Salon Blu, Inc. v. Salon Lofts Grp., LLC, 2018 NCBC 70.
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA IN THE GENERAL COURT OF JUSTICE SUPERIOR COURT DIVISION COUNTY OF WAKE 17 CVS 12778
SALON BLU, INC.,
Plaintiff,
v. ORDER AND OPINION ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS SALON LOFTS GROUP, LLC,
Defendant.
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Defendant Salon Lofts Group, LLC’s
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (“Motion to Dismiss”; ECF No. 42).
THE COURT, having considered the Motion to Dismiss, the briefs filed in
support of and in opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, the arguments of counsel at
the hearing, and other appropriate matters of record, concludes that the Motion to
Dismiss should be GRANTED for the reasons set forth below.
Harris, Wiltshire & Grannis LLP, by Amy E. Richardson and Deepika H. Ravi (pro hac vice) for Plaintiff Salon Blu, Inc.
Morningstar Law Group, by Shannon R. Joseph and Jeffrey L. Roether, and Porter Wright Morris & Arthur LLP, by Ryan P. Sherman (pro hac vice) for Defendant Salon Lofts Group, LLC.
McGuire, Judge.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Parties
1. Plaintiff Salon Blu, Inc. (“Salon Blu”) is a corporation with its principal
place of business in Raleigh, North Carolina. Salon Blu operates three hair salons in Raleigh and employs professional hair stylists in its salons. (Am. Compl., ECF No.
30, at ¶ 2.)
2. Defendant Salon Lofts Group, LLC (“Salon Lofts”) also has its principal
place of business in Raleigh, North Carolina. Salon Lofts competes with traditional
hair salons, such as Salon Blu, by renting booths within its facilities to independent
professional hair stylists. (Id. at ¶ 16.) In exchange for rent payments, Salon Lofts
provides the independent stylists with a booth within which to perform hair styling
services and provides the stylists assistance with “marketing, customer relations and
client management, scheduling, product acquisition, business development, social
media training, webpage development, and continued education in hairstyling.” (Id.)
Salon Blu does not allege that Salon Lofts receives any share of stylists’ revenues
from hair services provided by the stylists, only the rent payment for the booth.
B. The restrictive covenants and Salon Blu’s confidential and proprietary information
3. In consideration for employment, Salon Blu requires its stylists to enter
into an Employment Agreement. (Id. at ¶¶ 3, 26.) The Employment Agreement
contains a restrictive covenant which provides that the stylist “shall not engage in
the business of hairstyling or solicit Salon Blu customers for a period of one year after
termination of employment at Salon Blu, within a five-mile radius of any Salon Blu
location at which the employee provided services on behalf of Salon Blu.” (Id. at ¶ 9.)
4. The Employment Agreement also contains a confidentiality provision
that requires the stylists to “treat all proprietary information belonging to Salon Blu
as confidential,” and the stylist agrees that he or she “shall not use such information or divulge, disclose or communicate such information in any way” during his or her
employment and for three years after terminating employment with Salon Blu. (Id.
at ¶ 4.)
5. Salon Blu alleges that, inter alia, its “client contact information” and
“client hair coloring formula information” are proprietary and confidential. (Id. at
¶¶ 5–6.) All customer contacts with Salon Blu are conducted through the front desk
at the stylist’s salon location. Stylists “are expressly forbidden from gathering client
contact information, including by sending or accepting friend requests from clients
on social media.” (Id. at ¶ 5.)
6. Salon Blu’s hair coloring formulas are unique to each customer. (Id. at
¶ 6.) The hair coloring formulas are arrived at by using various hair dyes and
considering the “tone, brassiness, and hair texture” of the customer’s hair. Salon Blu
does not share the hair coloring formulas with anyone outside of Salon Blu. (Id.)
Salon Blu alleges that “[w]ithout Salon Blu’s guidance, training, equipment, and
expertise, Salon Blu stylists could not independently develop these color formulas.”
(Id.)
