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Saleem v. Forrester

424 S.E.2d 623, 262 Ga. 693, 93 Fulton County D. Rep. 161, 1993 Ga. LEXIS 53
CourtSupreme Court of Georgia
DecidedJanuary 8, 1993
DocketS92A1318
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 424 S.E.2d 623 (Saleem v. Forrester) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Saleem v. Forrester, 424 S.E.2d 623, 262 Ga. 693, 93 Fulton County D. Rep. 161, 1993 Ga. LEXIS 53 (Ga. 1993).

Opinion

Sears-Collins, Justice.

The appellant was convicted of numerous offenses in Dooly County Superior Court in 1983. The convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal the next year. Saleem v. State, 169 Ga. App. 952 (315 SE2d 487) (1984).

In the present case, the appellant asks us to review the Dooly County Superior Court’s denial of the appellant’s petition for writ of mandamus. In that petition, the appellant challenged the legality of the life sentences imposed following his convictions for armed robbery and kidnapping with bodily injury.

A petition for writ of mandamus is not the proper vehicle for obtaining post-appeal review of sentences imposed by a state court. “Mandamus is a remedy designed to compel the doing of ministerial acts[,]” Speedway Grading Corp. v. Barrow, 258 Ga. 693, 695 (373 SE2d 205) (1988), and will not lie when the act complained of involves the exercise of judicial discretion, such as sentencing (Anderson v. McMurray, 217 Ga. 145 (121 SE2d 22) (1961); see also Guhl v. Crow, 237 Ga. 699 (229 SE2d 475) (1976)). In addition, “[m]andamus is not an appropriate remedy to compel the undoing of acts already *694 done. . . .” Speedway Grading, 258 Ga. at 695.

Decided January 8, 1993 Reconsideration denied February 5, 1993. Mustafa Nasir Saleem, pro se. Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Neal B. Childers, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

Moreover, “for persons whose liberty is being restrained by vir tue of a sentence imposed against them by a state court of record,’ OCGA § 9-14-41, the exclusive means for seeking review of that sen tence, after review by the sentence review panel and after direct ap peal, is through a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under the pro cedures set forth in OCGA § 9-14-40 et seq.; OCGA § 9-14-41 Accordingly, we find that the issues raised by the appellant are proce durally barred, and the order and judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

Clarke, C. J., Hunt, P. J., Benham Fletcher, Sears-Collins and Hunstein, JJ., concur.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
424 S.E.2d 623, 262 Ga. 693, 93 Fulton County D. Rep. 161, 1993 Ga. LEXIS 53, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/saleem-v-forrester-ga-1993.