In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________
No. 02-23-00052-CR ___________________________
SALVADOR RUBIO, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
On Appeal from the 355th District Court Hood County, Texas Trial Court No. CR15025
Before Kerr, Birdwell, and Womack, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Birdwell MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Salvador Rubio appeals his conviction for first-degree felony arson
of a habitation. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 28.02(a)(2)(D). In his sole issue on appeal,
Rubio contends that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that his conscious objective or desire was to damage or destroy the
habitation. Because we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s
determination that Rubio intended to cause damage or destruction to the habitation,
we affirm the conviction.
I. Background
The Smith family hired Rubio to do remodeling work on their house in
Granbury, Texas. Over time, Rubio began exhibiting what Mr. Smith described as
strange behavior indicative of possible drug use. The Smiths eventually decided that
Rubio could no longer work for them. On December 16, 2020—the day before
Mr. Smith had planned to terminate Rubio’s employment—Rubio set the Smiths’
house on fire using small piles of flammable material and paint thinner that he had
placed in multiple locations throughout the house.
After starting the fire, Rubio called 911 and told the dispatcher that he had set
the house on fire. When officers arrived at the house, they heard fire alarms going off
and, through an open window, observed Rubio inside the house. Rubio then crawled
out of the window—at the officers’ direction—and his clothing and shoes were
melting and smoldering. When Officer Daniel Sweeney, one of the responding
2 officers, attempted to render aid to Rubio using water from an outdoor faucet, Rubio
stated that he did not want to be “put out.” He refused any medical treatment, stating,
“This is not what’s concerning me right now. . . . I did this for a reason.” He told
Officer Sweeney that he had used lacquer thinner to set a fire inside the house.
Officer Sweeney subsequently found two cigarette lighters on Rubio’s person, which
Rubio told Officer Sweeney he had used to ignite the house. According to Rubio,
some people had shown up to kill him, and he had to set the house on fire to try and
get away from them. Further explaining his reason for setting the fire, he told Officer
Sweeney that by setting the house on fire, the people that were trying to kill him
would run away from the fire and stop trying to kill him. He also told Officer
Sweeney that he was responsible for setting the fire and that he felt he needed to
explain to the Smiths why he had done it.
At Rubio’s trial, the jury heard testimony from Mr. Smith and the responding
officers and viewed Officer Sweeney’s body camera footage, which captured what he
had observed when he responded to the Smiths’ house on the day of the fire. The jury
found Rubio guilty and assessed his punishment at forty-five years’ confinement, and
the trial court entered judgment on the verdict.
II. Standard of Review
In our evidentiary-sufficiency review, we view all the evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational factfinder could have found
the crime’s essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
3 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979); Queeman v. State, 520 S.W.3d 616, 622 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2017). This standard gives full play to the factfinder’s responsibility to
resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable
inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct. at
2789; Harrell v. State, 620 S.W.3d 910, 914 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021).
To determine whether the State has met its burden to prove a defendant’s guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt, we compare the crime’s elements as defined by a
hypothetically correct jury charge to the evidence adduced at trial. Hammack v. State,
622 S.W.3d 910, 914 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021); see also Febus v. State, 542 S.W.3d 568,
572 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (“The essential elements of an offense are determined by
state law.”). Such a charge is one that accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the
indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or restrict the
State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which
the defendant was tried. Hammack, 622 S.W.3d at 914. The law as authorized by the
indictment means the statutory elements of the offense as modified by the charging
instrument’s allegations. Curlee v. State, 620 S.W.3d 767, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021);
see Rabb v. State, 434 S.W.3d 613, 616 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (“When the State pleads
a specific element of a penal offense that has statutory alternatives for that element,
the sufficiency of the evidence will be measured by the element that was actually
pleaded, and not any alternative statutory elements.”).