7. Salon Blu maintains a computer database containing its confidential
and proprietary information, which can only be accessed with “appropriate
credentials.” (Id. at ¶ 25.) The database includes “client contact information,
information regarding clients’ personalities and life events, clients’ hair color
formulas, and clients’ hairstyle and purchase history.” (Id.) Stylists only have access
to the information in the database regarding hair coloring formulas and “client notes.” (Id.) The Amended Complaint does not allege what information is considered part of
“client notes,” but at the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff’s counsel
conceded that stylists do not have access to client contact information in the database.
No Salon Blu employee is permitted to “collect” information from the database. (Id.)
C. Salon Lofts’ recruitment and solicitation of Salon Blu’s stylists
8. Between April and July 2017, seven Salon Blu stylists terminated
employment with Salon Blu and began providing hair styling services at Salon Lofts
locations within five miles of the Salon Blu location at which they were employed.
(Id. at ¶¶ 10–11.) Each of the seven former Salon Blu stylists had signed an
Employment Agreement with Salon Blu. (Id. at ¶ 10.)
9. Salon Blu alleges that Salon Lofts “engaged . . . in aggressive
recruitment efforts to induce Salon Blu’s employees to terminate their employment
with Salon Blu” and to rent space from Salon Lofts. (See id. at ¶ 12.) Salon Blu
claims that Salon Lofts “knew or should have known that Salon Blu’s employees had
Employment Agreements with Salon Blu containing restrictive covenants involving
Salon Blu’s business practices, customers, and confidential and proprietary
information” because such agreements are “common practice in the hairstyling
business.” (Id. at ¶ 36.)
10. Upon information and belief, Salon Blu alleges that Salon Lofts
encouraged Salon Blu stylists to breach the restrictive covenants and confidentiality
provisions of their Employment Agreements and to misappropriate Salon Blu’s trade
secrets. (Id. at ¶¶ 8, 12, 13, 30, and 31.) Salon Lofts encouraged Salon Blu stylists to record the proprietary hair coloring formulas and “other proprietary information
about Salon Blu customers and [to] use[] that information to solicit Salon Blu’s
customers to their booths at Salon Lofts.” (Id. at ¶ 8.) Salon Blu does not allege that
the stylists disclosed Salon Blu’s confidential information to Salon Lofts.
11. On August 29, 2017, counsel for Salon Blu sent a letter to Salon Lofts’
CEO notifying Salon Lofts that “several of Salon Blu’s former employees were
breaching their obligations under the Restrictive Covenants.” (Id. at ¶ 28.) Salon
Blu alleges that the August 29, 2017 letter put Salon Lofts “on notice regarding Salon
Blu’s restrictive covenants.” (Id. at ¶ 36.)
12. On September 13, 2017, Salon Blu sent a second letter to Salon Lofts
“stating that Salon Lofts’ practice of enticing Salon Blu employees to breach their
Employment Agreements constituted tortuous interference with contract.” (Id. at
¶ 32.) Despite the letters, Salon Lofts allegedly continued to induce Salon Blu stylists
to violate their restrictive covenants. (Id. at ¶ 33.) The Amended Complaint,
however, does not identify any specific individual stylist who left Salon Blu after July
2017.
13. Salon Blu claims that it has suffered damages resulting from Salon
Loft’s alleged conduct. (Id. at ¶ 14.)
D. Procedural history
14. Salon Blu filed this action on October 20, 2017 in the Superior Court of
Wake County against Salon Lofts and four of Salon Blu’s former stylists: Meredith
Peoples, Maureen Roberti, Amy Torres Bercian, and Ivy Hoffman (collectively, the “Former Stylists”). (ECF No. 3.) The original Complaint contained a claim against
the Former Stylists for breach of the Employment Agreements, claims against all of
the Defendants for misappropriation of trade secrets and unfair methods of
competition, and a claim against Salon Lofts for tortious interference with contract.
(Id. at ¶¶ 46–77.)
15. On October 25, 2017, this matter was designated to the Business Court
by order of Chief Justice Mark Martin and assigned to the undersigned. (ECF Nos.
1 and 2.)
16. Salon Blu subsequently took voluntary dismissals with prejudice of its
claims against each of the Former Stylists. (ECF Nos. 10, 15, 19, and 27.)
17. On December 28, 2017, Salon Lofts filed a motion to dismiss. (ECF No.
11.) On January 12, 2018, Salon Lofts filed its answer to the Complaint. (ECF No.
