Salter v. State of Colorado

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: June 18, 2026
• Docket: 25CA1407
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

25CA1407 Salter v State of Colorado 06-18-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA1407 City and County of Denver District Court No. 25CV223 Honorable Heidi L. Kutcher, Judge

Adam J. Salter,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

State of Colorado,

Defendant-Appellee.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division III Opinion by JUDGE FREYRE Johnson and Kuhn, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced June 18, 2026

Adam J. Salter, Pro Se

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Andrew M. Katarikawe, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee ¶1 Plaintiff, Adam J. Salter, appeals the district court’s order

dismissing his complaint for failure to state a claim under C.R.C.P.

12(b)(5). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In March 2025, Salter filed a complaint naming the State of

Colorado (the “State”) as the sole defendant. Salter listed various

parties who may have an interest in the action, including Discover

CBD, his former employer; Discover CBD’s attorney; Salter’s former

attorney; “medical providers who misdiagnosed Salter”; and various

Colorado agency workers and public officials. Salter alleged that he

had been denied damages by the State as it “ha[d] been sheltering

[Discover CBD] from liability and assisting them in not faithfully

participating in the process, withholding information, making

material false statements, and abusing the overall procedures to

avoid accountability.” Salter contended that he was “entrapped by

[the State] in unsafe and illegal business practices; the interstate

trafficking of unsafe cannabis products, unapproved drugs, pet

products, food, supplements, and marijuana; and the national

opioid crisis; with reckless disregard for the ongoing public health

1 emergency with regard to CBD and hemp, first declared in March of

2020.”

¶3 Salter pleaded seven claims for relief: (1) discrimination as a

self-represented litigant pursuant to the Colorado

Anti-Discrimination Act; (2) attempt to influence a public servant

pursuant to section 18-8-306, C.R.S. 2025; (3) medical and

disability discrimination pursuant to the Colorado

Anti-Discrimination Act; (4) unsafe and illegal business practices

pursuant to the Colorado Food and Drug Act; (5) workplace

disputes pursuant to the Whistleblower Act; (6) “[o]fficial

misconduct pursuant to section 18-8-401 et seq.,” C.R.S. 2025; and

(7) medical malpractice pursuant to the Health Care Availability

Act.

¶4 In May 2025, the State filed a motion to dismiss Salter’s action

under Rule 12(b)(5). The State argued that all of Salter’s allegations

were conclusory and that the complaint “did not contain a single

supporting fact that, if proven, would show that the State of

Colorado violated any law.”

¶5 Salter responded that his claims, “if true, suggest[ed] that

many of the known parties ha[d] claims against the parties and

2 each other,” and that Colorado preferred “clear and simple

claims . . . rather than in-depth specifics that give cause to the

expansion of proceedings or additional cause-for-action.”

¶6 In its reply in support of the motion to dismiss, the State

argued that Salter, having been alerted to the deficiencies in his

pleadings, had an opportunity to “show how his averments of

material facts, viewed in the light most favorable to him, plausibly

stated claims for relief.” The State asked the district court to grant

the motion and dismiss the action in its entirety.

¶7 The district court granted the State’s motion to dismiss

Salter’s action. In doing so, the court ruled as follows:

• Issue 1: Discrimination as a self-represented litigant

pursuant to the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act. To

establish a claim of discrimination, a plaintiff must show

(1) he belongs to a protected class; (2) he was denied full

and equal enjoyment of a place of public accommodation;

(3) the denial was because of his protected class; and

(4) he suffered damages. § 24-34-601(2)(a), C.R.S. 2025.

Salter alleged that he was discriminated against as a

self-represented litigant referring to Chief Justice

3 Directive 13-01.1 A protected class, as illustrated in

section 24-34-601(2)(a), refers to a person’s “disability,

race, creed, color, sex, sexual orientation, gender

identity, gender expression, marital status, national

origin, or ancestry.” Salter failed to allege facts that

establish he belonged to a protected class as required to

establish a claim of discrimination under section

24-34-601(2)(a).