4 III. Applicable Law
As relevant here, a person commits the offense of arson if he starts a fire with
intent to destroy or damage a building or habitation knowing that it was located on
property belonging to another. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 28.02(a)(2)(D). A person acts
“with intent” when he has the “conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct
or cause the result.” Id. § 6.03(a). A jury may infer intent from any facts that tend to
prove its existence. Dues v. State, 634 S.W.2d 304, 305 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.]
1982); Beltran v. State, 593 S.W.2d 688, 689 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980); Miller
v. State, 566 S.W.2d 614, 618 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978); Turner v. State, Nos.
02-11-00070-CR, 02-11-00071-CR, 2013 WL 530972, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
Feb. 14, 2013, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication). In arson cases,
intent “cannot be inferred from the mere act of burning,” but it may otherwise be
found from all the facts in the case, including the acts, words, and conduct of the
accused and the method of committing the crime. Beltran, 593 S.W.2d at 689; Miller,
566 S.W.2d at 618; see Dues, 634 S.W.2d at 305; Turner, 2013 WL 530972, at *1.
IV. Analysis
Rubio complains that the State failed to present sufficient evidence of only the
intent element. We conclude that the jury may have inferred from the evidence before
it that Rubio intended to damage or destroy the Smiths’ house.
The jury heard testimony and viewed body camera footage of Rubio telling
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In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________
No. 02-23-00052-CR ___________________________
SALVADOR RUBIO, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
On Appeal from the 355th District Court Hood County, Texas Trial Court No. CR15025
Before Kerr, Birdwell, and Womack, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Birdwell MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Salvador Rubio appeals his conviction for first-degree felony arson
of a habitation. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 28.02(a)(2)(D). In his sole issue on appeal,
Rubio contends that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that his conscious objective or desire was to damage or destroy the
habitation. Because we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s
determination that Rubio intended to cause damage or destruction to the habitation,
we affirm the conviction.
I. Background
The Smith family hired Rubio to do remodeling work on their house in
Granbury, Texas. Over time, Rubio began exhibiting what Mr. Smith described as
strange behavior indicative of possible drug use. The Smiths eventually decided that
Rubio could no longer work for them. On December 16, 2020—the day before
Mr. Smith had planned to terminate Rubio’s employment—Rubio set the Smiths’
house on fire using small piles of flammable material and paint thinner that he had
placed in multiple locations throughout the house.
After starting the fire, Rubio called 911 and told the dispatcher that he had set
the house on fire. When officers arrived at the house, they heard fire alarms going off
and, through an open window, observed Rubio inside the house. Rubio then crawled
out of the window—at the officers’ direction—and his clothing and shoes were
melting and smoldering. When Officer Daniel Sweeney, one of the responding
2 officers, attempted to render aid to Rubio using water from an outdoor faucet, Rubio
stated that he did not want to be “put out.” He refused any medical treatment, stating,
“This is not what’s concerning me right now. . . . I did this for a reason.” He told
Officer Sweeney that he had used lacquer thinner to set a fire inside the house.
Officer Sweeney subsequently found two cigarette lighters on Rubio’s person, which
Rubio told Officer Sweeney he had used to ignite the house. According to Rubio,
some people had shown up to kill him, and he had to set the house on fire to try and
get away from them. Further explaining his reason for setting the fire, he told Officer
Sweeney that by setting the house on fire, the people that were trying to kill him
would run away from the fire and stop trying to kill him. He also told Officer
Sweeney that he was responsible for setting the fire and that he felt he needed to
explain to the Smiths why he had done it.
At Rubio’s trial, the jury heard testimony from Mr. Smith and the responding
officers and viewed Officer Sweeney’s body camera footage, which captured what he
had observed when he responded to the Smiths’ house on the day of the fire. The jury
found Rubio guilty and assessed his punishment at forty-five years’ confinement, and
the trial court entered judgment on the verdict.
II. Standard of Review
In our evidentiary-sufficiency review, we view all the evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational factfinder could have found
the crime’s essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
3 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979); Queeman v. State, 520 S.W.3d 616, 622 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2017). This standard gives full play to the factfinder’s responsibility to
resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable
inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct. at
2789; Harrell v. State, 620 S.W.3d 910, 914 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021).