26.)
18. On January 17, 2018, Salon Blu filed a Motion for Leave to File
Amended Complaint (ECF No. 28), along with a proposed Amended Complaint (ECF
No. 30). Salon Lofts consented to the filing of the Amended Complaint, and on
January 19, 2018, the Court entered an order granting Salon Blu leave to file the
Amended Complaint and deeming the Amended Complaint filed on January 19, 2018.
(ECF No. 33.) The Amended Complaint alleges claims against Salon Lofts for tortious
interference with contract, misappropriation of trade secrets, and unfair methods of
competition under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 (hereinafter “G.S.”). 19. On February 23, 2018, Salon Lofts filed the Motion to Dismiss along
with its brief in support of the Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 43.) On March 15, 2018,
Salon Blu filed a response in opposition to the Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 47), and
on March 28, 2018, Salon Lofts filed a reply brief (ECF No. 48).
20. On April 12, 2018, the Court held a hearing on the Motion to Dismiss at
which counsel presented argument. The Motion to Dismiss is now ripe for
determination.
II. ANALYSIS
21. Salon Lofts moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against it under G.S.
§ 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(6) (hereinafter “Rule(s)”) for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted.
22. In ruling on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Court’s
inquiry is “whether, as a matter of law, the allegations of the complaint, treated as
true, are sufficient to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under some
legal theory, whether properly labeled or not.” Harris v. NCNB Nat’l Bank of N.C.,
85 N.C. App. 669, 670, 355 S.E.2d 838, 840 (1987). North Carolina is a notice pleading
state. See, e.g., Feltman v. City of Wilson, 238 N.C. App. 246, 251–52, 767 S.E.2d 615,
619–20 (2014) (quoting Wake Cty. v. Hotels.com, L.P., 235 N.C. App. 633, 646, 762
S.E.2d 477, 486 (2014)). “Under notice pleading, a statement of claim is adequate if
it gives sufficient notice of the claim asserted to enable the adverse party to answer
and prepare for trial, to allow for the application of the doctrine of res judicata, and
to show the type of case brought.” Id. 23. Dismissal of a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is proper “(1) when the
complaint on its face reveals that no law supports plaintiff’s claim; (2) when the
complaint reveals on its face the absence of fact sufficient to make a good claim; [or]
(3) when some fact disclosed in the complaint necessarily defeats the plaintiff’s
claim.” Oates v. JAG, Inc., 314 N.C. 276, 278, 333 S.E.2d 222, 224 (1985). In deciding
a motion to dismiss, the Court must construe the complaint liberally and accept all
well-pleaded allegations as true. See Laster v. Francis, 199 N.C. App. 572, 577, 681
S.E.2d 858, 862 (2009). The Court, however, is not required “to accept as true
allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or
unreasonable inferences.” Good Hope Hosp., Inc. v. N.C. Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs., 174 N.C. App. 266, 274, 620 S.E.2d 873, 880 (2005). In addition, the Court
may consider documents that are the subject of plaintiff’s complaint and to which the
complaint specifically refers. Oberlin Capital, L.P. v. Slavin, 147 N.C. App. 52, 60,
554 S.E.2d 840, 847 (2001).
A. Count I: Tortious interference with contract
24. Salon Blu alleges that Salon Lofts intentionally interfered with Salon
Blu’s Employment Agreements with its former employees and that Salon Lofts
induced the former Salon Blu employees to breach their Employment Agreements by
going to work for Salon Lofts within five miles of the Salon Blu locations where they
worked. (ECF No. 30, at ¶ 37.) Salon Blu claims that Salon Lofts sought to gain an
advantage over Salon Blu by having Salon Blu’s former employees bring valuable customers over to Salon Lofts and by inducing the former employees to divulge Salon
Blu’s confidential and proprietary information. (Id.)
