaki never claimed that she attempted to
withdraw prior to striking Diaz, and, therefore, she was precluded from
claiming self-defense. For these reasons, I concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-376 | July 26, 2019 Page 7 of 7