• Issue 2: Attempt to influence a public servant pursuant to

section 18-8-306. To prevail on a claim of an attempt to

influence a public servant, a plaintiff must demonstrate

that there was “(1) an attempt to influence a public

servant; (2) by means of deceit or by threat of violence or

economic reprisal; and (3) with the intent to alter or affect

the public servant’s decision or action.” People v. Van De

Weghe, 2012 COA 204, ¶ 13 (citation omitted). Salter did

1 Chief Justice Directive 13-01, Directive Concerning Colorado

Courts’ Self-Represented Litigant Assistance, p. 1 (effective June 12, 2013), https://perma.cc/8AKF-8C4A, “concerns assistance provided by Clerks, Family Court Facilitators, Self-Represented Litigant Coordinators, and others to litigants or potential litigants in non-criminal matters.”

4 not claim that Discover CBD was a public company or

that he had been a public employee. Further, Salter

“does not point to an instance in which the State ever

made an attempt to influence its public servants, aside

from saying ‘[p]ublic [e]mployees have issued statements

sheltering public employees and private parties.’”

Therefore, Salter did not provide any factual allegations

to establish that “the State attempted to influence a

public servant with the intent to alter or affect the public

servant’s decision or action” as required to by section

18-8-306.

• Issue 3: Medical and disability discrimination pursuant to

the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act. To prevail on a

disability discrimination claim pursuant to the Colorado

Anti-Discrimination Act, the plaintiff must show that

(1) he has a disability; (2) he was excluded from

participation in or denied benefit of services, programs,

or activities; (3) a place of public accommodation, a

public entity, or a state agency excluded or denied him;

and (4) he was denied or excluded by reason of his

5 disability. § 24-34-802(1)(b), C.R.S. 2025. Salter did not

show that he was excluded from participation at a place

of public accommodation, a public entity, or a state

agency or that he was excluded from participation in

Colorado’s judicial system. Further, despite arguing that

he was “denied relief” through his lawsuits by the State,

Salter offered no factual allegations to support the

essential element that he was denied anything by reason

of disability.

• Issue 4: Unsafe and illegal business practices pursuant to

the Colorado Pure Food and Drug Act. To successfully

assert a claim of unsafe and illegal business practices

under the Colorado Food and Drug Act, a plaintiff must

demonstrate that the defendant engaged in practices that

violate the specific provisions of the Act. § 25-5-403(1),

C.R.S. 2025. Salter did not assert facts that the State

played any role in Discover CBD’s manufacture, sale, and

distribution of CBD and hemp products.

• Issue 5: Workplace disputes pursuant to the Whistleblower

Act. Under section 8-4-120(1), C.R.S. 2025, only an

6 employer is subject to liability for a violation. Salter

cannot prevail on this claim because he did not allege

that he was employed by the State. Additionally, section

8-14.4-102, C.R.S. 2025, provides that, a “principal shall

not discriminate . . . or retaliate against any worker . . .

raising any reasonable concern about workplace

violations of government health or safety rules.” Salter

did not plead any facts supporting his allegation that the

State retaliated or discriminated against him for not

raising health and safety concerns. Therefore, Salter did

not plead sufficient facts to prevail under section 8-4-120

or 8-14.4-102.

• Issue 6: Official misconduct pursuant to section 18-8-401.2

To prevail on a claim brought under section 18-8-401,

the plaintiff must prove “that the defendant ‘knowingly

obtain[ed], retain[ed], or exercise[d] control over anything

of value of another without authorization or by threat or

deception’ and . . . that the defendant [i]ntend[ed] to

2 In its order, the district court mistakenly cited section 18-4-401,

the theft statute.

7 deprive the other person permanently of the use or

benefit of the thing of value.” While Salter argues that

the State “conspire[d] with each other” to “show

preferential treatment to employers, businesses, in-state

litigants,” and “discriminate[d] against low income, under

privileged, under educated, out of state, and

self-represented litigants,” he does not identify anything

of value which the State allegedly obtained, retained, or

exercised control over. Accordingly, Salter failed to allege

facts that support a claim for which relief can be granted.

• Issue 7: Medical malpractice. To prevail on a claim of

medical malpractice, the plaintiff must prove that “(1) the

defendant had a legal duty of care; (2) the defendant

breached that duty; (3) the plaintiff was injured; and (4)

the defendant’s breach caused the plaintiff’s injury.”