25. Salon Blu alleges that Salon Lofts “knew or should have known” that
Salon Blu’s employees had Employment Agreements that contained restrictive
covenants because it is “common practice in the hairstyling business” to include such
restrictive covenants in employment agreements. (Id. at 36.) Further, Salon Blu
argues that Salon Lofts was “put on notice” about the restrictive covenants on August
29, 2017, when Salon Blu’s counsel informed Salon Lofts about the former employees’
Employment Agreements. (Id.) In response, Salon Lofts argues that Salon Blu did
not adequately allege in the Amended Complaint that Salon Lofts had knowledge of
the Employment Agreements and also argues that Salon Lofts’ actions were justified
as legitimate business competition. (Br. Supp. Mot. Dismiss Pl.’s Am. Compl., ECF
No. 43, at pp. 9–10.)
26. A claim for tortious interference requires
(1) a valid contract between the plaintiff and a third person which confers upon the plaintiff a contractual right against a third person; (2) the defendant knows of the contract; (3) the defendant intentionally induces the third person not to perform the contract; (4) and in doing so acts without justification; (5) resulting in actual damage to plaintiff.
United Labs., Inc. v. Kuykendall, 322 N.C. 643, 661, 370 S.E.2d 375, 387 (1988).
However, interference is justified “if it is motivated by a legitimate business purpose.”
Embree Constr. Grp., Inc. v. Rafcor, Inc., 330 N.C. 487, 498, 411 S.E.2d 916, 924
(1992). “[C]ompetition in business constitutes justifiable interference in another’s business relations and is not actionable so long as it is carried on in furtherance of
one’s own interests and by means that are lawful.” Peoples Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Hooks,
322 N.C. 216, 221, 367 S.E.2d 647, 650 (1988). “[T]o demonstrate the element of
acting without justification, the action must indicate no motive for interference other
than malice.” Area Landscaping, L.L.C. v. Glaxo-Wellcome, Inc., 160 N.C. App. 520,
523, 586 S.E.2d 507, 510 (2003) (internal quotations omitted). Legal malice involves
actions “taken with the design of injuring one of the parties to the contract or of
gaining some advantage at the expense of a party.” Murphy v. McIntyre, 69 N.C. App.
323, 328–29, 317 S.E.2d 397, 401 (1984).
27. The Court concludes that Plaintiff has not adequately pleaded that
Salon Lofts had knowledge of the former employees’ Employment Agreements. The
North Carolina Supreme Court recently held that when alleging a claim for tortious
interference with contract, it is not enough to broadly allege that the defendants had
“knowledge of the contracts”; rather, a complaint must contain “facts sufficient to
make a good claim” that the defendants knew of the contracts at issue. Krawiec v.
Manly, 370 N.C. 602, 606–07, 811 S.E.2d 542, 546–47 (2018). Salon Blu does not
allege any facts supporting the conclusion that Salon Lofts had knowledge of the
Employment Agreements; in fact, Salon Blu merely alleges that Salon Lofts “knew or
should have known” about the Employment Agreements, an allegation that is far too
vague to satisfy the pleading requirements under Krawiec. Salon Blu’s claim for
tortious interference with contract fails on this basis alone; however, the Court will further address Salon Lofts’ argument that its actions were justified as having a
legitimate business purpose.
28. Salon Lofts also argues that it is protected by the business justification
exception because it was merely competing with Salon Blu and because there are no
allegations that Salon Lofts was acting with malice. (ECF No. 43, at pp. 9–11.) Salon
Blu counters that the business justification exception cannot apply in this case
because Salon Lofts does not compete with Salon Blu for employee contracts, since
Salon Lofts does not hire the beauty professionals who work in Salon Lofts’ facilities.
(ECF No. 47, at p. 7.)
29. Despite Salon Blu’s argument, Salon Blu concedes in its Amended
Complaint that “Salon Lofts competes with traditional salons,” such as Salon Blu,
suggesting that Salon Blu considers Salon Lofts a competitor. (ECF No. 30, at ¶ 16.)
Furthermore, as Salon Lofts argues, Salon Blu does not sufficiently allege that Salon
Lofts acted with “no motive for interference other than malice.” Filmar Racing, Inc.
v. Stewart, 141 N.C. App. 668, 674, 541 S.E.2d 733, 738 (2001); see also Pinewood
Homes, Inc. v. Harris, 184 N.C. App. 597, 605, 646 S.E.2d 826, 833 (2007) (“[G]eneral
allegations of malice are insufficient as a matter of pleading.”). Salon Lofts’ alleged
actions, such as recruiting employees of Salon Blu, could have been for legitimate
business competition purposes and do not necessarily indicate a motive for
interference other than malice. Accordingly, Salon Blu has failed to adequately plead
that Salon Lofts acted with malice. 30. Because Salon Blu has not sufficiently pled that Salon Lofts had
knowledge of the Employment Agreements or that Salon Lofts acted with malice,
Salon Blu’s claim for tortious interference fails. Salon Lofts’ Motion to Dismiss Salon
Blu’s claim for tortious interference with contract should be GRANTED.
