Salvado v. Prudential Property & Casualty Insurance

430 A.2d 297, 287 Pa. Super. 304, 1981 Pa. Super. LEXIS 2751

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: May 22, 1981
• Docket: 942
• Status: Published

Opinions

WIEAND, Judge:

This is an appeal from a summary judgment entered by the trial court in favor of the appellee insurer on the grounds that appellants’ claims for benefits under the Pennsylvania No-Fault Insurance Act were barred by the statute of limitations.

On February 29, 1976, Maria DeLuz Salvado, Stella Monteiro, Judite Monteiro and Lucretia Monteiro, a minor, were passengers in a motor vehicle operated by Etevenia Salvado and insured by the appellee, Prudential Property and Casualty Insurance Company. As a result of the vehicle accident occurring that day, the driver and the passengers received injuries for which claims were made to the appellee insurer for benefits under the Pennsylvania No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act of July 19, 1974, P.L. 489, 40 P.S. § 1009.101 et seq. These claims were paid in full. The last payment of benefits was made on November 18, 1976. On April 27, 1979, for the first time, claims for additional benefits were made to appellee on behalf of appellants. Appellee denied the claims because they were made more than two years after the last, prior payment of benefits. The instant action in assumpsit was then commenced.

Section 106(c)(1)¹ of the No-Fault Act establishes a limitation of actions as follows:

If no-fault benefits have not been paid for loss arising otherwise than from death, an action therefor may be commenced not later than two years after the victim suffers the loss and either knows, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known, that the loss was caused by the accident, or not later than four years after the accident, whichever is earlier. If no-fault benefits have been paid for loss arising otherwise than from death, an action for further benefits ... by either the same or another claimant, may be commenced not later than two years after the last payment of benefits. (Emphasis added.)

This limitation would seem to bar the present action by appellants for additional benefits. There are no circumstances alleged or appearing of record that would allow the adult appellants to commence an action for additional benefits under the No-Fault Act more than two years after all claims had been paid. It is argued, however, that the statute of limitations was tolled for Lucretia Monteiro, who was thirteen years of age at the time of the accident, because of her minority. If this is correct, then the claim on her behalf should not have been terminated summarily.

Section 106(c)(5)² of the No-Fault Act is controlling. It provides as follows:

If a person entitled to no-fault benefits is under a legal disability when the right to bring an action for the benefits first accrues, the period of his disability is not a part of the time limited for commencement of the action.

Whether minority is a “legal disability” which tolls the statute of limitations under the No-Fault Act has not been decided by the appellate courts of this state. The same issue, however, was previously before the Honorable Eugene Gelfand of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia. See: Robinson v. Safeguard Mutual Insurance Co., 3 Phila. Cty.Rptr. 548, 550-51 (1979). In that case, an original claim on behalf of a minor had been delayed for more than two years following the accident giving rise to a claim. The statute of limitations, it was held, was tolled during the period of legal disability caused by the claimant’s minority.

The No-Fault Act does not contain a legislatively drafted definition of the term “legal disability.” The term “disability,” however, is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th edition, as “[t]he want of legal capability to perform an act. [The] term is generally used to indicate an incapacity for the full enjoyment of ordinary legal rights; thus, persons under age, insane persons, and convicts are said to be under disability.” In recognition of this disability, the Supreme Court has adopted rules requiring that civil actions by and against minors be controlled by guardians appointed for that purpose. See: Pa.R.C.P.Nos. 2026 to 2050. We conclude, therefore, that “legal disability” was intended to include disability attributable to a claimant’s minority.

In the instant case the trial court reasoned that even if minority was intended to be a legal disability under Section 106(c)(5) of the No-Fault Act, such disability was terminated after a claim had been made on behalf of the minor and paid by the No-Fault carrier. Under such circumstances, the court concluded, even the claim of a minor for additional benefits was barred after the expiration of two years following the last payment of benefits.

The difficulty with this result is that it is inconsistent with and carves out an exception to the clear language of Section 106(c)(5). This section of the Act directs that where a claimant is under a legal disability, the period of disability shall not be included in the period within which an action is to be commenced. The intent seems clear. During legal disability the statute of limitations is tolled. The statute creates no distinction between actions to recover benefits and actions to recover additional benefits.

Where, as here, the words of the statute are clear and free from ambiguity, the letter of it may not be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b). See also: Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Labor Relations Board v. Teamsters Union Local No. 77, 20 Pa.Cmwlth. 410, 342 A.2d 158 (1975). We cannot disregard the clear meaning of Section 106(c)(5) merely because, as appellee contends, a literal interpretation will adversely affect the ability of No-Fault carriers to settle claims of minors.³ This contention if meritorious, is more properly addressed to the legislature.

However, we reject appellants’ argument that the payment of additional benefits to the minor claimant will establish a new two year period within which adult claimants can also seek additional benefits. These claimants were under no disability, and there is no valid reason for tolling the period of limitations to permit their claims for additional benefits. The two year period within which to commence one or more actions therefor began to run on November 18, 1976, when the last payment of benefits was made. After the expiration of that period, claims for additional benefits by persons under no legal disability were barred. The right to sue for additional benefits, having been barred by the statute of limitations, was not revived merely because another claimant had been under a legal disability which tolled the statute of limitations as to such person’s claim. Any other interpretation would be absurd and would be inconsistent with the clear legislative intent expressed in Section 106(c)(1).

The judgment entered in favor of appellee and against Lucretia Monteiro, a minor, is reversed, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings. In other respects, the order entering judgment in favor of appellee is affirmed.

PRICE, J., files a concurring and dissenting opinion.

1 . 40 P.S. § 1009.106(c)(1).

2 . 40 P.S. § 1009.106(c)(5).

3 . The facts of the instant case do not require that we decide and we do not decide whether the legal disability caused by minority can be terminated and removed by the appointment of a guardian to represent the minor’s interests and by court approval of the terms by which a minor’s claim is settled.