Maldonado v. GeneDx, Inc., 2024 COA 121, ¶ 33. A

principal may also be vicariously liable for its agent’s

malpractice, so long as the agent is not an independent

contractor. See Daly v. Aspen Ctr. for Women’s Health,

Inc., 134 P.3d 450, 452 (Colo. App. 2005). Taking all

8 facts in the light most favorable to Salter, the State could

be vicariously liable for alleged malpractice occurring at

University of Colorado Health and Memorial Hospital but,

without further facts in support of a physician’s

negligence, a misdiagnosis cannot prove liability. See

Day v. Johnson, 255 P.3d 1064, 1069 (Colo. 2011).

¶8 On appeal, Salter raises three issues: (1) “Rights, Privileges,

and Protections for Self-Represented Litigants”; (2) Initial Disclosure

and notice of claim against public entity”; and (3) “Obstructive Use

of C.R.C.P. 12 Motion to Dismiss.” We address and reject each

contention.

II. Motion to Dismiss

¶9 Salter contends that the district court erred by granting the

State’s motion to dismiss. We disagree.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 10 We review de novo a district court’s ruling on a Rule 12(b)(5)

motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted, applying the same standards as the trial court. Norton

v. Rocky Mountain Planned Parenthood, Inc., 2018 CO 3, ¶ 7.

9 ¶ 11 The purpose of a Rule 12(b)(5) motion to dismiss is to test the

formal sufficiency of a plaintiff’s complaint. Wagner v. Grange Ins.

Ass’n, 166 P.3d 304, 306 (Colo. App. 2007). A plaintiff must plead

sufficient facts that, if taken as true, establish plausible grounds to

support a claim for relief. Patterson v. James, 2018 COA 173, ¶ 23

(citing Warne v. Hall, 2016 CO 50, ¶ 24). Rule 12(b)(5) motions are

generally viewed with disfavor. Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo. v. Van Wyk,

27 P.3d 377, 386 (Colo. 2001).

¶ 12 To resolve a Rule 12(b)(5) motion, a court may consider

matters stated within the complaint itself, Van Wyk, 27 P.3d at 386,

and documents attached to or referred to within the complaint,

Prospect Dev. Co. v. Holland & Knight, LLP, 2018 COA 107, ¶ 11.

The court must accept as true the factual allegations in the

complaint, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.

Norton, ¶ 7. But the court is not required to accept as true bare

legal conclusions, id., or conclusory statements or allegations

lacking any factual support, see Warne, ¶ 27. The court may not

weigh evidence or make findings of fact when resolving a Rule

12(b)(5) motion. Medina v. State, 35 P.3d 443, 452 (Colo. 2001).

10 ¶ 13 Additionally, we cannot craft arguments for a pro se party.

Johnson v. McGrath, 2024 COA 5, ¶ 10. Indeed, a pro se party is

held to the same standards as an attorney. Cornelius v. River Ridge

Ranch Landowners Ass’n, 202 P.3d 564, 572 (Colo. 2009) (“[P]ro se

parties are ‘bound by the same rules of civil procedure as attorneys

licensed to practice law.’” (citation omitted)). But because a pro se

party’s pleadings should be liberally construed, Adams v. Sagee,

2017 COA 133, ¶ 10, we address Salter’s contentions, as best we

can discern them.

B. Analysis

¶ 14 Under the heading, “Rights, Privileges, and Protections for

Self-Represented Litigants,” Salter contends that self-represented

litigants have a “series of qualifying ‘essential elements’ that

establish a protected class under section 24-34-601(2)(a).” To

support this assertion, Salter argues that self-represented litigants

may be unrepresented because of financial resources.

¶ 15 He argues:

Based on various case law (such as Jones v. Williams[, 2019 CO 61]), Chief [J]ustice [D]irectives, and ongoing legislation changes, this creed of litigant protections regardless of origin or location, that allows for fair use of the

11 judicial branch regardless of income or financial resources establishes [Salter’s] claim for relief and warrants proper adjudication of such actionable claims in district court.

¶ 16 Beyond this argument, Salter does not explain how or why he

is a member of the group of individuals protected by section

24-34-601(2)(a). Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order on

this basis.