B. Count II: Misappropriation and misuse of trade secrets
31. In its second claim, Salon Blu alleges that Salon Lofts “encouraged and
induced” former employees of Salon Blu to collect Salon Blu’s confidential and
proprietary information to use while working at Salon Lofts. (ECF No. 30, at ¶ 44.)
Specifically, Salon Blu claims that the former employees violated Salon Blu’s policy
against the collection of customer contact information, hair color formulas, and other
customer information. (ECF No. 30, at ¶¶ 43–44.) Salon Lofts argues that Salon
Blu’s allegedly misappropriated information does not constitute trade secrets and
that Salon Lofts’ mere encouragement or inducement of Salon Blu’s stylists to gather
Salon Blu’s confidential information is not enough to sufficiently allege “acquisition,
disclosure, or use” by Lofts that constitutes misappropriation. (ECF No. 43, at
pp. 13–19.)
32. Under the NCTSPA, a “trade secret” is defined as
business or technical information, including but not limited to a formula, pattern, program, device, compilation of information, method, technique, or process that:
a. Derives independent actual or potential commercial value from not being generally known or readily ascertainable through independent development or reverse engineering by persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; and b. Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.
G.S. § 66-152(3). “Misappropriation” is defined as the “acquisition, disclosure, or use
of a trade secret of another without express or implied authority or consent, unless
such trade secret was arrived at by independent development, reverse engineering,
or was obtained from another person with a right to disclose the trade secret.” G.S.
§ 66-152(1). Trade secrets must be pled with sufficient particularity “so as to enable
a defendant to delineate that which he is accused of misappropriating and a court to
determine whether misappropriation has or is threatened to occur.” Analog Devices,
Inc. v. Michalski, 157 N.C. App. 462, 468, 579 S.E.2d 449, 453 (2003). In addition, a
plaintiff must “identify with sufficient specificity . . . the acts by which the
alleged misappropriations were accomplished,” and the allegations cannot be “broad
and vague.” Washburn v. Yadkin Valley Bank & Trust Co., 190 N.C. App. 315, 327,
660 S.E.2d 577, 586 (2008).
33. The Court need not reach the question of whether Salon Blu’s
confidential information is a trade secret because Salon Blu has failed to allege any
acts by which Salon Lofts misappropriated Salon Blu’s confidential information.
First, Salon Blu does not plead facts that would support an allegation that Salon Lofts
acquired, disclosed, or used Salon Blu’s confidential information. G.S. § 66-152(1).
There are no allegations that Salon Blu’s former stylists disclosed customer contact
information, hair coloration formulas, or any other confidential information to Salon
Lofts. While Salon Blu makes the conclusory allegation that Salon Lofts has “used”
Salon Blu’s confidential information, the facts alleged do not support this claim. Instead, Salon Blu has alleged that “Salon Blu’s former employees, at the direction of
Salon Lofts, recorded the proprietary formulas and other proprietary information
about Salon Blu customers and used that information to solicit Salon Blu’s customers
to their booths at Salon Lofts.” (ECF No. 30, at ¶ 8.) Salon Blu, however, has not
alleged facts that would support an allegation that Salon Lofts is vicariously liable
for the acts of Salon Blu’s former stylists. Salon Blu concedes that Salon Lofts does
not employ the former Salon Blu stylists at issue; the former stylists are instead
tenants who rent space from Lofts. (ECF No. 30, at ¶ 16); see Gordon v. Garner, 127
N.C. App. 649, 658, 493 S.E.2d 58, 63 (1997) (“Under the doctrine of respondeat
superior, for one defendant to be held vicariously liable for the actions of another, an
employer-employee relationship must exist between the two.”). There is also no
allegation that the former stylists were agents of Salon Lofts. Therefore, any attempt
by Salon Blu to attribute the conduct of its former stylists to Salon Lofts must fail.1
34. In addition, Salon Blu’s allegations that Salon Lofts encouraged and
induced Salon Blu’s stylists to collect its confidential information for use after they
left Salon Blu is not sufficient to allege misappropriation. See Control Module, Inc.