To determine whether the State has met its burden to prove a defendant’s guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt, we compare the crime’s elements as defined by a
hypothetically correct jury charge to the evidence adduced at trial. Hammack v. State,
622 S.W.3d 910, 914 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021); see also Febus v. State, 542 S.W.3d 568,
572 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (“The essential elements of an offense are determined by
state law.”). Such a charge is one that accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the
indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or restrict the
State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which
the defendant was tried. Hammack, 622 S.W.3d at 914. The law as authorized by the
indictment means the statutory elements of the offense as modified by the charging
instrument’s allegations. Curlee v. State, 620 S.W.3d 767, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021);
see Rabb v. State, 434 S.W.3d 613, 616 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (“When the State pleads
a specific element of a penal offense that has statutory alternatives for that element,
the sufficiency of the evidence will be measured by the element that was actually
pleaded, and not any alternative statutory elements.”).
4 III. Applicable Law
As relevant here, a person commits the offense of arson if he starts a fire with
intent to destroy or damage a building or habitation knowing that it was located on
property belonging to another. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 28.02(a)(2)(D). A person acts
“with intent” when he has the “conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct
or cause the result.” Id. § 6.03(a). A jury may infer intent from any facts that tend to
prove its existence. Dues v. State, 634 S.W.2d 304, 305 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.]
1982); Beltran v. State, 593 S.W.2d 688, 689 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980); Miller
v. State, 566 S.W.2d 614, 618 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978); Turner v. State, Nos.
02-11-00070-CR, 02-11-00071-CR, 2013 WL 530972, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
Feb. 14, 2013, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication). In arson cases,
intent “cannot be inferred from the mere act of burning,” but it may otherwise be
found from all the facts in the case, including the acts, words, and conduct of the
accused and the method of committing the crime. Beltran, 593 S.W.2d at 689; Miller,
566 S.W.2d at 618; see Dues, 634 S.W.2d at 305; Turner, 2013 WL 530972, at *1.
IV. Analysis
Rubio complains that the State failed to present sufficient evidence of only the
intent element. We conclude that the jury may have inferred from the evidence before
it that Rubio intended to damage or destroy the Smiths’ house.
The jury heard testimony and viewed body camera footage of Rubio telling
Officer Sweeney that he had deliberately set the house on fire “for a reason.” He
5 stated that he had used lacquer thinner and cigarette lighters to ignite the house in an
effort to evade the people who he believed had shown up at the house that day to kill
him. Explaining his thought process to Officer Sweeney, he believed that if the house
was on fire, the people trying to kill him would run from the fire and stop trying to
kill him. The evidence showed that Rubio had attempted to create a large house fire
by using lacquer thinner to set several small fires in multiple locations throughout the
house—as opposed to a single fire. We agree with the State that the jury could infer
from Rubio’s acts that he had done so to increase the level of protection that the
smoke and flames from a burning house would have had against the people allegedly
trying to kill him.
Evidence of Rubio’s words and conduct after he started the fire reflects the
same thought process. Specifically, he had to be instructed to exit the burning house,
and when Officer Sweeney unsuccessfully attempted to render aid, Rubio was
apparently more concerned about the burning house’s deterrent effects on those
people’s plan to kill him than he was about being on fire himself. Indeed, he stated,
“This is not what’s concerning me right now. . . . I did this for a reason.”
Rubio ultimately took responsibility for setting the fire and felt that the Smiths
needed to understand the reason why he had done it.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s guilty verdict, we
conclude that a rational factfinder could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that
6 Rubio intended to damage or destroy the Smiths’ house when he deliberately set
multiple fires throughout the house. Accordingly, we overrule Rubio’s sole issue.
V. Conclusion
Having overruled Rubio’s sole issue on appeal, we affirm the conviction.
/s/ Wade Birdwell
Wade Birdwell Justice
Do Not Publish Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
Delivered: December 14, 2023