Sallee v. City of Oklahoma City

2011 OK CIV APP 5, 247 P.3d 750, 2010 Okla. Civ. App. LEXIS 134, 2010 WL 5625964
CourtCourt of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma
DecidedDecember 3, 2010
Docket107,513. Released for Publication by Order of the Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma, Division No. 2
StatusPublished

This text of 2011 OK CIV APP 5 (Sallee v. City of Oklahoma City) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sallee v. City of Oklahoma City, 2011 OK CIV APP 5, 247 P.3d 750, 2010 Okla. Civ. App. LEXIS 134, 2010 WL 5625964 (Okla. Ct. App. 2010).

Opinion

DEBORAH B. BARNES, Judge.

{1 Plaintiff/appellant Ronnie Sallee (Sal-lee) appeals the trial court's Final Order filed on August 18, 2009, denying his motion for a permanent restraining order and permanent injunction filed on May 4, 2009. Based on our review of the facts and applicable law, and for the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

1 2 Sallee is a firefighter for the Oklahoma City Fire Department. Sallee lives in Noble, Oklahoma, and on February 10, 2009, he was elected to the Noble School Board. By letter dated February 23, 2009, the Fire Chief of the Oklahoma City Fire Department, G. Keith Bryant, informed Sallee that he "cannot hold regular employment with the City and be an officer of the Noble School Board" because to do so violates "Article IV Section 8 of the Oklszshoma City charter." 1 Article IV, § 8, of the Oklahoma City Charter (the Charter) provides:

No person holding office or employment under the United States Government or the State of Oklahoma, notaries public excepted, or any other State, or municipality, shall hold any office or regular employment under this City of whatever kind or nature, except that a member of a Federal, County or State Advisory Board or Commission may hold office or serve on a City Board or Commission of this City.

The letter from the Fire Chief further states:

In certain cases, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has determined that a school board/ school system is a public corporation and is considered both a municipality and a political subdivision of the State of Oklahoma. Therefore, you cannot hold regular employment with the City and be an officer of the Noble School Board.
You were previously advised at the January 20, 2009 Oklahoma City Council meeting that the [CJharter would be violated if you are sworn in or assume the duties of the elected school board position while remaining a regular full time City employee.
*752 It is my understanding that. you will be sworn into the Noble School Board on March 9, 2009. In order to avoid any action consistent with City and Department policy, please advise by March 9, 2009 whether you will continue your full-time employment as a firefighter with the City of Oklahoma City's Fire Department or serve as a member of the Noble School Board.

T3 On March 3, 2009, Sallee filed a Petition naming the City of Oklahoma City as Defendant and requesting "the issuance of a temporary injunction, and temporary restraining order and ultimately a permanent injunction against the Defendant from terminating [Sallee's employment] due to [the Charter] relied upon by the Defendant," and requesting, further, that "the court enter an order finding that [the Charter] does not apply to [Sallee]. 2 On March 5, 2009, Sal-lee filed a motion requesting a temporary restraining order and temporary injunction and, following arguments by the parties heard by the trial court on the same date, the trial court granted Sallee's request. The trial court found "that [Sallee] can be sworn in as a Noble school board member and the Defendant cannot take any action against [Sallee] and [Sallee's] employment with the City of Oklahoma City until this matter has been litigated by the parties and ruled upon by this court. 3 In its Final Order, filed on August 13, 2009, following a hearing on Sal-lee's request for a permanent restraining order and permanent injunction, the trial court found "that a school board is a municipal corporation and is subject to the dual office and/or dual employment holding provisions in [the Charter]." Therefore, the trial court denied Sallee's request for a permanent restraining order and permanent injunction. From this Final Order, Sallee appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

§4 Appellate review of a trial court's award or denial of a permanent injunction is a matter of equitable concern. City of Tulsa v. Raintree Estates I, Inc., 2007 OK CIV APP 41, ¶ 7, 162 P.3d 929, 933. Our review in this particular case of the trial court's denial of Sallee's motion for a permanent injunction is limited to one dispositive issue: whether the Charter forbids Sallee from holding a position on the Noble School Board while simultaneously holding regular employment as an Oklahoma City firefighter. This issue is one of statutory construction. Statutory construction is an issue of law subject to de novo review in the appellate court. In the Matter of the Adoption of Baby Boy A, 2010 OK 39, ¶ 20, 236 P.3d 116, 122.

ANALYSIS

15 The Oklahoma Constitution states, in pertinent part, that a city with "more than two thousand inhabitants may frame a charter for its own government, consistent with and subject to the Constitution and laws of this State...." Okla. Const. Art. 18, § 3(a). "[Sluch charter provisions, when not inconsistent with the Constitution, supersede the statutes pertaining to municipal affairs, and thereby become[] the superior law in matters pertaining to municipal affairs." Lee v. Norick, 1968 OK 173, ¶ 15, 447 P.2d 1015, 1017-1018 (citation omitted). "Whenever a charter is in conflict with any law relating to municipalities in force at the time of the adoption and approval of the charter, the provisions of the charter shall prevail and shall operate as a repeal or suspension of the state law or laws to the extent of any conflict." 11 0.S.2001 § 183-109 4

%6 In construing a provision of a city charter, statutory rules of construction are used. Baughman v. Weicker, 1929 OK 136, ¶ 47, 276 P. 208, 214. However, "[wlhere the language of a statute or ordinance is plain and unambiguous and its meaning clear and *753 no occasion exists for the application of rules of construction, the statute will be accorded the meaning as expressed by the language therein employed." City of Bethany v. Hill, 1973 OK 49, ¶ 8, 509 P.2d 1364, 1365 (emphasis added). The Oklahoma Supreme Court has recently stated:

The fundamental rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to legislative intent. That intent is first divined from the language of a statute. If a statute is plain and unambiguous, it will not be subjected to judicial construction but will receive the interpretation and effect its language dictates. Only where the intent cannot be ascertained from a statute's text, as when ambiguity or conflict with other statutes is shown to exist, may rules of statutory construction be invoked. When possible, different provisions must be construed together to effect a harmonious whole and give intelligent effect to each. An absurd result cannot be presumed to have been intended by the drafters.

Rogers v. Quiktrip Corp., 2010 OK 3, ¶ 11, 230 P.3d 853, 859 (footnotes omitted).

17 Therefore, in our determination of whether the Charter forbids Sallee from holding a position on the Noble School Board while employed as an Oklahoma City firefighter, we look first to the language chosen by the framers. The Charter provides:

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Related

Quinn v. City of Tulsa
1989 OK 112 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 1989)
City of Bethany v. Hill
1973 OK 49 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 1973)
State Ex Rel. Trimble v. City of Moore
1991 OK 98 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 1991)
Lee v. Norick
1968 OK 173 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 1968)
In Re the Adoption of Baby Boy A
2010 OK 39 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 2010)
Wylie v. Chesser
2007 OK 81 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 2007)
Rogers v. QuikTrip Corp.
2010 OK 3 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 2010)
Baughman v. Weicker
1929 OK 136 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 1929)
City of Tulsa v. Raintree Estates I, Inc.
2007 OK CIV APP 41 (Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma, 2007)

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Bluebook (online)
2011 OK CIV APP 5, 247 P.3d 750, 2010 Okla. Civ. App. LEXIS 134, 2010 WL 5625964, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sallee-v-city-of-oklahoma-city-oklacivapp-2010.