v. Data Mgmt., Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90146, at *11 (D. Conn. Dec. 10, 2007)
(dismissing trade secret claim because the Connecticut statute requires actual
acquisition, disclosure or use and plaintiff merely alleged that defendant “induced,
encouraged, aided or abetted” the use of trade secret information by others); Cent.
1 Indeed, there would not appear to be any use that Salon Lofts could make of contact information or color formulations for Salon Blu’s customers, since Salon Lofts’ “customers” are its tenant-stylists and not the end users of salon services. Trust & Inv. Co. v. Signalpoint Asset Mgmt., LLC, 422 S.W.3d 312, 323 n.11 (Mo.
2014) (affirming dismissal of trade secret claim because the Missouri statute
“expressly requires acquisition, disclosure, or use of a trade secret to show
misappropriation [and] [i]t contains no indication that ‘aiding and abetting’ someone
else’s misappropriation is enough to trigger liability”).
35. Salon Blu has failed to allege that Salon Lofts misappropriated Salon
Blu’s trade secrets. Therefore, Salon Lofts’ Motion to Dismiss Salon Blu’s claim for
misappropriation of trade secrets should be GRANTED.
C. Count III: Unfair methods of competition under G.S. § 75-1.1
36. In its third claim, Salon Blu alleges that the misappropriation of trade
secrets and tortious interference are unfair trade practices under G.S. § 75-1.1. Salon
Lofts contends that this claim must fail because Salon Blu has not adequately alleged
the underlying claims for misappropriation of trade secrets or tortious interference,
and so there is no basis for Salon Blu’s claim for unfair and deceptive trade practices.
37. A violation of unfair and deceptive trade practices under G.S. § 75-1.1
occurs when “(1) defendant committed an unfair or deceptive act or practice, (2) the
action in question was in or affecting commerce, and (3) the act proximately caused
injury to the plaintiff.” Dalton v. Camp, 353 N.C. 647, 656, 548 S.E.2d 704, 711
(2001). An act is unfair when a party “engages in conduct which amounts to an
inequitable assertion of its power or position,” and an act is unfair or deceptive if it is
“immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to customers.” S.N.R. Mgmt. Corp. v. Danube Partners 141, LLC, 189 N.C. App. 601,
607, 659 S.E.2d 442, 448 (2008).
38. To survive a motion to dismiss, unfair and deceptive trade practices
claims must allege that the defendant committed an unfair or deceptive act or
practice. As discussed above, Salon Blu has not alleged any wrongful acts besides
tortious interference with contract and misappropriation of trade secrets, both of
which claims the Court has already determined should be dismissed. Since Salon Blu
has not alleged any unfair or deceptive acts on the part of Salon Lofts, Salon Blu’s
claim must fail. See Combs & Assocs. v. Kennedy, 147 N.C. App. 362, 374, 555, S.E.2d
634, 642 (2001) (“[P]laintiff’s claim that defendants engaged in unfair and deceptive
trade practices rests with its claims for misappropriation of trade secrets, tortious
interference with contracts and civil conspiracy. Having determined that the trial
court properly granted summary judgment on each of these claims, we likewise
conclude that no claim for unfair and deceptive trade practices exists.”); Amerigas
Propane, L.P. v. Coffey, 2015 NCBC LEXIS 98, at *40–41 (N.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 15,
2015) (dismissing claim under UDTPA where court had already dismissed underlying
claims). Accordingly, Salon Lofts’ Motion to Dismiss Salon Blu’s claim for unfair
methods of competition under G.S. § 75-1.1 should be GRANTED.
THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that:
39. Defendant Salon Lofts Group, LLC’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint is GRANTED. SO ORDERED, this the 16th day of July, 2018.
/s/ Gregory P. McGuire Gregory P. McGuire Special Superior Court Judge for Complex Business Cases