¶ 17 Under the heading, “Initial Disclosure and notice of claim

against public entity,” Salter contends that the dismissal of his

claims was “based on material false information” and that “robust

disclosures have allowed [the State] an unfair advantage,” leaving

Salter a “victim to retaliatory discrimination against a protected

class . . . where, the Attorney General[’]s Office aided and abetted

the concealment of claims that warranted relief.” However, Salter

does not identify the materially false information on which the

district court improperly relied, the robust disclosures that have

provided the State an unfair advantage, the claims that have been

concealed by the Attorney General’s Office, or how these items have

made him a victim of retaliatory discrimination. Instead, we agree

with the district court that his allegations are conclusory.

12 ¶ 18 Finally, under the heading, “Obstructive Use of C.R.C.P. 12

Motion to Dismiss,” Salter contends that the “unfair advantage

gained from disclosure interference seen in issue 2 has caused

further injustice that plagues self-represented litigants talked about

in Issue 1.” More specifically, Salter argues that “these injustices

seem mostly unknown to the District Court” and that the court was

“left blind to certain claims that waive government immunity.”

Salter contends that the following claims were “prevented from

being put in front of district court because of [the State’s]

obstructive use of [Rule] 12.”

Claims such as: certain clerical and other mistakes of public employees that have caused injustices (including relating to making accommodations for self-representation); discrimination based on medical record or otherwise confidential, privileged, or protected information; Rules of evidence with regard to such confidential, privileged or protected information and use of lay testimony; Judicial Review of protected activities as protected activities; Colorado Court’s ruling in Demetry as unconstitutional; Use of electronic court systems by non-attorney.

Salter asserts that his claims “warrant further review in district

court” and that he is being “unjustly denied relief,” but he does not

13 specify what relief he is owed or what further district court review

may be required.

¶ 19 Construing Salter’s arguments liberally, we discern his

argument to be that his pro se status makes him a member of a

protected class and that the district court’s dismissal of his action

under Rule 12(b) was improper because it denied him an

opportunity for discovery and to pursue his claims on their merits.

We disagree.

¶ 20 To establish a claim of discrimination, a plaintiff must show

(1) he belongs to a protected class; (2) he was denied full and equal

enjoyment of a place of public accommodation; (3) his protected

characteristic was the basis for the denial; and (4) he suffered

damages. § 24-34-601(2)(a). As the district court stated, a

protected class as enumerated in section 24-36-601(2)(a) refers to a

person’s “disability, race, creed, color, sex, sexual orientation,

gender identity, gender expression, marital status, national origin,

or ancestry.” Salter argues that his protected status is as a pro se

litigant, but section 24-36-601(2)(a) does not include pro se litigants

as a protected class. Further, Salter has provided no authority that

identifies pro se litigants as a protected class.

14 ¶ 21 Additionally, Salter’s opening brief does not indicate any place

in the record where the court committed error, nor does he cite any

authority showing that the district court erred in dismissing his

action or explain how the court improperly denied him an

opportunity to pursue his action on the merits. We are not required

to accept as true conclusory statements or allegations lacking any

factual support, see Warne, ¶ 27, and we cannot weigh evidence or

make findings of fact when resolving a Rule 12(b)(5) motion,

Medina, 35 P.3d at 452. Further, “it is not the duty of the reviewing

court to search the record for evidence to support bald assertions.”

Brighton Sch. Dist. 27J v. Transamerica Premier Ins. Co., 923 P.2d

328, 335 (Colo. App. 1996), aff’d, 940 P.2d 348 (Colo. 1997).

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order dismissing Salter’s

action under Rule 12(b)(5).

III. Abandoned Claims

¶ 22 While we construe pro se filings liberally, that does “not

include inventing arguments not made by the pro se party.”

Minshall v. Johnson, 2018 COA 44, ¶ 21. Salter fails to assert any

argument on appeal concerning the following claims: (1) attempt to

influence a public servant pursuant to section 18-8-306; (2) medical

15 and disability discrimination pursuant to the Colorado

Anti-Discrimination Act; (3) unsafe and illegal business practices

pursuant to the Colorado Food and Drug Act; (4) workplace

disputes pursuant to the Whistleblower Act; (5) official misconduct

pursuant to section 18-8-401; and (6) medical malpractice

pursuant to the Health Care Availability Act. Accordingly, we deem

any issues related to these claims abandoned. See Armed Forces

Bank, N.A. v. Hicks, 2014 COA 74, ¶ 38 (arguments raised in the

trial court but not pursued on appeal are deemed abandoned).

IV. Disposition

¶ 23 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE JOHNSON and JUDGE KUHN concur.